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NATIONAL SECURITY

Journal of National Defence University-Kenya



CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CSSS)



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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY–KENYA

Vision

A centre of excellence in training, education and research in national security and strategy

Mission

To advance human intellectual capacity in the management of national security through the pursuit of education, research, innovation, development and community outreach to produce graduates of honour and integrity, capable of securing the country and enhancing national performance.

Philosophy

To contribute to training and education, research, strategic leadership development and practice in national security and strategy for the transformation of Kenya

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Foreword

National Defence University-Kenya is a specialized university mandated to offer education, training and conduct research in security, defence, policy and strategy domains. In pursuit of its mandate, the University is gradually developing a critical mass of security professionals, strategists and policy makers who are well anchored with skills and knowledge to contribute towards attainment of national interest in uncertain, dynamic and competitive global environment. Additionally, the University provides various research and innovation platforms to deliver practical solutions to contemporary and emerging security challenges as well as contribute to national development.

The National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya is one of the platforms the University uses to share knowledge and disseminate findings derived from research conducted by University staff and students as well as security professionals, scholars and industry actors among others. In this way, the Journal promotes scholarly debate in the fields of security, defence, policy and strategy.

It is my honour to introduce Volume I Issues 2 (2023) of the Journal whose theme is ***“Security Institutions in National Development.”*** The theme identifies the nexus between security and development and the expanded scope of security. Consequently, this edition covers a wide range of issues including the role of fusion centres in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering; the role of the church in promoting coexistence among warring communities; regional security complexes in the Great Lakes Region (GLR); the influence of devolution on de-securitization of Northeastern Kenya; and global terror and its impact on revenue mobilization in west Africa among others.

I commend the entire NDU-K community and in particular Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS) as well as our partners and authors for the collaboration, commitment and dedication which contributed to the development and subsequent release of this edition in time. I look forward to continued support by all stakeholders in the development of Volume 2 Issue 1(2024) whose work has commenced.

Major General S M Farah CBS
Vice-Chancellor

Word from The Chairperson Editorial Board

I am delighted to introduce this second thematic volume '*Volume 1 Issue 2 (2023)*' of *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya*. This second biannual issue-themed *Security Institutions in National Development* integrates traditional and evolving security approaches that impact the security of the state as well as the individual and its impact on national development.

Volume 1 Issue 2 explores diverse aspects of security that include: the role of fusion centers in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering in Kenya. The key objective of the study is to enhance and preserve Kenya's health security. The journal also examines the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and concludes that the GLR of Africa is a set of governments whose principal national security issues are so intricately entwined with one another that they cannot be isolated or addressed independently of one another.

The Journal highlights the impact of devolution in Kenya and recommends for the conduct of research on the nexus between interventions made using the devolved resources and the desecuritization of the people of North Eastern Region of Kenya. The North Rift Kenya has been an epicenter for inter-community conflicts over the years; the journal looks at the strategies adopted by the Catholic Church in enhancing peace among the warring communities in the region. The journal amongst other articles also looks at how Terrorism has influenced tax collection systems and the taxable sectors in Nigeria.

I extend special gratitude to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, Defence Headquarters and the University Council for the guidance, financial, technical and material support leading to the production of this Volume 1 Issue 2 (2023). I commend the editorial board for their commitment and dedication right from the call of articles, the internal/external reviews that resulted in timely publication of Volume 1 Issue 2 (2023). I finally extend my appreciation to the authors for working tirelessly to produce quality articles that met *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya* Standards

Brigadier O K Muleyi

Director, Centre for Security and Strategic Studies

Word From the Editor-in-Chief

National Security is a Journal of National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) dedicated to promoting scholarly debate by publishing insightful and thought-provoking peer reviewed articles in the fields of defence, security, policy and strategy. The theme for this particular edition, Volume 1, Issue 2 (2023) has witnessed enormous contributions from various authors. The journal provides a forum for the dissemination of cutting-edge research in all fields of national security and development, and strives to document the most recent advances in these important fields.

This issue explores a wide range of subjects ranging from the nexus between devolution and desecuritization, global terror and revenue mobilization in West Africa, contribution of the Catholic Church in promoting peaceful coexistence, small arms as a barrier to sustainable peace and development in Somalia, training of health professionals in a security environment, multi-institutional security framework in national security, role of fusion centers in integrating public health Regional Security Complexes in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and the Big Dilemma for the EAC Regional Force to the DRC Conflict and mentorship programmes as they relate to military performance.

On behalf of the editorial board, I take this opportunity to thank our devoted readers, innovative and talented authors and expert reviewers for being a part of this highly sought-after journal. I extend my gratitude to the Vice-Chancellor, National Defence University – Kenya, Major General M.S. Farah and the Director, Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS), Brigadier O.K. Muleyi and the entire University leadership.

It is truly an honor to be the Editor-in-Chief of the National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya, and with my team, we look forward to serving you and making this Journal your journal of choice. We welcome your contributions for Volume 2 Issue 1 which is scheduled for publication in February 2024 and whose theme will be on *Securing the Cyber Space for National Security and Development*.

Peterlinus Ouma Odote, PhD
Editor in Chief

**The Proverbial Silver Bullet? A Critical Analysis of the Influence of Devolution on the Desecuritization
of North Eastern Kenya**

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Abstract

Since the rollout of the devolved system of governance in Kenya, the three counties of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera which comprise the North Eastern region received over Ksh. 219 billion from the nationally collected shareable revenue between 2013 and 2021 to address her development needs. This allocation is beside the locally raised revenue and conditional grants received from the national government. Despite this flow of resources, there is minimal research conducted on the nexus between the interventions made using the devolved resources and the desecuritization of the people and geographical spaces in the region, a gap that this study sought to fill. The study was premised on the theory of change and a descriptive survey research design. The target population comprised residents, county government officials, elected members of the county assembly and opinion leaders (religious, clan and business leaders) drawn from the three counties, from which a sample of 216 was obtained. Data was collected using document analysis, a questionnaire and interviews. The findings revealed that devolution had contributed to desecuritization by changing the marginalization narrative through availing public goods and services which had triggered local investment, empowerment and timely handling of local grievances and concerns. Devolution was also found to have spurred local participation in the governance and development of the North Eastern region. The findings highlight a reversal of a pre-devolution phenomenon in which the local community could not identify with government actors due to marginalization and securitization. With a p-value of .000, the study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant impact of devolution on the desecuritization of North Eastern Kenya's people and geographical spaces. The study recommends timely disbursement of financial resources by the national government, stiff punishment of corruption and increased visibility of the national government to effectively address security concerns of the local community and the geographical spaces they occupy.

Key words: *devolution, desecuritization, marginalization, governance, development deficits*

Introduction

In classical international relations, realists present the state as the principal actor in global affairs. Realist thinkers such as Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1954) maintain that the power of the state is invoked and exercised by actors created by the state itself. Marshal (2012) describes the state as a political entity characterized by a clearly demarcated territory, the presence of a government, a permanent population, and the acceptance of such an entity by the community of states with whom it can engage as equals on the global stage. It is these four pillars that give life and legitimacy to the state and the absence of any disqualifies an entity as a state or downgrades an existing one to characterizations such as weak or failed state (Rotberg, 2002b; Rotberg, 2002a). Moreover, the territory of a state remains an enduring interest for the government of the day which readily deploys all or any of its instruments of national power to protect it.

The state functions primarily through a government which is the entity that exercises its constituent power. In exercising the power vested in it, the government is expected to provide a range of public goods and services to the citizens of the state. Among the services provided by the government is security, whose absence or compromise presents an existential threat to the state (Mersheimer, 2001). Realist thinkers further concur with the Hobbesian dictum that the anarchical nature of the international system is the basis for governments to build their own capable machinery that can secure the state. The absence of a leviathan to control the actions of states as each pursues its own interests in that anarchical maze and the ensuing insecurities is the *raison d'être* for the establishment of defense and police forces. The standard practice in (most) democracies vests the responsibility of protecting state borders from external aggression in the defense forces while the police and other comparable disciplined forces oversee safety and security concerns within the borders.

The dispersion of populations throughout the territory of a state implies the need to put in place the right institutions and resources to secure people and their properties, hence survival of the state. While vigilance is to be ensured by these institutions in every part of the country as per each agency's mandate, extra attention is given to populations and geographical spaces along the borderlands. This is particularly so because of the suspicion with which states view each other and the potential threats that may filter through the borders. The perceptions of threats are further

aggravated by the fact that most international borders especially in Africa, were arbitrarily set by the Europeans with little regard to the social ties among communities – and African history is replete with examples of social groups who had lived together as one community but were put asunder as the borders arrived at during the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 took effect (Herbst, 1989).

The separation of such communities meant different allegiances in terms of citizenship. This did not however stop cross-border interactions such as trade and marriage among them. Due to their peripheral location from the capital, these border communities, and the areas they occupy have not received an equitable share of resources and services from their national governments, leading to systemic marginalization and the presence of many ungoverned spaces (Mehretu, Piggozi & Sommers, 2000). In that circumstance, there tends to be a strong connection between these border communities informed by the shared kinship bonds. This situation informs overt or covert irredentist attempts by neighbouring states, due to the support they get from the marginalized communities. The consequence of covert irredentist attempts by a neighbouring state, empowered by cessation attempts by border communities, is inevitably met by strong state power and the securitization of such areas and the peoples therein. This is the context in which the North Eastern region of Kenya found itself in the post-independence period.

The paper takes the view that marginalization and securitization of border communities and their areas of residence were the key anchors of the bad relations between such communities and the state authorities in pre-devolution Kenya. Consequently, the paper seeks to make a case for devolution as an avenue for desecuritization. The null hypothesis to be tested in the paper is as stated below:

H₀: Devolution has no statistically significant influence on desecuritization of North Eastern Kenya

Literature Review

The Marginalization and Securitization Context in North Eastern Kenya

During the colonial epoch, the British isolated the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (then East Africa Protectorate) and administered it separately from the rest of the protectorate's territory. Through the Closed District Ordinance (1926), the inhabitants of the NFD were cut off from the

rest of the Kenyan communities, denying them an opportunity to forge a common Kenyan identity. The British feared the Somali interaction with other Kenyan communities could awaken their political consciousness and spur a militant approach to demanding freedom. The 1934 Special District Administration Ordinance sought to limit interaction between groups in the NFD, the objective being to water down the galvanizing power of the Islamic religion that was dominant in the district. Because of the segregation, the NFD was set on the path of marginalization by the British. The ordinances were implemented through strong-arm tactics and the deliberate lack of infrastructural development. The lack of investment in critical infrastructure was consistent with Britain's policy within her colonial enterprise not to expend resources in foreign lands that had no economic value (Wanyande, 2016). Thus, with the North Eastern border lands having neither high-value natural resources nor a favourable weather to support large-scale crop growing, the NFD suffered systematic marginalization.

In the run up to Kenya's independence, various political parties were formed in 1960, among them Kenya African Union (KANU), Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPP). While KANU and KADU advocated for nationalist ideals in Kenya, NPPP advocated a secessionist agenda, favouring the uniting of the region to the Federal Republic of Somalia rather than being part of independent Kenya (Mutisya, 2017). This was partly fuelled by the strong kinship and religious ties with the communities in Somalia, the pronouncement by the government of Somalia of her intention to unite all regions occupied by Somali speakers (see Figure 1) under one government and the marginalization of the region by the British colonial administration in charge of Kenya.

Shortly after Kenya's independence in 1963, the military wing of NPPP with the support of the Somalia government launched attacks on Kenya government installations, including a security camp of the Kings African Rifles (Whittaker, 2014). This triggered a declaration of a state of emergency in the NFD by the government of Kenya, marked by the imposition of a dawn-to-dusk curfew and the deployment of enhanced security in the area. By these actions, a violent confrontation between the Kenyan forces backed by the British Army and the Somali insurgent group backed by the government of Somalia was underway. The confrontation, variously referred to as the *Shifita* war of *Daf Daba* took place between 1963 and 1967 and ended after a ceasefire agreement between Somalia and Kenya brokered by the Organization of African Union (OAU)

was signed in Arusha on 14th September 1967 (Weitzberg, 2016). The two states agreed to restore diplomatic relations. In the absence of support from Mogadishu and the villagization tact used by the Kenyan forces, the *shifita* war dissipated. It is instructive to note that the agreement was between Kenya and Somalia and did not necessarily involve the dissidents themselves, who were Kenyan. This lends credence to the claims that the dissidents were receiving support from Somalia government in waging the war.




Figure 1: Geographical Spread of the Somali speakers during the colonial era

At the end of the *Shifita* War, the government of Kenya became increasingly sensitive to developments in the NFD. This paper avers that the support for Somalia's irredentist attempts by the local communities contributed to the subsequent securitization of the area and the people themselves. This worsened the already pre-existing marginalization overseen by the colonial government. Government policy tended to mirror that of the British colonial government. One of the often-cited policy documents is Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 whose thrust was Africanization of the country's economy through approaches such as indigenous industrialization. While the sessional paper provided for special consideration for less developed provinces in terms of development expenditure, it equally rooted for the investment of state resources in areas from

which the government would get a return on investment. The consequence of this practice by the independence government was a worsening of the already existing marginalization and inequalities between the peripheral or border areas compared to those located in the climatic zones that could support tea, coffee or maize growing (Okello, 2015).

The rather contradictory position espoused by Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 that national resources would be channelled to productive areas is particularly intriguing. It is important to note that at the time, the national economy as conditioned by the British during the colonial era was agrarian in its orientation. Instructively, though pastoralism is within the broader theme of agriculture and indeed the main economic activity for most of the border communities in the larger North Eastern Kenya region at the time, it was considered economically unviable. Could this therefore mean that the independence government may have deliberately perpetuated marginalization of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya as begun by the colonial government? This paper contention that this policy approach contributed to the resentment of the independence government by the inhabitants of North Eastern Kenya and the unwillingness of some of the members of the communities in these areas to cooperate with the government. This policy was continued by the Moi government which worsened the state-community relations by overseeing security operations, key among them the *Bulla Karatasi* and *Wagalla* massacres in which over 1000 lives were lost besides leaving a trail of destruction as documented by the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC, 2014). The *Bulla Karatasi* massacre has been characterized as ‘collective punishment’ undertaken by the military in 1980 in response to the killing of a district officer and seven senior government officials by the *shifita*. The *Wagalla* massacre of 1984 was a military operation to recurrent violent interclan conflicts that undermined peace in the North Eastern region. The massacres alienated the local community from the government.

Despite three changes in the political leadership of the country between 1963 and 2012, most of the developmental grievances voiced by border communities of North Eastern Kenya relating to marginalization were not adequately addressed. With minimal support for socio-economic development from the government based on the unviability of pastoralism, these communities were forced to forge their own socio-economic path by establishing ties with the communities in the neighbouring countries with whom they shared many social characteristics (Little, 2005). The evolving socio-economic ties between Kenyan border communities and those from the

neighbouring countries would evolve over the years to give rise to successive generations of a mixed population and a thriving trade in the North Eastern border lands (Imboywa, Mutungi & Muthomi, 2022). These dynamics along with the presence of many ungoverned spaces persisted and contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, most of which have been used over the years in exacerbating the recurrent inter and intra clan violent encounters as well as transnational terrorism. These acts of violence constitute an existential threat to the people and the territory of the Republic of Kenya. This contributed to the securitization of the people and the spaces they occupied. The securitization became even more pronounced in the wake of the fall of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in the early 1990s and the influx of refugees, some of whom turned out to have been active combatants in the war in Somalia (Hirbo, 2018). It was further compounded by the rise of terrorism on to global security agenda and the emergence of the Somalia-based Al Shabab terror group. In a nutshell, the North Eastern region was not only marginalized but also securitized under the first three administrations of independent Kenya.

The Devolution Turn: Its Legal Grounding

The promulgation of the constitution of Kenya (CoK) 2010 radically changed the governance model and especially the sharing of national resources. It provides for a devolved system of governance anchored on 47 subnational units called counties, each run by an elected government that exists to serve the development needs of her residents. The counties however work closely with the national government in the provision of certain services, key among them education and security. The CoK has certain provisions that are germane to this study with respect to the desecuritization of border communities and spaces that had been securitized since independence. These provisions include those touching on national values and principles of governance as espoused in Article 10, the Bill of Rights and the devolved system of governance.

These provisions of the constitution respond to aspects relating to marginalization. For instance, Article 10 covers national values and principles of governance as including national unity, sharing and devolution of power, participation of the people in their own governance, equity, inclusiveness, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized as well as sustainable development. These values and principles find expression in Article 174 of CoK which spells out the objectives of devolution. An analysis of the objectives of devolution presents Article 174 as a deliberate effort aimed at advancing the fundamental freedoms and rights that accrue to everyone

in the country irrespective of their ethnic extraction or regional affiliation as illustrated in articles 26 to 51 of the constitution. Some of the rights that render marginalization illegal while simultaneously making a case for devolution as a viable pathway to desecuritization of border communities and the geographical spaces they inhabit include: equality and freedom from discrimination, security of the person, and equal enjoyment of socio-economic and political rights. These three provisions i.e., national values and principles of governance, the bill of rights and the devolved system of governance serve to highlight the unity and complementary nature of the provisions in the CoK 2010 in terms of emancipating individuals and groups.

Article 174 provides for public participation in decision making, meaning that all residents within a county have every right to engage the county government in determining which development projects should be prioritized and by so doing further their own development. The article further envisages devolution as intended to ensure equity in the sharing of local and national resources so as to promote socioeconomic development by ensuring provision of services closer to the people who need them. This particular article acknowledges the existence of the marginalization grievance in some parts of Kenya, especially in the North Eastern borderlands that are mostly arid or semi-arid and the need to redress the inequalities to attain a balanced national development. The need to redress the existing inequalities is further recognized and measures to redress them are provided for in Article 202 of the CoK which establishes the framework for sharing of revenue between the national and county governments. Other measures embedded in the CoK to help address marginalization include the provision for establishment of an equalization fund vide Article 204 and the demand on the state to institute affirmative action programmes to ensure inclusion of minorities and marginalized groups in governance as well as access to education, economic and employment opportunities as provided for by Article 56.

The Place of Devolution in Securitization and Desecuritization Theory

The concept of securitization is credited to Ole Wæver (1995) but gained academic popularity after its usage by Buzan, Ole Wæver and de Wilde (1998) who likened it to a discursive act where an ordinary issue is articulated through the lenses of security. According to the trio, securitization occurs when state actors present the issue at hand as an existential threat to an audience which buys into the argument made by the securitizing agent, thus giving their approval, whether passive or active to the government to take extraordinary measures to secure the state or the referent object

in question. This in effect means that an existential threat to a state does not necessarily have to be external; it can be located within the territory of the state, threatening the entire state or some referent objects within it and whose duty of protection lies with the state.

Desecuritization on the flipside has been argued as a process rather than an act through which securitized issues increasingly lose their ‘prominence’ in security discourses and their attendant activities (Atland, 2008; Coskun, 2008). Desecuritization scholars such as Hansen (2012) and Mackenzie (2009) aver that the process of desecuritization may comprise one or a combination of sub-processes namely *détente*, replacement, rearticulation and silencing. It is instructive to note that these sub-processes are neither linear nor mutually exclusive but rather complementary and self-reinforcing. While *détente* is characterized by the slow shift of an issue from the dominant security discourse and its attendant military engagements, a process Hansen (2012) calls peace stabilization, replacement happens when a securitized issue is replaced by another. Rearticulation as a sub-process of desecuritization is concerned with the provision of political solutions to the threats and grievances that birthed the issue that became securitized. Silencing is about the cessation by the promoters of a given issue from articulating it as a security threat, which leads to its disappearance from the security discourse. From this description, it is evident that desecuritization only finds its expression in securitization. In other words, an analysis of desecuritization is only possible to the extent that the analyst is clear on what securitization is and how the securitized issues came to be recognized as such.

The advent of devolution to redress marginalization presents one of the avenues for desecuritization of border communities and geographical spaces. Hansen (2012) espouses desecuritization as the shifting of an issue from emergency mode requiring immediate substantive action to ordinary negotiating processes that are political, rather than security, in nature. In other words, the issue at hand moves from non-negotiable security politics to ordinary public policy sphere where government interventions would suffice in addressing it. In the public sphere as propounded by the Copenhagen School, people debate the desecuritized issue with a view to building consensus on how to address it as an ordinary issue that does not necessarily threaten the existence of the referent object. The implication of this eventuality therefore is that the actors within the desecuritization process are more and diverse as opposed to those driving securitization. This difference is informed by the fact that security processes tend to be a matter of high politics,

specialized, command-based and secretive. Normal politics and public policy within which desecuritization happens attract many actors with diverse views and hence broader perspectives.

Methodology

This study examines the contribution of shared revenue, locally generated resources and conditional grants given to the border counties of Garissa, Mandera and Wajir for recurrent and development purposes. These counties are used in this study for a variety of reasons, key among them being the high levels of poverty and infrastructural underdevelopment as reported by national agencies over time prior to the advent of devolution, the recurrent violent conflicts that have attracted forceful intervention from national security agencies and the huge amounts of resources that have been allocated to them since the advent of devolution (Controller of Budget, 2022; NGEC, 2017 & KNBS, 2009). The study is anchored on a convergent mixed methods survey design and uses a sample size of 216 obtained using stratified, purposive and simple random sampling procedures. The target population comprised of local residents, county government officials, Members of the County Assembly, religious, clan and business leaders drawn from eight towns within the region namely: Mandera Town, Takaba, Rhamu, Kutulo, Garissa town, Balambala, Habaswein and Wajir town. Data was collected through document analysis, a questionnaire and key informant interviews conducted through in-person and telephone sessions. The questionnaire, which had closed and open-ended questions that allowed for collection of quantitative as well as qualitative data, was administered to local community other than leaders with the help of research assistants. The assistants helped translate the questions in the Somali language where that was required, given the high levels of illiteracy in the study area (KNBS, 2019). The interviews were administered through in-person and telephone interviews to elected leaders, senior county officials and select religious, clan and businessmen. Quantitative data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics while qualitative data was analysed using content analysis. The two data sets were then triangulated and interpreted simultaneously. In the conduct of the research, ethical imperatives such as anonymity of respondents, confidentiality of the data given and the principle of non-maleficance were observed.

Presentation and Discussion of Findings

Table 1 shows resources received in each of the three counties comprising the North Eastern region from the sharable revenue raised nationally in line with the provisions of article 202 of CoK over

a period of nine financial years, spanning 2013/2014 to 2020/2021. Table 2 indicates own revenue raised within each county over the same period while Table 3 shows the amount of conditional grants that accrued to each of the three counties.

Table 1: County Share from the Revenue Raised Nationally (in Ksh billions)

County	2013/4	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	TOTAL
Garissa	4.4	5.1	6.3	6.9	7.5	8.1	7.7	7.0	7.9	60.9
Wajir	5.3	6.3	7.4	8.1	8.7	9.4	8.4	8.5	9.5	71.6
Mandera	6.5	7.8	9.2	10.0	10.3	11.2	10.3	10.2	11.3	86.8
TOTAL	16.2	19.2	22.9	25.0	26.5	28.7	26.4	25.7	28.7	219.3

Source (Controller of Budget, 2022)

Table 2: Own Revenue Raised within the County (in Ksh Millions)

County	2013/4	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	TOTAL
Garissa	35.9	130.7	105.9	82	86.7	108.2	109.9	103.5	65.6	828.7
Wajir	61.03	107.7	81.7	75.9	67.6	60.1	60.4	73.9	52.4	640.73
Mandera	90	87.7	88.2	55.8	61.8	89	124.9	143.3	132.8	873.5
TOTAL	186.9	326.1	275.8	213.7	216.1	257.3	295.2	320.7	250.8	2342.93

Source (Controller of Budget, 2022)

Table 3: Conditional Grants from National Government (in Ksh Millions)

County	2013/4	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	TOTAL
Garissa	0	0	472	490	115	484	133	446	803	2943
Wajir	0	0	158	192	144	284	25	272	413	1488
Mandera	0	0	182	275	178	315	340	431	393	2114
TOTAL	0	0	812	957	437	1083	498	1149	1609	6545

Source (Controller of Budget, 2022)

The data in Tables 1, 2 and 3 shows that cumulatively, the counties of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera received Ksh 228.3 billion from the three revenue streams over the study period. For the sharable revenue, the allocations per annum were on the increase in the first six years of devolution (up to 2018/19) across the three counties before declining in 2019/20 and then taking an upward trajectory in the subsequent years of the study period. This trend is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Sharable Revenue Received in the North Eastern Region (Controller of Budget, 2022)

Data obtained from KNBS (2019) shows that the Gross County Product (GCP) per capita increased across the three counties between 2013 and 2017 as shown in Table 4. The concept of GCP is advanced by the KNBS (2021) as a measure of newly created value resulting from economic activities by companies or individuals in a county. Put differently, it may be understood as a county's contribution to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Table 4: Gross County Product per capita, 2013-2017 (in Ksh thousands)

County	2013/4	2014/5	2015/6	2016/7	2017/8
Garissa	49357	49618	50792	51543	52099
Wajir	41652	41998	43455	43864	44712
Mandera	25867	26594	27287	27968	28602
TOTAL	116876	118210	121534	123375	125413

Source: KNBS (2019)

The consistently increasing annual GCP per capita over the 5 years arising from increased economic activities implies that there was an increase in the quality of life within the populace in the study area. To the extent that the same was not happening in the pre-devolution period, this study argues that the rise in the standard of living can reasonably be attributed to devolution through which the people were able to obtain employment or business opportunities that gave a boost to their economic security. A county government employee at Mandera town corroborated this argument thus:

I wish devolution came earlier. As a result of it, we have become empowered as a community and as individuals. In my own case, I was employed by the county government and thus I got a salary to supplement my small business in providing for my family. Prior to getting the job, life was difficult as business opportunities were limited. My friend too was lucky to get an opportunity to trade with a company contracted by the county government. So, yes there have been more economic opportunities since devolution was rolled out in 2013.

Besides the improvement in the GCP per capita, the study established that various public goods such as roads had been constructed using the resources devolved to the counties. Such infrastructure supported access to services like healthcare and education as well as establishment of private business enterprises such as public transport. These developments have contributed to creation of more employment and wealth creation for the investors. A businessman in Habaswein reported thus:

The road network in Wajir County was terrible before devolution. However, with resources coming to the county, the county government has constructed a 25km tarmac road and that is something to be proud of. Other roads have been either graded or gravelled besides being regularly maintained, thus making movement across the county easier. Security lighting has also been erected in key areas within Wajir township, supporting businesses late into the night. I'm happy with the progress because I do not have to go to Nairobi to achieve my economic goals or get some services like healthcare which is now being offered by the county government. There is however room for improvement.

These findings are the clearest indication yet as to the potency of the devolved system of government in addressing some of the marginalization grievances that had beset the larger North

Eastern region before the advent of devolution. The finding on the excitement surrounding the construction of the first tarmac road in Wajir County in 2014 is corroborated by Abdul (2018). That some of the respondents who are residents in the study area no longer find it worth travelling to major cities such as Nairobi to seek better economic opportunities highlights the central role of devolution in countering the marginalization narrative. This study argues that the fact that the residents have invested and are reaping the benefits of their investment, in some cases due to the forward and backward linkages with the county government projects, implies that they are willing to work with national government actors in shoring up security because that is in their interest. This is possible through a deliberate process of rearticulation and silencing, which are both sub-processes of desecuritization as explained in section 2.3 of this paper.

While the arguments presented above paint a picture of growth consistent with the revenues coming from the national government in the form of sharable revenue, an analysis of Table 2 on the own revenue raised locally paints a different picture. The expectation is that increased resources and thriving businesses as well as increased income should contribute to more locally raised revenues for reinvestment into the county. The trend of this stream of revenues to the counties is however characterized by inconsistencies as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Own Revenue Raised within the County (in Millions)(Controller of Budget, 2022)

Instructively, the dips in the revenue raised locally across the three counties seem to have occurred during the election years of 2017 and 2022. This trend was explained by a Member of the County Assembly of Garissa as attributable to the lack of stability in terms of continuity or change of county government regimes as follows:

During electioneering periods, enforcement of the collection of county revenues tends to slacken or suffer altogether as incumbents give waivers to businesses or property owners to gain their political support. We can also not completely rule out corruption as unscrupulous officials take advantage of the absence of political leaders as they engage in campaigns to defraud the counties at the revenue collection points. This undermines the completion of county projects that had been earmarked for completion with such revenues.

The subject of potential corruption as reported by MCA from Garissa is consistent with Shahow's (2023) assertion that the vice was rampant in the North Eastern counties, although his claims are not supported by any evidence of cases of graft and the amounts involved for further interrogation.

The study further established that apart from the sharable and locally raised revenues, the three counties of North Eastern were also receiving funding for development purposes in the form of conditional grants as presented in Figure 3. The conditional grants are envisaged to support the development of certain budgeted priority projects, hence contributing to addressing the underdevelopment concerns that were equated to marginalization in the pre-devolution era. It is important to note that such allocations cannot be diverted from the intended purposes, hence the reason why the condition must be met before allocation is disbursed.




Figure 4: Conditional Grants from the National Government

The presentations in Table 3 and Figure 4 make clear that in the first two years of devolution, the three counties of North Eastern Kenya did not receive any conditional grants because the national government had not fully developed the guidelines for the allocation of such funds. The grants included allocations from the equalization fund as provided for in Article 204 of CoK, reimbursement on level five hospitals and fuel levy fund for maintenance of county roads. The allocations however dipped in the 2017/2018 financial year, ostensibly because of the uncertainty occasioned by the election in 2017 while the 2019/2020 was attributed to the Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19).

Asked about the major development milestones their respective counties had made and which they believed were positively impacting them, the aggregated responses across the three counties on five items of interest to the study as spelt out in Article 43 of CoK were as presented in Table 5. (SA= Strongly Agree, A=Agree, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree)

Table 5: Aggregated Development Indicators in the Counties

Development line	SA	A	D	SD
1. Construction and equipping of hospitals and health facilities	45%	53%	2%	0%
2. Support for education	25%	61%	13%	1%
3. Construction of access roads	52%	48%	0%	0%
4. Support for agriculture	18%	42%	27%	13%
5. Provision of water	24%	46%	30%	0%

The study findings as tabulated in Table 5 indicate that 98% of the respondents agreed that part of the financial resources accruing to Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties went into construction and equipping of health facilities. On this development item, the study established that conditional grants went into expanding the range of services and facilities in level 5 hospitals while part of the sharable revenue went into construction of level 4 and lower tier health facilities. Each subcounty hospital across the three counties was reported as being manned by a medical doctor with a team of clinical officers and nurses. Further, each subcounty in Mandera for instance was reported as having a dedicated, well-equipped ambulance to take care of emergencies. A religious leader at Kutulo explained the turnaround in healthcare provision in the devolution era as follows:

Prior to devolution, Mandera County and the larger North Eastern region relied on the poorly administered and ill-equipped provincial hospital in Garissa. However, with the advent of devolution, we now have a level 5 hospital that can take care of the medical issues that used to be referred to Garissa or Nairobi. The hospitals have qualified personnel and the equipment needed to attend to various medical issues. So to me, the money from the national government and partners has been useful in supporting the health provision in our county.

These study findings are corroborated by the statistics published by the United Nations Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (2020) which indicated a drop in infant mortality from 42 in 2014 to 40.8 in 2019. This study argues that the decline in mortality rate can reasonably be attributed to the investments made by the respective county governments in the health sector within their jurisdiction. All other items of study as indicated in Table 5 registered a response of over 60% in the affirmative, meaning that the respondents had noted a positive change in the listed

sectors of education, roads, agriculture and water, changes which they attributed to devolution. The roads sector for instance received a response of 100% agreement, meaning that respondents had seen roads constructed by the county governments, most of which were either gravelled or graded, with a few segments in major urban areas of the region being tarmacked.

The study however notes that 40% of respondents disagreed that there was support for agriculture. This group of respondents while appreciating the county government's effort, lamented that as a pastoral community, they were not getting the support they needed with their livestock, especially with regards to timely vaccination drives, watering points for their animals as well as sourcing for competitive markets for their animals. A county official at Takaba acknowledged the challenges but noted that some of the herders were expecting more than was realistically possible from the county government. She explained thus:

It is true that there are some challenges faced by our herders such as pasture, frequency of vaccination drives and inadequate abattoirs. However, the herders need to appreciate that the county government cannot offer everything since it is also working with limited resources. It is almost impossible to provide adequate pasture for every herder during the dry season. The important thing is that the political goodwill is there, and we are doing the much we can with what we have to support them as well as the crop growers.

The water sector which also received nearly one-third (30%) of responses disagreeing that there were major developments, pointed to the short-lived nature of some of the interventions. This group of respondents argued that nearly all the water pans that the county governments had developed dried up immediately after the end of the rains. They also noted that the boreholes sunk for home use were far apart and the distribution of the water was not efficient as many families depended on donkeys to fetch drinking water from the nearby sites, some of which could be as far as five kilometres away from their homesteads. The nature of this complaint points to the need for more investment in the water sector to enhance access and use of clean water in the homesteads and by so doing help solve other problems such as waterborne diseases that have been reported as prevalent in the study area (WHO, 2017).

The devolution benefits examined above notwithstanding, the study established that various challenges could render devolution stillborn and especially its potency in desecuritizing the people and the geographical area that constitutes North Eastern Kenya. The challenges that emanated from

the study's respondents include insufficient public participation in critical processes such as budget making, project monitoring among others, lack of awareness of the roles of the citizens within the devolution set-up, corruption and the haphazard way resources were being released to the counties by the national government. These challenges are corroborated by Ndalila (2016).

Correlation Analysis

A correlation analysis of the study variables was shown in Table 6. The results indicate a significant positive relationship between devolution and desecuritization ($r=.713$, $p=.000$).

Table 6. Correlation Analysis

Variable		Performance of devolution	Desecuritization
Performance of devolution	Pearson correlation	1.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Desecuritization	Pearson correlation	.713**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

Hypothesis Testing

H₀: Devolution has no statistically significant influence on desecuritization of North Eastern Kenya

Table 7 shows the model fitness results arising from regression analysis.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.784a	0.637	0.603	0.22668

a Predictors: (Constant) healthcare, education, roads, agriculture, water

The findings in Table 7 indicate that devolution (healthcare, education, roads, agriculture and water) can explain 63.7% of desecuritization in the North Eastern region of Kenya. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) results were as shown in Table 8.

Table 8 ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	20.84	5	5.356	112.536	.000b
	Residual	12.741	211	0.046		
	Total	33.581	216			

a Dependent variable: desecuritization

b Predictors: (Constant) healthcare, education, roads, agriculture, water

The study findings presented in Table 8 indicate the p-value as .000 which is less than .005. This means that healthcare, education, roads, agriculture and water which are some of the core functions performed by county governments are significant in explaining desecuritization of border communities and the spaces such communities occupy. Consequently, the study rejects the null hypothesis. This finding is corroborated by the correlation analysis result in Table 6 which indicates a significant positive relationship between devolution and desecuritization of border communities and the spaces those communities occupy.

Conclusion

This study contends that desecuritization as a process requires a range of intervention measures such as a devolved and well-resourced system of governance. This assertion is informed by the very nature of a devolved system of governance and especially Kenya's which not only decentralizes resources to the counties but also empowers the citizens to play an active role in their governance by electing leaders to office, prioritizing development projects, among others. In the case of the North Eastern region of Kenya, devolution presents an avenue for addressing marginalization through the desecuritization sub-processes of rearticulation and silencing. However, in the absence of a robust governance framework, devolution may not fully achieve the intended benefit of desecuritization of the peoples and the region of North Eastern Kenya.

Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations in light of the variables:

The national government through the National Treasury should ensure timely disbursement of resources to the county governments to enable them to avail the services needed by the local community as a way of making the people feel included in their governance and as part of the republic of Kenya.

Actors within the justice system (Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the judiciary) need to make corruption undesirable through speedy investigations and delivery of judgements to ensure resources allocated to the counties but stolen by unscrupulous people are recovered and used to address marginalization.

The political leadership within the North Eastern region needs to actively educate their constituents on their role in holding the county governments accountable for the use of the resources allocated to the counties.

The department of civil registration needs to further entrench itself within the North Eastern region and offer identification documents to the citizens to enable them pursue opportunities for their own empowerment.

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Global Terror and Revenue Mobilisation in West Africa: Impact of Boko-Haram Activities on Taxation Systems in North-eastern Nigeria

By

Julius Adavize Adinoyi, Ouma Martin Odhiambo, Mumo Nzau & Kiamba

Abstract

This study investigates the profound effects of Boko-Haram terrorism on government revenue generation in Nigeria's north-eastern region. The primary objective is to understand how terrorism influences tax collection systems and taxable sectors. Key research questions revolve around how terrorist activities have impeded the government's ability to garner revenue effectively in the region. Utilising a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates systems theory with qualitative and quantitative data to address the research objective.

Primary data were drawn from 47 stakeholder interviews spanning government, civil society, academia, and the private sector, while secondary data were extracted from the Global Terrorism Index and various governmental and non-governmental organization databases.

Findings from the interviewee's response on the Likert scale reveal a lack of transparency in the tax collection system arising from inadequacies in taxing different income brackets, and a declining tax contribution to overall government revenue. In addition, the taxable sectors face significant challenges in regular taxation, especially within the informal sectors. Regression analysis indicates a 10.8% decline in revenue mobilisation directly linked to Boko-Haram's activities.

The results emphasize the urgency for the Federal government to increase funding for terror affected states in the north-eastern region, revamp the tax system to support small-scale businesses, and ensure regular training for tax officials. This research lays a foundation for further inquiries into revenue challenges in terrorism-affected zones and the formulation of effective counter-strategies.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Boko-Haram, Nigeria, Tax, Revenue*

Introduction

Globally, terrorism continues to precipitate high frequencies of humanitarian crises, statistically evident in the rise of displaced persons, refugees, gender violence, and food insecurity. The most affected countries include Iraq, Syria, Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Somalia. Boko-Haram has created a direct human, economic and physical loss, resulting in mass migration and has forced refugees/displaced persons to engage in illegal means of survival. The government in the north-eastern region of Nigeria have been consistently funded from the national budgetary allocations due to insufficient revenue mobilisation due to regional insecurity.

Studies shows that the terror-affected region of north-eastern Nigeria has seen a rise in terrorism leading to a massive disruption of economic activities (Okoli & Lortyer, 2014; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2011; The Economist, 2014; The source, 2014; Zenn & Pearson, 2014). This lack of control seems not to stop at limiting economic activities but also affects the government's revenue mobilisation systems. This research seeks to build on existing literature and employ a new theoretical lens using a systemic view (Kooiman, 2003, p. 206; Pierre & Peters, 2005, pp. 2–48) to investigate the effects of terrorism on revenue mobilisation. Specifically the study focuses on how Boko-Haram affects tax collection systems and the taxable sectors in north-eastern Nigeria.

Literature Review

Growing religious fundamentalism and heated political spaces in Northern Nigeria have facilitated Boko-Haram's spread in West Africa. In addition, long-term insecurity in the East African region has created an opportunity for terrorism to thrive in DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda (Daley, 2006). Resource-based conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can be attributed to the presence of natural resources and solid minerals in the region. This conflict has generated an increased interest in illegal mining, drug and arms trafficking and kidnapping, resulting in a surge in insecurity and terrorism (Daley, 2006; Montague, 2002).

Among the terror groups in West Africa, Boko-Haram accounted for 42% of the terror attacks across the region. Boko-Haram and Islamic States West Africa Province (ISWAP)¹ engage in extortion by 'taxing' the locals, illegal trades, abducting people for ransom and the release of their

arrested members. Their activities significantly undermine the governance and economy of the areas in the Lake Chad region. (Denisova, 2013) As part of terror financing, ISWAP taxes fishers and locals to protect their trade and animals. At the same time, Boko-Haram prefers to collect animals, food, fuel and additional payments as taxes that sometimes destroy the locals' businesses when they disagree (Paul & Ahmed, 2018). Furthermore, security forces on the roads extort and tax road users.

Terrorism and tax collection Systems

One of the reasons for the low performance of public expenditure is that budget expenditure is lower than realised revenue. Therefore, for countries in Africa to foster effective economic governance, there is a need to adopt good public expenditure practices (International Monetary Fund, 2000) by mobilising revenues, among other factors.

Africa is faced with daunting challenges in efficient revenue mobilisation systems (Vito Tanzi & Zee, 2001). Some of them include but are not limited to tax collection from workers employed in informal sectors like the agricultural sector, which is largely composed of subsistence production. Poor statistics on tax records result from the large size of the informal sector, as is the capacity in the tax collection system.

Income disparity in most African countries has made it difficult to institute an effective taxing and accounting system. The existing political system in Africa makes it easier for rich taxpayers to use their influence to obstruct policies that will efficiently tax the rich. Rich taxpayers evade personal income and property tax. A study (Hardoon, 2017) reveals inequality in the taxing system and argues a significant gap between the rich and the poor. The logic of high revenue mobilisation demands that the rich be taxed more than the poor. In reality, this gap is yet to be fully utilised by economic policymakers.

To ensure efficient revenue mobilisation for public financial management, a policy is needed to protect tax administration legally from political interference, its leadership independent of political interference, and transparency in the tax collection and accounting process.

By and large, Nigeria has witnessed tremendous growth in revenue from oil sales and tax revenues (Ikechi et al., 2021). Even though the taxing system is legally protected, the insecurity and activities of Boko-Haram have occasioned lax adherence to those laws (Interview with Abubakar

Tafawa, Balewa University, 20.09.2021, Bauchi, Nigeria). This trend means there is a reduction in non-oil revenue-mobilisation sources. The total revenue of Governments in Nigeria consists of the Internally Generated Revenue (IGR)² of Governments and the statutory allocation from the Federal Accounts Allocation Committee (FAAC) of the Federal government. In addition, it may include grants and gifts, and local and foreign loans.

Terrorism and taxable sectors

Taxable sectors include all trade in the formal and informal economy. Terror financing is part of the informal sector. This means involves transnational smuggling of natural resources like petroleum products which have declined recently. However, trade deals in other products have continued. For example, ISIS managed to smuggle oil from Iraq through the Kurdish region into the international market. The second chief source of terror financing in Iraq and Syria is the illegal trade in antiquities. The third is illegal trade in endangered species, amounting to about 10 billion USD in revenue.(Abid & Sekrafi, 2020) Hence, the income sources of terrorists continue to increase as they also evade adequate taxing.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a high rate of informal trading of gold, diamonds, arms, drugs, and human trafficking (Ouédraogo, 2017). Most informal trading is conducted by terrorist organisations and their networks. A clandestine network is engaged in those activities, especially with terror groups and mercenaries. Terrorism is financed not only through illegal means mentioned above, but in addition through tax evasion. Scholars have linked the relationship between unlawful and legal financing of terrorism (Chatain et al., 2008, 2009; De Koker, 2006). For example, the Al-Shabab group in East Africa is known for its dealings in the ivory trade. In 2012 alone, the group earned about 400,000 USD monthly (Jones, 2015). The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has also made fortunes from elephant poaching to fund its terror activities in Central Africa. Additionally, they tax individuals, farmers, and traders and take over banking assets and public and private properties in the areas they control.

In West Africa, the operations of markets, enterprises, and commerce have all been considerably hampered by Boko-Haram's actions in the impacted areas (Denisova, 2013). Investments have been discouraged, and economic output has decreased as a result of the ongoing fear of violence

and assaults (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). Governments have seen a decrease in taxable income as a result, which has an effect on their capacity to produce tax revenue (Abid & Sekrafi, 2020).

Critical infrastructure has been destroyed (Mohammed, 2014), preventing the delivery of necessary services and also interfering with the State government's ability to generate income. In addition, government income is diverted from capital expenditure to recurrent expenditures like fighting terrorism. The population displacement as a result of Boko-Haram's actions (OCHA, 2019) have impacted the displaced populations' ability to contribute to the tax since they lose their sources of income and become dependent on humanitarian relief. Trade and cross-border operations have reduced (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2021) due to the targeted impact of Boko-Haram on markets, border crossings, and transportation hubs. This interruption lessens the possibility for tax income from import and export levies as well as other trade-related taxes, which negatively impacts local firms.

Nigeria has been significantly impacted by Boko-Haram's operations and the State government's taxation systems have been affected because terrorist activity has reduced the government's ability to generate income (Oladimeji & Oresanwo, 2014). The consequences of Boko-Haram's operations has also interfered with economic activity in Cameroon (OCHA, 2018). Since companies find it difficult to function in an environment of uncertainty and volatility, this disruption has directly impacted the Cameroonian government's taxation systems.

Niger, a neighbouring nation of Nigeria, has also experienced severe difficulties in raising money. There has been high population displacement, agricultural production interruptions, and cross-border commerce decreases (International Crisis Group, 2017). These elements have made it difficult for the Nigerian government to collect taxes and mobilise income properly. The Chad region has seen its fair share of difficulties as a result of Boko-Haram. The terrorist group's actions has impacted business operations and commerce in Chad (Terwase et al., 2022) and the government has generated less revenue as a result of this instability (Idika-Kalu, 2020).

Theoretical framework

This study adopts systems theory to explain the critical elements of tax collection and existing taxable sectors. The theory explains how the revenue mobilisation systems of States are affected by the activities of Boko-Haram. Systems theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) demonstrates the

relationship between Boko-Haram's terror activities and its unitary implications on revenue mobilisation systems. It explains how the consequences of terror groups like Boko-haram and other terror groups in Africa affect continental peace and security which consequently affects revenue mobilisation of governments. Furthermore, the theory suggests the preparedness for situational change and the flexibility of elements of taxing systems to accommodate the impact of terrorism.

Systems theory posits that issues of international security and insecurity often affect the national system of governance. This has made it imperative to elaborate further on the system of governance (Oran, 2006, p. 27). This elaboration deemed it significant to select a specific aspect of insecurity which for this case is the impact of Boko-Haram on economic governance. The theory outlines the need for preparedness for situational changes, which is in line with the objectives of this study. The organisation of the key elements of revenue mobilisation determines whether the impact of terror will be absorbed or create a change in the revenue mobilisation system (Peters et al., 2004). The irreversible change caused by the impact of terrorism has the capacity to disrupt or halt the functioning of the State's tax systems.

Methodology

This study adopted mixed method and pragmatic approaches with the study population being drawn from north-eastern Nigeria. Both qualitative and quantitative research designs were adopted. The interviewees' sample size was 47 persons drawn from a population comprising of state government legislators, financial experts from non-governmental organizations, public finance and economics scholars from tertiary institutions, Open-Governance activists from civil society organisations, officials from North-East Development Commission, Nigeria Stock Exchange in Bauchi state, State Ministries of Finance and Budget, representatives of banks and State revenue commissions.

Purposive Sampling was used to identify not only the States with terror hotspots in northeast Nigeria but also suitable interviewees. The justification for this method based on the identified terror hotspot from the literature review. In addition, the researcher is best knowledgeable on how to collect data from selected interviewees due to security concerns in north-eastern Nigeria (Given, 2008, pp. 944–948).

The primary objective of this study is to understand how terrorism, specifically the activities of Boko-Haram, influences tax collection systems and taxable sectors in northeast Nigeria. The key research questions guiding this investigation are: How have terrorist activities impacted the efficiency of tax collection systems? How have these activities hindered the government's capacity to mobilise revenue, particularly in the north-eastern region of Nigeria?

To address these questions and the major objective, a combination of primary and secondary data sources were utilized. Secondary data regarding terrorism was retrieved from the Global Terrorism Index, while data on revenue mobilisation systems were collected from the official websites of Governments in northeast Nigeria. Qualitative data underwent thematic analysis, pinpointing crucial themes for in-depth exploration regarding their implications and interrelations. Quantitative data, in contrast, were interpreted using statistical methods, primarily employing linear regression analysis for model estimation. The study was underpinned by the hypothesis that Boko-Haram's terrorist activities exert a significant detrimental effect on revenue mobilisation systems in northeast Nigeria. All procedures adhered strictly to ethical research standards. The study tested the hypothesis that terrorist activities of Boko-Haram had a significant effect on revenue mobilisation systems in northeast Nigeria.

The interview guides were structured and distributed to 47 individuals in northeast Nigeria. The data was collected, entered, cleaned, coded and analysed for statistical inferences. The descriptive analysis incorporated descriptive statistics, which included the mean of the Likert scale regarding the interviewee's view about the question asked on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 -strongly disagree and 5- strongly agree). The standard deviations were also determined and interpreted accordingly. Standard deviation was obtained to reflect the variability of responses from the mean, while the mean was used to determine the degree and rating of the responses. On the other hand, the inferential analysis incorporated regression, which aimed at establishing the direction, degree, and strength of the linear association between revenue mobilisation and terrorism.

The study period covered the years 2005 to 2019. The sensitivity of this topic influences the purposeful research methods used and limits the robust participation of some interviewees. Hence interviewees were promised complete anonymity as an individual before their acceptance to participate in the research. Some earlier proposed diagnostics tests were unattainable due to few observations or missing qualitative responses and quantitative data.

Findings and Discussions

Most of the interviewees (93.2%) indicates that terrorism affects the revenue mobilisation capacity of the State government. Even though there are laws put in place to guide tax collection, they are hardly followed due to high handedness in terror affected locations. Another interviewee affirms that a State that is ravaged by terrorism is challenged by revenue mobilisation because the economic output level drops significantly with resulting high unemployment. In addition, many markets have been closed due to insecurity, resulting in reduced revenue mobilisation.

According to a lecturer in Jalingo, Nigeria, the implication of terrorism on the state's revenue is significant. The issue of protecting and ensuring the security of tax collectors becomes a challenge, leading to the liquidation of many businesses. In times of terrorism, revenue mobilization suffers due to decreased patronage of goods and services, with some companies increasingly involved in tax avoidance. Furthermore, terrorism usually results in the massive destruction of businesses and property, which are the main source of mobilising revenue. As a result of this, major cattle markets, which are among the key IGRs are ultimately shut down due to insecurity.

Information from the representative of the Nigerian Stock Exchange representative highlights that tax officials' role is affected by terrorism because insecurity created by Boko-Haram restricts the movements and protection of people. Thus, tax follow-up processes are limited, especially for taxing sectors that are yet to be electronically automated. A Taraba State House of Assembly member states that on-job training (like seminars and symposiums) is less frequently conducted since there is a security challenge. Additionally, as stated by an interviewee, tax officers are sometimes targeted by Boko-Haram terrorists. One of the bank officials states that the terrorists view the tax officials as rivals to their source of revenue from the community since the terror group also taxes the community members. According to a member of the Bauchi State House of Assembly, during times of terrorism, educational capacity-building institutions are often closed, depriving students, trainees, including tax officials, of access to them. Additionally, tax officials face an uncomfortable environment for carrying out tax-related activities. An academic scholar from Gombe State University states that despite the effort of the State government to digitise the tax collection system, the tax officials within the State are challenged with ICT.

Terrorism and Tax Collection System

On whether the tax collection systems are legally protected, independent, transparent and able to tax high-income earners properly, the average response shows that the interviewees were neutral on all statements of tax collection systems (Mean=2.99, Std=1.1). Specifically, the response reveals that interviewees were neutral on the statements that the tax collection is legally protected (Mean =3.30, Std=1.26) and independent (Mean =3.30, Std =1.07). However, the interviewees disagree with the statements that the tax collection is transparent (Mean =2.72, Std =0.958). They also disagree that the State is able to tax high-income earners properly (Mean =2.80, Std =1.10), and is able to tax low-income properly (Mean =2.844, Std =1.14). A government official from the Stock Exchange states that the northeast region tax collection system is legally protected and independent.

Assessment of various budget documents from north-eastern government shows that Adamawa State significantly increased tax collection from NGN 3 billion in 2005-2009 to NGN 12 billion in 2015-2019. This giant stride is affirmed in an interview stating that the Adamawa State government have continually made a concerted effort to ensure that the tax collection system is effective in all sectors despite the activities of Boko-haram (Interview with Adamawa State Office of the Accountant-General, 12.10.2021, Yola, Nigeria). In 2015-2019, Gombe State (NGN 6 billion) outperformed Yobe (NGN 4 billion) and Borno State (NGN 4 billion), which were at-per (within NGN 2 billion range) with Gombe in 2005-2009. Taraba State, which was the least in 2005-2009, was able to topple Borno and Yobe in 2015-2019.

However, a different trend was observed when measuring the impact of the tax collected by the government on their respective internally generated revenue within the region. In 2015-2019, the taxing system in Borno had more impact (78%) on the Borno IGR than in other States. The same applies to Yobe when compared to the other States other than Borno. Taraba State was the least performed in 2015-2019.

The salient trend in tax contribution to State's IGR was observed. Apart from Taraba State, the rest of the north-eastern States progressively increased tax contributions to their State's IGR. Taraba, on the other hand, in 2015-2019, witnessed a 12% declined tax contribution to the State's IGR. While other States increased their tax collection in 2010-2014, Borno saw a slight decline of NGN 0.2 billion.

Influence of Terrorism on Taxable sectors

On average, interviewees disagreed that the taxable sectors are regularly taxed with adequate data management or record their sales and keep adequate inventory (Mean =2.13 and Standard =0.89). Specifically, the response indicates that interviewees disagreed that the taxable sectors carry out regular and proper taxing (Mean =2.20, Std =0.910). Similarly, they disagreed with the fact that they record their sales and keep adequate inventory, especially in agricultural sectors (Mean =2.07, Std =0.879). While probing further, the interviewees argued that the safety of tax collectors is not assured, thus making it difficult to discharge their duties. Another interviewee argued that tax payments are weak due to terrorism.

According to an official at the Adamawa State Ministry of Finance, Budget, and Economic Planning, areas heavily impacted by terrorist activities may experience reduced productivity, which has a negative impact on the tax system compared to less affected regions. In times of terrorism, there is a significant decrease in tax collection, partly because tax collectors also require protection.

Terrorism affects proper taxing due to inadequate and poor record keeping especially in small scale businesses and farmers that practise subsistence agriculture. Moreover, areas affected by terrorism cannot be assessed by the collectors. Hence the tax system cannot be operationalised. Also, the inaccessibility of areas affected by terrorism will affect tax collection. In some of the interviewees' opinions, they argued that it is difficult to determine the tax value for taxation in an area badly affected by terrorism.

A government official from the Taraba State Office of the Auditor General states that terrorism has a detrimental impact on tax enforcement as it leads to the closure of markets and reduced income, which tax collectors attribute to the effects of terrorism. In summary, terrorism results in inequality within the tax system. Between 2007 and 2015, Nigeria lost about 16% of its total GDP to terrorism. The informal sector accounts for about 43% of Nigeria's economy and 34% of the GDP in Africa.(The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020) With such a sector considered a critical employer and income source for most of the population, its contribution to the economy, as the largest, cannot be over-emphasised. While the sector has been declining globally, in Africa and a country like Nigeria, terrorism has significantly contributed to the decline of informal

economic activities in terror affected areas. For example, the an official from Borno State Internal Revenue Service states that many businesses have liquidated as a result of terrorism.

Thus, the capacity to tax this sector is undermined as taxes collected are intangible. Likewise, the formal sector is not exonerated from this significant impact. However, the informal sector suffers more than the formal sector(United Nations, 2019). For example, Borno State has not maximised production from the over 5 million hectares of farmland at its disposal.(BudgIT, 2015) This incapacity can be mainly attributed to the prevailing insecurity caused by Boko-haram. As a result of terrorism, significant cattle markets in Yobe State, which has a potential of NGN 1 billion IGR(Musa, 2021) were shut down. Thus, terrorism reduces the informal sector's huge IGR and tax potential in Yobe State. A financial expert in Bauchi affirmed that the formal sector, especially the public service workers, are mainly the employees that pay tax.

In contrast, other sectors, especially the informal sector, cannot fulfil their tax obligations. According to a financial scholar from Gombe, most of the taxes collected in the informal sector are often not remitted to the government account due to the lack of formalised process. This confirms the tax inequalities between the two sectors due to the significant impact of terrorism on the informal sector than the formal sector. Another scholar in Bauchi opined that the massive part of this untaxed informal sector consists of the agricultural sector, which is significantly affected by the activities of Boko-Haram.

The IGR of the governments in the north-eastern region is affected by the activities of Boko-haram because the taxable sectors are not adequately taxed, thus creating inequality in the taxing system. For example, a government official from Adamawa, Bauchi and Yobe, states that taxing in areas affected by the activities of Boko-haram is ineffective, and this creates inequality in taxable sectors in the State. Hence, the government need to compensate for the gap in their budget funds by collecting funds from the federal government or through borrowing of loans.

From the compiled State budget documents obtained from government websites, the average IGR of States in north-eastern Nigeria shows that between 2005 and 2009, Taraba State generated an IGR of NGN 1.45 billion, which is the least among the other State within the same period. Adamawa State generated the highest IGR in 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 at a value of NGN 3.52 billion and NGN 4.72 billion, respectively. Bauchi State had the highest IGR of NGN 7.15 billion in 2015-2019. Borno performed lowest at NGN 4.15 billion in 2015-2019. An interview (Interview

with Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project, 12.09.2021, Maiduguri, Nigeria) in Borno stated that many markets and businesses had been closed down for an extended period; thus, low revenue mobilisation is not surprising.

A government official affirmed the Bauchi State government's impressive increase in internally generated revenue (IGR) despite Boko Haram activities in the north-eastern region. The IGR has seen substantial growth, now reaching NGN 700 million per month, compared to the previous collection of NGN 400 million.




Figure 1: Percentage Share of Actual IGR in Total Revenue

Source: Compiled from Budget Documents of North-eastern State Government Websites, 2022

From Figure 1, Bauchi (5%), Gombe (8%) and Taraba (5%) State increased IGR percentage contribution to their revenue in 2008-2009 to 8%, 9% and 7% respectively in 2010-2014. These figures further increased to 10%, 11% and 11% for each State in 2015-2019. On the other hand, Adamawa (9%), Borno (5%) and Yobe (9%) States reduced IGR contribution to their respective revenue to 8%, 3% and 8% in 2010-2014. However, they made a subsequent increase to 13%, 6%, and 9% in 2015-2019, respectively. The trend shows that in the two categories of State, one set is steadily increasing while the other was interrupted in 2010-2014.

The trend shows that Borno State falls below its counterpart States in their respective contribution to their revenues. Also, the figures clearly show that the government in north-eastern Nigeria cannot increase their IGR sufficiently. Thus, the State depends on the statutory allocations and

dividends from the FAAC of the Federal government, which forms a more significant percentage of their revenues.

Combining the IGR from the State government and the statutory allocations and dividends from the FAAC of the Federal government as total revenue, most governments are not able to fund their actual budget expenditures with their total revenue. This gap means that they resort to taking loans to cover the deficit. Assessment of various budget documents shows that Taraba State outperformed other States since it could fund all its actual expenditures in 2008-2009 and 2010-2014. However, Taraba could not fund 22% of its actual expenditure in 2015-2019 without a loan. Bauchi increased its ability to fund the actual expenditure from 67% in 2010-2014 to 81% in 2015-2019. Between 2010-2014 and 2015-2019, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe decreased their actual expenditure funding capacity by 14%, 2%, and 6%, respectively. This figure means that the Federal Government's support to the State government is not enough for State's expenditure. Thus, it is evident that the government's expenditure patterns in the north-east are way above what they get as income. Furthermore, Ikechi *et al.*(2021) affirmed that this deficit financing had increased the State government's borrowing from local and foreign sources.

To identify the impact of terrorism on revenue mobilisation systems, this paper first generated the composite index for terrorism and revenue mobilisation systems (tax collection, taxable sector, and inequality in tax system) and then conducted a simple regression analysis to establish the significance level. The hypothesis that there was no significant relationship between terrorism and revenue systems was tested. The outcome of the results is depicted in Table 1.

Table 1: Regression Results between Terrorism and Revenue mobilisation systems in West Africa

Model Summary						
Model		R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1		0.325 ^a	0.106	0.086	1.138	
a. Predictors: (Constant), Terrorism						
ANOVA ^a						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.898	1	6.898	5.325	0.026 ^b
	Residual	58.297	45	1.295		
	Total	65.195	46			
a. Dependent Variable: Revenue mobilisation system						
b. Predictors: (Constant), Terrorism						
Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
	(Constant)	3.771	0.496		7.602	0.000
	Terrorism	-0.419	0.181	-0.325	-2.308	0.026
a. Dependent Variable: Revenue mobilisation system						

Source: Author's own creation, 2022

The results in Table 1 indicate a relatively moderate association between terrorism and revenue mobilisation systems ($R = 0.325$). The coefficient of determination ($R^2 = 0.108$) shows that terrorism explains a 10.8% variation in the revenue mobilisation systems of States. Additionally, the results reveal that this model is significant, as evidenced by the ANOVA statistics (F statistic=5.325, p -value=0.026). The standard beta coefficient shows that terrorism has a negative but statistically significant effect on revenue mobilisation systems (Beta =-0.325, $t = -2.308$, $p < 0.05$), thus depicting terrorism as key in the reduction of revenue mobilisation capacity of states in north-eastern Nigeria. Thus, the study rejected the null hypothesis.

Conclusion

According to systems theory, a system consists of various interdependent components, and any change in one component can affect the entire system. With respect to revenue mobilisation and taxes, and from the statistics and arguments presented earlier, the government in the north-eastern region cannot fund their budgets without loans. They depend on the Federal government's Statutory funding and the State's IGR to form the State's total revenue. The percentage funding of the State's total revenue from their IGR is below 10% in the majority of the States in northeast region. Between 2004 and 2019, Adamawa State had the highest IGR percentage (10%) contribution to their total revenue while Borno State recorded a 5%, as the least. The statistics indicate the over-dependency of States in the north-eastern region on the Federal government's Statutory financial allocation. This low percentage of IGR contribution is attributed to an insufficient taxing system caused by terrorism. Tax, the significant IGR source, is challenged by the inadequacies in its collection and the shortfall in the taxing sectors.

The study has established that Boko-haram activities have reduced the size of the taxable sector. Many businesses are liquidated due to terrorism (Interview with Borno State Internal Revenue Service, 15.09.2021, Maiduguri, Nigeria), thus, a reduced tax size is inevitable. Also, the informal sector, which contributes a significant percentage (43%) (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020) to the State's economy, is not well structured for taxing. Cattle markets across the north-eastern States with the potential to generate about NGN 1 billion have witnessed closure because of the activities of Boko-haram. Additionally, the tax officials cannot perform their tax collection duties due to inaccessibility and victimisation by the Boko-haram terrorists. Thus, the taxable

sector has not provided sufficient revenue for the government, and the taxing system cannot maximise its potential. The data analysis revealed that a unit increase in terrorism led to a 10.8% decrease in revenue mobilisation systems.

Businesses and IGR contribution to actual expenditure across the States in the region progressively declined from 2005 to 2019 due to inadequate taxing systems occasioned by Boko-haram activities. The region is likely on a huge debt projection because the State runs a deficit budgeting and financing system. Therefore, this article argues that the activities of Boko-haram significantly and negatively affect revenue mobilisation in northeast Nigeria. There is low revenue mobilisation and generation in the State because terrorism impacts the taxable sectors. Also, insecurity has made it impossible for tax officials to carry out their tax enforcement responsibility and regularise the informal taxable sector like agriculture. The Internally generated revenue of regions affected by terrorism is significantly low compared to other stable regions. Terrorism can lead to governance issues especially revenue mobilisation, since taxing activities are significantly reduced. This position affirms the hypothesis that terrorism negatively impacts revenue mobilisation in areas affected by terrorism.

Recommendation

The policy suggestions from this research call on the Federal government of Nigeria to increase the amount of statutory funds provided to the north-eastern government in order to reduce the impact of terrorism arising from poor taxing systems. The north-eastern government need to create a tax system that is well-organised and successful in raising money from both the formal and unofficial taxing sectors. In addition, they need to create a security plan that guarantees government tax officers to perform their responsibilities without being concerned about being targeted by terrorists. Lastly, they should promote the expansion and IGR contribution of small and medium-sized (SMEs) businesses impacted by terrorism by providing the SMEs with financial and institutional support.

The practical recommendations of this research to government's security and development agencies suggests that regular training and capacity development programmes for tax officers in tax collection are important to improving the officer's competence and effectiveness. The State government agencies need to work towards improving the security of the region and partner with

key economic stakeholders to create and adopt technological innovations aimed at boosting revenue mobilisation through a better tax collection system.

For academics, this research recognises the need to identify the unique obstacles to income mobilisation and generation in terrorism-affected areas by conducting more studies. Specifically, new studies should examine the efficacy of recent initiatives and policies intended to increase the region's ability to mobilise and generate money. Furthermore, studies should be conducted to determine the best methods for generating and mobilising money and compare the north-eastern area to other parts of the nation.

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The Role of the Catholic Church in Promoting Peaceful Coexistence among the Communities in the North Rift: Mile Stone, Challenges and Lessons

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Abstract

North Rift Kenya has been an epicenter for inter-community conflicts over the years. There are multi-sector government initiative operations to manage the skyrocketing banditry attacks that have paralyzed socioeconomic activities among these communities living in the region. The Catholic Church through its humanitarian and pastoral services has implemented several strategies as their contribution to addressing peace among the warring communities in this region. The main objective of this research is to analyze the role of the Catholic Church in promoting peaceful coexistence among the communities in the North Rift: successes, challenges, and lessons. The findings from this investigation synthesized the successes achieved by the Church, the challenges they faced in their programming, and deduced the lessons learned that can be used to inform policy and operations the government is currently carrying out in the region. The target population of the study was 129 employees who have participated in North Rift Peace Programmes from Nakuru, Eldoret, Kitale, Lodwar, Isiolo, Maralal, and Nyahururu. The study applied Nassiuma's (2000) probability systematic sampling formula to determine the 98 sample size. For rapid data collection, the investigator used a structured questionnaire administered online via Google Forms. Descriptive statistics and regression analysis techniques were used for quantitative data. The findings established that the strategies employed by the Catholic Church Peace Programme, the management of emerging challenges, and ploughing back lessons learned in the peace-building process have achieved several milestones in the peace-building process in the North Region where conflict has existed over several decades. The findings of the study will be useful to the policy of the North Rift Peace and also operations being undertaken by sector-wide agencies.

Keywords: *conflict resolution, communities coexistence, church program, resource conflict, community empowerment.*

Introduction

Kenya has experienced various conflicts over the years, including secession attempts in North Eastern Kenya in the 1960s and persistent pastoral conflicts in North Western Kenya. These conflicts have been characterized by hostilities between different ethnic communities, such as the Pokot and Karamojong, Pokot and Marakwet, and Pokot and Tugens (Rohwerder, 2015; Gibbons, 2014 & Wanyande, 2003). According to Rohwerder (2015), contemporary high levels of conflict in Kenya have been precipitated by a range of factors. These factors include: i) Boundaries: Conflicts often arise when there are disputes over boundaries, particularly between neighboring communities or counties ii) Competition over land, pasture, water, and other resources: The competition for these resources can be intense, especially in areas where there is scarcity, and this can lead to conflicts iii) Migration of herders in search of pasture and water: Herders may move their livestock to areas where there is better grazing or water, and this can bring them into conflict with other communities iv) Political party zoning: The practice of dividing electoral constituencies along ethnic lines for political gain has been blamed for exacerbating inter-communal tensions in some areas v) Underdevelopment, poverty, and inequalities: These factors can create conditions where conflict becomes more likely, as communities compete for limited resources vi) Proliferation of small arms: The easy availability of small arms has been identified as a key factor in the escalation and intensification of conflicts, particularly in pastoral areas.

Turkana, Pokot, and Malire are pastoralists who live in the extreme North Rift region. They have frequently engaged in conflicts and clashes over animals, pasture, and water, as well as long-running violent ethnic conflicts (McCabe, 2004). Displacements of communities in North Rift and pastoral areas were inextricably linked to the loss of livestock, the primary source of subsistence, as well as access to land, pasture, and water, as well as related resources and markets (IDMC, 2014). Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) also emphasized conflict, violence, cattle rustling, and various forms of human rights violations as major causes of loss of life, livestock, and displacement. Other processes include natural disasters such as flooding and drought, as well as state and private interventions. According to the IDMC report, each of these processes has operated independently (in combination or sequence) to erode the social and economic well-being of pastoral communities, resulting in deaths and displacements. The conflict between the communities in the North Rift, Kenya dates back several decades, and it has been

characterized by intermittent violence, including cattle raids, ambushes, and retaliatory attacks. The conflict has resulted in the loss of lives, displacement of people, and destruction of property. The competition for resources such as water and grazing land has also intensified as the population of both groups has grown, and this has further fueled tensions between them (Daddah, 2022).

Religion can be a significant source and resource for restraining war or bringing ethnic conflict to an end through its normative rationales that go beyond traditional diplomacy. Religion often provides a moral and ethical framework for individuals and communities, and its teachings can offer guidance on how to resolve conflicts peacefully. According to Chepkorir (2019) some of the common strategies used in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts; Dialogue: Involves bringing people from different groups together to have an open and honest conversation about their differences and to seek common ground; Coordination: Refers to the efforts to bring together various actors' involved in the peacebuilding process, including governments, civil society organizations, and international organizations; Reconciliation: Refers to the process of restoring relationships between individuals or groups who have been in conflict, often involving acknowledgement of past harms and efforts to make amends; Participation: Involves ensuring that all stakeholders, particularly those who are most affected by the conflict, have a voice in the peacebuilding process; Training: Involves providing education and training to individuals and groups on topics related to conflict resolution, mediation, and peacebuilding; Advocacy: Involves advocating for policies and actions that support peacebuilding efforts; Networking: Involves connecting individuals and groups involved in peacebuilding efforts to share information, resources, and strategies; Facilitation: Involves guiding a group through a process of discussion and decision-making; Negotiation: Involves the process of reaching an agreement between conflicting parties through discussion and compromise; Mediation: Involves a neutral third party facilitating discussions between conflicting parties in order to reach an agreement; Problem-Solving Workshops: Involves bringing together individuals from different groups to identify and work on specific problems related to the conflict.

According to Klopp (2007) the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Kenya and the National Council of Churches of Kenya have been facilitating peace-building and reconciliation in ethnic conflict areas such as Kuresoi North. They also encourage civic engagement, conflict resolution, and democracy. The CJPC and NCKK representatives gather all conflict and other issue

information and relay it to the national office, which responds by providing food, shelter, and clothing. The challenge for religious-based organizations is that they are not always prepared for conflicts and have likely not dedicated resources and energy to preventing ethnic conflicts.

The existing literature has not adequately addressed the strategies implemented by faith led organizations in promoting peace among the warring communities in the conflict prone areas in Kenya by looking at the milestone, challenges, and lessons learned for sector-wide future innovative interventions necessary to engender peaceful and prosperous coexistence by the communities. The study particularly analyzed the challenges faced by the strategies implemented by the Catholic Church in promoting peace among the warring communities, the effect of the strategies on the milestones achieved by the Catholic Church in promoting peace among the warring communities to deduce the lesson that can be adopted by the sector-wide approach launched by the Government of Kenya through the police and the military.

Theoretical Review

The investigation was based on Problem-Solving Theory by Freeman and Fisher (2012). The problem-solving theory, in the context of peace and conflict, aims to address the gaps left by power politics theory by offering a different approach to resolving conflicts. This theory suggests that by understanding the underlying fears and needs of the warring parties, examining the history of the conflict, and working towards mutually acceptable solutions, durable resolutions can be achieved. Problem-solving theory recognizes that conflicts often arise from a complex interplay of factors, including historical grievances, unmet needs, and breakdowns in relationships. It emphasizes the importance of going beyond power dynamics and focusing on the underlying causes and dynamics of the conflict. According to this theory, a key step in resolving conflicts is to create a conducive environment for dialogue and negotiation. By facilitating open and constructive communication, the parties involved can gain a better understanding of each other's perspectives, fears, and needs. This process allows for the exploration of mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of the conflict and meet the interests of all parties involved.

The problem-solving theory also emphasizes the importance of building trust and improving relationships between conflicting parties. The theory emphasizes the importance of improving the relationship between the conflicting parties. By building trust, fostering open communication, and promoting understanding, the theory asserts that the parties can create an atmosphere that is

conducive to resolving the conflict. Through dialogue and engagement, the parties can identify shared interests and work towards mutually acceptable solutions. This approach recognizes that sustainable resolutions to conflicts often require addressing the underlying issues and needs of all parties involved, rather than solely focusing on power dynamics or imposing one side's interests over the other (Freeman & Fisher, 2012). Problem-Solving Theory was the basis that the investigator explored to establish the role of the Catholic Church in promoting peaceful coexistence among the communities in the North Rift.

Empirical Review

Religious social doctrine refers to the body of teachings and principles that are rooted in the scriptures and official teachings of various religious traditions, including Christianity. These teachings emphasize the importance of social justice, peace, and the common good, and provide a framework for understanding and addressing social issues. International religious organizations have developed various methodologies for promoting peace and reconciliation in conflict-affected areas, which could be adapted and applied in North Rift. These methodologies often involve community engagement, dialogue, and mediation, and aim to foster a sense of shared humanity and common purpose among conflicting parties (Appleby, 2010).

The Church is actively serving victims of conflict, defending human rights, and promoting education for both children and adults in areas affected by violence. Furthermore, they are also defending the space of civil society from the oppression of violence, indicating their commitment to promoting social justice and peace. The Church offers a remarkable network of people across the world, suggesting that Christians have a global reach and a strong presence in many regions affected by conflict. This network of people may include individuals and organizations that are actively involved in humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and community development. The network is transitional, constantly moving people, goods, services, information, and ideas, allowing for much of today's peace-building. Thus, religious-based organizations ought to be proud of their contributions to global peacemaking and peace-building efforts. They should, however, constantly promote peace rather than wait for ethnic conflicts to erupt (Bartoli, 2005).

According to Appleby (2004), Catholic Relief Service (CRS) has carved out a niche in the world of Strategic Peacebuilding (SP) through its international development agencies. Some of the roles CRS has played include: facilitating peace agreements, providing safe spaces for conversation

between parties in conflict, reaching out to rebel groups, and directly working with victims of war. The CRS has also worked with different religious leaders in promoting dialogue and understanding.

Inter-religious dialogue has been important because it fosters understanding, mutual respect, and tolerance among different religious groups, which can reduce tensions and promote peace. Religious leaders often facilitate such dialogues and use their moral authority to promote peace and reconciliation. Trauma healing and psychosocial work are also crucial in areas affected by ethnic conflicts, as they have helped individuals and communities cope with the psychological and emotional effects of conflict. Religious organizations can provide counselling, support groups, and other forms of psychosocial assistance to those affected.

Advocacy and citizen diplomacy have also been used effectively as tools for peace-building and reconciliation. Religious organizations have used their influence to advocate for policies and actions that promote peace and justice, and mobilize their members to engage in the engendering peaceful coexistence. The Catholic Church, in addition, has contributed to development and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict areas. For example, the Church have provided micro-enterprise development programs to help people rebuild their livelihoods and have supported infrastructure development projects to improve access to basic services such as healthcare and education. Overall, the Catholic Church has made significant contributions to peace-building and reconciliation efforts in areas affected by ethnic conflicts. The church's involvement has complemented the work of other institutions, such as peace and justice commissions, and helped to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable peace (Appleby, 2004).

Devine (2016) identified the underlying causes of the conflict as: core resources, political economy, and infrastructure insecurity, were identified and explained by Devine (2016). The second hypothesis discovered that state-level approaches to conflict resolution are ineffective. Concerning the third hypothesis, it was demonstrated that some of the Catholic Church activities significantly contribute to conflict management and these strategies have not been adequately documented. This suggests that more research is needed to clarify the nature and dynamics of the Catholic Church's activities in contributing to conflict management.

In the past, the Catholic Church has used aspects of conflict management theory in its activities aimed at assisting people in realizing their full potential. This entails addressing basic human needs, transforming conflict at the individual, relational, institutional, and cultural levels, and leading to reconciliation based on peace, truth, justice, and mercy (Njue, 2010; Devine, 2016). Throughout the 1990s, the Catholic Church became more active in monitoring political, development, and human rights issues affecting the two communities through its own justice and peace commissions. Despite strong opposition from the local chief, a government appointee, they opened a justice and peace office in Lodwar among the Turkana in 1993 and West Pokot in 1999 (Dolan, 2007). The Catholic Church believes that the State's conflict management policies and structures are insufficient to deal with the conflict or provide an alternative way of life to those involved (Diocese of Lodwar Pastoral Plan, 2007).

According to Simion, Koech, and Ayanga (2022), the Church's peace-building models included the Mounting of Humanitarian Response Model and Policy Advocacy, which were carried out through dialogue, seminars, evangelism, sports, and cultural events. These approaches helped to some extent, to reduce tension and violence in the region to some extent. The Church's youth mentorship programs helped to instil the values of unity, honesty, peaceful coexistence, and self-reliance in the region's and society's youth.

Financial resources are often a challenge for organizations engaged in peace-building efforts, including those based in the Church. Without sufficient funding, it can be difficult to sustain peace-building programs over long term and to see lasting positive impacts in communities affected by conflict. For example, some organizations have developed social enterprise models that generate revenue through the sale of goods or services, which can then be reinvested in peace-building programs. Other organizations have developed partnerships with government agencies, international donors, or private foundations to secure long-term funding commitments (Simion, Koech, & Ayanga, 2022).

Magondu (2012) established that the Kenyan Catholic Church's leadership has the necessary skills to manage conflict, and the church's attitude toward conflict is positive. Communication and change management are important conflict resolution tools in the Kenyan Catholic Church. The implementation of measures to prevent, prepare for, and transform conflict improves the effectiveness of conflict management in the Kenyan Catholic Church. According to the study, the

Kenyan Catholic Church's conflict management can be improved through mediation processes, creating equal opportunities for all parties to be heard, advocacy for just outcome, putting emphasis on reconciliation, addressing the true root causes of conflicts, encouraging tolerance, appreciation of individual strengths and flaws, recognition of each individual contribution to the conflict, and calling sincere apology from the perpetrators of violence.

Chirchir (2019) conducted a study in the Kerio Valley Basin to investigate the effects of social conflicts on household livelihoods and the necessary intervention measures. The study discovered that the main causes of conflict were cattle theft, access to and control over pasture and water. The study also discovered that social conflicts have hurt the lives and livelihoods of communities through, among other things, loss of household income when livestock, the primary source of family income, is stolen; loss of lives; strained relationships among family members and neighbours; and loss of marketing opportunities.

Methodology

This study adopted a descriptive research design which is commonly used to describe the characteristics of a particular population or phenomenon. It involved collecting data from a sample of the population and summarizing the data using statistical methods such as frequency distributions, measures of central tendency, and measures of variability. The target population of the study was 129 employees who have participated in North Rift Peace Programmes from Nakuru, Eldoret, Kitale, Lodwar, Isiolo, Maralal, and Nyahururu. The sampling formula by Yamane (1967) was adopted to arrive at a 98 sample size that gave the required information strategies implemented by the Catholic Church in promoting peace among the warring communities in the North Rift, Kenya: milestone, challenges and learned innovations. The questionnaire was converted into Google Forms and a link was sent to the respondents who in turn filled out the forms that were automatically submitted to the database. Once the data was extracted from Google Forms, the researcher used SPSS Version 23 to generate descriptive statistics; means, medians, and standard deviations, to summarize the data. Further analyses were the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and regression analysis, to test hypotheses or explore relationships between variables. Data visualization tools, such as charts and graphs were used to present the results.

Throughout the study, the researcher observed legal and ethical requirements by obtaining all necessary authorization from the relevant authorities before conducting the study. Participants

were given consent form to sign, ensuring that they were well informed about the purpose of the study, what their involvement entailed, and any potential risks or benefits. Adhering to the principle of voluntary participation means that participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Results and Discussions

This section presents the descriptive statistics and regression analysis results of strategies implemented by the Catholic Church in promoting peace among the warring communities in the North Rift, Kenya: milestone, challenges and lessons learnt for sector-wide innovations. The first section presents results and discussions of the descriptive statistics whereas the second section presents regression analysis results.

Table 1: Peacebuilding Strategies

Statement	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
Ethnic conflict reconciliation Strategy	2	9	2	60	27
Peace-building workshops	11	7	2	44	36
Prayer movements to address inter-ethnic conflicts	9	7	3	50	31
Involve community leaders in peace convention	3	9	3	49	36
Alternative livelihood	7	6	2	51	34
Providing alternative water sources	9	2	5	47	37
Providing an enabling environment for dialogue	6	3	1	52	38
Comprehensive inter-community peacebuilding	11	18	5	39	27

Key: SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N- Neutral, A- Agree, SA-Strongly Agree

Results on inter-ethnic conflict reconciliation strategy’ revealed that the majority of respondents (87%) agreed that ethnic conflicts has led to the lack of inter-ethnic harmony among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Concerning ‘peace-building workshops’ the study revealed that the majority of respondents (80%) agreed that the peace-building workshops have been useful in imparting peace-building skills and advocacy, thereby enhancing inter-ethnic harmony among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Further findings on ‘prayer movements to address inter-ethnic conflicts’ revealed that prayer movements to address inter-ethnic conflicts have facilitated healing and hope for the future of the victims among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Results on ‘involving the community leaders’ peace convention revealed that the majority of

respondents (81%) agreed that involving community leaders’ peace convention to address inter-ethnic conflicts has facilitated healing and hope for the future for the victims among the communities in the North Rif.

Concerning ‘alternative livelihood’ the results revealed that the majority (85%) of the respondents agreed that providing alternative livelihoods like growing crops to support the conflicting communities in providing food for their households has facilitated healing and the victims with hope for the future. The majority of respondents (84%) agreed that ‘providing alternative water sources’ through sinking deep wells and distributing water for cattle and household have facilitated healing and hope for the future. Further finding on an enabling environment for dialogue revealed that the majority of respondents (90%) agreed that ‘providing an enabling environment for dialogue’ as an alternative to fighting has facilitated healing and hope for the future of the victims among the communities in the North Rift. Lastly, findings on comprehensive inter-community peacebuilding revealed that the majority of the respondents (66%) agreed that the church has developed a participatory comprehensive inter-community peacebuilding policy and facilitated healing and hope for the future of the victims in the communities.

Table 2: The challenges faced by the church in strategies implementation

Statement	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
The poor road network	7	4	6	45	38
The poor communication technologies	9	2	3	46	40
Engraved cultural practices	2	7	6	39	46
Cruelty among warring communities	2	8	8	46	36
Lack of inter-sectoral coordination	11	8	2	55	24
The harsh terrain in the area	18	17	4	41	20
The hard-liners taken by opponents	12	9	0	48	31
Lack of political goodwill	8	6	2	57	27
Sparsely populated area	14	4	2	40	40
Existing high levels of poverty	7	8	7	41	37

SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N- Neutral, A- Agree, SA-Strongly Agree

Table 2 presents the challenges faced by the church in implementing peace strategies in the region. First, concerning road networks, the results revealed that the majority of respondents (83%) agreed that ‘the poor road network’ has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift. Second, concerning communication technology the results

revealed that the majority of respondents 86% agreed that ‘poor communication technologies’ including telephone communication have hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift. Third, concerning cultural practices the results revealed that the majority of respondents (85%) agreed that ‘engraved cultural practices’ among warring communities have hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Fourth, findings on warring communities revealed that the majority of respondents 82% agreed that ‘cruelty among warring communities’ has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Fifth, further findings on inter-sectoral coordination results revealed that the majority (79%) of respondents agreed that lack of inter-sectoral co-ordination has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. The hard-liners taken by opponents have also hampered the implementation of peacebuilding strategies among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Sixth, concerning the terrain in the region, the results revealed that the majority (61%) of respondents agreed that the harsh terrain in the area has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift. Seventh, findings on politics revealed that the majority (84%) of respondents agreed that ‘lack of political goodwill’ has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift. Eighth, further findings on population distribution in the region revealed that the majority (80%) of respondents agreed that ‘sparsely populated area’ has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift, Kenya. Lastly, findings on poverty revealed that the majority (78%) of respondents agreed that the existing ‘high level of poverty’ has hampered the implementation of peace-building strategies among the communities in the North Rift.

Table 3: Milestones Achieved in Peacebuilding Process

Statement	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
Increased inter-community cohesion	5	4	4	49	38
Reduction of conflict	2	5	8	52	33
Increased community participation	3	6	6	49	36
Increased self-knowledge of conflict resolution	7	2	3	52	36
Sustainable use of commonly shared resources	6	4	11	52	27
Reduced incidences of conflicts over resources	7	4	3	53	33
Inter-ethnic tolerance	7	6	9	46	32
Enabled sharing ideas	11	3	3	49	34
Avenues for conflict resolution	4	6	3	51	36
Achieved the development of a policy framework	7	3	6	55	29

SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N- Neutral, A- Agree, SA-Strongly Agree

Concerning inter-community cohesion, the results revealed that the majority (87%) of respondents in the investigation agreed that there is ‘increased inter-community cohesion’ among the warring communities, which was achieved through the Catholic Church peace promotion and that there is an increased self-knowledge of conflict resolution among the warring communities. There are also avenues for conflict resolution among the warring communities that have been achieved through the Catholic Church peace promotion initiatives. Results on the status of conflict revealed that the majority (85%) of respondents agreed that there is ‘a reduction of conflict’ among the warring communities achieved through the Catholic Church peace promotion and that there is increased community participation in peace-building initiatives among the warring communities achieved through the Catholic Church peace promotion. Concerning the status of shared resources, the findings revealed that the majority (79%) of respondents agreed that there is a ‘sustainable use of commonly shared resources’ among the warring communities through the Catholic Church peace interventions. Further findings on the status of conflict over resources revealed that the majority of respondents 86% agreed that there are ‘reduced incidences of conflicts over resources’ among the warring communities achieved through the Catholic Church peace promotion. The peace intervention by the Catholic Church also led to a number of conflict transformation scenarios. Concerning tolerance, results revealed that the majority (78%) of respondents agreed that there is ‘inter-ethnic tolerance’ among the warring communities; on information sharing and avenues for

conflict resolution, the results revealed that the majority (83%) of respondents agreed that there is an enabled sharing of ideas among the warring communities; on ‘the development policy framework’, the results indicated the that majority (84%) of respondents agreed that there is need to improve the policy framework that fosters partnership between the church, government, and grass root communities among the warring communities.

Table 4: Lesson Learned from the Peace-Building Strategies by the Catholic Church

Table 4 presents the findings of the lesson learned from the peace-building strategies by the Catholic Church. Lessons learnt are important in sharing such lessons with future intervention in inter-ethnic conflict resolutions in Kenya.

Statement	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
That justice system that uses local strategies	6	3	1	52	38
Community-led conflict resolution strategies	7	6	7	48	32
Empowered communities lead conflict mitigation	9	10	4	44	33
That confrontational approach is a strategy	8	4	5	55	28
Warring community views on the conflicts	8	4	6	46	36
Full representation of the warring communities	2	7	7	47	37
Comprehensive stakeholders’ analysis	9	11	5	34	41

SD-Strongly, D-Disagree, N- Neutral, A- Agree, SA-Strongly Agree

The findings on local justice systems revealed that the majority (90%) of respondents were fully in support of a ‘justice system that uses local strategies.’ On community lead conflict resolution revealed that the 80% of respondents were in support of the ‘community-led conflict resolution strategies’. On community empowerment the majority (77%) of respondents were in support of ‘empowered communities-led conflict mitigation’ and peacebuilding has been one of the lessons learned from Catholic Church peacebuilding in the North Rift. Concerning the confrontational approach, the results revealed that the majority (83%) of respondents were in support of the ‘confrontational approach as a strategy’ that cannot work. On representation in peacebuilding, the findings revealed that the majority (84%) of the respondents supported ‘full representation of the warring communities’ in terms of age and gender has been one of the lessons learned from the Catholic Church peacebuilding in the North Rift, Kenya. Finally, concerning stakeholders’ analysis strategy, the majority (75%) of the respondents supported that interventions should

include comprehensive stakeholders’ analysis for purposes of involvement and ownership of the interventions agreed on in conflict resolutions and Peacebuilding in the North Rift, Kenya.

Effect of Strategies, Challenges, and Lessons Learnt on Peacebuilding Milestone

This section presents the regression analysis results of the effect of strategies, challenges, and lessons learned on peace milestones achieved by the Catholic Church Peace Programmes in the North Rift Region. First, the marginal contribution of the strategies, challenges, and lessons learned variability to the peace milestone achieved which was measured in terms of the R^2 followed by the P-value which measured the significance of model prediction. Lastly the beta results of the relationship between strategies, challenges, lessons learned, and peace milestones achieved with results presented in Table 5.

The R^2 value, which is the coefficient of determination, represents the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (milestone achieved in the peace-building process) that can be explained by the independent variable (peace-building strategies, the challenges faced by the church on strategies implementation, and lesson learned from the peace-building strategies by the Catholic Church). An R^2 value of 0.964 indicates that 96.4% of the variability in the dependent variable was explained by the independent variable, which suggests that the data was well-fitted to the regression line. Based on the information provided, it can be inferred that the regression model was able to predict the outcome variable with statistical significance. Therefore, the model can be considered to have statistically and significantly predicted the outcome variable.

Table 5: Effect of Peacebuilding Strategies, Challenges, and Lessons Learnt on Mile Stone Achieved in Peacebuilding Process

		Unstandardized		Standardized		
		Coefficients		Coefficients		
		Std.				
Model		B	Error	Beta	T	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.357	.209		1.708	.092
	Peacebuilding strategies	.791	.144	.814	5.477	.000
	Challenges	-.565	.137	.516	4.131	.000
	Lessons learned	.763	.019	.928	40.689	.000

Concerning peace-building strategies results revealed a positive and significant relationship between peacebuilding strategies employed by The Catholic Church peace programs and milestones achieved in the peace-building process, $\beta=0.791$, $p=0.000<0.05$ indicating that peace-building strategies employed by the Catholic Church peace-building programs contributed to the milestone achieved in the peace-building process by The Catholic Church peace programs in Kenya. The results indicated that the beta value was significant ($\beta=.791$, $p=0.000$). The findings indicated that an increase in peace-building strategies employed by the Catholic Church peace programs by one (1) unit will lead to an increase in the milestone achieved in the peace-building process by 0.791 multiple units.

Further results on the challenges faced by the church on strategies implementation by the Catholic Church peace-building programmes revealed a negative and significant relationship between the challenges faced by the church on strategies implementation by the Catholic Church peace-building programs and milestones achieved in the peace-building process. The value indicate $\beta=-0.565$, $p=0.000<0.05$ which meant that when the challenges faced by the church on strategies of implementation, the milestones achieved in peace-building process by The Catholic Church peace programmes in Kenya is likely to reduce. The results indicated that the beta value was significant ($\beta=-.565$, $p=0.000$). The findings indicated that an increase in the challenges faced by the church on strategies of implementation by The Catholic Church peace-building programmes by one (1) unit will lead to a decrease in the milestone achieved in the peace-building process by -0.565 multiple units.

Other findings concerning lesson learnt from the peace-building strategies by the Catholic Church revealed that a positive and significant relationship between lesson learnt from the peace-building strategies by the Catholic Church and milestone achieved in the peace-building process. The results indicated $\beta=0.763$, $p=0.000<0.05$, which meant that lessons learnt from the peacebuilding strategies by the Catholic Church contributed to the milestone achieved in the peace-building process. The results indicated that the beta value was significant ($\beta=.763$, $p=0.000$). The findings revealed that an increase in lesson learnt from the peace-building strategies by the Catholic Church by one (1) unit will lead to an increase in the milestone achieved in the peace-building process by 0.763 multiple units.

Conclusions

The main aim of this study was to investigate strategies implemented by the Catholic Church in promoting peace among the warring communities in the North Rift, analyzing the milestone, challenges and lessons learnt for sector-wide innovations. First, the study established the Catholic Church uses a myriad of strategies for peace interventions among the warring communities living in the North Rift Region. These include: inter-ethnic harmony, peace-building workshops, prayer movements addressing inter-ethnic conflicts, community leaders' peace conventions, provision of alternative livelihood and creation of enabling environment for dialogue and participatory comprehensive inter-community peacebuilding policy.

Second, the study also established that the Catholic Church Peacebuilding process has faced several challenges. The key challenges that the interventions by the Catholic Church Peacebuilding Initiative has faced include; difficulty in accessibility of communities due to poor the status of the road network; poor communication technologies, cultural practices, the warring communities, inter-sectoral coordination, politics, population distribution and poverty. Third, the study further established that the Catholic Church peace-building process has achieved various milestones including; improved inter-community cohesion, reduction in the conflict, increased community participation, improved conflict resolution techniques, better appreciation of resource sharing, reduced conflicts on resources, better tolerance among the communities evidenced by sharing of information like markets, politics, some level of community-driven conflict resolution and community-driven peacebuilding policy building framework. Fourth, the experience of the Catholic Church in peacebuilding in the North Rift region has given birth to several lessons that other agencies running peace-building programmes in the region can learn including; the use of a community-driven justice system, how to use community lead peace resolution strategies, the effectiveness of community empowerment conflict mitigation strategies, harnessing community views on conflict mitigation strategies, representation strategies and stakeholders analysis strategies to ensure all-inclusiveness and community cohesion. Finally, the study established that the strategies employed by the Catholic Church Peace programme have achieved several milestones in the peace-building process in the North Region where conflict has existed for several decades.

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Regional Security Complexes in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and the Big Dilemma for the EAC Regional Force to the DRC Conflict

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Abstract

This article analyses the key topics and concepts that have fueled scholarly and policy discussions on the Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) in the Great Lakes Region. Following the 1993 Burundian civil strife and the 1994 Rwandan genocide that marked the beginning of decades of warfare, numerous regional and international endeavors have supported peacebuilding and stabilization in the Great Lakes Region. Large-scale refugee flows have been produced by conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the years, while the conflict has deepened into the Congolese society and culminated into an intense regional conflict involving several nations (due to buffer zone effects of conflict). This article argues that the GLR of Africa conflict intricately affects the countries in the region and cannot be isolated or addressed independently without involving all the countries in the region. This paper uses desk review to examine the regional security complex in the GLR. The analysis of the R.S.C.s systematically outlines the internally triggered vulnerabilities in the Great Lakes Region, the state-to-state relations that create the region, the region's dealings with other regions, and the dealings between global and regional security structures. The paper contends that the Great Lakes Region must be recognized as a collection of states constantly distressed by one or more security external forces and, as such, ought to find a collective solution to the conflict in the DRC.

Key Words: *regional security complexes: great lakes region: conflict intervention*

Introduction

Africa has experienced multiple conflicts related to colonial and post-colonial legacies, leading to protracted conflicts in many countries. According to Clapham, “the post-colonial era in Africa is now, and only now, coming to an end.” Apartheid and the Cold War came to an end, and with the erosion came two factors that influenced foreign policy considerably in Africa. Domestically, the neo-patrimonial postcolonial state’s disintegration and the ongoing economic crisis—along with the ensuing pressure for reform—changed political forecasts (Khadiagala & Terrence, 2001).

Regional security dynamics have become more important since the international system lacks a focal conflict. Many states in the system are entangled in an immense web of symbiotic security issues. Nonetheless, as most states dread their neighbors more than distant powers, proximity is frequently linked to a sense of disquiet. Units within these complexes depend on one another for security in a far greater way than units outside of them (Tapan, 2021). The institutional structures and power dynamics across the continent have changed due to these global and national developments, which have also changed the environment in which foreign policy pronouncements are formulated. African leaders sometimes react by making shaky and flimsy attempts to restructure their political and economic structures; the pressures sometimes result in state collapse. Numerous states fall between these two extremes, and the future remains uncertain (Khadiagala & Terrence, 2001).

Africa faces many serious challenges in the twenty-first century: political instability is still pervasive and chronic; economic growth is typically weak and uneven; poverty is growing. Oliver et. al assert that “the continent has the lowest GNP per capita (\$670, compared to the global average of \$4,890).” Since 1960, there have been at least 80 violent changes in government in Africa. Notwithstanding the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), these realities pose considerably bigger hazards to human security than armed conflict in most African states. Africa is still underrepresented in the international arena for great power diplomacy. There is now a consensus that one major contributing element to this condition is war and ongoing political conflict (Furley & Roy, 2013, p. 15).

After the Cold War, different geographic blocs have taken a more prominent center stage in world politics. Despite pushing security boundaries in regional studies, Buzan and Weaver apply a “neo-realist structural framework” to analyze regional classifications. They contend that the “pressure

of local geographical proximity” in addition to the “anarchic structure and its balance-of-power repercussions” create regional security arrangements (Fawn, 2009, p. 191).

Despite being plagued by catastrophic conflicts, Africa’s Great Lakes Region (GLR) has incredible potential for peace and prosperity. This region is rich in natural and cultural resources, from biodiversity to solid minerals and human abilities. The Great Lakes Region is home to some of the most ecologically diversified freshwater systems, subtropical rainforests, savannah grasslands, and temperate highlands, which have enormous economic gains, agricultural benefits, and offer great tourist sites. It also has a diversified population in terms of culture and language, as well as historical, religious, economic, political, and legal traditions that both internal and external forces have persistently altered. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Tanzania make up the GLR. A thorough and comprehensive analysis must take into account the historical, sociopolitical, cultural, and economic geographies that cross and complicate these artificial borders (Omeje & Tricia, 2013).

The DRC has not experienced peace since gaining its independence in 1960. During the colonial era, the Belgian government built a governing structure that was more concerned with maximizing the use of national resources than meeting its people’s needs (Kisangani, 2012). In 1970s and 1980s, DRC experienced violence and conflict due to mismanagement of resources under the leadership of Mobutu (DFID, 2008). Due to the poor post-colonial governance, DRC’s economy, infrastructure, social fabric, and government capacity kept on deteriorating, and this left DRC off track against all the MDGs rendering it one of the poorest countries to date. The conflict in the DRC is one of the most complex in the continent, despite numerous interventions over the years, as it frequently links political, economic, institutional, social, and security concerns to a convoluted and interwoven web of complexities. With a set of nations whose principal matters of security are so intricately entwined with one another that they cannot be isolated or tackled autonomously, this article examines the regional security complex in the GLR. Analysis of the Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), outlining domestically bred weaknesses in the Great Lakes Region, ought to consider the dynamics of relations between different states of the region, persistent conflicts and regional and international security structures that protract the conflict.

Theoretical Framework

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

The discussions in this article apply the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan advocated for this view. A regional security complex is a collection of “governments whose major national security challenges are so interconnected that they cannot be separated or addressed separately. It is evident that over time, back from the Westphalian system, and even beyond, states have always sought to collaborate strategically to attain optimum regional security (Cruden, 2011, p. 1). According to the hypothesis, a key element in the formation of regionally based clusters is security interdependence. A framework for analyzing and contrasting regional security across different regions is provided by RSCT” (Erokhin, Tianming, Xiuhua, 2018, p. 18).

Buzan (as cited in Lake & Patrick, 2010, p. 12) coined the phrase "regional security complex" to refer to a certain type of region bound together by security issues. The assemblage of states that make up a 'region' is distinguished by a 'regional security complex.' In modern international politics, a regional security complex is a collection of nations continuously impacted by one or more security externalities originating from a particular region. Members of such a complex are so interdependent on one another for security reasons that the decisions made by one member significantly affect the others. Geographic closeness is not a requirement for a nation to be a member of a complex, even though geography may tie most of its members to one another. Current regional security complexes frequently include one or more important members who are not physically located in the region where the complex is based. These members are typically authorities with the power to impel force over enormous distances (Lake & Patrick, 2010). In such instances, the aim is mutual obligation and seeking to bring an equilibrium to the always overarching and anarchical international system. The tenets of this theory explain how to relate four levels of analysis and what to look for at each as follows:

Firstly, the domestically created vulnerabilities of the states in the region. Is a nation powerful or fragile based on the continuity of the local symmetry and the relationship between the state and the nation? The type of security concerns a state has been determined by its particular vulnerability; in some cases, even when a state or group of states is not hostile, it can nonetheless pose an underlying risk.

Secondly, interactions between states, which help to define the region;

Thirdly, "complex" is characterized by essential internal relationships; hence the region's connection with neighboring regions is expected to be moderately restricted. A complex devoid of global powers, that is one with global power may have resilient interregional connections in one course of gross asymmetries. However, if significant alterations in the arrangements of security interdependence that describe complexes are ongoing, this level can become substantial;

Fourthly, the regional impact of global powers (the interaction of global and regional security institutions Buzan & Ole, 2003, p. 51).

According to Buzan et al., a "security complex" consists of components whose main "securitization, de-securitization," or both processes are interconnected. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assess or fix these security issues separately. According to Buzan et al., securitization may benefit internal and regional power consolidation in the short term. Still, over time, it results in the global parallel of "autism and paranoia." On an intrastate level, securitization suppresses civil society, establishes an oppressive and powerful state, ultimately causes the economy to collapse, raises military spending, and intensifies the security dilemma with neighbors who do not support the same philosophical project or who are not a part of the security complex. In Africa, civil wars and internal dynamics, such as refugee flows and the expulsion of foreigners, frequently impact regional security. In a way, weak points rather than strengths lead to security interactions in Africa, as seen when collapsing states destabilize the security of their neighbors.

Methodology

This study adopted a descriptive research design and undertook a qualitative investigation encompassing descriptive and analytical characteristics. It is founded on a widespread assessment of interrelated literature on regional security complexes and the big dilemma for the interventions in the GLR. The analysis relied on secondary data sources such as books and journals. The study, therefore, uses both analytical and descriptive approaches. The data collected through desk review helped evaluate the interrelated factors in the regional security complexes where DRC finds itself. The fact that the paper delves into the description of the complex factors in RSCT purports that the methodology has to be systematic. Based on this, DRC was taken as a case study for analysis.

Study Findings

Regional Security Complexes: The Vulnerabilities in the Great Lakes Region

Regional Security Complexes' (RSC) in modern world history may be neatly divided into different eras: "the modern era, which lasted from 1500 to 1945; the Cold War and decolonization, which lasted from 1945 to 1989; and the Post-Cold War era, which began in 1990" (Buzan & Ole, 2003, p.14). This narrative's main storyline is often revealed, and the periodization is consistent with most neorealist and globalist accounts. The initial international system operating worldwide is established during the first half of this millennium, and sovereign, territorial states in the mold of those found in Europe replace other political systems. Regionalism has been noted to be the most favorable means of tackling transnational security issues in the post-Cold War era, simply describing how different projects have been developed to enhance peace and security within various regions (Crude, 2011, p. 2). States become the main players in the security game as a result of these two processes, and as the international system expands to a global level, space is made available to establish unique regional security subsystems. Most governments view their close neighbors as the principal players in the security game (Buzan & Ole, 2003, p.14).

Intra-state risks are more prominent than inter-state challenges throughout Africa and much of the developing world. States rarely pose a direct threat to other states. Yet, cross-border destabilization can result from domestic instability in a weak state. A regional perspective must be used to assess security in developing countries (Fawn, 2009). It is widely believed that regional conflicts will continue to be a major source of concern for decision-makers, providing embarrassing and challenging issues for the administration of security while posing serious dangers to peace and security arrangements. "Regional" conflict brings to mind the larger topic of regions and regionalism, which was once vigorously studied but then withered away as a result of a decline in regional integration research, a neorealist-induced obsession with the global system, and skepticism about the significance of regions in international politics (Lake & Patrick, 2010).

Buzan and Weaver's definition of the region is pertinent to our examination of the wars in the DRC. They claim that the region:

“refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other. The regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs... Each regional security complex is made up of the fears and aspirations of the separate units (which in turn partly derive from domestic features and fractures). Both the security of the separate units and the process of global power intervention can be grasped only through understanding the regional security dynamics” (Gebrewold, 2016, p. 39).

The African Great Lakes region has been thoroughly examined by scholars and experts on African conflicts, who have concentrated on diverse social-political and economic issues facing the region, conflict trends and impact on the population. Conflicts in the region are distinguished by their particularly complex nature, diversity, and casualties; the complex roles played by outside actors; the effects of conflict on political, social, economic, demographic, and development landscapes; and the frequently precarious nature and politics of conflict intervention, resolution, and peacebuilding in the region. Disputes in this region are multifaceted in terms of their vertical and institutional articulation, as well as their spatial and sectoral distribution (Omeje & Tricia, 2013). Disputes in the GLR are characterized by a complex interplay of localized revolt, competing regional interests, and the international community's diminished ability (or willingness) to prevent humanitarian tragedies. These causes are all relevant to the emergence of the regionalized conflict in the African GLR. The 1993 Burundian civil war and the 1994 Rwandan genocide marked the beginning of a decade of warfare. Both conflicts in the DRC produced large-scale refugee flows. Over a few years, the conflict deepened in Congolese society and culminated in a massive regional conflict involving seven nations (Dokken, 2008).

Ever since, conflict in one nation has tended to disperse and intensify, endangering regional security. Conflict is quite likely when knowledge about prejudices about one ethnic population travels from one state to another. For instance, conflict based on one or more forms of cultural diversity is highly likely to arise if new knowledge about ethnic groups in one state is genuine or untrue. Intentional or accidental spillover, irredentism, or border conflicts could occur from an ethnic group's alliance with transnational kin groups (Landis & Rosita, 2012), p.393). The DRC conflict involves many different identity groups and is immensely complex because it crosses

borders. Conflicts in the Great Lakes tend to have “mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a wider region, providing for more protracted and obdurate conflicts,” regardless of where the conflict arises (Landis & Rosita, 2012, p.393).

Perhaps, in the GLR, ethnic and political exclusion may be the most difficult barrier of all. This is particularly relevant to the fragile state structures of Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. It will be crucial to probe the circumstances of these leaders’ ascent to power, their ethnic identities, and how recent domestic events have affected their perceptions of foreign actors before moving to their foreign policy objectives and how they are influencing the region’s geopolitics. Former Congolese President Laurent Kabila, Yoweri Museveni, and Paul Kagame all rose to power on the wave of rural uprisings that had outside assistance, with a lot of help from one another (Khadiagala & Terrence, 2001).

The genocide in Rwanda left the Tutsi minorities in Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern Congo with a fear of possible repeat of genocide. The failure to recognize the pervasiveness of this fear is largely responsible for the mutual miscommunication that has arisen between Kigali and the international community in the wake of the massacre (Khadiagala & Terrence, 2001). The term ‘externally driven’ is frequently used in governance discussions in Africa. In terms of security, this relates to African security as a function of global governance, as a ‘victim’ of external networks preying on weak governance, and as a recipient of significant bilateral support. This is partly related to the critical influence of international aid in many parts of the continent and the financial support provided to African governments by the international community (Breslin & Stuart, 2013). The next part of this paper will offer an understanding of the relations between different actors in the GLR.

State-to-State Relations and the Transnational Aspect of the War in DRC

Although non-state dangers are now included in the study of international security, theories describing how these new security risks are created still adhere to the classic international relations theory’s state-centric presumptions. The departure from an emphasis on the national and long-established security threats undermines the common belief that regional economic integration enhances regional security, even while economic alliances in Africa are believed to promote peace (Fawn, 2009).

Because of their great interdependence and current vulnerability to emerging security threats, these divisions face an operational environment that fosters more uncertainty. Particularly, regional interdependence inside an “*insecurity complex* coupled with *laissez-faire* (or market) economic regional integration” (Fawn, 2009, p. 190) can be destabilizing since it results in uneven growth rates that consequently generate or intensify novel security challenges. In other words, depending on whether a certain form of regional economic integration is pursued inside an insecurity complex or a security community, it will have a varied impact on the neighborhood.

One explanation for troublesome conflicts in the GLR and the DRC in particular, is the question of a diversity of participants and diverse interests. Besides the effortlessly visible internal parties to the fight, numerous other characters exist, both at the forefront and contextually. Although having the best intentions, organizations like the Red Cross, UNHCR, and World Food Programme (WFP) frequently fall foul of strong economic or political interests in their operating regions. The issue is that these actors are typically investigated as either peace facilitators or catastrophe relief groups; they are seldom ever regarded as an ‘industry’ with interests that can obstruct peacemaking efforts (Baregu, 2011, p. 15).

It is worthy to note that the DRC is a territory of great interest because of its geostrategic importance, and enormous riches. Due to such, recurrent intra- and inter-state conflicts and wars have plagued the country. Having the world’s most important natural resource reserves for both mineral and gas, DRC stands at a critical position globally. International actors and neighboring states cannot hesitate to take advantage of the DRC’s situation for the sake of their own interests, thus wishing for stability and peace in the DRC might not favor their endeavors. For instance, the political environment is the main reason why there is oil and gas conflict in the DRC, an instance whereby international companies are seeking to position themselves in the sector in best ways possible for maximum gains (Channel Research, Belgium, 2011, p. 105). Additionally, ethnic and geopolitical competition among the DRC’s neighbors has claimed approximately six million lives since 1996 and displacing over five million Congolese, making the conflict in Eastern DRC the deadliest in the world history (Parens, 2022). Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the DRC are the main actors in fueling this ethnic and geopolitical competition. This conflict then, has been the main cause of poverty cycle and militarization in DRC. To curb this regional conflict, Kenya, the US and concerned international actors should work towards peaceful resolution since the effects might be dire and spill over to the whole of Central and East Africa in the near future. If the effects of

this conflict get out of hand, the Chinese, Russian, or other interested extremist involvement in this region's affairs to suit their interest won't be avoided (Parens, 2022).

Strategic elite alliances, regional (formal and informal) economic and trade networks, a continual flow of refugees, and the high number of mercenaries traveling between the nations, all contribute to the interconnectedness of the conflicts in the GLR. Warfare in the DRC is not an anomaly and fits into this nuanced picture. The country's abundance of natural resources, which makes it more desirable to transnational players than the majority of other countries, makes it unique with respect to other nations. Investors do not appear to shy away from the nation even during civil wars (Dokken, 2008).

Even more worrisome are the other actors who are invisible yet quite strong. While some covertly support peace, Baregu (2011) asserts that the majority almost always works to undermine it. These actors include the intelligence and security services (CIA, M16, Regional Security Organizations), secret service agencies, private military and security firms, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and money launderers working in the criminal justice system's murky and ambiguous corners. International financial institutions, weak nations, warlords, and plunderers—individuals and groups that prolong and profit from poverty—all collaborate in intricate interdependencies.

International corporations vying for concessions and exploration rights in the DRC continue to find the country quite alluring. The mining prospects for copper, cobalt, gold, and diamonds are particularly intriguing. Investors disregard territorial integrity or national sovereignty. They get into agreements with whoever controls the resources, whether the government, invading forces, or warlords. Crime networks that include money launderers, gun dealers, and drug traffickers are another category of transnational actors in the DRC. These networks have formed arrangements with both state and warlord players to loot Congo's natural riches, obviously taking advantage of the troubles in the Country (Dokken, 2008).

Several examples demonstrate how criminal networks can arm themselves to control natural resources. The function of the region is a crucial factor in the operation of regional security assemblages. Both benefits and drawbacks result from this. The issue of resources and outside engagement also raises some concerns about the use of private security contractors as actors in security assemblages intended to preserve resources and the involvement of African nations in intra-African wars. In particular, the case of the DRC stands out since, at one point or another, troops from Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia were stationed there. Most of the

time, they were “guarding” strategic assets, and even after withdrawal, there was still some engagement with auxiliary troops financed and backed by particular governments. Even actors formerly employed by the government play roles in several security assemblages and lead double lives as part of many security complexes. For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) at some point had brought criminal charges against Jean-Pierre Bemba (Breslin & Stuart, 2013) who was perceived as funding militia in the Eastern DRC.

Several modern insurgencies involve governments against rebel groups that cross international borders, seek refuge in neighboring states, and get funding from competing governments. When transnational rebels reside in another country, the war ceases to be entirely internal and inevitably involves regional governments. As security forces cannot operate on foreign soil, conventional counterinsurgency techniques can only do so to neutralize the threat. This can alter the nature of the conflict and trigger an escalation involving nearby states. Cross-border militancy can exacerbate regional strains and perhaps ignite a full-fledged civil war between governments. For instance, a burgeoning Hutu insurgency based in the DRC presented significant difficulties for the new Tutsi-led authority in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide in that country. Rwanda invaded the DRC twice as a result of the Hutu rebel force’s presence in the DRC: first to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko and install what it believed to be a friendly rule, and second to overthrow the Laurent Kabila government that he had helped put in place (Salehyan, 2010).

Past Security Interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The conflict in the DRC is a standard example of a protracted conflict with catastrophic events that are putting the will of sub-regional players and the entire international community to the test. Any signs of achievement are frequently swiftly erased, which results in evident group discontent. Even when the global community tries to ignore it, the issue keeps resurfacing with fresh difficulties. The GLR and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regions are impacted by negative events most frequently in the Eastern DRC. Overlooking the issue is no longer an alternative. This conflict is predominantly unusual since the international community continually tries new peace initiatives of involvement hoping that they might work, despite the lack of a real, long-term solution in sight (Namangale, n.d.). Simply, it can be noted that the peace agreements are stop gap measures seeking for long term solutions among neighboring states of the DRC and

international actors since there is no notable improvement in DRC's security regardless of the numerous signed agreements.

When Laurent Kabila's army overthrew the then Mobutu regime in 1998, the DRC was accepted into the regional organization SADC. Ever since, SADC and the DRC have largely collaborated in their interactions. Even though the DRC belongs to a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC actions have helped to uphold peace and security in the country. Angola, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and other nations have all participated in SADC's war interventions in the DRC, as well as having coalitions inside Southern Africa and the regional bloc (ACCORD, 2016).

According to Day (2022), massive amounts of the United Nation's budget, roughly \$7 billion for peacekeeping missions, have been diverted to state-building; in the DRC, for instance, the UN peace operation costs more than \$1 billion annually, and it is accompanied by hundreds of millions of dollars in bilateral development assistance to governance institutions throughout the nation. Day (2022) further adds that fixing failing or unstable states has taken thirty years, and astonishingly little has been accomplished as a result. Countries like the DRC continue to be mired in the violent conflict despite hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign aid, ongoing UN peace operations, and direct assistance for decades and have shown they are unable to establish the kinds of legitimate, effective institutions that international interveners had envisioned. Some research indicates that international interventions may sometimes have the opposite effect of what they intended, weakening the very state institutions they were meant to strengthen by fostering increased reliance on outside assistance or supporting authoritarian regimes who do the same. At worst, state creation can turn out to be the problem rather than the solution for a failing state.

The largest financial support offered by Belgium, the EU, the US, Canada, Japan, and South Africa to ensure adequate representation of interested parties at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) also proved ineffective. The ICD did not become the definitive peace deal until extensive efforts from different actors such as SADC's persistent pressure, backing from South Africa, the United Nations, European Union, the USA, and the international community, as well as the Pretoria peace accord established between the Rwandan and Congolese governments. The efforts that resulted in this final peace agreement reached in Pretoria on July 30, 2002, and finally endorsed by all parties

as an all-inclusive agreement in Sun City on April 2, 2003, involved a large number of participants, including governments with armies in the Congo, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and Uganda (Justenhoven, Ehrhart, Verlag, 2008).

A classic example of an armed struggle is the Ituri War. It linked regional political fighting between governments in the GLR to larger processes of political reconfiguration in the Congo. In addition to these political considerations, the warring parties were frequently suspected of having only economic objectives. During the Ugandan army's control of the region from 1998 to 2003, the Ituri conflict grew in the shadow of the Congo War. The neighboring nation sponsored the creation of armed organizations in Congo that were used in battles with the Congolese government and to manage the conquered territory with its Rwandan friends. Since then, Ituri has seen fighting between a dozen local armed groups, some of which were ethnically driven. In addition to Ugandan incitement, other factors that contributed to their development included a number of long-standing, local, and national disagreements that became more extreme during the Congo wars and the rise in political violence (Veit, 2010).

Fighting increased in the eastern districts under the authority of the Rwandan-RCD, which has its headquarters in Goma, despite the peace accord signed in Pretoria on July 30, 2002. The United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), the largest UN peacekeeping force, could not stop the development of new armed groups or the rise in bloodshed (Justenhoven, Ehrhart, Verlag, 2008). The international community interfered heavily in Ituri after a peace treaty that put an official end to the Congo conflicts in 2003. The United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), which had been going on since 1999, only started operating in Ituri in 2003. From June to September 2003, the European Union dispatched forces to ruthlessly subdue Bunia, the district's capital, because it was unable to stop the rising bloodshed between militias at the time. After this incident, a more powerful MONUC force retook control. Following that, the Ituri brigade of the UN, which had several thousand soldiers, was given the authority to uphold peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Since then, MONUC has fought to establish its authority over the armed groups in Ituri. Following MONUC's (with its appendages with MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade) example, numerous other foreign organizations and NGOs made Ituri a region of intense intervention (Veit, 2010).

In most cases, the move to restore peace and security in the DRC is caused by hidden interests that motivate the conflict in the region. This makes it harder for agreements to take any effect.

Examples of these agreements are; the Lusaka Agreement of 1999, Sun City (South Africa, 2002), Ituri 2006, AND Goma 2008. Additionally, impunity is a major barrier to peace realization in the DRC since it makes negotiations harder. Prevailing power dynamics inside the DRC, neighboring states, and individual UN Security Council members in regards to the GLR conflict therefore, are great considerations in managing past failures and trailblazing a new path for sustainable peace in the region (Mureithi, 2014, p. 60).

Conclusion

The DRC is a territory of great interest because of its geostrategic importance, enormous riches, and recurrent intra- and inter-state conflicts and wars that have plagued the area. It is true that the DRC and its neighbors play a crucial role in any peace process since without stability and peace in the Congo, neither peace in central Africa nor the GLR can be feasible. The EAC Regional Force's entry into the DRC is still an extremely precarious operation. Given the dynamics and the precarious position in the GLR, which has the potential to undo the gains made recently, this study is timely.

In practically every attempt to bring about peace, failures and issues arise. Still, in the history of intrastate battles, those encountered throughout the process of bringing about peace in the DRC are exceptional. Journalists and academics have been unable to explain why Congo's bloodshed has persisted despite peace efforts. Unlike many other peace processes across the world, the Congolese peace process was heavily supported and facilitated from the beginning in 1998 by a number of "individuals, organizations, and states" with extensive knowledge and experience in resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations. Facilitators have worked to incorporate prominent combatants, leaders of nonviolent political parties, and members of diverse socioeconomic groups in the peace process since 1998. Yet, when the ultimate peace accord in 2003 was reached and the world's largest UN peacekeeping force was deployed, not only did the violence not end, but it worsened as new rebel factions emerged in the country's eastern areas (Justenhoven, Ehrhart, Verlag, 2008).

It is against this background that the biggest dilemma for the author of this paper is whether the EAC Regional Force will make any difference in a region with such complexities in terms of security. The precise nature of the regional force's mandate has been inconsistent since the EAC forces were deployed. The success of the EAC's first deployment will depend on the successful

transfer of responsibility to the government's Military Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). Due to unfinished security sector reforms, the FARDC continues to be just as politicized, divided, and inefficient as before. Experts contend that, given this fact, a short-term improvement appears unlikely as long as the EAC Regional Force is in place (Wekesa, n.d.).

Recommendations

Great Lakes Region's conflicts should be handled locally because they collectively form what can be considered a conflict formation or system. A conflict formation is a collection of conflicts connected in such a way that they mutually feed off and fuel one another. These disputes cross international lines and are typically initiated by the same parties acting in their self-interest. This implies that any attempt to address any of them must consider this reality and adopt dynamic, extra-territorial techniques. Failing to recognize this fact has invariably led to solutions that are incomplete, ineffective, and unsustainable (Baregu, 2011).

Problems such as the "struggle for control of political power and unresolved civil rights over land ownership, greed for resources and economic benefits and lack of proper mechanisms to monitor and enforce the agreement have been cited as the bases for the collapse of the peace efforts to avert violence in the Congo (Justenhoven, Ehrhart, Verlag, 2008). It will be crucial to understand that, just as the RSCT asserts, the DRC is currently confronting numerous underlying and interconnected obstacles as the EAC Regional Force takes shape. According to reports, the M23 is not the only rebel organization engaged in hostilities in the area. In the Eastern DRC, more than 120 armed groups are active. When attempting to comprehend the goals of each group, this offers a challenging position. All groups are also motivated by the need to survive. In conclusion, and according to scholars such as Wekesa (n.d.), the primary goal of the EAC Regional Force and its deployment in the DRC remains the biggest unanswered question. If the EAC fails to specify its goals or how its intervention will differ from previous ones, then its presence in the DRC might as well be seen as just another mission with personal agendas.

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TRAINING HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN A SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: A DISCUSSION PAPER

By

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Abstract

Training of health care professionals is unique owing to the need for knowledge acquisition, skills, and competencies in caring for human life. It requires a delicate balance on what should be done for the client/ patient and their families to avoid adverse outcomes. The situation becomes worse in a risky environment that compromises the lives of both health professionals and care seekers. These individuals are likely to face serious health risks such as exposure to hazardous materials, physical injuries, and mental stress. With complexities in health care and management, there is a need to diversify health professional training to reduce such risks. Therefore, learners working in such a set-up need to be equipped with not only professional knowledge but with additional training to prepare them for deployment in security-challenged settings. Training on how to respond to emergencies in a tactical manner is critical. For example, interlacing basic life support with tactical combat casualty care. In addition, learners need to have clear clinical reasoning that will help in enhancing decision-making and problem-solving abilities. This paper describes the aspects of health training in security-challenged environments. A desk research of scholarly evidence was embarked on through internal and external desk reviews of existing scholarly literature. The search terms were security environment, health professionals, risky environment, health risk and military training. The research question was, 'How is training of health professionals in a security environment?' Content analysis was then done to examine the content, themes and opinions in regard to health training in a security environment.

The findings highlighted the experiences of training health professionals in a security setting. The study findings revealed that regular refresher training through simulations is important in ensuring the retention of knowledge and skills. Further, exposing the learners to risky environments using realistic combat scenarios is essential to validate what the students have learned through practical, real-world applications.

Keywords: *Security environment, Health Professionals, Risky environment, Health risk, military training*

Introduction

The statement by Orson Scott Card that “The essence of training is to allow error without consequence” underscores the importance of training. This is to avert the consequences that would otherwise be detrimental should one be faced with a situation requiring a particular skill or knowledge about. In healthcare, training aims at preventing morbidity and mortality. Besides the mandatory training that addresses statutory requirements as guided by regulators’ requirements, the type and level of training required varies depending on factors such as the type of care offered, and the care provider’s role and responsibilities. For instance, using evidence-based practice in healthcare is crucial in ensuring optimal practices and secure patient outcomes. This is because it stimulates critical thinking and informs decision-making (Krugman, 2003).

The environment in which the military operations take place is often characterized by unpredictable and ambiguous situations that place demands on military personnel. In combination with high levels of violence and threat, these situations elicit acute stress reactions, which can impair performance and the ability to operate effectively. Effective training practices are therefore essential to prepare military medical personnel for the demands of these challenging situations (Fletcher & Chatelier, 2000). The military has been found to be vibrant in training, equipment and advanced technology (Macharia, 2016).

Military health professionals in this discussion paper refer to healthcare service providers within the military establishment otherwise known as “Combat medics”. They are both soldiers and professional healthcare providers, most of whom choose to enroll into the military as operational specialties. Others undertake medical training either from a basic entry-level or advanced (specialization) level from within the military rank and file. Either way, they are charged with the responsibility of healthcare service provision to the service members and their dependents both in peacetime locations and during combat.

A security environment is an austere environment in which there is considerable degradation or denial of access to electricity, clean water, fixed or portable medical facilities, diagnostic and therapeutic supplies, and medical professionals for extended periods. When evacuation or mission requirements exceed current capabilities to deliver such care, this environment may offer a need to provide patient care for lengthy periods of time (Butler et al., 2017). There has been very little work done to describe health training in a security environment. Though the focus of this

discussion paper is on service provision in a combat environment, it is worth noting that training of these personnel takes place in a non-combat environment, underpinning the importance of simulation of combat setting to optimize preparedness (Gibson et al., 2022; Kaufman et al., 2000).

To succeed in training, health systems need to be strengthened in order to achieve the intended objectives of promoting public health initiatives. Owing to complexities in field training for health professionals especially in a security environment, hands-on experience is critical (Burkett & Aguirre, 2020). Sufficient health workforce and infrastructure is essential in ensuring quality care, especially in crisis situations (Winkelmann et al., 2022). Health professional training institutions in low and middle income countries face various limitations which include staff shortages, lack of equipment and other training materials and poor funding (Cancedda et al., 2015). With this dearth, innovative ways of training plays a critical role in enhancing quality training despite the existing challenges.

Digital infrastructure in the current times is critical with the advent of technology. With digital training, it is possible to reach many health professionals in various settings even in the war zone areas or remote areas where physical resources may be limited. In addition, health professionals irrespective of their location need to get up-to-date information and are also required to have continuous professional development. These digital platforms play a key role. Some of these digital platforms could be self-paced courses, thus the individual can do them at their convenience. Considering that military health professionals may not always be in a peacetime location, the self-paced courses are fundamental.

This paper therefore brings a discussion on key aspects considered in health training in security. It also includes the challenges experienced during the training.

Aim of the study

This study aimed to explore the following areas of training in a security environment:

- i. Medical military training
- ii. Pre-deployment preparation
- iii. Technological advancements
- iv. Challenges encountered during training

Theoretical framework

The discussion in this paper is supported by two theories; theory of reinforcement and theory of experiential learning.

The theory of reinforcement lays emphasis on a person's learning behaviour and suggests that the learner repeats the behaviour so as to have a positive outcome. This theory was proposed by Skinner and suggested that training programs need to be aligned to organizational objectives. In return, once a person has a reinforced behaviour receives a reward.

The theory of experiential learning will also be utilized in the discussion. This theory was described by David Kolb (Cherry & Lehman, 2022). He describes that the needs and wants of the learner are addressed by experience. With experience, a person gains competence and is able to do a self-evaluation. This theory proposes two ways of gaining experience; abstract conceptualization and concrete thinking. In addition, it proposes two ways of transforming experience, which are active experimentation and reflective observation.

In training, healthcare professionals participate in the learning process and require constant repetition to achieve the expected outcomes. In addition, they have to gain experience so as to competently offer services. Health professionals are largely trained on skill acquisition, therefore repetition and gaining experience are critical in achieving competence which will lead to confidence in practice. Using the theory of reinforcement, the initial training starts with the use of mannikins before moving to real human beings. This will allow the learner to gain exposure, thus being less harmful to society.

Methodology

A narrative literature review through internal and external review of existing scholarly literature was done. This method was appropriate because it is inexpensive and data can be obtained quickly and be used as a benchmark for a research process. The research question was 'How is the training of health professionals in a security environment?' This was later refocused to military training. The search terms were security environment, health professionals, risky environment, health risk, health training and military training. A total of seventeen articles were reviewed after excluding sixty-nine articles for not meeting the inclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria were that the articles needed to be focused on military set-up training and be aligned with the aim of the study. Content analysis was done to examine the content, opinions and attitudes in relation to health professionals

training in a security environment. The databases used for the search were Biomed Central, Google Scholar and PubMed Central. The reviewed articles were retrieved from the databases as follows:

PubMed Central	Google Scholar	BioMed Central
Total retieved - 23	Total retrieved - 55	Total retrieved = 8
Total excluded = 17	Total excluded = 47	Total excluded = 5
Total reviewed = 6	Total reviewed = 8	Total reviewed =3

Figure 1: Article selection

The descriptive review highlighted the experiences of training health professionals in a security setting. Although there is limited time, the process of conducting the review was rigorous, and this method was suitable for this paper to achieve immediate results that could inform the needed preparations for medical military training. Seventeen references were reviewed. Except for two that were published in 2000, the rest were published between 2017 and 2023. The limitation of accessing the required information was the scarcity of empirical literature on the subject matter of the study.

Discussion

Based on the literature reviewed, the findings are discussed under the following sub-headings; military medical training, technological advancements in training, pre-deployment preparation and challenges experienced during training.

Military health professional training

The medical military personnel play a critical role in defending and stabilizing the country. Besides, they offer medical care to the injured soldiers and their families. Their medical education includes catastrophe assessment, diagnosis and treatment of harms and emerging and re-emerging disease prevention including mental health care. With the emerging and re-emerging health happenstances like COVID-19, there is a need for extreme preparedness of medical military personnel to effectively respond to these health challenges.

Due to the unpredictable and occasionally brutal nature of war, combat medics need to consider uncontrollable elements. These include incoming hostile fire, contact with enemy forces, darkness, resource shortages and extended evacuation times. In addition, there are casualty transportation issues, command and tactical decisions affecting health care, extreme environments, and provider experience levels. These challenging situations require high-level training for the military medical personnel as opposed to what they are trained on in the civilian setup. This therefore means that the medical personnel need to be knowledgeable about the variations in tactical settings. They also need to be trained on how they can treat injuries in combat settings and safely transfer combat patients. They should learn to focus on rapid actions that address preventable causes of death until the tactical situation supports more thorough medical care (Chapman et al., 2012).

Areas that need to be covered in medical training include physiology, first aid, knowledge of weapons used in combat, pain management and documentation such as leadership (Raeeszadeh et al., 2022). These medical personnel need to understand the principles of war surgery, how bullets work, the body's response to such, and how to overcome the harm from weapons. This shows the need to expose the trainees to such environments during training to gain experience. The military health professionals may also be deployed to provide non-medical services which may include administration and management (Rhon et al., 2022). With this view, the training should fully equip the trainees for such occurrences.

Some of the specialities trained in a military set-up include cardiopulmonary and electroencephalograph (EEG) technicians, dental specialists, medical care technicians, medical laboratory technicians, medical record technicians institution service technicians, optometric technicians pharmacy technicians physical and occupational therapy specialists radiological (X-Ray) technicians, counsellors and social workers. These, having undergone military training are trained specifically to provide care in the military, particularly in combat settings. This means therefore that once trained, it is necessary to retain their skills as they are able to function as armed professionals.

Other than providing routine care to service members, their families and veteran officers, the military health professionals also provide care to their colleagues during wartime. Some of the injuries which may not be common in a civilian set-up include trauma related to gunshots, burns, wounds resulting from chemicals, musculoskeletal injuries and infectious diseases which could arise from their areas of deployment. Such injuries have a direct impact on deployment and, thus should be handled with extreme caution and with a high level of experience.

During training, several approaches including theoretical and practical sessions and teamwork especially in trauma management. This was seen in Norway's military medicine while in the Swedish military education, there is a combination of academic medical skills and the culture of military training (Sonesson et al., 2017). One of the challenges experienced by trainees is a balance between theory, practicals and research. In most health professional programmes, the content to be covered is a lot and in most cases there is competition for time. This may also mean that the learners are always busy to meet the course requirements. This therefore means the learners need a lot of support so as to go through the programme without becoming mentally stressed. To avoid such, it calls for the trainers to be innovative in their teaching, making sure that the learners achieve the intended goals.

International collaborations in education and training have been found to be successful in military medical education. These collaborations may also include civilian institutions. Some of the courses that the students can benefit from international collaborations and exchange programmes are Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support (BATLS), Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS),

Military Operation Surgical Training (MOST) and Definitive Surgical Trauma Care (DSTC) (Sonesson et al., 2017).

Feedback is crucial to determine the quality of medical training provided. As a result, continuous monitoring and evaluation of programmes is required to keep quality checks in control. Moreover, feedback helps to improve the delivery of the training since all players share their feedback in the course of the training. The players are students, faculty, clinical mentors and other stakeholders including potential employers, programme regulators and the Ministry of Health. Several ways are used to obtain feedback during training. Some of these ways include anonymous course evaluation by learners, peer –to-peer evaluation, clinical evaluation forms and programme evaluation. Top down approach is also used to evaluate the programme. This could be done through assessment of goals set during the year on whether they were met or not.

Technological advancements in military medical training

Technological advancements in medical training, coupled with military setting render the training increasingly complex, as such calling for innovative approaches to training. Many technologies have been developed for military training and these are also applicable in civilian settings (Fletcher & Chatelier, 2000). Globalization and the introduction of technologies like e-health or telemedicine call for technological advances both in classroom teaching and clinical site placement teaching to ensure that the trainees are at par with the evolving and dynamic medical care. The military has always been at the forefront in leading innovations and inventions, thereby adaptability of technology in training may not be a challenge. Military training encompasses research, which has facilitated advances in health care including vaccine development and preventive medicine (Leone et al., 2023). An example of advancement in military medical training is the enhancement of tactical simulators which produce a more real-life scenario for trainees (Thompson, 2022). In addition, modern technologies enable the trainees to prepare for a real-world scenario.

Other technologies that are changing the world are robots, artificial intelligence and information technology. In addition, virtual reality and simulation technologies can also be utilized. Scenarios can be simulated to give a real life picture to the learners, thus lead to a better understanding of the

content. These technologies will not only change classroom teaching but also field training to ensure the trainees are well-versed and can competently use the technologies (Billing et al., 2021). These technologies in the health sector enable healthcare professionals to provide remote care. With this aspect of technological advancement, it is clear that the training of healthcare professionals needs to be upscaled to meet such emerging trends.

Before COVID-19, there was very little adoption of technology in the provision of care to patients. Due to restrictions of movement and social distancing, e-learning technology, including telemedicine was adopted. Telemedicine has increased access to health care as a patient may comfortably access the services of a specialist who is far away (Quinn et al., 2022). During training, the trainees are exposed to these technologies so as to gain competence and be able to utilize them in the course of their profession. The accessibility of such technologies through simple gadgets like mobile phones makes it easy to access in whatever setting that the trainee may be in without requiring the physical presence of a teacher.

Pre-deployment preparation

Optimal preparation for health professionals includes exposure to combat situations before deployment (Suresh et al., 2021). The aim of this is to enable them to have a clear understanding and effectively provide service in these settings. In the United States of America (USA), Texas, a Tactical Combat Medical Care (TCMC) course was developed to prepare the providers for deployment in combat units (Holloway, 2016). TCMC is a pre-hospital wartime training that enables health care providers to supplement their basic training with field experiences (Holloway, 2016). Pre-deployment preparation is a cycle that involves the environment, behaviour, jointness and mission readiness. It involves training and re-training of the personnel in order to sustain peace support operations (PSOs), and also optimizing nursing care during PSOs. Jointness involves the various services so that they work together for the common good.



Figure 2: Pre-deployment preparation

Adapted from (Jumat et al., 2014)

Despite improvements in military field hospitals, many armed conflicts still take place under austere (harsh) conditions, especially in low-income countries. Depending on the physical environment and tactical considerations, military medical specialists need to prepare themselves and their teams for the most likely eventualities (Anagnostou et al., 2020). The routine medical treatment provided in peace-time locations does not produce the qualified medical workforce needed to care for patients during conflicts and deployments. In deployed environments, clinicians require broader skills than they do while practising as sub-specialists in military treatment facilities during peacetime. For instance, the lack of obstetrical or paediatric services required during deployments may force obstetricians and paediatricians employed in military medical facilities to function as general surgeons (Hutter et al., 2019).

Lessons learned from “Operation Desert Storm “ indicate that clinical expertise and military tactics complement each other (Hutter et al., 2019). Operation Desert Storm was a military operation that was aimed at expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and it happened 25 years after the first Gulf war. The lessons learnt from Operation Desert Storm include the need for constant training,

preparation for uncertainty, and the need to minimize casualties, which is affected by operational effectiveness. It is crucial, therefore, to take a structured strategy to enhance trauma care for combat and non-combat injuries that includes injury prevention, acute care, rehabilitation, and return to duty (Hutter et al., 2019). Military operations frequently face threats from their physical environment such as hostile fire, darkness, extreme weather, and health-related issues. As a result, periodic and pre-deployment skill assessments should be conducted to determine the type of training that is needed for each operational environment (Anagnostou et al., 2020). Borrowing from the theory of experiential learning, this phase is very critical in moving a health professional from a novice to an expert.

Gaps develop because standard medical care for military personnel and their families, including obstetrics, chronic illnesses, and metabolic disorders, is typically provided at medical treatment facilities. In addition, deployments frequently result in a variety of problems, including trauma, burns, infectious infections, musculoskeletal injuries, and chemical agent-related wounds (Hutter et al., 2019). In one of the studies, participants indicated that inadequate pre-deployment preparation was a detrimental aspect of their experience (Moore et al., 2020).

Challenges experienced in training

There are a vast of challenges experienced since this is a specialized training that goes beyond peacetime but also includes war zone training.

One of the challenges in military medical training is the limited number of experienced personnel as compared to the number of trauma patients received. This poses a greater challenge to the existing personnel because the available personnel will concentrate on providing care to the patients, thus training may be compromised (Sonesson et al., 2017). A study in South Africa established that nurses reported were not adequately prepared for deployment in mission fields as they felt they had deficiencies in training as compared to their counterparts (Jumat et al., 2014).

Limited opportunities, particularly the education and training opportunities which could provide a blended learning approach are lacking. The blended learning approach uses digital media and technology in addition to traditional teaching and therefore is a mix of online and face-to-face sessions. Lack of these opportunities impacts negatively on the training as it could contribute to

less competently trained personnel who may lack the confidence to operate in such situations. In military training, the successful implementation of the blended mode of learning requires further discussion (Henkel, 2017). There is a need to ensure the presence of effective technology, particularly in developing countries where access to such resources is limited. It should be appreciated that education methodologies change over time and the adoption of advanced technologies is critical to enhance the quality and efficiency of training.

The military training is tailored to health mission, and not to a specific county's health outcomes (Burkett & Aguirre, 2020). In this case, upon completion of training, the military health professionals may be posted to provide services outside the country as per their mandate. This affects the achievement of strategic impacts as there is a lack of specificity thereby the focus will be on direct patient care rather than a comprehensive approach, which has better outcomes (Burkett & Aguirre, 2020). Considering the obligation of the military personnel, a comprehensive approach, despite its positive impacts may be difficult to implement as a result of the nature of their operations.

The lack of locally available resources has resulted in the importation of training resources, which has proven to be costly. Thus affecting the quality of training offered to the trainees. To prevent mortality and morbidity from the significant amount of trauma sustained during operations, the medical force must be organized, trained, and equipped to treat combat-related illnesses and injuries before deployment (Moore et al., 2020). Having Combat Support Hospitals at various levels during combat calls for prior preparation of medical staff and nurses through training on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). TCCC is the standard care provided to victims in the battlefield before reaching the hospital. The course entails training on providing care under fire, in the field as a first responder when there is no longer hostile fire and evacuation of the injured persons (American Course on TCCC, 2022). This training will enable the health care professionals to effectively administer first aid and evacuate casualties while minimizing further trauma. Managing the severely injured patients in the battle field within the golden hour may be applicable during operations other than war. In war fighting, this concept is often constrained by the tactical situation on the battlefield, which include time, distance and unsecure environment. The battlefield casualty's chance of survival may be limited if the golden hour concept is not handled. However, the patient may improve significantly after arrival at a field hospital. Military constraints

limit how far forward hospital surgical facilities can be deployed. Every medical training should provide skill on ensuring the medical personnel possesses the basic skills to keep casualties alive at the war front until they reach a surgical facility. The correct application of Battle Field Advanced Trauma Life Support training provides life support principles, particularly in an austere and potentially hostile environment with limited equipment and diagnostic aids, that will enable saving of lives.

Emerging diseases for example COVID-19 pandemic posed a great challenge to the training of health professionals not only in the civilian set-up but also in the military (Quinn et al., 2022). Emerging diseases, which are highly infectious pose a great challenge since the military professionals stay together in camps thus spread of infections is likely to be very high. This calls for extreme caution whenever there are disease outbreaks that could easily spread.

To gain experience, trainees acquire skills from both military and non-military environments. This may lead to decreased exposure to the unique military medicine and thus become disadvantaged eventually when they are posted to work in the military settings (Quinn et al., 2022). In addition, not only are the health professionals expected to gain competency in health matters, but they are also to retain their military skills (Quinn et al., 2022). This means they need to create time for training that focuses on military competencies to ensure retention of the skills. These training lay emphasis on the military culture and operations.

Conclusion

Education and training in a security environment can be sustainable. Training health professionals is critical to ensure competency in the provision of care. Military healthcare professionals are trained competently to provide services both in civilian and military settings as well as in peacetime and war zones. Although faced with challenges, military medical training is unique and requires unique approaches and resources to achieve the intended competencies. Technological innovations have been adopted to advance military medical training. A blended approach of learning which combines both face-to-face and digital technologies is a great approach to support learning. The challenges encountered in the training of health professionals in a security environment vary from limited opportunities for blended learning, lack of resources including

training equipment, lack of well experienced trainers, emerging diseases and limitations in utilizing collaborative approach in provision of care.

Recommendations

High-level preparations need to be undertaken before rolling out military health professional training to ensure effectiveness and high-quality training.

There is need to outsource or tailormake locally training materials that could bring familiarity to the trainees and be utilized for training.

There is a need for advanced technology to enhance the training of military health professionals who will practice competently in diverse settings.

Development of curriculums that take into consideration of the unique nature of the military environment and deployment is critical.

The medical personnel need to be equipped with tactical skills that meet mission requirement in combat situations.

There is need to consider the appropriate training equipment for combat simulation which is a challenge especially in developing countries.

The authors recommend qualitative research such as ethnographic research to understand the military culture and how it informs and influences medical practice in combat setting. In addition, there is a need for phenomenological studies that would inform future preparations and operations in austere environments.

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Small Arms as a Barrier to Sustainable Peace and Development in Somalia

By

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Abstract

Somalia is frequently referred to as a fragile state due to decades of protracted conflicts, which have led to widespread instability and weak governance. Volatility in the country is linked to the widespread proliferation of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). SALWs are any man-portable lethal weapons designed to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. They are a category of firearms designed for individual use and characterized by their compact size and portability. For three decades, the country has been plagued by conflict and violence, primarily driven by the proliferation of these weapons, which are frequently acquired through illegal channels. These weapons are held by various actors, including armed groups, militias, and civilians, creating a significant challenge in regulating their distribution and use. This article aims to examine the relationship between illegal SALWs proliferation and sustainable peace and development in Somalia. The research employs a case study approach, analyzing primary and secondary data to understand how SALWs undermine peace and development in Somalia. Adopting social conflict theory, this study views the societal environment through the lens of power struggles, inequalities, and conflicts among different groups. According to this theory, social structures generate tension and disparities, ultimately leading to violence and conflicts. The findings suggest that the availability of SALWs make it easier for insurgent groups in Somalia to engage in violence and criminal activity, such as piracy and extortion, exacerbating the instability in the country. The study proposes that to achieve sustainable peace and development in Somalia, it is essential to address the issue of small arms and implement measures to reduce their proliferation and use, such as stricter laws and enforcement, disarmament programs, and efforts to disrupt the illegal arms trade. In addition, there is a need for greater regional cooperation as a recommendation to manage the problem of illegal SALWs in Somalia.

Keywords: *Small Arms and Light Weapons, Development, Conflict, Sustainable Peace, Somalia.*

Introduction

Protracted armed conflicts in Africa have been driven by many factors, including poverty, poor governance, resource scarcity, competition for power, and external intervention (Mthuli, Ncube & Jones, 2013). These conflicts have left millions of people displaced, killed and maimed, causing immense economic damage and political instability. These conflicts have spanned several decades, ravaging communities and hindering social and economic development. One significant factor contributing to the perpetuation of these conflicts is the widespread availability of weapons, often obtained through illegal means (Joseph, 2013). These weapons serve as catalysts for violence, as they are utilized by various armed groups, militias, and even civilians. Controlling the spread and use of these weapons has proven to be a complex challenge, impeding efforts to restore peace and security in affected regions.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) are a category of firearms designed for personal use. They are characterized by their compact size and portability, including handguns, rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns, and various other weapons. In Somalia, SALWs are easily available including firearms, grenades, and other portable weapons. The Horn of Africa has been ravaged by conflicts catalyzed by increased SALWs. Somalia is one country in the Horn of Africa where SALWs have proliferated and been used by various actors, including government forces, armed groups, and civilians (Ken, 2013). The availability of SALWs in the continent has further triggered the creation of insurgent groups that seek to exert power and control over their territory. Sustainable peace and development involve building lasting peace, security, and stability within communities, nations, and alongside balanced social and economic progress (Igbuzor, 2011). The key features of sustainable peace and development include conflict prevention and resolution, social inclusivity and justice, good governance and rule of law, and economic development (Ssereo, 2013). The process involves defining and addressing the root causes of conflicts, supporting reconciliation, promoting human rights, and ensuring equitable access to opportunities and resources. Sustainable peace and development seek to create thriving communities where every individual can prosper and is free from inequality and violence. It incorporates the absence of armed violence and conflict, as well as stability in social, political, and environmental spheres. Sustainable peace and development envision a society where communities and nations live in harmony, without the threat of conflict and violence. This leads to social and economic well-being.

It guides actions and policies aiming to create a just, equitable, and sustainable future for all in society.

The conflict in Somalia has been ongoing since 1991, when the civil war broke out following the coup d'état against President Siad Bare (Ajú, 2022). The conflict has since been protracted by the lack of a unified governance of the country, regional conflicts, and the presence of numerous armed groups. Small arms have posed a significant barrier to achieving lasting peace. Their proliferation has surged since the civil war's onset, fostering a culture of violence, instability, and insecurity (Bradbury, Mark & Sally, 2010). Illegally acquired, these weapons continue to fuel violence and insecurity. Armed groups emboldened by the availability of arms challenge central government authority, leading to multiple conflicts and a dearth of political dialogue (Moller & Bjorn, 2009). This makes it challenging for the Somali government to implement effective security measures, as these arms can be used to intimidate civilians and undermine the rule of law. Consequently, achieving control and stability in certain areas remains elusive for the government and peacekeeping forces (Williams, 2020).

This article aims to examine the nexus between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the fragile situations in Somalia that have impeded sustainable peace and development. Additionally, this article discusses the intervention efforts implemented toward building sustainable peace in Somalia and further provides recommendations for addressing the challenge of SALWs in Somalia. Qualitative research methodology was adopted with information sourced from primary and secondary sources.

Theoretical Basis

The theoretical basis for discussing the role of small arms as a barrier to sustainable peace in Somalia is rooted in social conflict theory. Social conflict theory examines society through the lens of power struggles, inequalities, and conflicts between different groups (Jeong, 2019). The theory focuses on the role of social structures and institutions in defining societal dynamics and how the social structures perpetuate tensions and disparities. Social conflict theory identifies the society as incorporating different groups with differing goals and interests leading to competition for power, resources, and influence. The social conflict theory provides valuable insights into understanding how small arms have been a barrier to sustainable peace in Somalia.

According to Väyrynen (2023), social conflict theory offers insights into the role of power, inequality, and social structures in generating and perpetuating conflicts. This theory helps us

understand how the proliferation of small arms worsens existing social tensions and contributes to ongoing violence. In Somalia, the unequal distribution of power and resources, stemming from weak governance, clan-based power dynamics, and political instability, has fueled competition among different groups (Zahar & McCandless, 2020). This competition has ignited inter-group tensions and led to state fragmentation. Weapons are viewed as symbols of power and dominance, with armed groups using them to assert their authority. This perpetuates a cycle of violence as factions arm themselves to gain power and control. Ultimately, this creates a security dilemma significantly influenced by the proliferation of small arms, acting as a barrier to sustainable peace in Somalia.

Methodology

This research applied case study research design for in-depth investigation and analysis on how SALWs have been a barrier to the realization of sustainable peace in Somalia. The study applied qualitative methods in data collection and analysis and aimed at understanding, describing, and exploring the phenomena of SALWs and sustainable peace in Somalia. For data analysis, themes were generated based on the study objectives, identification of emerging patterns and possible conclusions and recommendations. The main areas defining the study included Somalia and Kenya. The study incorporated 100 participants, including Somali government officials, officials of the African Union and IGAD Special envoy to Somalia, the citizens of Somalia both in Kenya and Somalia, personnel from peace organizations, clan elders, and security agencies in Somalia. Purposive and convenience sampling techniques were employed to recruit participants for this study and ensure that key informants were reached for the relevant information. The study data was gathered through a mixed approach from key informant interviews with relevant respondents (regional peace organizations, policymakers, officials from relevant Government Ministries, and security departments). Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) complemented this, which was conducted through unstructured questionnaires (The Somali citizens, etc.). Secondary data (from books, journal articles, credible reports, etc.) was collected from published sources that included hard and soft library material available in national, institutional, and organizational libraries.

Results and Discussion

Information from primary and secondary sources provided key findings which aligned with the research objectives. This section provides an in-depth examination on how SALWs undermine sustainable peace and security in Somalia and discusses the key factors that facilitate the proliferation of SALWs, including terrorism and armed groups, porous borders, weak governance, youth radicalization, poverty, and clan conflict. The discussion also centers on efforts implemented at different levels that aim at combating the proliferation of SALWs in Somalia.

How SALWs Undermine Sustainable Peace and Security in Somalia

Post-1980 witnessed a surge in SALWs proliferation in Somalia, resulting in a staggering estimate of 600,000 to 750,000 weapons in civilian hands, with only about 14,000 registered, indicating the widespread presence of illegal weapons (GunPolicy, 2017). This increase of illegal SALWs can be attributed to clan-based self-defense militias and the activities of violent groups like Al-Shabaab, posing a substantial obstacle to sustainable peace in the country. Somalia's dire peace situation is reflected in its ranking of 156 out of 162 countries on the 2022 Global Peace Index (GPI), with a GPI score of 3.125 (Global Peace Index, 2020). The GPI places Somalia alongside Iraq, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Syria, and South Sudan as one of the world's least peaceful states. The GPI scale ranges from 1 (most peaceful) to 5 (least peaceful); the factors contributing to Somalia's low ranking include easy access to illegal SALWs, political instability, violent crimes, displacement of people, external and internal conflicts, among others.

Years of instability in Somalia have created fertile ground for the proliferation of illegal SALWs. This diffusion and proliferation of illegal SALWs have significantly fueled ongoing conflicts, directly impacting physical security and livelihoods (Joseph, 2013). Somalia serves as a prominent example. The inadequately trained and equipped police, military, and correctional services have limited capacity to manage this issue. Weak governance institutions have contributed to the rise of illegal SALWs in Somalia (Ken, 2013). The state of institutions in Somalia, and the absence of stable governance structures, have led to increased anarchy and militias, which remain a major obstacle to achieving lasting peace in the country.

Somalia has many clan-based militias and violent Islamist movements that trigger serious security threats to the citizens and government. The armed groups in Somalia include Al-Shabaab and AhluSunna Waljama'a, among others (Ahmed & Reginald, 2009). These groups have acquired arms and ammunition from national and international sources, and neighboring countries

(Bradbury, Mark & Sally, 2010). According to Small Arms Survey (SAS) report, illegal SALWs in Somalia have originated from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran (Small Arms Survey, 2014) through armed traffickers. SALWs have been diverted into Somalia by arms traffickers. The presence of large armed groups in Somalia has made the availability of illegal weapons easy and simultaneously created a roadblock to sustainable peace in the country.

The lack of effective state control over the flow of SALWs into and within Somalia has contributed to the country's high levels of violence and insecurity. The absence of a central government and the presence of multiple armed groups have made it difficult to regulate the trade in weapons. The porous nature of Somalia's borders has made it easy for smuggling weapons into the country.

Factors Facilitating Proliferation of SALWs in Somalia

Illegal arms trade is a major contributor to conflicts and violence in Somalia. The main drivers of this trade include weak or ineffective government regulations and enforcement, political instability, organized crime and terrorism, and a demand for weapons in conflict areas (Silvestri, 2019). The drivers of illegal SALWs operate in a cyclical fashion where one driver fuels another, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of violence and conflict.

Terrorism and Armed Groups

Terrorism and armed groups have been significant drivers of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Somalia, posing a hindrance to sustainable peace and development. According to 75 percent of the responses, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has exacerbated the security challenges in Somalia, leading to increased violence, insecurity, and human suffering. One of the main ways terrorism and armed groups contribute to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Somalia is through their involvement in illicit arms trafficking (Ken, 2013). These groups often engage in illegal arms smuggling and trafficking, taking advantage of porous borders, weak law enforcement, and corruption. They acquire weapons from various sources, including illicit arms markets, transnational criminal networks, and state stockpiles.

Furthermore, 65 percent of the respondents emphasized that terrorism and armed groups in Somalia exploit social and economic grievances to recruit supporters, enticing them with access to small arms and light weapons. This has led to a surge in armed fighters and the spread of weapons. The presence of these groups also erodes the rule of law and weakens state institutions

(Joseph, 2013). They often challenge both central and local authorities, creating a power vacuum that hampers the state's ability to regulate and control the flow of small arms and light weapons. Insufficient governance and weak law enforcement have facilitated the widespread availability of weapons in the country, fueling their proliferation.

Porous Borders

Porous borders in Somalia have been significant drivers of SALWs proliferation, posing a hindrance to sustainable peace and development. The lack of effective border controls has facilitated the illicit flow of weapons, exacerbated security challenges, and contributed to violence and instability. One of the main ways porous borders contribute to the proliferation of SALWs in Somalia is through smuggling and trafficking. The country shares porous borders with neighboring countries, including Kenya and Ethiopia, which make illegal arms trade lucrative (Mohamed, 2010), especially among the pastoralist communities. The lack of proper border controls, including weak or corrupt customs and law enforcement officials, inadequate infrastructure, and limited surveillance, make it easier to smuggle weapons across the borders and enter Somalia.

Participants in the study were asked to identify the key elements that trigger the proliferation of SALWs. Multiple respondents affirmed that illicit arms trafficking networks take advantage of these porous borders to smuggle weapons into Somalia, including through clandestine routes, hidden compartments, and other smuggling techniques. These weapons often come from various sources, such as illicit arms markets, transnational criminal networks, and state stockpiles, and end up in the hands of armed groups, terrorists, criminals, and other illicit actors within Somalia. The flow of SALWs across porous borders can also fuel inter-communal conflicts and exacerbate existing tensions. In Somalia, where clan-based conflicts and disputes over resources are prevalent, the influx of weapons from different sources can escalate local disputes and result in further instability, displacement of communities, and loss of life.

Weak Governance

The prolonged conflict in Somalia for decades has weakened government institutions and structures (Musau & Stephen, 2013). Weak governance in Somalia has been a significant driver of SALWs proliferation, posing a hindrance to sustainable peace and development. The lack of

effective governance structures, institutions, and the rule of law has contributed to the uncontrolled flow of weapons, exacerbating security challenges and undermining efforts to achieve lasting peace and development. Somalia lacks effective arms control measures. The absence of robust regulatory frameworks for arms acquisition, possession, and transfer, as well as weak enforcement of existing regulations, has created an environment where weapons easily fall into the wrong hands. This includes illicit arms markets, armed groups, terrorists, criminals, and other illicit actors who exploit the lack of governance to acquire and use weapons for their nefarious purposes.

Participants also identified weak governance as a barrier to proper SALWs management in Somalia. This governance issue extends to the accountability and oversight of state security forces, including police and the military, leading to problems like corruption, mismanagement, and weapon diversion. Consequently, weapons intended for official use can end up in the illicit market or be employed by non-state actors, further fueling SALWs proliferation. Weak governance in Somalia has led to state fragmentation, with various actors competing for power and limited territorial control. This, in turn, has fueled the rise of armed groups and militias acquiring weapons through illicit means to advance their interests, perpetuate violence, and destabilize the region. These armed groups, including clan-based militias and extremist organizations, contribute to insecurity and the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons within the country.

Clan Conflicts

Participants recognized clan conflict as a key driver of instability in Somalia, hindering national unity and stability. Clannism has played a significant role in the prolonged collapse of the Somali state, with clan-based governance deeply ingrained. From 1969 to 1991, Said Barre employed a clan-based divide-and-rule strategy, appointing loyal politicians from specific clans to control the military and civil institutions (Moller & Bjorn, 2009). This resulted in a coalition government dominated by the Ogadeen, Dulbahante, and Marehaan clans at the expense of others, fostering animosity and suspicion among clans and giving rise to clan-based rebel groups (Joseph, 2013). The availability of arms further fueled the conflict, enabling these groups to consolidate power in line with their interests.

Clannism has been a political ideology in Somalia, including power, territory expansion, resource distribution, and appointment to influential positions (Bradbury, Mark & Sally, 2010). Clannism has become the modus operandi of the political-economic arrangement of the Somali society. Manipulation of leaders within the clans has been advanced to national levels as every clan leader

pushes for their selfish interests. These clans, therefore, seek to remain relevant by ensuring they have military power within their communities. They embark on arming their militia to remain powerful and influential. This derails sustainable peace as supremacy within the clan level which advances to national politics and governance, making Somalia fragile.

Factionalism has made governance in Somalia difficult as different clans amass power and compete over natural resources and political power (Ken, 2013). Sporadic clashes have also been imminent between clans over urban land ownership. Divisions across clans have weakened the country, increasing fragility situations. The resultant effect is an increase in the proliferation of illegal arms, further limiting the realization of sustainable peace.

The Somali government forces have also been getting the support of local clan militias in launching an offensive against Al-Shabaab (Hassan, 2023). The collaboration has been impactful in creating security coercion that has been important in fighting the Al-Shabaab. Different operations carried out by the pact have resulted in the killing and wounding of Al-Shabaab militants and displacing them from their areas of operation. The clan factor has thus been important in supporting government operations against Al-Shabaab.

Youth Radicalization and Poverty

Poverty has been a key driver of Somalia's fragile situation. Young people drop out of school as they are being lured into militias and criminal groups (Mustapha & Yerima, 2021). The school enrollment has been reducing owing to dropouts to join militia groups, poor education infrastructure, and lack of security. Radicalized groups in the country are deeply rooted, amassing many youths within their network. Groups such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), and Al-Shabaab have been pursuing Somali youths with the prospect of livelihood (Joseph, 2013). The study participants asserted that the country's poverty situation pushes the youths to consider joining criminal gangs and radicalized groups to earn a living. This further increases demand for small arms as these youths are trained to fight. In addition, the allure of religious fundamentalists coupled with bad governance has significantly contributed to youth radicalization in Somalia.

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a high poverty rate and lack of access to basic necessities. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHDI) ranks Somalia as the third most destitute country in the world (OPHI, 2015). The country has been plagued by civil war, drought, and famine for decades, contributing to the dire economic situation. The lack

of infrastructure and government institutions has made the country's economic development difficult. Many Somalis rely on international aid and remittances from abroad to survive. The presence of insecurity coupled with Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations have scared off potential investors (Joseph, 2010).

Instability in Somalia has further worsened the country's economy, resulting in widespread poverty (Ken, 2013) and rendering many people jobless and unable to participate in economic activities. Further displacement has also limited economic activities as looting and extortion have become common. About 7.1 million people in Somalia suffer humanitarian crises and emergencies with 3.9 million in food security stress (AfDB, 2022). The Human Development Index ranks Somalia at position 165 out of 170 countries (AfDB, 2022). The severe lack of basic economic and social development has been blamed on the protracted conflict fueled by increased illegal arms in the hands of civilians and militias.

Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms in Somalia

Over the past two decades, Somalia, in collaboration with the international community, has taken significant steps to address the issue. The efforts have been at local and national levels as well as international arena. The policy framework has been advanced at different levels to control the spread of illegal SALWs. The policy framework includes:

International and Regional Efforts

The international community has been supporting efforts aimed at restoring sustainable peace. The main impediments to sustainable peace have been terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab, that have infiltrated the country's security system and managed to amass a huge number of weapons. International efforts have been focusing on increasing the capacity of Somali security forces by bringing in more troops to support security efforts (Silvestri, 2019). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprising troops from different countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, and Burundi, have supported Somali security forces and managed to be in control of Kismayo, Mogadishu, and south-central parts of Somalia. Recovery of these regions from Al-Shabaab has helped restore the government's efforts towards peace. The international community and AMISOM have supported security efforts financially, with military hardware and logistics (Farah, Ahmad, & Omar, 2015).

In 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) lifted the arms embargo on Somalia (UNSC, 2014). This decision aimed to bolster the Somali government's security systems by allowing the acquisition of weaponry to combat insurgents, including Al-Shabaab. The embargo lift facilitated the construction of security infrastructure and supported the Somali National Army. Collaboratively with development partners, the Somali government has constructed armor storage facilities, whereby some are designated for storing recovered illegal SALWs and ammunition (Uchegbu & Maiangwa, 2022). Capacity-building efforts have been led by the UN, including bodies like UNMAS, UNIDIR, UNDP, and UNISOM, along with other stakeholders such as the European Union (EU) and NGOs (Mustapha & Yerima, 2021). The international community's endeavors have been focused on assisting the government in fulfilling its responsibilities for managing weapons and ammunition.

Common Security and Defense Policy in Somalia (CSDP) – The European Council has been spearheading CSDP mission and operations in Somalia intending to consolidate and enhance EU's response towards the evolving security context and situation and strengthening its role as the maritime security provider (European Council. 2022). The EU CSDP has been providing support to Somali security forces regarding training and equipment capacity to ensure they take over security responsibilities. The mission is to assist Somalia in enhancing police capacity to contain illegal SALWs and strengthen the Interpol national bureau in Mogadishu.

Regional efforts, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), play a crucial role in mitigating the spread of arms and restoring sustainable peace in Somalia. AMISOM, authorized by the United Nations Security Council, has provided security and stability in Somalia. Its primary objective is to support the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to establish a secure and peaceful environment. AMISOM has contributed to the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, conducting operations to reduce the availability and influence of small arms in the country. Through its peacekeeping mandate, AMISOM has worked to build the capacity of Somali security forces and promote stability, creating conditions for sustainable peace.

IGAD has facilitated diplomatic negotiations and dialogue among different Somali stakeholders to address the root causes of conflict. It has played a vital role in mediating and supporting peace agreements, promoting inclusive governance, and fostering regional cooperation to restore stability in Somalia. These regional efforts have focused on comprehensive approaches to tackle

the arms spread and promote sustainable peace. They involve strengthening border control mechanisms to prevent illicit arms trafficking, supporting disarmament initiatives, and facilitating the reintegration of former combatants into society (Uchegbu & Maiangwa, 2022). According to a respondent from IGAD, the organization has prioritized capacity-building programs for the Somali security forces, including training and equipping them to address security challenges and enforce arms control measures effectively.

National Level

Efforts towards combating the proliferation of small arms have been advanced at the national level as the government develops and implements structures that promote sustainable peace. In August 2012, the National Constituent Assembly adopted the Provisional Constitution of Somalia (Silvestri, 2019). This marked a pivotal step in ensuring the government attains some level of legitimacy and authority. The international community recognized and backed the efforts, notably the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US), among other countries and organizations. However, the proliferation of SALWs and prolonged insecurity have kept the country isolated.

The Somali government has adopted the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program to reduce the circulation of small arms. This program encourages the voluntary surrender of weapons by individuals, groups, and communities (Hassan-kayd, 2019). It includes creating a national database of small arms and light weapons and destroying these weapons and ammunition. The Somali National Security & Stabilization Plan (NSSP) incorporates several measures to reduce availability of small arms and light weapons (Williams, 2020). These measures involve establishing a Weapons Destruction Program, a Weapons Collection and Control Center, and a weapons tracking system. Additionally, the NSSP proposes a Weapons Identification and Disarmament Program for registering, controlling, and destroying illegal weapons and ammunition.

Somalia's National Arms Control Policy (NACP) resulted from collaborative efforts between the government, the African Union, and the United Nations to regulate arms, ammunition, and related materials transfers. The policy mandates that all such transfers must be authorized and documented by the Ministry of Interior and National Security. The Somali National Security Architecture focuses on strengthening security forces' capacity to combat SALWs proliferation, including establishing a national weapons register and implementing disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration programs. To enhance small arms and light weapons control, the Somali government passed the 2014 Arms and Ammunition Control (LAC) law, which prohibits the import, export, manufacture, possession, transfer, and use of such weapons and establishes a National Arms and Ammunition Control Commission to oversee its implementation (UNIDIR, 2022).

The government offers amnesty to insurgents and conducts rehabilitation programs. Many participants stressed the importance of security sector reforms in countering small arms proliferation. These reforms include intensive training for security personnel, including police and the army. The government has also established a robust system to monitor the marking, registration, and licensing of arms held by civilians and private security firms. Marking weapons has positively impacted combating illegal arms, leading to a significant reduction in SALWs diversion to the illegal market (Snodgrass & Mwanika, 2009). Additional measures encompass eliminating the illegal SALWs market, developing policies for civilian arms licensing, constructing arms storage facilities with development partners, conducting training on governance focusing on transparency, accountability, and impartiality, and enhancing security training for the army and police.

A participant from the Ministry of Interior noted that the Somali government has been working with the United Nations and the international community to strengthen the capacity of its security forces and police to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons. This includes training, equipping, and deploying police and security forces to enforce the LAC and other relevant laws. President Hassan, early this year, declared a ban on people from carrying weapons on the streets of Mogadishu, the country's capital (Hassan, 2023). If effectively enforced, such a ban could help reduce the level of violence and insecurity in the city and limit the ability of criminal and terrorist groups to operate. The ban could help to reduce the risk of armed conflict, criminal activity, and terrorist attacks in the city. It could also make it easier for law enforcement agencies to identify and apprehend individuals involved in illegal activities, including the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Local Level

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been at the forefront at local levels in implementing initiatives aimed at promoting peace through curbing illegal arms in Somalia (Moller & Bjorn, 2013). The CSO introduced Neighborhood Watches, a community-level security system promoting nationwide conflict prevention and political dialogue. Local community organizations

are actively engaged in this effort. The Coalition for Grassroots Women Organizations (COGWO) supports voluntary demobilization programs, aiding the reintegration of former criminals and militias into communities (Mohamed, 2010). Additionally, COGWO offers alternative livelihood opportunities for unemployed youth and women through empowerment initiatives like business clubs and microfinance. This helps prevent the involvement of youth and women in radicalized groups, which often promise a source of livelihood to recruits.

Opportunities, Challenges, and Prospects

Opportunities

The effective management of SALWs throughout their lifecycle has been crucial in facilitating operational readiness, reducing the risk of diversion or loss to non-state armed insurgents, and protecting national strategic assets. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS has placed the national security agenda as a top priority, ensuring efforts towards management of weapons have been on top gear. The Office of National Security has been working with state security institutions to develop a national ammunition and weapons management framework (Snodgrass & Mwanika, 2009). This has enhanced the government's management of weapons and helped to reduce arms in the wrong hands of civilians.

The partial suspension of the armed embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in 2013 allowed the FGS to strengthen its forces (Hassan-kayd, 2022). The FGS imported arms, ammunition, and military equipment to bolster the armed forces' capacity. They have successfully fulfilled their commitment to ensure government control over these weapons, preventing unauthorized use that would violate the arms embargo. In 2018, President Abdullahi Farmaajo signed the Control of Arms and Ammunition decree, signaling the country's strong commitment to effectively manage arms. This decree led establishing a centralized system responsible for authorizing the importation and transparent, accountable distribution of weapons and ammunition to federal and state forces. The government, together with AMISOM, developed the Halane facility, a new training ground for the SNA (Ajú, 2019). This facility acts as the central armory for managing and processing imported weapons. It has improved weapon registration and marking and enhanced oversight and accountability in weapon distribution. With assistance from the international community, the government integrated arms registration into the security sector's biometric system, ensuring that individuals owning arms have their biometric data on file with the SNA. This has significantly reduced illegal arms in the country.

Establishing the Joint Verification Team (JVT) by FGS helped mitigate the risk posed by post-distribution diversion of weapons (Mustapha & Yerima, 2021). The JVT facilitated routine inspections on security forces stockpiles, supply chain, and inventory records. The team has conducted numerous site visits to verify weapons and ammunition across the Somali Police Force, Somalia National Army, and Custodial Corps (Mustapha & Yerima, 2021). The team has been physically counting weapons and ammunition and verifying them against records. The JVT has strengthened post-distribution control and oversight thus enhancing logistical capacity and working modalities as a key area for the FGS.

Challenges

Weak state institutions in Somalia present a significant challenge to addressing the small arms issue (Moller & Bjorn, 2013). The government faces limitations in regulating small arms, hindering efforts to control their proliferation. The informal economy presents a major challenge as small arms are often tied to illicit trade. Political instability and ongoing conflict in Somalia further complicate the issue, as armed groups and militias rely on small arms to advance their agendas. Despite previous efforts, SALWs proliferation remains a significant concern, fueling insecurity and conflicts. Stronger measures are needed to combat illegal SALWs trade and promote peace and development.

Prospects

The international community and other actors are committed to supporting Somalia in addressing the small arms issue. The UN and various international organizations have provided resources and expertise to bolster Somali security forces, improve border control, and enhance regional coordination to prevent small arms flow (Silvestri, 2009). The Somali government has shown a commitment to addressing the issue of small arms, and there is political will to make progress in this area.

Many respondents believe that peacebuilding efforts can address Somalia's conflict root causes, including small arms issues. These efforts can decrease small arms demand and foster stability by tackling underlying grievances. Strengthening state institutions is vital for handling the small arms problem, with a capable government regulating their use to curb weapon flow, promoting lasting peace and development. Regional cooperation offers potential by enhancing border control and preventing arms from crossing borders. Community-based approaches are also effective, engaging

communities in disarmament, raising awareness, and providing alternative livelihoods to deter violence.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite huge efforts in curbing illegal SALWs and pushing for sustainable peace at local and national levels, Somalia still faces challenges and resistance. These efforts have not adequately resolved conflicts in the country. This article recommends the following:

Ending the conflict: Ending the conflict in Somalia is crucial for reducing small arms proliferation. The conflict drives the demand for small arms. It normalizes their use in dispute resolution, enabling armed groups to easily obtain and employ them for violence against civilians and other groups. Ceasing the conflict will diminish the demand for small arms and limit armed groups' access to them. Furthermore, it will establish a stable, secure environment, instilling confidence in the government and security forces' ability to protect citizens from armed violence, reducing the perceived need for individuals to acquire small arms for self-defense.

Strengthen governance institutions: Enhancing governance institutions is vital to tackling illegal SALWs and Somalia's fragility. Ineffective information sharing and coordination between government agencies hinder resilience-building efforts, a major obstacle in managing illegal weapons. Strengthening governance capacity across institutions bolsters the government's legitimacy and authority to fulfill its mandates.

Address the proliferation of illegal SALWs: The government should develop a national institution to manage and control SALWs (Farah, Ahmad & Omar, 2015). The agency needs sufficient funding, personnel, and policy development to address the possession and spread of SALWs. Strengthening border security and implementing effective monitoring and control measures will help prevent SALWs from entering the country.

Sensitization on disarmament: Decades of conflict in Somalia have led to the accumulation of large stockpiles of illegal arms among civilians, fostering a pervasive gun culture deeply ingrained in societal beliefs (Snodgrass & Mwanika, 2013). There is a need to develop and implement mind and behavior change programs that focus on dissuading the population from the gun culture.

Post-conflict reconstruction: Prolonged conflict in Somalia has left most people illiterate, impoverished, and without essential social services. High youth unemployment and the proliferation of illegal SALWs lead to increased armed violence. Investing in socioeconomic

sectors is crucial to offer Somalis alternative livelihoods, reducing their reliance on armed conflict (Hassan-kayd, 2019). This will help curb illegal SALWs and an avenue for sustainable peace.

Regional cooperation: Porous Somali borders facilitate the illegal arms flow within the country. Regional security collaboration, particularly in countering illicit SALWs, is vital for achieving lasting peace (Gurses, Rost & McLeod, 2008). In addition, regional cooperation will help support political peace efforts in Somalia to ensure strong governance, political will, and stability.

Conclusion

The proliferation of SALWs in Somalia poses a major obstacle to sustainable peace and development. Key drivers, such as terrorism, armed groups, porous borders, and weak governance, contribute to the uncontrolled weapon flow, worsening security challenges and impeding lasting peace and development. These factors exploit the availability of small arms and light weapons, perpetrating violence, destabilizing the region, and threatening civilians and the state. The consequences of this proliferation are dire, leading to increased violence, crime, and instability, which hinder the government and international actors in establishing effective security and the rule of law. It diverts resources and attention from crucial development priorities, making it challenging to provide basic services, maintain law and order, and promote sustainable development.

Addressing the issue of small arms proliferation in Somalia requires comprehensive and multi-faceted efforts. This includes strengthening arms control regulations, improving border security, enhancing accountability and oversight mechanisms for state security forces, and promoting political stability, inclusivity, and state-building processes. It also involves addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity and instability, such as poverty, inequality, and grievances, through socioeconomic development, community resilience, and addressing root causes of conflict.

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MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY TO ENHANCE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE QUEST FOR MULTI AGENCY COLLABORATION

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Abstract

The research sought to examine the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder engagement in developing national cyber security capacity to enhance national development with a focus on KDF. Specific objectives were to determine the contributions of KDF and academic institutions in national cyber defence capacity enhancement and determine the effectiveness of the multi-stakeholder framework spearheaded by KDF in national cyber defence capacity enhancement to bolster national development. The theories informing the study were Risk Theory of Safety and Security, and Integrated System Theory of Information Security Management using both diagnostic and descriptive research design methods. The study used a sample size of 100 participants drawn from Kenya security agencies (50) (KDF, NIS, and NPS), Kenyan universities and research institutions (25), and another (25) from the corporate and civil societies comprising the Communication Authority Kenya, and Kenya Information Communication Network (KICTANET). The data was collected using open-ended questionnaires sent to the participants via email. Purposive and snowballing sampling techniques were used, while thematic analysis was used for the qualitative data analysis, expressed in narrative and percentages as per themes therein. Some of the study findings are that, while KDF has been integrated into Kenya's multi-agency teams on cyber security, their contribution has been minimal thus far. However, KDF continues to play an advisory role to the government on digital threats. Further, academic institutions have remained theoretical on cybersecurity matters, with just a few universities offering such training. In addition, while a multi-stakeholder approach is most appropriate to handle cybersecurity threats, there lacks a

proactive multi-agency framework to quell such threats, create awareness, and a response team in the event of cyber-attacks. This study recommends the creation of a multi-stakeholder team to develop home-grown solutions and increase the role of KDF in cybersecurity multi-agency collaboration and advisory roles as well as research. Further, the study recommends, a proactive center for cybersecurity response team to be established in Kenya, spearheaded by the KDF.

Keywords: *Multi-stakeholder, Cybersecurity, KDF, National Development*

Introduction

Cybersecurity relates to the protection of individuals and organizations using internet-connected devices and systems like software and hardware among other electronic devices from potential cyber threats or attacks (Craig, Diakun-Thibault & Purse, 2014). The increased reliance on information systems pervading all aspects of human life coupled with globalization has introduced the fifth dimension of warfare in the cyber domain (Robinson, Jones & Janicke, 2015). Implementation of information systems is a force multiplier in economic development (Breda, Barbosa & Morais, 2017). However, the introduction of information systems has resulted in an unprecedented increase in cyber threats on a global scale threatening economic and national security with a lack of a coordinated approach at the national level to deal with the threats. Cybersecurity threats relate to malicious acts designed to damage or loss of data and disrupt digital life. Common cyber threats are virus attacks, denial of services, data breaches, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) conducted by either State or non-state actors (Humayun et al., 2020). Threat actors range from corporate spies, hostile nation states, criminal organizations like terror groups, and lone hackers, among others (Rollins, 2009). These threats have the capability of delivering devastating strategic effects on critical infrastructure with the potential of crippling effects on the national economy. The cyberspace therefore presents a global-sized threat with potential for high-level collateral damage that does not conform to international legal requirements nor the principles of distinction and proportionality and which introduces a high number of non-combatants to the battle space.

Some of the most severe attacks are state-sponsored attacks targeting critical infrastructure and conducted as a precursor for war on the other dimensions of warfare (Akoto, 2021). The cyber-attacks are meant to cripple a nation's ability to sustain its war or defense efforts by targeting its industrial base. A case in point was the attacks on the Estonian critical infrastructure in 2007 and the Russian State-Sponsored cyber-attacks on the Ukrainian power supply and transport system before the onset and during the conduct of the current military offensive (Czosseck, Ottis & Talihärm, 2011). Cyberspace, however, unlike other dimensions of warfare, presents a challenge in the regulation and application of national and international legal requirements and is devoid of any national boundaries. It is unimpeded by geographical distances, and capabilities are unrestricted by the economic capacities of states or perpetrators (Geers, 2010). Cyber threats harm economic development while the cost of cyber security solutions remains prohibitive. There is thus, the need for the development of capacity for securing cyberspace for economic security (Geers, 2010). Information technology, software development, and cybersecurity skills are some of the soft skills that are cheap to train with high returns in comparison to the prohibitive cost of cyber solutions.

Cybersecurity solutions have currently emerged as a cornerstone for export sales in the international security market currently topped by the US, China, Japan, and France which account for a third of the global security market (Sales, 2018). The development of the national cyber security skill capacity enhances the national posture for cyber defence and economic security. In this regard, software and cyber skills development will not only be exported as a foreign exchange earner in the regional and global security market but also facilitate the protection of the national cyberspace (Sony & Aithal, 2020). Cyber skills will also serve as a source of employment, improving livelihoods and therefore contributing to national development and security through reduction in predisposition to crime and radicalization caused by poverty hence an effective tool towards achieving total human security. In addition, with cyberspace as the new frontier of warfare, mechanisms have been put in place by regional and international organizations and security blocks for collective defense and response to cyber threats (Wolter, 2013). The UN cybersecurity mandate is to enhance the capacities of member states to deal with the exploitation of cyberspace in aspects threatening international peace and security, e.g. terrorism and state-sponsored attacks.

The U.S embraced a multi-stakeholder approach to cybersecurity in 2016 endorsing a national initiative for cybersecurity education, spearheaded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Thierer, 2021). The multi-stakeholder initiative in the U.S for improved awareness and preparedness for cybersecurity-related threats was funded by the Department of Commerce for regional alliances and multi-stakeholder partnerships (Ciglic & Hering, 2021). The core goal was to promote cybersecurity education in the U.S, and workforce development to fight cybersecurity threats. The most notable aspect of the milestone made by the U.S is the level of multidisciplinary cooperation for common goals.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has played a fundamental role in cybersecurity training, and cybersecurity research initiatives to inform pertinent policies (MIT, 2022). MIT has successfully performed internet policy research, with a significant impact in boosting U.S cyberspace security. MIT has significantly impacted cybersecurity research and policy development in the U.S, as well as enhanced cybersecurity awareness through personnel training. Similarly, China has made a milestone breakthrough in cyberspace security by embracing policy responses in developing effective and efficient cyberspace security (Austin, 2018). China sought diplomatic relations with the EU to cooperate in cybersecurity prospects for policy and infrastructure development, prompting the need for interdisciplinary collaboration within and outside the country. Cybersecurity enhancement in South Africa, unlike anywhere else in the African context, has been implemented through schools. South Africa, akin to the U.K has adopted schools as critical institutions in promoting cybersecurity awareness in the digital age (Kritzinger, Bada & Nurse, 2017). Notably, in South Africa and the U.K, education and skills prioritization for cybersecurity are informed by the stakeholders in the economy. The schools, government, and academia play an active role in cybersecurity initiatives in South Africa, with recommendable outcomes (Ciglic & Hering, 2021; Kritzinger, Bada & Nurse, 2017). On the other hand, Egypt has also sought to integrate cybersecurity training in schools to boost awareness and professional development (Alsmadi & Zarour, 2018). The New Education Cybersecurity Program has evolved over the years in personnel training and innovation to improve cyberspace prospects. In the Rwandan ICT sector, numerous stakeholders have contributed to the development of ICT policy for the improvement of the cybersecurity policy in the country (Bowman, 2015). The National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) is the epitome of the cybersecurity policy in Rwanda, developed in 2005 through multi-stakeholder collaboration in the ICT sector.

Kenya has experienced a surge in cyber-attacks in the recent past, with a record count of about 860 million incidences in the past year (Kenya National Computer and Cybercrime Coordination Committee, 2022). Frequent cyber-attacks in Kenya are denial of services, spyware, distributed denial of service, malware/virus, social engineering, and phishing (Joshua and Doreen, 2023). The target of the majority of cyber-attacks is critical communication and information infrastructures, especially with the increased social media usage. In 2017, Kenya faced 7.7 million cyber-attacks. In July 2023, cyber-attacks in Kenya disrupted access to 5,000 Kenyan government services offered online including Visa, driving license application portal, passport, online train booking portal, and mobile money transactions (Africa News, 2023). About 79% of the cyber-attacks in Kenya have been executed by criminals infiltrating the computer systems of numerous organizations across the country (Africa News, 2023). Further, 14% of the attacks involved malicious software overloading traffic, while the rest targeted web-based applications. Besides, Kenya is ranked third after Nigeria and South Africa as the most targeted by cybercriminals in Africa. Overall, there is cause for alarm for the security institutions like the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), to take up an active role in defending the digital infrastructure, to foster socioeconomic prosperity.

This study examines the role of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) multi-stakeholder engagement in developing national cybersecurity capacity, to bolster national development. The study-specific objectives were to assess KDF, and academic institutions' contribution to National Cyber defence capacity enhancement, and the effectiveness of a multi-stakeholder framework spearheaded by KDF in National cyber defence enhancement to foster national development.

THEORETICAL BASIS

The Risk Theory of Safety and Security

The Risk theory is used in scientific disciplines in the threats identification, risk specification, and determination of potential countenance strategies. Risks, according to the risk theory of safety and security, emanate from the objective existence of threats (Lukas, 2016: Ludek, 2016). There exists consciously controlled acting and uncontrolled acting for a given complex part for risks to emerge. The theory underpins, in the course of elements behaviors, interactions occur, and unfortunately, some of the interactions are negative, and could render adversities. A security incident, thus emerges from negative interactions (Lukas, 2016). Through risk identification, an

evaluation of negative acts or threats is done, defining potential impacts (Ludek, 2016). Further, measures to counter pertinent impacts are defined. In addition, risk management strategies are formulated for the fulfillment of the function of the pertinent reference object(s).

This study applied the risk theory of safety and security in defining the strategy for cybersecurity enhancement. Pertinent concepts from the theory utilized are Cyber threats identification, impacts definition, and cyber threats countenance definition based on the scale of threats impacts. Similarly, the concept of risk management, in this case being the multi-stakeholder engagement, spearheaded by KDF, is largely informed by the risk theory of safety and security.

Integrated System Theory of Information Security Management

The Integrated systems theory of Information security management theory was proposed by Kwo-Shing, which combines security policy theory, risk management theory, management systems theory, and control and auditing theory as well as contingency theory, to establish the information security management theory (Hong et al., 2003). The theory denotes integrated systems theory is fundamental in delving understanding of information security management, by defining pertinent strategies and predicting managerial outcomes (Hong1 et al., 2003). The theory acknowledges the increased threats to data security with internet usage, amidst the presence of unauthorized users. As such, the theory proposes the adoption of effective information security management ideals to secure data for organizations and individuals.

This theory was useful in this study, in demystifying contemporary data security risks, and the need for adoption of effective internet data security management strategies to protect individuals and organizations. Further, the theory helps in denoting the essence of integrating multi-agency efforts in defining cybersecurity prospects, through improved information security management.

METHODOLOGY

This study sought to examine the contribution of KDF and academic institutions in national cyber defence capacity enhancement, and the effectiveness of KDF-spearheaded multi-stakeholder engagement to bolster national cyber defence capacity for national development. In this regard a qualitative study design was applied, using both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected by means of an unstructured questionnaire to enable comprehensive data collection from the respondents by utilizing open-ended questions (Kazi, & Khalid, 2012). Questionnaires were

piloted among the KDF personnel, and approved by the NDU-K study supervisor for dissemination. The study participants were contacted via the phone for briefing about the study, and sought consent for their participation. The questionnaires were then administered via email, for the participants to fill them and send back within seven days. Purposive or judgmental and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify the study participants. In this regard, Security agencies, specific information technology (IT) oriented Kenyan Universities, and corporate and civil society were chosen. Potential bias in this sampling was overcome by ensuring questionnaires were filled independently by the participants.

The target population was the key stakeholders in Kenya's national security agencies and academia mainly Kenyan Universities. Specific institutions of the target population in Kenya comprised Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), the National Police Service (NPS), officials from National Intelligence Service (NIS), Kenyan public/private universities with orientation to computer science and technology courses, the officials from Kenya Communication Authority (CA), and Kenya information communication and technology network officials.

A total of 100 participants were reached, comprising 50 from national Security Agencies (25 from KDF, 15 from NPS, and 10 from NIS). Another 25 were from academia and research institutions (20 from universities and 5 from research institutions). Further, 25 were from corporate and civil society, mainly the KICTANET. Thematic qualitative data analysis method was used in which themes were identified from the questionnaires, and compiled into percentages for discussion.

For the secondary data, the annual reports and publications by the respective institutions on the study topic were utilized. These included government agencies such as the Communication Authority of Kenya (CAK) amongst others, and non-governmental organizations on Cybersecurity like Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANET), and diverse publications by Kenyan universities and KDF.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Analysis of the Questionnaire

Out of the 100 questionnaires distributed, seventy were returned fully filled and were used to compute the results. Five (5) of the questionnaires were subtracted from the total sample due to missing data. The data collected from the questionnaires was subjected to frequency counts, and

ultimately the percentages based on the emerging themes from the responses. The biographic information of the participants comprised 45% female and 55% male. Further, 20% fell in the bracket 25-30 years, 30% were in the age bracket 30-40 years, 15% were aged 40-50 years, and the rest (35%) were above 50 years of age. Further, 20% were diploma level, 50% were degree holders, while 10% were post-graduate diploma/masters' level. Further 10% had doctorate qualification.

The participants were also asked if they had encountered any form of cyber-attack, which revealed that, 75% of the participants had such encounters. Some of the common attacks included hacked social media accounts, denial of service, social engineering, and phishing instances where one is duped into clicking an insecure link. Phishing had a prevalence of 45% among the participants, denial of service 10%, and hacked social media accounts had a prevalence of 60%. The organizations listed by the participants that should be charged with cybersecurity concerns include the KDF with a prevalence of 25%, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) with a 5% prevalence, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK) with a prevalence of 65%, and the National Computer and Cyber Crimes Co-ordination Committee (NC4) with a prevalence of 45% of the study participants. The 90% of the study participants agreed with the view that a multi-agency strategy would enhance cyber threat management through the creation of synergy enhancing security leading to economic development. On the other hand, 10% demonstrated the need for individual awareness about cyber threats to avert pertinent frequent attacks. Overall, the participants believed that a multi-stakeholder engagement could improve national development through enhanced cybersecurity capacity development.

KDF Contributions in National Cyber Defense Capacity Enhancement

A total of 35% of the KDF study participants stated the institution has embraced a multi-stakeholder approach to address cyber security issues in the recent past. Some of the cited efforts included the incorporation of military personnel in the National Computer and Cyber Crimes Coordination Committee (NC4) and the Kenya Computer Incident Response Team (KE - CIRT) Bundi, Mbaya & Muriuki, (2018), reiterated similar integration efforts exists in the KDF institution, where the pertinent teams work in collaboration with the other stakeholders in the cybersecurity docket. The NC4 is a multiagency institution that provides strategic guidance, coordination, and advisory services to both the public and private sector strengthening the security

resilience and cyber security capacity of the stakeholders. Kenya Computer Incident Response Team (KE-CIRT) is also a multi-agency government organization that facilitates collaboration and multi-stakeholder engagement. The Kenya Information and Communications Act, of 1998, mandates the Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK) to develop a national cyber security management framework through the establishment of a national Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) (Wanjiku, 2009). However, it emerged that, while such teams exist, their impacts have not been felt fully in the economy, especially with the notable upsurge in cyber-attacks at both individual and organizational levels.

The KDF has a role to advise the government about potential threats to the critical information infrastructure as denoted by 20% of study participants. On the other hand, the Kenya National Computer Cybercrimes Coordination Committee/NC4, (2023) recounts, KDF play advisory role to the government on cyber-related threats for mitigation. However, 45% of study participants felt that the KDF has not made a significant contribution to the digital infrastructure in Kenya. The ultimate goal is to facilitate national capacity development by mitigating cyber-attacks and monitoring as well as mobilizing a collective cyber response to enhance national cyber security. With a prevalence of 70% of study participants, the study established the KDF needs to do more to boost a secure cyberspace in Kenya. The terrorists, among other militia groups, also target Kenya's digital space with the ultimate goal of causing harm to such as the banking sector which has been attacked frequently (Fred, 2016). Some of the study participants (25%) associated some cyber-attacks especially on the government digital platforms with the Al-Shabaab. The implications are that the KDF's role in fighting terror attacks is not limited to physical battles but also in the digital space. Kenyans have increasingly become vulnerable to cyber-attacks because there are insufficient safeguards in cyberspace amid increased reliance on the internet.

The Roles of Academic Institutions in Enhancing National Cyber Defense Capacity

The contribution of academia is critical to the defense of national cyberspace, however, the academic potential remains highly unexploited, and its role in cyber defense is minimal with a highly theoretical approach (Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2012). Similar findings were established in this study where 65% of the participants delved that, the academic institutions have remained quite theoretical in Kenya as regards cyberspace infrastructure development. The academic knowledge development role ensures maximum utilization of national resources including the academic infrastructure and human resources including students at their highest level of cognitive

capacity (Catota, Morgan & Sicker, 2019). Such advances from academic institutions facilitate national cyber defense and the development of homegrown solutions reducing vulnerabilities posed by outsourced cyber solutions.

On the other hand, 20% of the study participants denoted, that there are just a few universities in Kenya that offer cybersecurity degrees and courses. Lack of homegrown cyber solutions creates dependence on outsourced solutions presenting an exploitable national security vulnerability (Forrester, Lopez & Valentina, 2022). The insufficiency of the required expertise can be addressed through academia by analyzing problems in cyberspace. Fortunately, security agencies like the military (KDF) may spearhead a multi-stakeholder framework to facilitate problem identification and define potential remedies for implementation. The academic institutions helps formulate course and curriculum development and software development for homegrown solutions.

Kaibiru et al, (2023) indicates a dire national skill deficit and the need to address the gap through curriculum interventions. According to the study, 13.2% of national universities offer cybersecurity degree programs. Further improvements in the courses can be implemented through a military-spearheaded multi-pronged approach comprising the Integration of cybersecurity in schools and other academic institutions. Similar findings were established in this study where 20% stated there are very few institutions training cyber security-related courses in Kenya. The learning institutions ought to integrate cybersecurity courses in every discipline as a common course and the introduction of the skills at lower educational levels through the CBC was spearheaded as denoted by 45% of the study participants. In this endeavor, the Ministry of Education in conjunction with the military through National Defence University-Kenya NDU-K could offer oversight for effective program implementation across the country. However, such an approach would require a parliamentary Act.

The launch of cybersecurity courses as common courses in universities and the Competence curriculum (CBC), will facilitate the utilization of Universities and research institutions as national resources for the development of cyber capacity as denoted by 20% of study participants. Lehto, (2015) underpinned, that the learning institutions of higher learning can conduct national cyber threats analysis in conjunction with security agencies through an integrated academic data analysis program to develop cyber solutions for existing threats. The focus of such a development in the learning institutions is to facilitate maximum utilization of existing academic infrastructure like the data analytics center that exists in JKUAT (Kariuki, 2017). The use of local tools and facilities

would help in the development of homegrown solutions in response to cyber threats to address vulnerabilities as denoted by 55% of study participants. Besides, 90% of the study participants denoted the need for the development of homegrown solutions to cybersecurity threats. The direct involvement of ministries of education, commerce and industry, the State Department of Youth Affairs, and the Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) would be crucial, as cited by 35% of the study participants. Overall, the effective multi-stakeholder approach to cybersecurity in Kenya is essential with the rising cases of cyber-attacks.

Information communication technology (ICT), software development, and cybersecurity skills are soft skills, cheap to train with high returns in comparison to the prohibitive cost of cyber solutions as identified by 95% of participants from academic backgrounds. Cybersecurity solutions have currently emerged as a cornerstone for export sales (Westerlund & Rajala, 2014). In this respect, the development of the national cyber security skill capacity enhances the national posture for cyber defense and economic security. Software development and cyber skills will not only facilitate protection of the national cyberspace but can also be exported as a foreign exchange earner in the regional and global security market as denoted by 25% of the study participants. It will also serve as a source of employment improving livelihood and therefore contributing to national development hence an effective tool towards achieving total human security.

Multi-Stakeholder Framework Effectiveness in National Cyber Defense Capacity Enhancement

Cyberspace is the 5th dimension of warfare and just as it diffuses national boundaries it also presents a common space to all stakeholders, from the micro individual to national-level systems (Wells, 2016). A Multi-stakeholder engagement in cyber security is complex and requires military spearheaded multi-agency approach and an aggressive development of capacity. This requires a graduated approach capitalizing on academic institutions, the Ministry of Defense, education, commerce and industry, communication and digital economy, and the State Department for Youth Affairs. Similarly, 95% of study participants denoted the increased need for multi-stakeholder cooperation in Kenya to quell the cyber threats and frequent attacks. Jones, (2021) reported the viability of a multi-agency strategy is pegged on the fact that outsourced cyber solutions have a prohibitive cost and expose cyberspace to exploitable vulnerabilities in the age of IT dependence. The collaborative framework therefore provides for synergy facilitating maximum utilization of

scarce resources while enhancing the national cyberspace defense posture and contributing towards national economic development.

Munyua (2016) revealed that multi-stakeholder engagement will improve the national cyberdefence capacity by revolutionizing collaboration on cybersecurity. Multi-stakeholder engagement will improve national cyber defense capacity as it does not just enhance collaboration but also offers solutions to most cybersecurity-related issues. Similarly, this study established, that lack of multi-agency collaboration contribute to heightening cyber security attacks in Kenya with a 56% response rate from the participants. The study participants in this regard, delved into, how a multi-stakeholder framework allows for resource mobilization for synergy. Such an approach provides a framework for information sharing, capacity development, threat analysis, and response to facilitate national development.

A multi-agency framework, like the National Cyber Security Secretariat and the National Computer and Cyber Crimes Coordination Committee (NC4) in this case, can be enhanced to facilitate a military-spearheaded multi-stakeholder/multi agency framework to facilitate collective response through the full operationalization of existing multi-agency institutions like KE-CIRT and NC4 ((BundiMbaya & Muriuki, 2015). With a prevalence of 45% of study participants, this study established that the KDF has the potential to lead a proactive cyber defense team/multi agency team to bolster safety in Kenya's cyberspace. However, 20% of participants stated, that CA should lead the multi-agency team in such endeavors. However, overall, there was consensus that KDF plays an influential role in the security prospects of Kenya, and so it should be in cyberspace. An effective multi-agency framework would address the Lack of a common information-sharing platform and collective response and preparedness like US PPP (Public Private Partnership) for information sharing (Maude, 2013). The Public and private sectors in U.S, work in collaboration on matters cybersecurity. The creation of a platform for risk analysis and mitigation utilizing all national resources including academia allows all data traffic to be channeled through a common platform to facilitate the analysis of threats and development of cyber solutions.

On the other hand, corporate institutions are critical stakeholders in cyberspace and have leveraged information technology to advance economic development (Reveron & Savage, 2020). The sector, especially the banking industry in Kenya has been the hardest hit by cyberattacks resulting in huge losses with a direct effect on the economy (Tariq, 2018). The same hackers can access different

banks with isolated as opposed to integrated approaches to cyber defense. Cyber security threats to the financial institutions can be mitigated through an information-sharing platform and the implementation of a collective cyber response framework, as established in this study. Multi-stakeholder collaboration allows for an integrated approach to address the existing cybersecurity skill gap in cybersecurity (Tagarev & Sharkov, 2016). In this regard, collaborative efforts of forensics and Cyber Law developed by the government, and the input of security agency institutions such as NDU-K would certainly bear the most fruit as denoted by 70% of the study participants. While there have been some attempts to enhance multi-stakeholder efforts, minimal progress have been achieved in defining a proactive team in this respect.

Multi-stakeholder framework would provide the best strategy for exploiting the threats presented by reliance on information systems as stipulated by 75% of the study participants. Besides, 90% of study participants denoted confidence in the KDF-led multi-agency cyber defense team, citing previous interventions of KDF in other public sectors like the Kenya Meat Commission. However, the multi-stakeholder cybersecurity framework in Kenya is not comprehensive and lacks effective implementation, owing to collaboration between the public and private sectors in cybersecurity remaining substantially low. The defence efforts in cyberspace are weakened by the absence of a proactive multi-stakeholder in Kenya. As such, Kenya suffers from an uncoordinated cybersecurity framework development (Sang, 2022). A military-spearheaded multiagency framework for the mobilization of national resources for capacity development to facilitate the exploitation of cyberspace for economic development through sustainable cyber defence is thus fundamental in Kenya.

Due to the complex landscape of the cyber domain, a multi-stakeholder engagement best presents the strategy for the mobilization of national resources for capacity development, which would therefore incorporate the development of a framework for multi-stakeholder engagement (Ciglic & Hering, 2021). The multi-stakeholder engagement strategies have been implemented in countries like the US, Egypt, and South Africa among others. Locally, a multi-stakeholder engagement for resource mobilization and synergy would allow for efficient collective cybersecurity threat analysis, capacity building, information sharing, and collective response as denoted by 85% of study participants.

Conclusion

Cybersecurity is a collective multi-stakeholder responsibility that requires collaborative action to achieve national cybersecurity capacity development. Numerous efforts to multi-agency approach for cybersecurity have been made in Kenya, comprising NC4, and Kenya Computer Incident Response Team integration with the KDF, however the inputs from the KDF into the team have seemingly been low. The most remarkable role of KDF on cybersecurity roles in Kenya is the government advisory on such threats. Through improved channels and strategies to manage the Cyber threats in Kenya, a secure cyber space shall be realized for full exploitation of the pertinent opportunities to achieve socioeconomic development.

The academic institutions have made minimal efforts to boost the Cyber security resilience in Kenya. There are very few universities offering comprehensive courses on Cyber security. More efforts are of the essence to boost awareness, through training of personnel at both CBC levels and the institutions of higher learning on cyber security matters. It is important for the learning institutions to not only develop appropriate curriculum on cyber security, but also work in collaboration with other agencies like the KDF. Overall, there are skills deficits in cybersecurity in Kenya, which partially informs the prevalence of the cyber-attacks in Kenya in the recent past.

While Kenya has made good progress in securing the cyberspace, there lacks a proactive multi-agency cybersecurity team to handle the emerging cyber threats. The way KDF ensures physical security of Kenya, it is in the very same spirit they ought to take over the cyber space for a secure digital economy. With the increased online consumers, the risks of digital warfare is inevitable, hence the need for heavy presence of not only the KDF, but also other agencies as well working in collaboration. The key stakeholders in the cybersecurity in Kenya should be Kenya communication authority, security agencies, research institutions and the Universities, all spearheaded by the KDF. Besides, corporate institutions from the private sector, such as the banking sector should not be left out in the cybersecurity mitigation and response team since they are common target by the cyber criminals.

Recommendations

This study recommends the development of home-grown cybersecurity solutions, through effective multi-stakeholder collaboration. Potential stakeholders in this endeavor are the academic institutions, the government of Kenya especially parliament, stakeholders in the security docket, communication authority, corporate sector especially the private sector, and ultimately the KDF offering insights and advisories on pertinent threats.

The study also recommends an increased role of the KDF in cyberspace security enhancement through, not only participation in multi-agency teams like NC4, but also research. This study established that KDF has been integrated into the cybersecurity teams but thus far their inputs and impacts have been minimal.

It is also recommended that academic institutions should initiate cybersecurity-related programs to boost the personnel pool in Kenya and increase awareness through the provision of common courses at both CBC and higher learning levels. This study established few universities are offering cybersecurity-related courses, hence a skills deficit.

The study recommends the creation of a center for cybersecurity response, and information sharing that incorporate agencies from academia, security agencies, corporate institutions, and others, spearheaded by KDF. This study established, that there is no proactive multi-agency cyber-attack response team.

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THE ROLE OF FUSION CENTERS IN INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING: A CASE STUDY OF KISUMU, ELDORET, NAKURU, MOMBASA AND NAIROBI IN KENYA.

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Abstract

The prevalence of disease in public health and medicine has periodically been overlooked throughout the past decade due to the reluctance to report wrongdoing and the difficulties in establishing causal relationships between causes and subsequent sicknesses. This happens as a result of the need to react to a variety of emergencies, including public health crises, natural catastrophes, and complicated massive disastrous situations. Security forces' crucial role in fostering national development, notably in preventing disease spread, remains underappreciated. In Kenya, research on health security has concentrated on how political, economic, and social factors influence disease management within counties. This study examines the role of fusion centers in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering in Kenya. The skills to improve and maintain Kenya's health security, a technical infrastructure assessment for information sharing, and resource allocation are the specific objectives that this study sought to examine. The study employed both primary and secondary data. 200 respondents were studied, among them top clinical leaders, doctors, members of the Kenya Medical Practitioners Pharmacists and Dentists' Union, Kenya Medical Research Institute, pharmacy and poisons board members, patients, security personnel, Kenya Bureau of Standards representatives, national environmental authority, anti-counterfeit authority, and Kenya Revenue Authority, as well as representatives from a few different Kenyan government agencies. Secondary data is collected from journals and documented scholarly articles. The study recommends the establishment of a legal framework in Kenya that encourages collaboration between law enforcement and medical practitioners. It further recommends the establishment of integrated fusion centers in major cities to improve healthcare. There is need for the security agencies in Kenya to learn from countries that have integrated fusion centers with public health and implement their best practices. Lastly, the study suggests that the national and county governments set aside funds to assist with establishing local fusion centers.

Keywords: *Fusion Centers, Medical Intelligence, Public Health, security, Technical infrastructure.*

Introduction

Sharing sensitive information requires cooperation, trust, and capable leadership, which can take time. The practice of counterterrorism has, nevertheless, benefited from coordinated efforts (Fusion Center Accountability and Intergovernmental Information Sharing, 2014). Fusion centers, which combine data from various sources, are an efficient and effective way to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the capacity to combat crime and terrorism, according to the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) (2013). The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism introduced the Global Fusion Cells Program in January 2020 as a best practice for gathering and analyzing data to support intelligence-led action, enabling government informed decision-making, aid in the prevention of attacks, and assure adequate readiness.

According to Ratcliffe et al., (2015), advances in technology and the use of law enforcement data have made it possible for police to combat complex crime issues, such as street criminal groups, which can pose risks and threats to public health. Although the information sharing and analysis concepts of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), whose techniques were first created to combat complex crimes like terrorism and organized crime, might help alleviate many of the issues encountered by the police. A fusion center can assist national and local governments in identifying and forecasting developing patterns in crime, public health, and quality of life that go beyond terrorism threats (Lewandowski et al., 2018).

The larger Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model serves as the foundation for the fusion center idea. ILP places a greater emphasis on the generation and application of information within the larger law enforcement governance structure as opposed to community-oriented policing (COP), community involvement, and participation. Fusion centers, which represent this expanding emphasis on collaboration and consolidation, have come to be known for their emphasis on processed data and valuable information. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and local governments in the United States own and run the control fusion centers. By identifying emerging threats, they gather, examine, and disseminate threat intelligence to all levels of government and law enforcement.

Threats to public health can come in a variety of shapes and sizes, including bacteria, parasites, prions, viruses, epidemics and pandemics, communicable diseases, chemicals (including naturally occurring toxins, persistent organic pollutants), heavy metals, and illegal drugs. Unsafe food reportedly costs low- and middle-income nations \$110 billion annually in lost productivity and medical costs, according to the World Food Program. 125,000 foodborne illness fatalities among children under the age of five occur annually in about 40% of cases. Food-related illnesses impede socioeconomic development since they burden healthcare systems, discourage travelers, and jeopardize both domestic and foreign trade. This study seeks to answer the following research questions: how does expertise enhance and preserve Kenya's health security?; how does technical infrastructure affect fusion centers; and how does resource allocation affect fusion centers?

Theoretical Basis

The following theories are used in this article to describe the idea of collaboration amongst institutional networks, which has been the subject of numerous hypotheses: the 1972 book *Management Theory* by Kast and Rosenzweig; *A Critical Evaluation of the Resource-Based View Theory and the Open Systems Approach to Management* (Peter & Barney, 2003).

Management Theory

According to Kast & Rosenzweig (1972) several philosophers and theorists created general systems as a management technique for organizations after recognizing similarities with other organizational theories. After World War II, open systems theory was developed in response to prior views of organizations, such as Elton Mayo's human relations viewpoint and Henri Fayol's administrative theories, which considered the organization essentially as a self-contained unit. Essentially, the system approach to management acknowledges that a management system is a sophisticated formal system that is organized to function effectively and efficiently to achieve a desired goal. When a system fails to perform as planned due to inadequate communication, human conflicts, or a lack of goal congruency, the entire organization suffers. Even though there are many different management theories, the open systems approach to management is most suited for fostering communication within and among local fusion centers and implementing efficient information exchange. The idea of universal systems developed over time as an organizing theory, with its roots originally in biology and social sciences.

The concept of open systems theory essentially relates to the idea that organizations are heavily influenced by their surroundings. Other organizations that exert economic, political, or social factors comprise the environment. The environment also supplies critical resources that support the organization and contribute to transformation and survival. Management theory includes corrective actions such as goal planning, hiring people for internal and external roles, overseeing the product transformation process, organizing the end results, and managing the flow of information. The concept also strives for the continuous development of an organization. Despite the system's efficiency, the open systems management approach requires constant learning and improvement to evolve the organization rather than maintain a steady state. In essence, open systems theory aims to achieve dynamic equilibrium as stated by Chikere and Nwoka (2015).

The management theory is vital since it offers helpful procedures that help to fortify collaborations with outside organizations and enforce analyst training to facilitate information sharing among fusion centers. The aforementioned management theories give fusion centers the skills they need to often exchange information with their partners by developing constant communication, networking, and teamwork with outside organizations. The necessity for training all fusion center analysts is similarly supported by encouraging team members who share comparable jobs and responsibilities to improve their capabilities and productivity.

Resource-Based View Theory

The pioneers of this approach, Peter and Barney (2003), emphasize the firm's resources as critical determinants of competitive advantage and success. The model posits that a firm's resources are diversified, allowing them to gain a competitive advantage. It also assumes that resource heterogeneity would continue over time because resources required to implement business strategies are not fully transferable among enterprises. According to the Resource-Based View (RBV), businesses can be viewed as assemblages of resources and competences. The assets and skills used by businesses to compete are pricey, uncommon, exclusive, and non-transferable since they cannot be purchased or sold on the open market.

This approach places a strong emphasis on an inside-out business strategy, according to which a company can beat its rivals by utilizing its own internal, distinctive resources and competencies (Barney, 2006). Barney (2006) contends that in order to meet user needs, capabilities must be created rather than used as pre-existing resources. These include people with knowledge,

experience, skills, and talents, as well as machines, devices, and tools with specific technical requirements and characteristics. They also include methodologies, tools, and models installed within an organization, as well as various kinds of tangible assets like real estate and buildings, as well as intangible assets like patents and brand names.

A resource-based approach encourages an organization to promote competitive advantage, achieve firm excellence, gain an organizational edge, and enhance corporate performance and long-term viability. Product, production, and facility innovation are all examples of technical innovation, according to Liao et al. (2008). It has to do with goods, services, and technologies used in industrial processes. The resource-based view concept is centered on a company's strategic resources, such as its organizational, physical, and human resources. Due to the availability of resources, this theory therefore provides the basis for articulating how fusion centers would collaborate successfully and efficiently with the public health sector.

Methodology

This paper adopts a qualitative case study technique to analyze the role of fusion centers in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering in Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Mombasa, and Nairobi Counties in Kenya. The Counties are selected since they are densely populated and were representative of the characteristics that enhanced proper generalization of the study findings. The study employs a semi-structured questionnaires that was administered to healthcare officials. The first section entails the respondent profile data. The second section includes the study objectives that are divided into expertise and fusion centers; technical infrastructure and fusion centers; and resource allocation and fusion centers. The study employs open-ended interviews with Key Informants from different fusion centers to better understand their perceptions on integrating fusion centers and public health. Some government officials were interviewed via telephone for their perceptions of the fusion center variable. The findings from the fusion centers' senior leadership are integrated with academic literature to espouse how the public health sector is in need of reforms to curb medical insecurities.

The data collection for this research is acquired through evaluating various secondary sources. The role of the fusion centers in national security is examined through a review of open-source, public domain materials from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The feasibility and effectiveness of public health in fusion centers is scrutinized through a review of publicly available

materials from governmental websites, news coverage from scholarly journals or publications, major newspapers, and academic databases. Conceptual and general studies on the relevant theories associated with fusion centers are drawn from relevant peer-reviewed academic and other scholarly publications.

The questionnaire are pre-tested on groups of 20 healthcare facilities in five Kenyan towns: Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Mombasa, and Nairobi. Unclear questions are removed or amended for clarity. Top administrators, employees, students pursuing careers in healthcare, religious leaders, patients, and Kenyan government officials are among the demographic groups represented. A cross-section of Kenya's accredited medical institutions' top clinical leaders, doctors, the Kenya Medical Practitioners' Pharmacists and Dentists' Union (KMPDU), Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB) officials, patients, security personnel, Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) representatives, National Environmental Authority (NEMA), Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA) and the Kenya Revenue Authority representatives received 200 questionnaires. A total of 192 questionnaires are returned, yielding a response rate of 96%. The researcher ensured a conscious effort to include every participant in the sample, and every questionnaire that is returned is reflected in the final data analysis. Quantitative data is analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as other traditional quantitative methods including Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Chi-square. The survey data is entered into the Statistical Program SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) to evaluate, discuss, and draw the conclusions of the research. For the analysis of the demographic information, the descriptive statistics is entered into a Microsoft Excel sheet.

Discussion/Analysis of Findings

Fusion Center and its Role in National Security

As earlier alluded to in this work, fusion centers, as previously stated, are described as a "collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to maximize their capacity to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity" (Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006). The primary products of a fusion center are situational awareness and warnings underpinned by law enforcement intelligence. These are generated through an intelligence process that encompasses the collection, integration, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of information, ultimately producing actionable intelligence.

Furthermore, decisions must be made regarding the type and volume of information that fusion centers can access. According to Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins (2007), security clearances can range from Secret-level to Top Secret, and all the way up to Top Secret-Secure Compartmentalized Information.

In order to tackle crime, the government works closely with partners and important urban fusion hubs. Standard fusion center responsibilities, such as obtaining, assessing, and disseminating threat information, play a critical role in crime prevention and protecting local communities from violent crimes. The information hubs are uniquely positioned to empower frontline personnel to understand the local implications of national intelligence while also protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of people in their communities, by putting national threat information into a local context and assisting frontline personnel in comprehending terrorist and criminal threats they may encounter in the field. The information centers provide to the federal government about the threats and problems they experience in their local communities, allowing it to efficiently support local efforts.

Fusion Centers and Public Health

Public health, in the words of Acheson (1988), is "the science and art of preventing disease, extending life, and promoting human health through coordinated efforts and informed decisions of society, organizations, public and private, communities, and individuals." The purpose of public health is to protect the health of entire populations. These populations may range from an entire nation or geographical area to a single neighborhood. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention posits that public health is about preserving and improving the health of individuals and society as a whole by promoting healthy lifestyles, conducting research for disease and injury prevention, and studying detection, prevention, and response to infectious diseases. Levesque et al., (2013) asserts that there is consensus that population health takes precedence over individual health, and that public health adopts a population health approach that considers the genetic, behavioral, and socioeconomic factors influencing people's health and well-being.

The potential for disease outbreaks to weaken the relative power of a state, particularly during times of conflict, has had a significant impact on the securitization of illnesses (Curley *et al.*, 2011). Public health intelligence (PHI), according to Wei Xin Khong, a Public Health Officer, in the

Ministry of Health, Singapore, is the act of keeping an eye on risks to the world's health by gathering and analyzing data on public health-related events from open source, governmental, and other sources of intelligence. According to WHO (2019), the process of going from data to knowledge synthesis to action with the specific goal of early detection for effective response is known as public health intelligence (PHI).

Sullivan, Milner & Bowsher (2016) argue that several uses for the data acquired through medical surveillance activities include the foresight planning of potential strategic responses and the foresight planning of medical requirements. The acquisition, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental data are all considered to be medical intelligence, according to the United States military. The development of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in the military and civilian sectors as well as military medical planning and operations for the maintenance of the combat force are all relevant to this. Given that health is a nation's greatest asset, the healthcare and medical sectors are the foundational elements that must be strengthened in every nation.

The effectiveness and efficiency with which the healthcare and medical fields are handled and managed will substantially impact the resident's quality of life. According to Howard (1987) and Buchanan and Brock (1989), patients or their surrogates have rights to refuse life-sustaining treatments or request assistance in dying; drug experiments on children, demented or dying patients, and other incompetent or desperate patients; bias-free definitions of health, death, disease, and futility of treatment; and physicians' paternalistic deceptions and violations of patient confidentiality. Controversial subjects include abortion, selection, the involuntary hospitalization and care of mentally ill individuals, the removal of viable organs from brain-dead or cardiac arrest patients, and arguments for fetal testing. There are also conflicts of interest between medical professionals and their employers and third-party payers, both public and private.

In a different conception how public health surveillance systems can be strengthened, Njeru *et al.*, (2020) contends that strengthening public health surveillance systems that can swiftly identify and respond to the first cases of disease outbreaks and other public health emergencies calls for a methodical strategy. Early detection and local control of epidemics can be accomplished through the use of effective public health monitoring systems that provide fast and reliable information

(Anati *et al.*, 2015). The Integrated Disease Monitoring and Response (IDSR) strategy, introduced by WHO in 1998, is the main method for performing public health monitoring in African nations (WHO, 2019). The framework increases the use of surveillance and laboratory data to better identify and address the primary causes of illness, mortality, and disability in African countries. One of the primary purposes of IDSR adoption is to monitor illnesses and public health event trends to guarantee that any atypical disease patterns, such as outbreaks, are rapidly discovered, examined, and responded to (Njeru *et al.*, 2020). The integration of IDSR into the fusion center will enhance the capacity of the government in addressing public health issues.

Fusion centers can bring together security agency analysts and those who specialize in health and medical issues to comprehend and recognize health threats posed by counterfeit products, all crimes, hazards, and links between terrorism and criminal information, as well as health risks posed by pandemics, animals, agriculture, food, and environmental health, among other things. In the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with assistance and support from other agencies, a comprehensive plan outlining how national and international readiness and response activities will complement and improve overall public health and medical preparedness has been produced as part of the National Health Security Strategy. Information exchange forms part of the strategy.

The integration of the PH/HC community's perspective into the fusion center's collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence processes enhances the overall homeland security effort by increasing the level of preparedness and situational awareness of PH/HC groups across the country. Epidemics of both communicable and non-communicable diseases have also contributed to the loss of lives and property over the last 25 years. Consumption of contaminated grain has been connected to many incidents of food poisoning due to aflatoxin in Makueni, Machakos, and Kitui in Eastern Kenya, where 123 people died and 333 were hospitalized in 2004 (Mutugi & Maingi, 2019). Another non-communicable medical disaster documented in various parts of Kenya was industrial alcohol poisoning, the most serious of which occurred in Machakos in 2005, killing 53 people (Sharif, 2005).

Public Health in Africa

According to Nayyar GM *et al.* (2017), the proliferation of counterfeit medications has been referred to as a "global pandemic". The growing reports of a wide range of subpar pharmaceuticals, including vitamin supplements, in high- and middle-income countries serve as an example of the pandemic character of this issue (Taberner *et al.*, 2014). Worldwide, it is believed that counterfeit medications have resulted in deaths and extended, serious illnesses, earning criminals an illicit \$75 billion annually (Blackstone *et al.*, 2014). The gaps in tackling the issue are databases and intelligence information sharing between security agencies and healthcare professionals. Similarly, researchers, policymakers, regulators, and consumers have become increasingly vocal about the need to address food safety issues in Africa (Anyogu *et al.*, 2021; Jaffee *et al.*, 2020). Food fraud, on the other hand, has gotten less attention. Food fraud and food safety are related, and according to the WHO (2015), Africa already carries a heavy weight in this area due to the highest per capita incidence of foodborne illness.

Ghana is not far behind, where Sudan IV, a food dye that is known to cause cancer, is mixed into palm oil. Non standardized milk powder sold in Nigeria lacks animal protein, and vegetable oil sold in Kenya is manufactured from used cooking oil that is inappropriate for human use. Plastic rice, which is meticulously wrapped in the packaging of well-known companies, has taken the place of regular rice throughout Africa (KSCH IP, 2020). Not only are counterfeit and illegal items harmful, but they also have an impact on the sales of regional businesses.

Despite Kenya's legal system, alcohol related problems are still prevalent. In Kenya, the availability of illicit alcohol is expanding, packaged under the names of well-known alcoholic beverages (Mututho, 2014). Methanol is periodically added to the contents of these non-standard packages to increase their effectiveness, which can occasionally have disastrous results. Authorities aimed at preventing alcohol fraud are ineffectual, and through questionable business activities, illicit alcohol is standardized (Kwambai & Kimutai, 2017). The implementing officers lack the skills required to discern between legal and illegal alcoholic brands because they have not had any prior training. As a result, illegal alcohol is sometimes sold at licensed establishments under the pretense of being a well-known brand.

Cancer ranks just behind cardiovascular diseases as the second most common cause of non-communicable disease mortality in both Kenya and the rest of the world. According to Global

Cancer Statistics, there were 42,116 new cases of cancer in 2020 compared to 47,887 new cases in 2018 (MOH Kenya, 2020). Lack of concern for public health in the community can contribute to some cancer causes. The likelihood of poor health outcomes rises when an industry is situated in a rural location where the majority of the populace is weak owing to a lack of resources, understanding about their legal rights, or ability to influence policy decisions.

Interpretation of the Findings

The key issues under study were: expertise, technical infrastructure and resource allocation. Expertise was operationalized using knowledge, level of training and capacity building, while technical infrastructure was operationalized using technology, communication channel and leadership. Resource allocation, on the other hand was operationalized using government funds, transparency and accountability. In this study, which is a case study of the Kenyan cities of Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Mombasa, and Nairobi, the goal was to ascertain the function of fusion centers in combining public health and medical intelligence collecting. A sample of government officials participated in a semi-structured phone interview. Participants in the interview were questioned about the Fusion Center and how it functions on a daily basis. The responses of the participants were comparable. The term "information sharing" was used by all to describe their Fusion Center.

Additionally, participants were asked how long it generally takes for information supplied by Fusion Centers to other agencies to prompt action. If it were to be shared with public health in this particular circumstance, participants were also asked why. Are there sufficient resources to support the process? One of the top clinical executives responded, "The exchange of information is instant, but there are no established procedures on how information should be shared and utilized by the agencies. As a result, due to a lack of funding and a favorable legal environment, the idea of fusion centers has not yet been operationalized in the counties.

The Pearson Chi-Square was utilized to ascertain the association between the variables because the study's goal was to do so, as can be seen in table 1 below.

Table 1: Pearson Chi-Square

			Expertise	Technical Infrastructure	Resource Allocation
Expertise	Pearson Square Sig. (2-tailed) N	Chi-			
Technical Infrastructure	Pearson Square Sig. (2-tailed) N	Chi-	.786** .000 192	1 192	
Resource Allocation	Pearson Square Sig. (2-tailed) N	Chi-	.992** .000 192	.814** .000 192	1 192

(Source: Survey Data, 2023)

The study findings indicated that there is a significant relationship between expertise and technical infrastructure with $p=000$. This implies that expertise depends on technical infrastructure in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering. The study findings indicated that there is a significant relationship between expertise and resource allocation with $p=000$. This implies that expertise depends on resource allocation in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering. Furthermore, the study findings indicated that there is a significant relationship between technical infrastructure and resource allocation with $p=000$. This implies that technical infrastructure depends on resource allocation in integrating public health and medical intelligence gathering.

The results derived from the demographic responses provide important insights into the relevance of fusion centers for health management. Based on the results of principal component analysis and multivariate analysis of the chi-square test, the relevance of fusion centers to healthcare management needs was estimated to account for about 66% of the variance according to the responses. Considering the required technical infrastructure, and the readiness and performance of the emergency response system, when clinical leaders were asked to rate the success of fusion centers in healthcare, they gave each capability, resource, and stakeholder engagement a 50% score. After analysis by principal component analysis, it emerged that the employment of fusion centers in Kenyan healthcare management scored 67% variance. The significant variability found implies that fusion centers have the potential to considerably improve the effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare management in Kenya, particularly in the areas of crisis, intervention and preparedness.

Some of the respondents were asked if they could advise the Kenyan government to improve the Fusion Center Network. One of the respondents mentioned that she would want to see the Fusion Center Network launch an intranet system as a way of digitalizing its operations in that all Fusion Centers can work from a given shared system and can all log in to undertake research on emerging cases and merge with the cases that other Networks are working on. She argued that this will increase efficiency in terms of operations and also numerous issues could be tackled from a single platform. Hence the Kenyan government should heavily invest in the technical infrastructure.

The study findings also found that fusion centers encounter various problems in establishing a fully functional integrative information sharing environment. The perspectives supplied by the top administrators questioned for this research unanimously stated that they faced various obstacles due to a variety of resource limits and limitations, the majority of which were resource allocation. The obvious issues fusion centers face when relying on partners and customers to engage with and supply information to the fusion centers are timing issues, between the time information is relayed to the time information is acted upon.

The results of this study strongly suggest that governance or advisory bodies, whether internal to a single fusion center or representing several fusion centers in a state, are important in creating and maintaining successful information-sharing environments for fusion centers. It is therefore

paramount that the government works hand in hand with such advisory bodies to effectively and efficiently disseminate public health information hence prompting medical security.

Conclusion

In an era of increased globalization, public health and surveillance are increasingly important in biosecurity. Bio-surveillance is a new science that expands standard public health monitoring to include the identification and forecasting of bioterrorist threats and disease outbreaks in plants and animals. A reliable bio-surveillance system involves not only the consolidation of different sources of data, but also the analytical prowess to evaluate these data and highlight critical trends for disease diagnosis and prevention. Global health intelligence has emerged as a crucial component of national security in the twenty-first century. It strengthens national defense and deserves a larger share of the finances currently given to conventional warfare. In addition to directly protecting national security, global health intelligence indirectly supports security through soft power, human and health security systems.

Ethical considerations in health management are critical to nurturing a healthy and productive future generation in Kenya. Setting up ethical committees and centers to provide guidance to their constituents requires a collaborative effort from important stakeholders such as physicians, patients, healthcare organizations, and other entities. Through the application of ethical concepts, physicians should cultivate self-regulation and responsibility principles. The study ensured that the respondents' details were not disclosed and also the responses gathered from individuals were strictly for academic purposes. Fusion centers should participate in activities planned by PH/HC teams and organizations at the national, state, and local levels that are in charge of protecting the health of individuals, the community, and the environment. In addition, while conducting exercises to assess fusion center operations and information-sharing procedures, PH/HC organizations and agencies should send appropriate representatives. The development of action plans to close any gaps in collaboration efforts that are discovered during these exercises should be a joint effort between fusion centers and their PH/HC partners.

National development is insufficient without a healthy population, which is responsible for national productivity. An increase in a population that is not healthy reduces a country's wealth. Healthy people are assets, and their existence is not coupled with unhappiness or liability. Kenya's government invests a lot of money in universal health care to ensure that the country has a healthy

population. This article proposes that Kenya's security institutions work together with public health to promote nation building.

Recommendations

Policy makers within the government of Kenya need to create a legal framework that promotes cooperation between law enforcement and medical professionals. To enhance healthcare, it is advised that the Kenya government takes into account developing integrated fusion centers in significant counties. Establishing these centers would not only enhance information sharing between county and national governments but also improve public health and medical intelligence gathering. By acting as information hubs, these fusion centers could efficiently gather data, identify new threats, and aid in the decision-making process.

Fusion centers should prioritize recruiting and training personnel capable of effectively processing and analyzing information. This involves distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant data, understanding the nature of community-specific threats, and applying specialized knowledge to interpret findings. Such personnel would play a vital role in eliminating or mitigating existing threats.

Personnel from the public health and medical sectors should engage in regular collection, analysis, and dissemination of health-related information to law enforcement organizations. This includes sharing data on health security threats linked to the detection of suspected biological or chemical agents within a community.

Kenya's security agency should learn from countries that have successfully integrated public health into their fusion centers, by adopting their best practices. The state can facilitate this by encouraging international collaboration among officials managing integrated fusion centers. Such investment could dramatically enhance the country's capacity to respond to public health threats and emergencies.

National and county governments need to set aside funds to support the establishment of county fusion centers. The government can direct resources to fusion centers allowing the center to function independently. These centers would empower state security agencies to play a more active role in building a healthier nation.

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MENTORSHIP PROGRAMMES AND MILITARY PERFORMANCE AMONG THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES

By

Emmanuel Kipngetich Chirchir

Abstract

This paper presents an attempt to understand the relationship between mentorship programmes and military performance among the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF). In today's realm of strategic studies, mentorship is the foundation of any nation's military professionalism and is usually the fabric of organization culture and leadership. This paper interrogates the contribution of mentorship programmes to military performance among the KDF. This is achieved through the analysis of the efficacy of mentorship programme for leadership development in the Kenya Defence Forces with the aim of proffering strategies for enhancing leadership development. The article is anchored on the Servant Leadership Theory. A literature review was conducted, questionnaires, and Key Informant Interviews were held. The study established that in KDF the mentorship programmes have not been effective. The concept is unstructured and unknown to many members of KDF. The findings however, indicate that a well-structured program leads to improved performance, efficiency, and effectiveness. Equally, mentorship programs in KDF foster commitment and retention in service. The study concludes dedicated mentorship programmes can be executed in smaller group units and sub-branches. There is a need to institutionalize the program through a policy as currently, only informal mentorship frameworks exist. KDF needs to deliberately initiate strategies to ground this concept amid the financial commitment that comes with it.

Introduction

In the study of International Relations, it has been extensively argued that the military is the last instrument of resort in statecraft and as such, the men and women must maintain a high standard of professionalism in their actions. In the aforementioned discipline of study, it is widely argued that the environment that nation states operate continue to be vulnerable, uncertain, complex and sometimes ambiguous. These two sets of arguments therefore suggest that, as a military, retaining a competitive edge in the areas of innovation, transformation and the retention of high standards of leadership are key in guaranteeing state survival. Military leadership is significantly unique; it requires extremely high levels of competence and dedication to deliver on the national objectives irrespective of the sacrifice. The 21st Century has experienced quite a disruption on how we do things in the military, presenting a paradigm shift in our engagement internally to deliver on external promises.

Globally, militaries have a long tradition of mentorship. Mentoring continues to be advocated as a tool for equipping people to develop critical skills. Teaching, coaching, and mentoring is a core competency within this leader development model, yet many soldiers are dissatisfied with the mentorship that they receive. Furthermore, cultural values of the younger generation and the changing demographics continue to challenge the military's leadership development strategies. Most militaries lack an effective formal mentorship program in order to improve leader development, leverage the power of millennials, and increase potential in all categories of people. One way of transforming and developing a military officer to premier leadership ethics and culture is through mentorship. Mentorship has been identified as an effective means of developing leaders. Scholars such as Gleiman, Ashley & Gleiman (2020) have identified mentorship in civilian organizations as an effective means of developing current and future leadership empowerment. Additionally, Crisp and Kelly (2018) have recommended that mentorship relationships be included as part of the practice of developing leaders. This demonstrates the need for military organizations to design, implement, and modify formal mentoring programs to meet military exigencies.

The fiber of any nation's organizational culture and leadership, as well as the cornerstone of its military professionalism, is often mentorship (Gleiman, Ashley & Gleiman, 2020). Redaja (2019) asserts that modern military organizations recognize and encourage the incorporation of mentoring in the programs of development of leaders. One of the most essential elements of a military officer's transition and advancement to senior roles is participation in mentoring programs. Cojocar, & Ana (2014) note that in the United States of America for example, military officers are professionally encouraged to participate in mentorship opportunities where they acquire mentorship through specialized curriculum within the

organization and externally through select approved institutions. This is not only on professional expertise but also on maturity, critical team-building skills and other life aspects. In Kenya, KDF is undergoing a rapid transformation accelerated by the changing environment from the well-defined and predictable security to the current unpredictable and irregular threats accelerated by climate change, underdevelopment and poverty.

The military-wide initiative is anticipated to stimulate and support a continuity of local mentorship programs at subordinate commands, across multiple branches, and at educational institutions, which the KDF lacks. Mentorship programmes has not been properly embraced in the militaries as a valuable strategy for growing human capital despite possessing the above-mentioned combination of factors for leadership development. In order to make recommendations for improving the leadership development of the KDF, this article evaluates the effectiveness of the mentorship program for that purpose. This study investigates the idea of mentoring and how it affects the growth of leadership in the KDF. Specifically, the study seeks to examine the existing mentorship programmes for leadership development in the Kenya Defense Forces and to assess the efficacy of the existing mentorship programmes for Leadership Development in the Kenya Defense Forces.

Theoretical Basis

This paper is located within the Servant Leadership theory by Greenleaf in 1970 (Norris, Sitton, & Baker, 2017). This is an emergent leadership theory that postulates that leaders must serve first. Wilkin (2020) argues that various characteristics are consistently identified as associated with servant leaders. Significantly, the first list comprises what is stated as functional attributes since they are prominently repetitive in nature. The functional attributes are the characteristics and distinctive features belonging to servant leaders and are viewed through specific leader behaviours in the organization. They include vision, honesty, integrity, trust, service, modeling, pioneering, appreciation of others and empowerment. The other characteristics are identified as accompanying attributes of servant leadership. They include communication, credibility, competence, stewardship, visibility, delegation, influence, encouragement, listening and teaching (Norris, Sitton, & Baker, 2017). The accompanying characteristics are not secondary or subordinate in nature but rather complementary and prerequisite to effective servant leadership. Ryckman (2017) observes that a leader is not necessarily the person with the most distinguishable title, pay or longest tenure, but the individual acting as role model, risk taker, servant and promoter of others.

According to Harber & McMaster (2018), one characteristic that is given prominence in servant leadership is empowerment. Empowerment is viewed as the provision of permission to individuals to showcase their skills, talents, resources, and experiences, and to make their own decisions in the completion of the work assigned. In terms of application in the military circle, this means that junior officers are mentored through

delegation of authority and the capacity to make decisions that previously were the domain of senior officers. This involves senior officers entrusting the juniors with authority and responsibility based on mentored mutual agreements.

According to Sloan (2009), servant leadership fosters follower autonomy, growth, and learning, all fostered via empowerment and mentoring. This demonstrates how servant leadership is used in the military when senior officers appreciate the skills of the juniors through mentoring programs that provide them with the tools, instil a sense of shared power, and enable them to operate at their highest level. Since the servant leadership theory encourages the use of mentoring as a strategy for empowering and sharing decision-making between senior and junior officers, it is pertinent to this study.

Methodology

The study is conducted to establish if there exists a relationship between mentorship and leadership development in KDF. Both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies are used in the study. In order to create the research through the examination of secondary data, substantial library research is conducted, during which relevant studies and published works from national and international repositories are consulted and examined. Both quantitative and qualitative data are used in the research to uncover associations that need to be further examined with various categories of respondents within the study population. The study samples the desired population from the Kenya Defense Forces using both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. KDF leadership comprises three categories; strategic, operational and tactical level leaders. The study specifically targets these categories to bring out the true reflection in the institution in understanding the concept of mentorship and its influence on leadership. The study seeks to understand the nature of mentorship programmes for leadership development in KDF and their efficacy in KDF leadership development.

A sample of 132 general officers, senior officers, and officers drawn from the strategic, operational and tactical levels were given questionnaires and interview schedules to complete; the results were then collected for study. The respondents' quantitative data is gathered using the questionnaires. Using a purposive sample of senior military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the interview schedules were utilized to collect qualitative data. Secondary information is gathered from studies and publications found in national and international repositories that are relevant to the study topic.

Analysis of the Findings

The Efficacy of the Existing Mentorship Programs for Leadership Development

Today's world is more globalized and complex, and leadership development has changed from a traditional perspective to one that takes into account contemporary initiatives like mentoring. This is also a result of the knowledge that the contextual and intricate nature of leadership development aims to instil contemporary ideals like social awareness, interpersonal competency, and social skills. Leadership development has the ability to help new leaders flourish, particularly after taking up the succession baton from departing and retiring leaders in the field of rising multinational organizations. The armed services have made an effort to promote the advantages and positive features of mentorship (leadership and professional growth) while discouraging its disadvantages, such as nepotism and fraternization. There is also a growing trend in actualization of formal mentorship programs and education by the military services and especially since the year 2000 (Wilkin, 2020). The growth of mentorship programs in the private sector is mostly to blame for this. This shows that, in an effort to better its workforce, the military absorbs social science concepts like mentoring in the same way it incorporates new technologies into its fighting programs.

Xu & Anna (2022) argue that globally, organizations have credited mentorship for successful development of employees through inculcating motivation, inspiration and skills enhancement. Such organizations view mentorship as an innovative management strategy that significantly contributes to the rejuvenation, regeneration and survival from within. A more knowledgeable or experienced person acting as a mentor, role model, instructor, or even a supporter of a less knowledgeable or experienced person is seen in such organizations as a personalized relationship. The mentor is the person with more knowledge and experience, and the mentee is the person with less knowledge and experience. Both the mentor and the mentee gain from the mentoring connection. The advantages for the mentors are that they serve as role models for the next generation in fields where they are most interested and concerned, and they typically make sure that the mentee adopts the best practices (Melanson, 2007).

The mentor also benefits from mentoring since they have more time for more professional tasks, get organization recognition and rewards, and perform better at work because they are exposed to

fresh ideas. For the mentee, the advantages are evidence that they are prepared to go on to the next stage of their career growth and are determined to get the additional support they need to make that advancement. Compared to non-mentees, they also benefit from promotions, greater incomes and pay, less stressful work and career experiences, and fewer plans to leave organizations (Melanson, 2009). As such mentorship is a powerful tool for leadership development in every organization.

According to Rath, & Barry (2008) the importance of mentorship in leadership development is underlined in the wisdom of Strength-Based Leadership theory, developed by Martin Seligman in 2003, on the need to maximize the effectiveness, productivity, and success of companies. This is implemented through continuous development of the strengths of organizational resources such as people. As such mentorship has a significant role in development of leaders in organizations. For many organizations, mentorship is a cornerstone of professional development and career satisfaction. Mentorship not only improves job satisfaction but also enhances productivity, personal growth and rejuvenates passion for superior performance of individuals (Melanson, 2007).

The respondents of this study were presented with selected statements to assist in evaluating the efficacy of mentorship programmes in the Kenya Defence Forces. In this regard, the respondents were presented with the statement: “Efficacy of Mentorship and Leadership Development.” The findings are presented in **Table 1** in percentage (%).

Table 1: Effectiveness of the Existing Programmes on Mentorship in KDF

Efficacy of Mentorship and Leadership Development	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
Mentorship is a critical tool for KDF today and in the future	2	3	10	15	70
Mentorship is a driver to effective KDF leadership.	3	5	12	15	65
Mentoring programmes builds leadership, knowledge, skills and experience.	1	1	3	20	75
Mentoring leads to improved performance, efficiency and effectiveness.	2	3	5	10	80
Mentorship programmes have been incorporated as a critical tool for leadership transfer in KDF	1	2	5	55	37
Mentorship programmes in KDF foster commitment and retention.	1	4	5	40	50
KDF military officers who participate in mentorship programmes have a higher promotions ratio than the others who never participate.	2	3	5	55	35
The strength of KDF military leadership is through strategic level mentorship engagement	5	10	60	10	15

This study established that mentorship not only supports and guides the mentee but helps mentees achieve their own goals and those of the institution. The respondents strongly agreed (70%) that mentorship is a critical tool for KDF today and in the future. This was a key finding and suggests that KDF should focus on mentorship programmes in order to explore the full potential of

mentorship. The respondents again strongly agreed (65%) that mentorship is a driver to effective KDF leadership. By fostering a more inclusive and diverse leadership pipeline, mentorship programmes can help to ensure that the military and its leaders are better equipped to address the complex challenges of modern warfare. The respondents were also asked to state whether mentoring programmes build leadership, knowledge, skills and experience. Seventy five percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. This suggests that mentorship promotes a culture of learning and continuous improvement, and creates a strong sense of institutional knowledge and culture. The other statement that was tested was that mentoring leads to improved performance, efficiency and effectiveness. Eighty percent of the respondents strongly agreed that mentorship programmes help in improving performance in the military. By fostering a culture of mentorship, military leaders can have better clarity of goals and enhance accountability. On the statement that mentorship programmes in KDF foster commitment and retention, 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that mentorship can contribute to increased job commitment and retention by providing officers with the support, guidance, and career development opportunities they need to succeed in their roles. By fostering a culture of mentorship, the military can ensure that its leaders are invested in the organization and committed to its mission.

Other statements that the respondents were asked to comment upon included whether mentorship programmes have been incorporated as a critical tool for leadership transfer in KDF. Fifty five percent of the respondents agreed that mentorship can play a crucial role in leadership transfer in the military. This is attained by facilitating knowledge transfer, succession planning, cultural continuity, and improved adaptability. By investing in mentorship programmes, the military can ensure that it has a strong pipeline of leaders equipped with the skills and knowledge required to meet the complex challenges of modern warfare. On the statement on whether military officers who participate in mentorship programmes have a higher promotion ratio than others who never participate, 55% of the respondents agreed that officers who participate in mentorship programmes may have a higher promotion ratio than those who do not participate. The deduction here is that these programmes can provide officers with visibility, networking opportunities, and the support they need to succeed in their roles and advance their careers within the military. Notably, the majority of the respondents were neutral on the statement that the strength of KDF military leadership is through strategic level mentorship engagement. Sixty percent of the respondents were neutral.

Challenges to Mentorship Programmes in Kenya Defence Forces

Mentorship programmes have positive effects on development of leaders in all organizational setups. Success of leadership development is hinged on strengthening of the mentoring process to attain the needs of the protégé (Garcia, et. al., 2017). Empirical studies have been conducted on causes of mentorship failures and its influence on leadership development. For instance, Muir (2014) studied the influence of formal mentoring programme on leadership development in British Army. This is a qualitative case-study that employed in-depth semi-structured interviews from participants and mentors. There were three main themes that emerged from data analysis; mentor partnership-leader identity discovery, leader identity development through critical learning environment and leader identity development under self-knowledge. The findings showed that the principles of adult learning were instrumental components of leadership development process. There was a general belief that lack of formal mentoring was detrimental to the success of the mentoring relationship in the military.

A different study by Randolph Jr and Burl researched on the mentoring and success of African American Army officers in the US Army. The study employed qualitative explanatory case study design to explain the relationship between mentoring and African American Army Captain success levels. The findings show that the causes of the failure in mentorship were directly related to the lost mentoring time for junior officers.

Changya Hu, Jung-Chuen Wang, Min-Hwa Sun, and Hsin-Hung Chen (2008) investigated the connection between official mentoring roles and mentee outcomes in military academies in South Korea. The sample size comprised of 424 freshmen participants and 659 senior cadets from different military academies. Data is analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression analysis and the results show that there is a positive relationship between career mentoring and mentor satisfaction and provision of career mentoring. However, career mentoring has a negative relationship with commitment of freshmen to military career. Lack of career mentoring tended to contribute to failure of mentoring relationship between the freshmen and mentors.

As already discussed, mentorship has the potential for contributing to leadership development in organizations. However, it is notable that in some instances, the mentorship process may face

failures. There are many variables that may lead to failure of the mentoring process between the mentor and protégé. This discussion is presented below.

The respondents were presented with selected statements to assist in evaluating the challenges of mentorship programmes in Kenya Defence Forces. In this regard, the respondents were presented with the statement: “Challenges to Mentorship Programmes in Kenya Defence Forces.” The findings are presented in Table 2 in percentage (%).

Table 2: Challenges to Mentorship Programmes in KDF

Challenges of mentorship programmes	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
KDF does not support mentorship programmes	10	60	15	10	5
There is inadequacy in role models to support the mentorship programme in KDF.	5	65	15	10	5
KDF top leadership discourage mentorship programmes	5	70	10	15	5
KDF mentorship programmes are about being talked to by the mentor rather than engagement/exchange in reflective dialogue	0	5	30	60	5
Ethical issues among KDF Chain of Command negatively affect mentorship programmes	0	5	15	70	10
KDF does not allocate enough time and thought on mentorship programmes	5	5	5	75	10
There is insufficient budgetary allocation for mentorship programmes in KDF	10	5	10	65	10
Mentorship in KDF is viewed as a programme for the psychologically weak individuals	15	70	10	5	0
KDF does not accord enough mentorship programmes for junior officers.	0	5	5	75	15

A set of statements are presented to the respondents in order to establish the challenges that KDF is facing or likely to encounter in operationalizing mentorship agenda. In synthesizing the challenges to mentorship programmes in KDF, 60% of the respondents disagree with the statement that KDF does not support mentorship programmes. This statement rephrased suggests that leadership support is essential for the success of mentorship programmes in the military. Some ways in which leadership can provide support include: establishing a culture of mentorship, providing training, allocating resources, encouraging participation, monitoring progress, recognizing success and providing feedback.

In asking whether there is an inadequacy of role models to support mentorship programmes in KDF, 65% of the respondents disagree with 5% strongly disagreeing with the statement. This strongly suggests that KDF has enough pool of mentors that can help to create a more robust and effective mentorship programme, providing benefits to both mentors and mentees. The other statement that is tested is whether KDF leadership discourages mentorship programme. In this statement, 70% of the respondents disagree with the statement, with 5% strongly disagreeing. This suggests that KDF leadership has created a conducive environment that encourages mentorship programmes. Conducive environment for mentorship spans across aspects of training, morale and welfare.

The respondents were equally presented with the statement whether mentorship in KDF is viewed as a programme for the psychologically weak individuals. Seventy percent of respondents disagree with the statement, with 15% strongly disagreeing. Mentorship programmes in the military can be beneficial for all service members, including those who may be struggling with emotional challenges. Mentorship programmes can provide emotional support, guidance, and encouragement to mentees, but they are not designed to provide clinical interventions for mental health issues. If a service member is struggling with emotional challenges, they should seek appropriate mental health support from a qualified mental health professional.

The other statement that is tested is whether KDF mentorship programmes are about conversational engagement by the mentor rather than exchange in reflective dialogue. Sixty percent of the respondents agree with the statement. This is a concern as it reveals a flaw in the execution of mentorship programmes. Mentorship programmes are not just about being talked to

by the mentor but also about engaging in reflective dialogue and exchanging ideas. Effective mentorship involves a two-way conversation between the mentor and mentee, where the mentee can ask questions, share their experiences, and receive feedback and guidance from the mentor. The mentor should also actively listen to the mentee's concerns and provide support and encouragement. The goal of mentorship is to facilitate the mentee's growth and development, which requires a collaborative and interactive approach rather than a one-sided lecture.

The other statement presented to the respondents is the extent to which ethical issues among KDF chain of command negatively affect mentorship programmes. 70% of the respondents agree that ethical issues among KDF chain of command negatively affect mentorship programmes. Mentorship programmes rely on trust, respect, and open communication between mentors and mentees. When ethical issues arise, such as instances of unethical behavior or abuse of power by those in positions of authority, it can damage trust and undermine the effectiveness of the mentorship programme. Mentors who engage in unethical behavior may not be able to provide positive guidance and support to their mentees, and mentees may be reluctant to seek advice or guidance from mentors who they do not trust. Additionally, ethical issues can create a toxic work environment that may discourage individuals from participating in the mentorship programme altogether.

The respondents are presented with the statement that KDF does not allocate enough time and thought on mentorship programmes. 75% respondents agree that KDF does not allocate enough time and thought on mentorship programmes. This feedback supports the earlier concern of the efficacy of mentorship programmes in KDF. Allocating time to mentorship programmes is essential for the development of individuals. Although KDF leadership has conceptually accepted that mentorship is a useful tool for leadership development, the tool has remained a concept at most levels of command than operational. The other statement presented to the respondents is whether there is insufficient budgetary allocation for mentorship programmes in KDF. 65% respondents agree that there is insufficient budgetary allocation for mentorship programmes in KDF. The deduction on this statement is that budgetary consideration in support of the programme is likely to be of a lesser priority among other programmes in KDF. Without adequate funding, it may be difficult to provide mentorship opportunities to all members of the military.

The respondents are asked whether the KDF does offer enough mentorship programs for young officers in the interim. The KDF does not offer adequate mentorship programs for junior officers, according to 75% of respondents. Lack of mentoring in the military can result in diminished readiness, less resilience, greater risk of mental health problems, and lower retention rates, especially in today's context. Organizations must offer mentoring programs that foster the professional growth of junior officers and guarantee that they have the tools and resources they need to be successful in their positions.

Conclusion

This study assesses the efficacy of KDF mentorship programmes as a means for developing effective leaders. The study first confirms that there was a need to build a culture of effective mentorship in KDF. The effectiveness of the existing mentorship programmes in KDF is evaluated in terms of their ability to offer meaningful guidance and support to the mentee for personal and professional growth. The study determines that existing mentorship programmes offer benefits of career growth and opportunities for networking. Although KDF leadership supports mentorship, there are several factors that act as impediments to their effectiveness. The first challenge identified is that mentorship in KDF is a conversational engagement instead of a reflective dialogue between the mentor and mentee. Other challenges identified included ethical issues such as abuse of power, which affects the trust between mentor and mentee, failure to allocate adequate time for mentorship programmes, and insufficient budgetary allocation.

Although there are still gaps in the mentorship literature especially in Kenya, this experimental study in KDF provides preliminary evidence that a semiformal mentorship program can serve as an institutional mechanism that enhances leader efficacy development. The article specifically demonstrates that mentorship increases leader efficacy. Mentorship modules for strategic, operational, and tactical levels can help to improve mentorship programs. Institutionalizing the concept and allowing proper implementation strategies to include formal mentoring programmes orchestrated through training, seminars and other forms of engagements, while allowing for periodical assessment and feedback will go a long way in grounding the benefits of the program.

Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations:

There is need to institutionalize the programme through a policy since only an informal mentorship framework exists currently.

There is need to reinvigorate social events within military units as they foster social cohesion, which is a key ingredient for mentorship.

Define clear goals and expectations: Before launching a mentorship program, KDF should define the goals of the programme and communicate these to both mentors and mentees. Clear expectations should be established for both parties in terms of time commitment, communication frequency, and the specific skills or areas of development the mentorship will focus on.

Select mentors carefully: KDF should select mentors who have relevant experience, are skilled communicators, and are committed to the success of their mentees. Ideally, mentors should be individuals who have a track record of successful mentoring relationships and are able to provide guidance, support, and constructive feedback.

Train mentors: KDF should provide mentors with training on effective mentoring practices, including active listening, setting goals, providing feedback, and managing expectations. Mentors should also be trained on how to handle difficult situations and how to maintain a positive and productive relationship with their mentees.

Match mentors and mentees thoughtfully: KDF should consider factors such as personality, experience, and career goals when matching mentors and mentees. It is important to ensure that the mentor and mentee have a good rapport and that their communication styles are compatible.

Provide ongoing support: KDF should provide ongoing support to both mentors and mentees throughout the mentorship program. This could include regular check-ins, feedback sessions, and resources for both parties to help them achieve their goals.

Measure success: KDF should establish metrics for success and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the mentorship program. This could include measuring improvements in specific skills or knowledge areas, or tracking the progress of mentees towards their career goals

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MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF SECURITY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN KENYA

By

Fred Jonyo

Abstract

This research sought to examine the role of a multi-agency security approach in promoting national security, in the case of northern Kenya. Specifically, the study assessed the operational and structural framework of the multiagency security framework integrated in northern Kenya, and the effectiveness of the new security strategy. The findings of the research acknowledge that Kenya's security approach has over time transformed from a "single-handed" or single-agency approach to a multi-agency approach that involves the integration of diverse security actors who work as a team to enforce internal security and protection of the country from external aggression. Owing to the complexity of contemporary conflicts including terrorism and banditry and the rising role of human rights organizations, the traditional approach to securitization that involved the use of brute force and enhanced police presences as evidenced by the Wagalla Massacre has to some extent waned. Recent trends in the country's securitization as evidenced by the Lamu security response and Northern Kenya have involved the integration of Multi-Agency Teams as a response mechanism to addressing the region's insecurities.

While arguing in support of the integration of the multi-institutional security approach, the article highlights that this approach presents to enhances collaboration among security stakeholders, a condition which is very critical to addressing security issues. Through qualitative analysis premised on key informant interviews and reviews of secondary data, the essay paper also posits that the approach presents to intensify civil-military relations as it provides public-centered securitization and this may boost the country's public trust in security agencies hence easing intelligence gathering. The article also considers the approach as very critical because it brings together actors or stakeholders of diverse capabilities and expertise, an element that is central to harnessing security operations. This article concludes by reinforcing the need for the government of Kenya to fully support the integration of a multi-agency security approach in handling security matters not only in the northern frontier region but in Kenya at large. The findings of this essay

augment already existing pieces of literature that support and criticize the integration of a multi-institutional security approach in Kenya. The paper's findings can therefore serve as a tool for policy formulation and academic purposes.

Key Words: *Multi-Institutional; Multi-Agency; Single Agency; Northern Frontier District; Security Actors*

Introduction

Kenya's peaceful coexistence is largely threatened by multifaceted and complex security issues. Kenya continues to experience diverse security threats including cattle rustling, banditry, ethnic and religious radicalization, politically organized and orchestrated violence, arms smuggling, and small arms proliferation, among others. Since the 1998 United States of America embassy bombing, Kenya has witnessed high-profile insecurity incidents within its borders, such as the 2013/2014 Mandera clan conflicts, 2011 Baragoi cattle rustling, 2015 Nandemo cattle rustling, 2013 Westgate Mall attack, 2015 Garissa University College attack, 2012 /2013 clan conflicts in Mandera, 2002 Kikambala Hotel attacks and the recent increasing banditry cases in the northern part of Kenya. These attacks continue to put the country in a precarious situation as a result of massive losses of lives, destruction of properties, and curtailing Kenya's investment potential. The northern Kenya region also borders politically unstable countries including Somalia, and Ethiopia whose multiplier effects of political instability are felt in the northern parts of Kenya.

Northern Kenya is one of the regions in Kenya considered a security hotspot. For purposes of this study, northern Kenya constitutes the counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, and Turkana counties. A study conducted by Chome (2021) identified northern Kenya counties including Garissa to be of serious security threat in Kenya. The study findings identified Marsabit County as one of the northern Kenya counties that continue to witness not only several instances of insecurity but also serve as a potential hotspot for radicalization and recruitment.

In Abdi's (2011) qualitative study of the Kenyan northern frontier region, he highlighted diverse reasons why Kenya's northern region is a security hotspot. He links the insurgencies, banditries, and other forms of crime to the existence of porous borders in the northern region that allow for ease in arms proliferation including small arms and light weapons. Secondly, the region is highly vulnerable to climate changes and environmental degradation hence not only enhancing their

and stiff competition over ownership and control of natural resources hence nurturing conflicts among the pastoralist communities.

Thirdly, the region is largely arid and semi-arid and experiences diverse droughts and famine that make the locals more susceptible to joining organized criminal groups as a means of survival. Noteworthy, the region has also suffered the grip of state marginalization and exclusion and this has bred diverse social cleavages. Terror groups and other organized criminals continue to exploit the economic and political exclusion in northern Kenya to win recruits. For instance, the northern counties of Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir which are dominated by Muslim Somalis are considered the biggest victims of underdevelopment and unequal development. Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera are considered among the seven poorest counties of Kenya with poverty levels estimated at 63%, 66%, and 78% respectively, as compared to the national poverty level of 36% (Abdille, 2019). A report by the International Crisis Group (2019) indicates that of the three counties, more than three-fifths of the population lives on less than \$1.90 daily. In terms of embracing education, the primary school enrolment rate is estimated at 37% against the national rate of 77% (International Crisis Group, 2019).

A study conducted by Osamba (2000) on the twin phenomena of security threats, including banditry and cattle rustling, finds that cattle rustling has in the recent past undergone a transformation from a cultural practice to an international commercial venture that is bankrolled by cattle warlords and political elites. The evidence points to the fact that state marginalization, state repression, economic vulnerabilities, and militarism in the region have eased the exploitation of the locals by the political elites and the warlords for engagement in banditry and cattle rustling. Osamba (2000) findings also reveal that the northern parts of Kenya are prone to violence because of their nomadic pastoralist economy that serves as potential grounds for conflicts over competition for natural resources such as water and pasture.

Based on this background, it is evident that the selection of northern Kenya was primarily informed by the propensity of violent incidents in the region. The paper avers that whereas diverse security strategies have been integrated into the region since independence, the security situation remains concerning, with several raids, lives lost, and properties destroyed reported. The research argues that most integrated security approaches have failed to achieve their full objectives and have only had short-term positive implications due to their lack of engagement with all security stakeholders.

This article applies qualitative data analysis and aims to discuss the opportunities and costs linked to the integration of a multi-agency security approach to national security. The article explores this topical issue through a case analysis of Kenya's security approach in the Northern parts of Kenya, including the counties of Mandera, Isiolo, Marsabit, Wajir, Turkana, and Garissa, among others.

Theoretical Framework

This research applied the system theory as propounded by Emile Durkheim, which explains how societies are organized to enhance stability and ease in operations. The theory assumes that the society (system) is made up of sub-systems interlinked to one another for the efficiency and effectiveness of the society. This implies that there must be a sense of harmony and synchronized operations among all subsystems for the whole system to work as anticipated. The theory concurs with the realist philosophy that assumes that the state is the leading actor in international relations and operates like a system. For the state to effectively perform its mandates, including development and survival, it is constituted of diverse parts or arms and sub-arms that support the general operations of the entire system. The system theory posits that the failure of either the sub-systems that constitute the whole system is most likely to jeopardize whole system operations leading to a lack of efficiency and effectiveness in conducting its mandates (Bertalanffy, 1972). This is based on the fact that each of the sub-systems has a role to play in society.

One of the sub-systems of the whole system (state) is the Department of Security whose overall mandate is to enhance peace and security or maintain internal and external order within the state. The Department of Security is constituted of diverse elements, including the National Police Service, the Kenya Defense Forces, the Anti-Stock Theft Unit, and the Immigration Department among others. The failure of any of the elements or components that constitute the Department of Security is likely to culminate in the failure of the entire security system.

Noteworthy, the operations and the constitution of the multi-agency security approach embody the basic tenets of the system theory as propounded by Emile Durkheim. This is because the multi-agency team is usually constituted of multiple parts/elements /components that have to work in synergy for the multi-agency team to achieve its overall objective, including neutralizing and dismantling the growing influence of terror groups and other activities considered existential threats to peaceful coexistence (Kimonye, 2022). For instance, Kenya's Security Multi-Agency team is composed of the National Intelligence Service, the National Police Service, Kenya's

Disciplined Forces, and officers from the Immigration Department and also incorporates the civil society and the locals. This team is expected to work collaboratively and in synergy despite having a diverse set of skills and abilities and specialization on matters of security. For instance, whereas the Kenya National Police Service specializes in the internal security of the country, the disciplined forces specialize in protecting the country from any form of external aggression while the National Intelligence investigates and reports any form of intelligence or information to be acted upon by either the National Police Service or the Kenya Defense Forces or both.

The failure of any of the components of the Multi-Agency Team to perform its work efficiently, effectively, and in goodwill results in the failure of the entire team unless necessary mitigation measures are put in place. Therefore, as guided by the system theory, every part of the system must work independently and interdependently to enhance the general functioning of the system. This implies that in case the National Intelligence Service fails to collaboratively and independently perform its mandate, there is a likelihood of the team experiencing a lack of necessary intelligence to enhance its security operations.

Overall, the multiagency security framework is akin to the system theory. Just like the system theory that acknowledges the existence of several sub-systems, the multi-agency security framework acknowledges the existence and roles of several security components or actors that must perform their roles for the purposes of restoring peace and stability in the country. As Kimonye, (2022) points out, the multiple organs of the security sector must work in synergy and build a sense of trust, functionality, and cooperation to achieve the overall security goals and objectives. The security agencies must work in synergy based on their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses for effective coordination and performance. Therefore, based on a multiagency security approach, security actors and institutions form parts within the security system with specific mandates or functions.

Methodology

The overall objective of the study was to examine the role of a multi-agency security approach in promoting national security in northern Kenya.

The research relied on key informant interviews whose findings were corroborated by a review of secondary literature. The study adopted a case study research design approach and involved interviewing security actors in Kenya including the Members of Parliament in the northern Kenya region, members of the National Assembly Committee on Security, officers of the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and religious faithfuls among others. The rationale for selecting the respondents was largely based on the respondents’ experience and knowledge of security operations and strategies in northern Kenya. The interviews were conducted in Nairobi, Garissa, Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera, Isiolo, and Wajir counties. To augment the primary sources of data collection, this research also involved reviewing existing pieces of literature and scholarships from books, journals, and reports among others that assessed Kenya’s security strategies to neutralize insecurity threats, with a primary focus on the Multi-Agency Security approach in the northern frontier Region. A total of 15 respondents were interviewed for this study, as shown in Figure 1 below. The respondents constituted security actors as well as religious faithful who have played a central role in multi-agency operations.

Figure 1

Agency	Level of Respondents	Number
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)	Field Officer	3
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)	Regional Commander	3
Office of the President	Intelligence Officer	3
Judiciary	Judge	1
Parliament	Members of the Parliamentary Committee on Security	1
County Government	County Security Team	2
Interdenominational Team	SUPKEM, NCKK	2

Source: Author, 2023

Data Analysis

This qualitative study applied the use of thematic analysis approach to analyze primary data obtained through key informant interviews. Key themes were derived from the key informants' responses which guided this study's findings.

Ethical Considerations

The research was conducted in strict compliance with ethical standards to ensure high standards of reliability and validity to research findings. The study relied on very reliable and factual secondary sources. Key informants' consent was sought to take part in the research and their anonymity and confidentiality rights were preserved. Only respondents, above 18 years old and who have expert knowledge of the multi-agency security framework were interviewed for this study.

Limitations of the Study

Time and resource constraints are some of the limitations of the study. The study is also only limited to analysis of the status of the multi-agency security approach in northern Kenya consisting of the counties of Turkana, Isiolo, Marsabit, Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. Given the expertise of the researcher, he overcame these limitations by allocating enough time and resources for the study. He also ensured enough sample size was selected and adequate secondary literature reviewed to enhance the reliability and validity of research findings.

Analysis of Northern Kenya Security Outlook and Strategies

The northern parts of Kenya have had a troubled past since independence. Upon attaining independence, one of the security challenges that the Kenyatta regime experienced was the demand for self-determination and ultimate secession by the inhabitants of the northern frontier region, which constituted the modern-day Isiolo counties, Garissa, Marsabit, Mandera, and Wajir. The population of these counties had demanded secession from Kenya to Somalia. To make real their threat, the counties formed the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front with the sole objective of using both violent and non-violent approaches to ensure the Northern Frontier region seceded from Kenya (Alio, 2022). This movement was supported by the Somali government as the secession threat was viewed to conform with Pan-Somali nationalism goal. As observed by Khalif and Oba (2013), the secessionist move was not only fueled by the Pan-Somali nationalism goal

but also by emanating local grievances including regional discrimination and marginalization based on the individuals and religion as well as the imposition of government policies and administrative practices that conflicted their interests.

With Kenya considering the northern frontier regions' secessionist attempts as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Kenya declared a state of emergency in the region, which permitted the security agencies to detain locals without trial, restrict the freedom of movement and assembly and confiscate properties (Anderson, 2017). This security strategy that involved the use of brute force by security agencies without the involvement of the locals enhanced the social cleavages of the population in the northern frontier region. Conflicts intensified in the region with the locals demanding the withdrawal of the security apparatus in their locality, claiming the security personnel were using brutal force against the unarmed civilians, and massive human rights violations were also reported. In 1967, with the security situation worsening in the northern Kenya region, then Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda led mediated talks between President Jomo Kenyatta and Somali Prime Minister Mohammed Egal which led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to end the conflicts. Despite this resolution, the security situation remains precarious in northern Kenya, with the government relying upon the use of militant security strategies to address the menace. According to a multi-agency security officer,

In the past, before the integration of these new security strategy reforms, violence in the northern frontier region was believed to be sustainable through the excessive use of force. The security agencies adopted colonial tactics for conflict resolution. During demilitarization programs, the security agencies, without much consideration of the local's fundamental human rights as well as privacy would raid homes and villages and beat them up to force them into submission and even forcefully gather intelligence. This provided a short-term solution to the real problem as it reduced civilian-military relations.

Upon his assumption to office in 1978, one of the security challenges that the Moi regime experienced was the resurgence of the Shifta Wars of northern Kenya. The Northern Kenya population protested against the government of Kenya for development neglect, and excessive use of force against unarmed Somalis and rescinded their demand to secede from Kenya. As a strategy to contain the situation, the government of President Moi declared a state of emergency in the northern Kenya region and deployed security agencies in the region. Human rights groups reported

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A community leader interviewed for this study stated that President Kibaki seemed to have set the right trajectory of viewing security from a multifaceted approach. His regime was able to establish a direct linkage between security and human development. He initiated programs aimed at mitigating the development gaps in perceived marginalized regions. Essentially, his regime also to some extent enhanced community sensitization programs on security matters in most parts of the country.

Faced with the ever-increasing rates of insecurity and conflicts despite the integration of militant approaches to securitization, Kenya adopted a multi-agency security approach to help address the rising security issues. The rationale for this development was informed by the fact that the former approach largely lacked the necessary synergy and coordination among all security actors and hence failed to realize its intended objective including addressing the security situation in the Northern Frontier Region.

The rationale for the institutionalization of the multi-institutional agency is supported by responses from one of the government officials who acknowledged that, initially there existed a lot of institutional gaps in Kenya's security architecture. Most security interventions were less effective because of confusion in command and the high centralization of security operations. Most security operations never had definite missions and were less of local engagements and this led to resistance against security agencies and the difficulty in accessing necessary evidence and intelligence from the locals on security matters.

This implies that the adoption of the multi-institutional security approach was not only informed by the contemporary security dynamics but also aimed to address the existing security gaps that predominated the then security infrastructure.

Conceptualizing Multi-Agency Security Approach

The multi-agency security approach incorporates the process whereby institutions, entities, and agencies work together as a team in preventing, detecting, deterring, investigating, and prosecuting security threats within the country. This approach calls for inclusivity and enhanced coordination among all security actors and stakeholders in managing security threats in different parts of the country. As Schmid (2011) points out, this security approach calls for the working together of all core security agencies and supporting institutions in an integrated and coordinated manner to

improve information sharing and efficient response mechanisms to existing security threats. The approach not only appreciates the use of hard security strategies but also prioritizes the use of softer mechanisms that conform to human needs.

This security approach is considered very critical and necessary as it leverages the capabilities of different security agencies to handle security threats and this helps in both deterrence and prevention of crime. Rand (2016) holds the view that for a multi-agency security approach to be successful, the team's activities, roles, and responsibilities as well as expectations must be well-defined and synchronized to enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and lack of duplication of roles during a crisis. The multi-agency security approach also calls for the formal security actors to work in close partnership with the non-state actors including the civilians in an organized and synchronized manner for purposes of intelligence gathering and sharing. It is assumed that through this cooperation, the lack of public trust in security agencies will be bridged.

In Kenya, the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center embodies the tenets of the multi-agency security approach. This institution is tasked to coordinate and facilitate all counter-terrorism efforts. The institution brings together major security actors including representatives from the National Police Service, Kenya Defense Forces, the National Intelligence Service, and other state and non-state organs (Kivunzi & Nzau, 2018). The formation of this multi-agency task force was based on the assumption that this approach enhances the maximum utilization of resources and brings diverse capabilities of each security agency hence serving as a critical framework for coordinating and deterring terror-related activities. Rosenbaum (2002) opines that a multi-agency security approach is very effective in identifying and defining security threats as it accommodates diverse experts who may bring diverse approaches to handling security concerns.

The multi-agency security approach also calls for enhanced civil-military relations. Contrary to the traditional approach, it considers the civilians/locals as very important and pivotal security stakeholders whose interventions can help address existing security challenges. The approach considers civil-military synergies/fusion as central to gathering intelligence information on security threats among other considerations. The multi-agency security approach therefore holds the view that addressing security challenges calls for collaborative efforts from all security stakeholders including the police, military, locals, and other agencies including civil societies. This

approach considers addressing security issues such as banditry and terrorism as a collective action that brings together the police, the military, the locals, and other state and non-state actors.

The multi-agency security approach assumes that the different security agencies that constitute an established multi-agency team have diverse skill sets and capabilities and equipment that may be necessary for the detection, prevention, and response to security threats (Kibusia,2020). As Meteti (2022) observes, the multi-agency approach allows security actors from both the state and non-state sectors to share resources, expertise, objectives, and outcomes among others for purposes of effectiveness and efficiency of the multi-agency team. According to one of the officers of the National Counter Terrorism Center, Before the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center that embodies the multi-agency security approach, each organ of security worked in isolation. They worked independently and not interdependently. The National Intelligence for instance conducted investigations and obtained very reliable intelligence on security threats. However, they did not care to share such information with necessary security agencies because such a framework was not defined. Everything appeared to be in a mess and perpetrators of insecurity took advantage of the situation. The security agencies seemed less coordinated and organized. This prompted the government to form the NCTC in 2014 to enhance collaboration and coordination among security agencies.

A study conducted by Mwangi (2017) aimed at assessing the effectiveness of Kenya's multi-agency initiatives finds that whereas these initiatives have been successful to some extent, full achievement of the multi-agency actors has been thwarted by the lack of synergy among security actors in handling security matters. He described the challenges to the effectiveness, success, and efficiency of multi-agency initiatives to constitute a lack of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among security actors and stakeholders. Using a case analysis of the Westgate attack and the irresponsiveness of Kenya's security actors to salvage the situation, Mwangi (2007) links the situation to a lack of cooperation, planning, collaboration, and coordination among security actors.

One of the key informants who serves as a *Nyumba Kumi* officer lays the fears with the impending challenges to the multi-agency security approach to revolve around inadequate funds. While acknowledging the fact that the approach is quite necessary, the respondent noted that as integral parts of the multi-institutional security team, they provide very credible information to the security

agencies, yet they are usually not motivated. The respondent while showing frustrations indicated that whereas security is a collective responsibility, they at times feel demotivated. The respondent however appreciated the inclusivity that defines the multi-agency team and reiterated the need to provide remunerations to all the members of the security team, including the Nyumba Kumi officers.

Effectiveness of Multi-Institutional Agency Approach in Northern Kenya

Considering that the security issues in Northern Kenya are multifaceted, complex, and transnational, joint actions from the citizens, the state, the non-state, and other stakeholders are needed to effectively fight against it. Kenya's government assumes that by integrating a multi-agency approach, terrorism and other forms of crime efforts in Northern Kenya are likely to be synergized, and this will possibly result in ease in information sharing, intelligence gathering, and maximization of resources. As observed by Mugwa'nga (2023), the multi-agency framework not only helps in breaking information sharing barriers but also limits toxic competition among security actors, resource constraints, overlapping roles and responsibilities, power struggles, bureaucracy issues, and mistrust in security practice.

Since 2014, in handling the region's terrorism threats and infiltration, the government of Kenya has integrated different multi-agency initiatives. One of the Initiatives has been the use of the National Counter-Terrorism Center to manage the terror-affiliated threats in northern parts of Kenya and other parts. The National Counter-Terrorism Center brings together different sector actors with diverse capabilities, including the National Police Service, the Disciplined Forces, the Office of the Director of Criminal Investigations, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, and the Department of Immigration Services. This multi-agency institution coordinates and spearheads both state and non-state actors involved in violent extremism prevention and deterrence, including instituting de-radicalization programs.

Subsequently, the government has also instituted the Border Control and Coordination Committee, which consists of several security stakeholders and ensures that Kenya's border points are safe by preventing the entry of illegal immigrants, contraband goods, and small arms. The government of Kenya also enforced the Nyumba Kumi Initiative and other community policing initiatives to facilitate security operations in the region and Kenya at large.

While raising optimism in the multi-agency security approach, a field officer from the national counter-terrorism center noted that the contemporary security approach in northern Kenya is quite inclusive and brings on board both disciplined forces and civilians. Civil-military relations have been enhanced. The respondent asserted that because of local engagements, they have been able to identify diverse security hotspots, and banditry routes, make diverse arrests, and neutralize impending attacks courtesy of tip-offs from the civilians. This *modus operandi* presents to better the security situation in the Northern Frontier Region.

The government of Kenya has also responded to the security situation in northern Kenya by imposing night-to-dawn curfews to enhance security agencies' patrols. Currently, the multi-security agencies operating in northern Kenya counties have imposed night-to-dawn curfews in major counties, including Turkana and some North Rift counties, that are considered hotbeds of insecurity. The government has redeployed additional security personnel with divergent capacities and capabilities to beef up security in the region. For instance, on April 13, 2023, the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination promised to deploy additional security personnel constituted of the Disciplined Forces, the National Police Service, and the National Intelligence Service among others in an attempt to thwart the growing banditry and terror infiltration activities within the region. The government also deployed an additional 2000 police reservists in Northern Kenya and North Rift to facilitate the process of restoration of peace and stability in conflict-prone areas. The government of Kenya, through legislative action in 2013 also deployed the army in the Turkana region, Samburu, Marsabit, and West Pokot in an attempt to address the rising clan rivalry in the region.

One of the multi-agency security approaches that have yielded positive efforts in the northern frontier region has been improved civilian-military/police relations through increased local involvement in security matters. The government of Kenya has in the recent past brought to the limelight major security stakeholders in the region in an attempt to address the security situation contrary to the 'single-handed' approach that it initially integrated. For instance, the clan elders, police and military reservists as well as leaders from faith-based organizations including the SUPKEM are currently involved in most security operations in the northern region. They have remained critical sources of security intelligence, implementing security policies and encouraging peaceful coexistence among people who live in the region. The implementation of the Nyumba

Kumi Initiative and other community policing programs in the region have helped in enhancing security to some extent.

This multi-agency security approach, as exemplified by community members' engagement in security matters has been very critical in intelligence gathering and information sharing. For instance, preliminary reports suggest that most arrests of accomplices of crime in the northern region and other parts of Kenya have been conducted through the sharing of very credible information by the locals. Civil -security relations have to some extent helped boost public trust in security agencies. Subsequently, as a result of community engagements, there have been several barazas and community engagement forums led by religious leaders and locals aimed at emancipating the locals on the centrality of living in a peaceful society that is free of conflicts and violence. The sensitization programs conducted by the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya as well as the human rights organization continue to serve a very critical role in so far as deterrence of banditry and terror activities is concerned within the region. The sensitization program also focused on reminding the locals of their constitutional responsibility to report suspected criminal practices or cases. The security approach has also involved organizing engagement forums by religious leaders and locals to emancipate the locals on the centrality of peaceful coexistence and living.

A religious faithful noted that the incorporation of the Nyumba Kumi Initiative and the members of the Inter-Religious Groups is one element that has boosted their security operations. The Nyumba Kumi has in the recent past served as their linkage to the community and a potential source of information on security threats. Religious players have done a splendid job, especially in reminding the locals about the need to embrace the religious virtues of peace, love, and diversity. As a result, both political and religious tolerance has improved within the locality.

The inter-agency security operation in northern Kenya has facilitated the establishment of an efficient security intelligence network which is very critical for security responses. For instance, due to security collaborations, the propensity of terror attacks has greatly reduced in northern Kenya when compared to earlier times. This is because the collaboration has been central to information sharing and intelligence processing which continue to inform prompt security responses. The multi-agency team in the northern frontier region has been quite good in conducting defensive operations aimed at curtailing the growing instances of existential threats in the Northern

Frontier region. For instance, the Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (2023) reports that a total of 29 people were arrested in relation to terror activities, with 9 from Garissa County, and attributes these arrests to the ability of the local population to share actionable and reliable information to the multi-agency security team. The Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (2023) report further acknowledged that in the period between January and December 2022, there was at least one terrorist arrest in the counties of Nairobi, Tana River, Kwale, Narok, Mandera, Nyeri, Laikipia, Kilifi, 3 unspecified county arrests were also made while both Mombasa and Lamu reported 4 and 5 cases respectively.

The multi-agency security framework should be fully embraced and integrated as it has aided to some extent in establishing collaborative efforts in the restoration of peace and stability in the northern Frontier region. As the former president Uhuru Kenyatta observes, this approach has helped address institutional gaps in security infrastructure, especially in terms of roles and responsibilities overlaps, resource utilization, and lack of public trust in security architecture hence serving an incredible role in enhancing the operational capacity of security infrastructures in the northern Frontier region. Further, the president indicated that most resources and human forces in the war against all forms of insecurity in the Northern Frontier region are now harnessed and coordinated through the multi-agency team that has a well-defined chain of command hence limiting instances of challenges such as doctrinal differences among security actors. This has helped in synchronizing security operations within the Northern Frontier Region.

In supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of the multi-agency security approach, one of the elected officials stated that, since the multi-agency framework was implemented in the Northern Frontier Region, insecurity-based fatalities have significantly reduced, and suspected arrests of criminals have heightened due to the presence of very active preventive and counter-preventive measures. The team despite diverse constraints has improved its operational capacities and developed a very coordinated chain of command and information sharing. The parliamentarian noted that the country stands a better chance of neutralizing the security threats in the northern region through the multi-agency security framework than the "single-handed" approach traditionally integrated.

As Kibusia (2020) study finds out, the multi-institutional security framework has created a sense of seamless coordination and collaboration among security actors hence making them much more

responsive to security threats. The synergy of security actors constituted of stakeholders with diverse abilities and capabilities are central for purposes of security planning, evacuation, investigations, and conducting raids and counter raids aimed at neutralizing the threats of insecurity. Civil-military synergies have led to the locals of Northern Kenya not viewing the security actors as accomplices of crime but rather law enforcers continue to support multi-agency security operations in the Northern Frontier region.

A field officer of the National Counter-terrorism while holding the view that the multi-agency security approach is ideal for addressing the security gaps in Northern Kenya provides necessary suggestions on how to enhance coherence during operations. The field officer noted that security teams that constitute a multi-agency team usually go through a different curriculum during training. As a result, they obtain new skills that are varied in the long run. They are also trained differently in the handling of security agencies. She observed that due to this diversity, there is need for a collaborative training of security agencies before conducting joint operations. This will lead to the coherence of security operations.”

Conclusion

This study examined the role of a multi-agency security approach in promoting national security through a case study analysis of northern Kenya. The research found that whereas multi-agency efforts in the northern frontier region of Kenya present positive opportunities for neutralizing security-related threats in the region, it is important to highlight that the multi-agency task forces have suffered some limitations that have curtailed their ability and capability to fully neutralize terror and banditry practices in the region. One of the setbacks has been inadequate funding which has made it quite complicated for the security agencies to roll out several actionable multi-agency security-affiliated practices including sensitization programs, support to the community as well and efficient and effective patrols. The other reported constraint associated with the multi-agency security approach is the lack of necessary equipment and facilities to support multi-agency activities. The study finds that owing to the dynamism and trends that define contemporary conflicts in the northern frontier region, a multi-institutional approach is central to dismantling and neutralizing insecurity threats as it provides a better opportunity for a collaborative security system that leverages the capacity and capabilities of every actor in the security sector and also builds

public trust on the security infrastructure hence facilitating information sharing and security response mechanism.

Recommendations

To boost the responsiveness and operational capacity of multi-institutional security agencies in the Northern Frontier Region, both the state and the non-state actors should;

The national government in collaboration with county governments, should develop efficient and effective standard operating procedures that guide multi-agency initiatives to mitigate the challenges associated with multi-agency teams including bureaucratic politics and duplicity of roles and responsibilities. The standard operating procedures should clearly outline the chain of command and control mechanisms to enhance operational efficiency.

The security actors should conduct joint training and seminars for enhanced cohesion and understanding among security stakeholders. This will also help in establishing the synergy of operations among the security stakeholders.

The national government should establish an independent institution to mobilize multi-agency and institutional resources and synchronization of resources.

The national government and county government should increase and enhance the timely allocation of resources to support multi-agency operations and activities, especially in terms of sensitization programs and remunerating the community security leaders.

Embracing good governance practices including fairness and transparency in the constitution of multi-agency strategies.

The non-state actors, the national government, and the county government should pursue investment opportunities that harbor employment creation and improved livelihoods hence eliminating/ reducing the locals' vulnerabilities to engaging in crime.

The national government and county government should collaborate with neighboring nations and embrace a region-based multi-institutional security framework in handling transnational crime.

E-policing and enhance rapport between the community and the security agencies should be enhanced to facilitate information sharing and gathering. This can be achieved through active

security agencies' engagements in local initiatives as well as enhancing professionalism in their mandates.

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