NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya

CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (CSSS)

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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY–KENYA

Vision

A centre of excellence in training, education and research in national security and strategy

Mission

To advance human intellectual capacity in the management of national security through the pursuit of education, research, innovation, development and community outreach to produce graduates of honour and integrity, capable of securing the country and enhancing national performance.

Philosophy

To contribute to training and education, research, strategic leadership development and practice in national security and strategy for the transformation of Kenya

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Foreword

National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) was chartered on 27 May 2021 as a specialised institution of national strategic importance to offer education as well as training and conduct research in defence, security and strategy. In pursuit of this mandate, the University aspires to build capacity for teaching, research and innovation in order to foster intellectual abilities as well as professional skills for effective response to current and emerging security issues in an increasingly dynamic environment. Importantly, the University recognises the nexus between security with development and hence the centrality of collaboration with other organisations and stakeholders to offer solutions to contemporary defence and security challenges of the 21st Century and beyond.

In this regard, this inaugural *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya* offers a platform to share knowledge derived from research findings generated by the University community, resource persons from security agencies, scholars and industry experts. It is, therefore, my honour to introduce Volume 1 Issue 1 (2023) of the *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya*; a pioneer thematic collection of peer reviewed research papers themed *Human Security for National Development.* The Journal's initial issue focuses exclusively on the human security dimension within Kenya and the wider Eastern Africa sub-region against a backdrop of the prevailing and emerging social, economic and political realities. Indeed, the Journal examines topical security issues and suggests short to long term policy interventions in support of shared prosperity.

I commend the Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS) for producing a concise collection proffering thought-provoking thoughts as the basis for inclusive national and regional peace and stability, in support of human development. Finally, we hope this inspiring Journal whose authors emphasize the search for

and implementation of innovative defence and security policies will not only appeal to the readers but also ignite dialogue among scholars and industry practitioners; thanks to the relevance and diversity of ideas on a region whose strategic and security importance has a global posture.

Lieutenant General J M Mwangi MGH CBS
Vice-Chancellor, National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K)

Word From the Chairperson Editorial Board

On behalf of the Editorial Board, I am delighted to introduce this inaugural thematic volume of *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya.* This is a product of the Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS); a Think Tank established to strengthen research in security, strategy and policy. This pioneer biannual issue-themed *Human Security for National Development* integrates traditional and evolving security approaches that impact the security of the individual as well as national development, especially in Kenya and in the Horn of Africa which is characterised by a complex peace and s ecurity environment.

This Volume explores diverse aspects of security and megatrends affecting human security: from an analysis of energy security as a pathway for developmental transformation in Kenya; an analysis of Kenya's model for preventing and countering violent extremism and whether the model embodies human security; to the debatable subject of the use of hard approach to security in realising the national development agenda. Notably, the Volume highlights policy measures and options that may assist to consolidate peace and security with emphasis on individual security, for instance by improving living conditions among the populace.

I commend the Editorial Board for putting together a timely academic artifact whose authors display immense expertise not only in regard to complex challenges facing the sub-region but also in providing insights into potential policy measures in support of Human Security and National Development. This maiden edition thus deepens the understanding of broad perspectives on how security may positively impact peoples' security and well-being, various regional security dilemmas and opportunities therein. The Journal thus serves as a link between academic research on the one hand and policy and practice on the other hand.

I extend special gratitude to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, Defence Headquarters and the University Council for the guidance, financial, technical and material support leading to the production of this inaugural journal. I also underscore my appreciation to the authors and peer reviewers for their academic rigour and insightful critique.

It is my aspiration that the comprehensive and consistent flow of evidence-based material herein will enhance regional and global intellectual discourse in the areas of defence, security, strategy and policy resulting in a more secure world.

Brigadier (Rtd) A Mohammed, EBS
Director, Centre for Security and Strategic Studies

Word From the Editor-in-Chief

The novel Journal of National Security is an undertaking of the National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K), aligned to its philosophical ideal to contribute to education and training, research, leadership development and practice in national security and strategy for the transformation of Kenya. The Journal will focus on disseminating vibrant, promising, and multidisciplinary cutting edge research in the broad field of security, development, strategy, national interest and policy. The aim of this flagship initiative is to facilitate an in-depth dialogue and synergistic collaboration between both the defence and national strategy community, security agencies, academia and industry practitioners' community.

The Journal will regularly publish high-quality articles, including empirical research papers, research notes, and reviews. The Journal thus welcomes submissions that offer significant value or new knowledge related to all areas of defence and national interest.

Volume 1 Issue 1 (2023) of the *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya* explores the wide range of subjects under the theme 'Human Security for National Development'. In this premier issue, there will be a total of nine articles and two book reviews that cover a broad spectrum of issues such as: the evolving role of military in national development; energy security; cyber security in economic and social development; preventive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa; gender perspectives on human security; Kenya's model for preventing and countering violent extremism; Kenya's response to climate change, and food insecurity; security sector reforms for sustainable human security and the effects of United States withdrawal from Afghanistan on human security. One of the book reviews examines a book titled: *I am a Girl from Africa,* and another is *Hope and War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020*. It is my great hope that the reading of this Journal will forthwith spark meaningful discussions, debates, and collaborations.

We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the Vice Chancellor, NDU-K, Director CSSS, associate editors, editorial board members, peer reviewers, contributing authors, and many others for making the first issue of this Journal available. We cordially welcome your contributions for the next issue whose theme will be on *The Role of Security Institutions in National Development.*

Peterlinus Ouma Odote, PhD
Editor-in-Chief

Examining the Evolving Role of the Kenyan Military in National Development

**By Raudhat Saddam, Janice Nabwire Sanya, Daniel Iberi,
Asia M Yusuf, Dr. Mumo Nzau**

Abstract

Military involvement in enhancing human security has been a trend in the last few decades. Under the realist paradigm, the state is the main actor in the international system, and its survival is dependent upon sufficient power to pursue and defend its national interests. However, the security spectrum has broadened beyond traditional external military threats. Thus, human security has emerged with the individual being the referent object. Government initiatives, towards building state capacity and development, deal with enhancing human security, making it possible for the military to intervene and boost development efforts from within. Expectedly, the involvement of the military in development has provoked multiple arguments. Scholars have argued that this approach diverts already scarce manpower and resources from their primary task. Due to the perceived danger that their neighbouring states pose to them. The involvement of the military in national development has been justified on the grounds that the disciplined forces have filled in where civilian authority had failed or underperformed. Hence leveraging on the unique capabilities and capacities within the military. This paper examines the evolving role of Kenyan military in national development. Desktop research, review of existing literature such as books, journals, reports, legal documents, and articles, are used in this research.

Key Words: *Development, Military, Human Security, Nation, Security.*

Introduction

Traditionally security has been strictly understood in military terms, according to classical political thinkers. As highlighted by Sabine, the military was not envisioned as having any place or role in internal state matters (Sabine, 1973). Instead, the military's role is solely viewed through a security lens, and its sole function is national defence. This means that there is a lack of a central government that can enforce laws in the international system (Donnelly, 2000). However, this does not imply that the international system is necessarily chaotic, instead, the power of a state is countered by the power of another state. In this system, states focus on their own capabilities and how they can exercise influence over each other. Military forces are an example of such a capability perhaps the most important kind. The size, composition, and preparedness of two states' military forces matter more in a short-term military confrontation than their respective economies or natural resources (Donnelly, 2000).

This strict understanding of the role of the military in state matters has shifted during the contemporary period. There has developed an understanding among some scholars that focusing on safeguarding the 'core values' of a state from military threats that emanate from outside its borders is no longer adequate (Krause & Williams, 1996). The Neorealist understanding of the concept of security continues to be questioned and pushed. Following publications such as the United National Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994, the idea that the state is the referent object of security is challenged (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). The report was key in highlighting that the threats that face the existence of a state are not just external, and the importance of prioritizing the citizenry as the referent object in the international system and of security.

The focus on human security at the individual level has led to the inclusion of a range of issues into the potential threats that require a larger focus such as economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration (Krause & Williams, 1996). Human security and human development are issues that gained traction after the Second World War when a new institutional liberal order devised a two-fold security agenda, hoping to put an end to the widespread

conflict that had characterized the majority of the 20th Century (Dowdeswell, 1996). The assumption that a nexus exists between security and development continues to be pushed through two key arguments. Firstly, that underdevelopment serves as a threat to the people and also contributes to the formation of a breeding ground for other threats, such as conflict or war (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). Secondly, the resulting conflict from underdevelopment leads to the deterioration of human and developmental security, thus trapping communities into a cycle of 'low-development-conflict-worse-harsher-conflict', according to Donadoni (2018). Meaning that conflicts emerge due to the conditions that characterize underdevelopment, and the resulting conflict then leads to more underdevelopment, continuing the cycle.

It is to this end that issues surrounding human development are increasingly being prioritized in matters of national strategy, while more actors in the international system such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), individuals, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), international bodies/organizations, as well as states continue to push for agendas that support human development and equity. Internally, states are making various efforts to ensure that the citizenry's needs are met and developmental agendas and goals are achieved. While notable effort has been made, and there is notable progress in the quality of lives that people lead as a result of this, there are still areas where the civilian-operated parts of the government have fallen short. Due to the resources that exist within the military such as human resources, financial, and infrastructural resources among others, the military has been engaged in efforts to enhance national development efforts. Some examples of these have been highlighted in this paper.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is underpinned by the understanding of Human Security and the crucial place this concept of security plays in the survival of the state. Before the end of the Second World War, the dominant concept of security was state-centric, which was a result of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. The Westphalia Treaty has had lasting effects on International Relations, the most significant of which is the idea of state sovereignty (Patton, 2019). It is under this treaty that states have focused on protecting and preserving their internationally-recognized

borders. This has meant that territorial integrity, political stability, military and defence arrangements and economic and financial activities have been the focus of security institutes (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2010). However, as was highlighted in the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 1994, the concept of security has for too long been narrowly interpreted.

Human security is freedom from fear and want. This concept of security focuses on what safety means to people in the 21ˢᵗ Century. There are four essential concepts tied to human security as outlined in the UNDP Report: first that human security is universal, meaning that it concerns all people around the globe, no matter the country of origin. Second, the components of human security are interdependent. Thus, when the security of one group of people in one part of the world is compromised, this has an adverse effect on another group of people in another part of the world. Third, it is easier to secure human security through prevention rather than intervention. Comparatively, it is less costly to deal with the threats to human security before they manifest than after. For instance, it is easier to invest in primary health care, than it is to deal with HIV/AIDS outbreak. Fourth, human security is at its core human-centric. Human security deals with how people live within society, the social opportunities available to them, and whether they reside in conflict or peace (UNDP, 1994).

The international system has shifted, at the global level. Human security responds to the threat that global poverty, climate change, and illegal immigration etc pose to society. The need for global safeguards from these threats is imperative. There exists a security-development nexus The nexus assumes that as former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan once stated, "development and security are inextricably linked" (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). As stated before, underdevelopment can create the breeding ground for conflict. Thus, this paper proposes that similar to the institutional shift that has occurred where policies now reflect on the UNDP Report, for instance, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Kenyan military should be engaged in development efforts in the country to enhance national and global security.

Methodology

This is a desktop review making use of secondary data from books, journal articles government documents and Newspaper reports to analyse the the activities of Kenya military in different spheres of development.

Discussions and Analysis of findings

Military Involvement in National Development Efforts

The functions of the United States (US) army following its independence through the 1800s act as a good example of how crucial the military can be in national development. It not only acted squarely on defence and security but also undertook the development of its state, especially important infrastructural projects and supply of critical goods and services. It is plausible to say the US army was and has been a key contributor to the developmental progress of the United States.

According to scholars such as William Adler, the army used to supply public goods that were needed for economic development surpassing those that individual states could supply during a time when they were unable to do so (Adler, 2021). According to Alder, the army contributed widely to the state's economic growth and accelerated industrialization sooner than would have been the case in early America (Adler, 2021). The army trained and provided the private sector with engineers during a time when engineering expertise was scarce and also established the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) on March 16, 1802, which has been an important instrument in the development of the state. At the moment, USACE provides outdoor recreation, is the nation's environmental engineer, owns and operates more than 600 dams, provides technical and construction support to more than 100 countries, researches and develops technologies to protect the nation's environment and enhance the quality of life among other activities towards development (USACE, 2022).

In the health sector, the US army has been at the frontline for more than 200 years, and this has led to significant advances in the medical field. It is the army doctors that came up with the first US-based surgical textbook and that established the

first American school of preventive medicine and public health (USAMRDC, 2022). There are also medical research labs established by the US military both in the US and abroad that conduct research and initial development of biologies to prevent infectious diseases. The biologies include; devices, diagnostics, drugs, vaccines, and insect repellents. The history of the US military research lab abroad can be traced back to around 1900, with the establishment of the Yellow Fever Commission in Cuba (Maj. Gambel, 1996). Today, there is the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command that manages and executes research in five basic areas: military infectious diseases, combat casualty care, military operational medicine, chemical biological defence, and clinical and rehabilitative medicine (USAMRDC, 2022).

In his article, Jonathan Kaplan describes the Israel army, which is officially known as Israel Defence Forces (IDF), as a central institution in Israeli society. Kaplan argues that IDF is generally perceived to be a 'nation builder' and other than defence, which is its primary goal, has taken up many other social tasks (Kaplan, 2015). In education, for example, there is a special system of apprenticeship programs under the IDF that caters for young Israelis who have records of juvenile crime or delinquency. These young people are each allocated to a senior mechanic who acts as their personal mentor. This program has been successful in reforming individuals and increasing the number of trained mechanics in Israeli society. It has also been beneficial in reducing the number of potential members of street gangs and of those who might become involved in more serious crimes (Lt. Shaw, 1979).

Within IDF, there is a unit called the *Nahal* (Fighting Pioneering Youth) through which the army established military settlements that combined farming with regional defence. These settlements were usually founded and maintained by Zionist youth groups but were later turned over to civilian groups. The *Nahal* established most of the Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley and the Arava (Kaplan, 2015).

Senegal is described as a democratic model with a history of peaceful transitions of power, free and fair elections, and accountable civilian government since its independence despite being in a region suffering from democratic backsliding

and coups (State Department, 2022). While Senegal appears to be 'weak' from an institutional perspective, its military has been proactive compared to all other state institutions in national development (Matisek, 2019).

Its first president Léopold Sédar Senghor and General Diallo assisted in the development of the concept of Armée-Nation. The concept has been popular since the early years of independence and has acted as the backbone of the military's participation in development activities. It can be argued that this concept has been accepted by civilians and is also widely studied in the military. Through the spirit of Armée-Nation, the Senegalese military participated domestically by setting up a civil-military committee in 1999 to support development by bringing together representatives from parliament, the military, government ministries, civil society and the private sector to collaborate in implementing public programs (Col. Diop, 2011). In conjunction with the ministry of environment and conservation, the Senegalese military is actively participating in the realization of the state's portion of the 7,000-kilometer great green wall which was an initiative by African states to build stop desert advancement.

Armée-Nation has enabled the Senegalese Armed Forces to work with civilians in improving their lives while remaining apolitical and professional. This has created a self-reinforcing cycle of goodwill, respect, trust, and pride among the Senegalese people and has enabled the military to enjoy a better reputation within Senegal compared to other militaries in some African countries (Col. Diop, 2011).

Composition and Mandate of the Kenyan Military

The key to understanding, if the success of military engagement in national development efforts would work in Kenya, is first to understand whether the mandate of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) allows for such action. As well as under what circumstances would it be most productive to engage in such activities. KDF is comprised of services: The Kenya Army, Kenya Navy, and Kenya Air Force. The commander-in-chief of all the armed forces is the President of Kenya. The current Kenya Defence Forces were established under Article 241 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution and are governed by the Kenya Defence Force Act of 2012 (Kenya, 2013).

As currently constituted, the Kenya Defence Forces are composed of Kenya Army, Kenya Air-force and Kenya Navy. In 2014, the Ministry of State for Defence listed the following Kenya Army formations and services Kenya Army Infantry; Kenya Army Paratroopers; Kenya Army Armoured Brigade; Kenya Army Artillery Brigade; Kenya Army Engineers Brigade; 50 Air Cavalry Battalion; Kenya Army Ordnance Corps; Kenya Army Corps of Transport; Kenya Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineering; Kenya Army Corps of Signals; Military Police Corps; Kenya Army Education Corps; Medical Battalion; and Defence Forces Constabulary (DFC) (Kenya, 2013).

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya replaced the 1969 Constitution, which itself had replaced the 1963 independence Constitution. Under article 241, *Establishment of Defence Forces and Defence Council*. The Defence Council which consists of the Cabinet Secretary responsible for defence, who is the chairperson; the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces; the three commanders of the defence forces; and the Principal Secretary in the Ministry responsible for defence is responsible for the overall policy, control, and supervision of the Kenya Defence Forces (Kenya, 2013).

Kenya has a decent reputation in peacekeeping across the world. Kenya's military officers have also served in senior leadership positions in various missions around the world. According to Kenya's Ministry of Defence, "Kenya is a key supporter of UN peacekeeping efforts in the international system. Kenya has over the years remained receptive to requests to contribute to peace operations based on the consent of the parties in the host state" (MoD, 2022).

Current national development efforts where the Military is active in Kenya

Since the beginning of the 21st Century, many nations around the world have adopted a broader, multifaceted and multi-actor/multi-agency approach in the management of public affairs including issues touching on human security and hence human development. Kenya is no exception. As a lower middle-income country in the global south and as a burgeoning economy and a consolidating democracy, Kenya has endeavoured to engage its security institutions in a

manner that they do not merely remain "security actors" in the traditional sense but important players in the wider discourse of human security and human development (Maupeu, 2021). One institution that continues to play such a role is the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). With over six decades of professional experience, Kenya's military has in many ways complemented and/or supplemented other governmental structures, ministries, departments, and agencies in a manner that has enriched its role in the wider realm of national development. Under the Constitution, Kenya's military operates under civilian authority in which it is charged with the duty of securing the state from external threats as well as assisting civilian authorities in times of dire need and complex emergencies over and above other national duties that are meant to enhance the general well-being of the people of Kenya. In this direction, Kenya's military has been tasked in various capacities to support a number of critical aspects of human security and general human development of the nation (Maupeu, 2021).

As part of the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities, KDF personnel have engaged in the development of water and water-related resource management especially in the arid and semi-arid parts of the state by way of afforestation exercises, water pan construction, the sinking of boreholes, and distribution of clean water for domestic consumption and agricultural use at the community level. Lamu, Isiolo, and Marsabit have benefited from this project. For instance, Basuba village in Lamu East was rendered two complete water plans on October 7, 2021, which is expected to provide water to over 1,000 homes and neighbouring counties including Garissa and Tana River (KDF, 2021).

At another level, KDF has also been involved in processes associated with enhancing health security in the state especially through enabling access to health facilities and health services to communities through the construction of dispensaries, hospitals and community health centres in various parts of the state, especially where the poor and marginalized population are concerned. In Lamu, KDF has renovated the Kiunga Health Center. It has also conducted medical camps in parts of Laikipia, Turkana, and Lamu. Over 1,000 patients benefited from a free consultations and medical care. Reports mention that the KDF surgeons successfully conducted operations on four individuals in Lamu. In

collaboration with the Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU), the duo attended to over 6,000 residents of Lokichar and Morulem in Turkana County on a two-day free medical camp. In addition, they performed successful cataract surgeries, and cervical cancer screening among others (Ombati, 2019).

Further, the KDF has been involved in the advancement and application of science and technology for the purposes of enhancing food security. For example, the KDF has been involved in value-added processing, and technology targeting proper storage and packaging of fruits and vegetables which are made available to communities, especially in far-flung areas where environmental stress and the adverse effects of climate change normally take a toll on communities (Maupeu,2021). On September 7, 2020, the KDF was tasked with the management of the KMC, a government-owned meat processor and marketer which is directly linked to the livelihoods of millions of cattle/livestock farmers across the state. For the period that the military has run the institution, much improvement has been realized in terms of timely and efficient management of the beef/meat subsector in the state not only for the local market but also for export purposes. Due to the efficiency in running KMC, it recorded a profit of Ksh. 150 million from Ksh. 5 million in the 3rd quarter of the first year KDF took over (Ahmed, 2022).

Like other modern military establishments around the world, Kenya's defence and security architecture is an important facet in the wider strategic growth of the state especially when it comes to matters of strategic planning of various aspects that add value to Kenya's grand strategic outlook. This has been operationalized through research and training at various levels where important matters of strategic and developmental importance to the state have been addressed through the training and research undertaken under the rubric of KDF research and training institutions that include the Defence Forces Medical Training School (DFMTS), Defence College of Health Sciences, Defence Forces Technical College (DEFTEC), Joint Command and Staff College (JCSC), the Joint Warfare Center (JWC), International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), the Kenya Military Academy (KMA) and the National Defence (NDC), all of which are constituent colleges of the newly established National Defence University–Kenya

(NDU-K). Each year, these institutions train and conduct research on many aspects relating to human development and the grand strategic outlook of the state; where matters to do with regional integration, regional security, humanitarian operations, health, disaster prevention and management, diplomacy, and conflict management among others are examined for the betterment of Kenya's national interest and overall national development (Maupeu, 2021).

It is also worth mentioning that from time to time, serving as well as retired KDF personnel have been involved in special taskings and undertakings for purposes of training as well as technically supporting other governmental agencies not only as administrators and managers of various establishments such as the police, and the intelligence machinery but also specific line ministries and departments including at ports and airport management, the coastal guard establishment (Kenya Coast Guard Services), specific devolved structures such as the former Nairobi Metropolitan Service (NMS), the Kenya Space Agency (KSA), the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA), the National Air Support Department (NASD), and the Kenya Railway Corporation (KRC) as well as serving in various boards of governmental many parastatals (Baraka,2020).

The KDF also plays critical roles in matters of diplomacy and foreign relations either as ambassadors or high commissioners but also as special envoys to various regions and context-specific tasks to do with matters of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development not only in Africa but the world over. The force has served in Namibia, Sierra Leone, Sudan (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur [UNAMID]), Chad and recently Congo. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) proceeded to join other contingent forces from Nepal, Tanzania and South Africa in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) (Achuka, 2022).

Challenges and Prospects

Kenya is currently recovering from the COVID-19 Pandemic, which had numerous political, social, and economic repercussions. While the state has implemented many political and economic changes to promote sustainable

growth, social development, and political stability, Kenya still confronts many obstacles. Youth unemployment, inequality, poverty, climate change, transparency and accountability, poor private sector investment, and economic susceptibility to internal and external shocks are key development concerns in Kenya (The World Bank, 2022).

These issues are interconnected. Most vulnerable communities or groups experience inequities and lack of chances. Unemployment is common among the youth which counts 16.3% of 20-to-24-year-olds were jobless in 2021. (Kamer, 2022). Lack of employment is caused by corruption where opportunities in Kenya are rarely given freely without tribalism or nepotism links (Rakewa, 2018). Kenya's perceived corruption index is rated 128th out of 180 nations in 2021. (Masinde, 2022). Many political officials in the nation have been involved in scandals and corruption charges, but the pattern is a lack of adequate accountability and openness. This absence of proper repercussions has hurt development aims and ambitions and caused the failure of several development efforts. The wealth gap between upper- and lower-class Kenyans is widening. 17.1 million Kenyans, or 36.1% of the population, live below the international poverty level of $1.90 a day (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Ways the military may assist to improve human sectors that effect national security

Climate change has and will continue to harm the state. Kenya's tea output is affected by this change hence a decline is expected. Kenya is the world's largest provider of black tea, although ideal and medium tea-growing regions are expected to decline by 25% and 40% by 2050. (Bhalla, 2021). Tea Farming is one of the state's primary currency-earning businesses, along with tourism and remittances, and employs three million people (Bhalla, 2021). Commercial farming is not the only kind of farming that has been impacted by climate change; most farmers in Kenya rely on rain, which has led to drought and famine.

From July to September 2022, 3.5 million individuals face severe food insecurity, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (National Drought Management Authority, 2022). The delayed and depressed March, April, and

May rainfall damaged agricultural, pasture, and water supply in the state. Below-normal, irregular, and poorly distributed rainfall hampered rain-fed agricultural output. This, along with a delayed rain, hampered seed germination and growth. South-eastern Marginal Mixed farming had total crop failure, affecting food stocks and the local market (National Drought Management Authority, 2022).

In Kenya, rain-dependent agricultural techniques are being addressed to combat food insecurity. Civilian efforts haven't been enough to stop the problem. This is concerning since the most vulnerable areas over-rely on rain-dependent economic activities and have a rising population, making them prone to violent conflict to secure already limited resources (Saddam, 2022). Galana Kalalu projects are among the Kenya Vision 2030 activities that may help to food security (Mbuthia & Wakhungu, 2021). Kenya has misused its potential. Kenya has 1.3 million hectares of irrigation potential, but only 150,600 were irrigated in 2018. (Mbuthia & Wakhungu, 2021). This lags behind Africa's irrigation titans.

As we discuss the Galana Kalalu project and food insecurity in Kenya, we must also consider how the Kenyan military might assist. The Kenyan military may revive and start similar programs. The military may provide knowledge and people for such initiatives. It may be simpler to convey military personnel's expertise of established infrastructure to civilians. While not facing Galana Kalalu-like problems (Maupeu, 2021).

Kenya is marked by rural-urban migration. This migratory tendency is generally ascribed to economic and social possibilities in metropolitan regions that may not be accessible in rural locations. Pastoral communities also move in large numbers inside the state, from one rural region to another or rural-urban. The military can also help nomadic populations.

Indeed, the rapid climate change in Kenya has had adverse effects on economic activities that are rain-reliant. In Kenya, this also includes pastoralism. The impact of this rapid change of climate has been prolonged drought, and thus these communities are faced with exacerbated land degradation and desertification, poor crop yield and forage reductions, as well as a spike in animal diseases and livestock losses (HABITABLE Project, 2021). These conditions have made these

groups vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and resource conflict. The noted essential coping mechanism to overcome the aforementioned hardships is mobility, particularly seasonal migration, whereby these communities will for a time seek out new land to forage and find water for their livestock (Perch-Nielsen et al.,2008). Traditionally this form of coping mechanism was sustainable. However, today bearing in mind the rise in population and the resulting land pressure in Kenya coupled with the increase in the increase and frequency of droughts in the region, this solution is no longer sustainable (HABITABLE Project, 2021).

These rapidly evolving challenges have created complex situations, pastoral communities have now resorted to changing their traditional routes of migration, which has then led to conflicts with other communities. Pastoral communities have also been characterized by an increased vulnerability to cattle rustling, an issue that further puts strain on the few resources that are available to this vulnerable group (Gumba, 2020). The military is well equipped to help with the latter issue. Solutions to the issues that are facing these pastoralists would be to first offer protection. The military has the expertise and capability to ensure that nomadic communities are safe as they transverse the country in search of food and water. While cattle rustling or cattle raiding has always been viewed as a cultural practice that helps redistribute wealth. Unfortunately, 2017 and 2018 were characterised by high-intensity conflicts during cattle raids that left dozens killed or maimed, and negatively affected human security and development in the region (Gumba, 2020). This was in Kenya's West Pokot and Elgeyo-Marakwet counties.

It is instructive to note that cattle raiding was fundamentally changed when nomadic communities acquired illicit firearms, trafficked from neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia in the 1980s. Guns weaponised conventional raiding and through force, enabled the acquisition of large herds of livestock, which precipitated commercialised cattle raiding (Daghar & Okumu, 2021). This illicit 'enterprise' is run by "Cattle Warlords", who are spurred on by the rising demand for cattle in the region. Pastoralists are targeted as they move from dry regions to areas with pasture. The increase in frequency and intensity of drought has increased this window of vulnerability. The act has also gained popularity among

the youth, who are recruited as they look for alternative means of livelihood, which they have been unable to secure through pastoralism. Additionally, with the introduction of firearms, organised criminal groups have increasingly recruited and used underage children to conduct cattle raids. Cattle rustling has also been connected to human trafficking (Daghar & Okumu, 2021). The military resources can be utilized in this situation to can help protect nomadic groups from attacks from these cartels, and also the identification these individuals/groups that are providing illicit arms to these raiders.

Infrastructure is crucial to the survival and positive growth of any state. It is not an exaggeration to state that concrete, steel and fibre-optic cable are the fundamental building blocks of the economy. This is because infrastructure enables trade, powers businesses, connects workers to their jobs, creates opportunities for struggling communities and protects the nation from an increasingly unpredictable natural environment (Puentes, 2015). Different forms of infrastructure serve as a mode of employment, from the construction of dams and roads, hospitals and railway lines, to the maintenance of these resources. Thousands if not millions of people earn a livelihood directly from the establishment and maintenance of infrastructure.

National development goals are interlinked with infrastructure. For instance, it is through the development of wind and solar farms as well as the establishment of geothermal and hydropower plants that greenhouse gas emissions are diminished (Puentes, 2015). The turn of the century has been characterized by a boom in investment in infrastructure in Kenya. It is no secret that this has been in part due to the interest that China has taken in the African Continent, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Munene, 2022). Kenya has also outlined its developmental goals by committing to the realization of the 17 Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDGs) and setting out to achieve Vision 2030. Among the flagship development infrastructure projects that have been undertaken is the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) (Munene, 2022).

Kenya has also made great strides in the energy sector, as part of its initiative to use Clean Energy and eliminate the production of Greenhouse Gasses. The

state boasts a variety of clean energy sources such as hydropower, geothermal, bioenergy, wind and solar farming (Centurion, 2022). Hydropower is used to generate energy in specific locations of Kenya, primarily around the country's five major rivers: Lake Victoria, the Tana River, the Great Rift Valley, the Sabaki River and the Ewaso North River. However, variable rainfall patterns and droughts periodically diminish system production and reliability, necessitating the integration of backup oil-fired power plants into larger hydro networks (Centurion, 2022). This is not a sustainable solution to the issue as it leaves Kenya's oil energy vulnerable to shocks in the international oil market.

This is not the only challenge that Kenya faces in this sector, in accordance with Vision 2030, other forms of sustainable clean energy sources are being exploited, key among them is the Wind Farms to be installed. The most notable of which is the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project. Unfortunately, these projects have been met with resistance from indigenous groups, despite the fact that these vulnerable groups are the communities projected to be most aided by the presence of these farms. In 2020, the Baharini Wind Power Project was nullified by the county government after a failure to adhere to resettlement agreements (Kavilu, 2021). This is not the only project that failed, The Kinangop Wind Park, was in a similar fashion for the same reason. Even the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project has been stalled for similar reasons.

While the military is not the right actor to be engaged in conflicts that go on between indigenous communities and foreign investment firms, they can play a role in the space of innovative research. Home-grown and home-led infrastructural projects are key. The military is uniquely placed to have both the local and technical knowledge to the best advice on what areas are more suitable to develop certain projects. The military also boasts a level of efficiency that cannot be rivalled, when engaged with the civilian population they can help create capacity to develop projects from within that do not require over-whelming foreign-led projects that are not aware of the local nuances and realities.

Conclusion

In the contemporary world, the state is faced with varying threats. A number of these threats are human-security centred and have the potential to undermine the society that makes the state. The military holds within itself the unique ability to provide aid in instances where the civilian population has fallen short or is incapable as outlined in the paper above. The efforts that have been made and continue to be made should be encouraged, to ensure capacity building and foster closer relations between the civilian population and the defence forces. There is a need for innovation within certain aspects of the maintenance of infrastructure. This is an opportunity for collaboration between civilians and military personnel, to establish sustainable and long-lasting solutions.

Recommendations

i. The Kenya military should work at the intersection of human security and development in light of the local and national-level protracted crises, conflicts, natural disasters, pandemics, and epidemics which are increasingly undercutting prospects for peace and stability, as well as sustainable development. This is possible by leveraging the systems thinking approach where strategic actors – both civil and military – purposely engage to identify the points of intersection in enhancing development and ensuring state stability.

ii. The military, through its research locus such as the newly-founded National Defence University, Kenya and its affiliate centres, should strive to be centres of excellence to gain/increase public confidence and trust to deliver beyond their traditional military roles.

iii. To mitigate the adversarial Climate Change-related impact, the military, in consultation in with the civilian authority should consider interventions such as expanding forest conversation activities and its protection; develop locally-owned and managed irrigation projects; and engage in mass education drives on climate change.

iv. Through a harmonised security framework, the military should actively engage the local leadership (at the trans-county and county levels) and pastoral communities to help in the recovery of illicit arms among these community members. However, beyond containing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the complex social-political-economic curse of cattle rustling should be a priority to both the political leadership and the military think tanks.

v. The military can also be positively engaged in identifying alternative economic ventures for the youth in these communities who are vulnerable to recruitment into harmful groups. While active recruitment is an option among these groups, it is also important to push for other forms of apprenticeship such as carpentry and engineering. This helps to cultivate the economy of the community and develops a relationship between the community and the military.

vi. Additionally, the military should increase partnerships strategically geared towards developmental and human security-based initiatives with other foreign military affiliates in order to learn from the best practices.

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Energy Security for a Holistic Developmental Transformation in Kenya: A SWOT Analysis

Mumo Nzau, PhD

Abstract

During 2020 and 2021, the COVID-19 Pandemic brought economic productivity and billions of livelihoods globally to a near halt. It disrupted trade, commerce, industry and exchange within states and across regions, thereby worsening unemployment and human suffering. Barely two years later in early 2022 the world was plunged into yet another crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A host of international sanctions against Russia have since fuelled a global food and energy crisis thereby worsening inflation, national debt and a host of other macroeconomic problems world over. This state of affairs, coupled with the adversities occasioned by global climate change spells doom on many developing countries' quest for holistic and sustainable development. Kenya is no exception. Against all these odds, Kenya seeks to transform itself into an industrializing middle income economy by 2030. This overarching national developmental end objective resonates with key regional and global development blueprints including Africa Agenda 2063 and UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2030, the population of Kenya will be 66 million and at least 80 million by 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2015). The main argument in this paper is that, for Kenya to handle the human security demands and needs of such a populace, it has to undergo a holistic developmental transformation. Taking-on a conceptual and discursive approach to a SWOT Analysis informed by secondary sources of data, the paper responds to this puzzle by making a strong case for energy security as a prime ingredient in any recipe for holistic developmental transformation in Kenya. While the findings point to serious threats and weaknesses, they also reveal numerous strengths and opportunities in

as far as the energy security-holistic development nexus in Kenya is concerned. Subsequently, it makes a number of pertinent recommendations on how to harness these strengths and opportunities going forward.

Key Words: *Energy Security, Holistic Development, Kenya, SWOT Analysis, Transformation*

Introduction

Vision 2030 seeks to transform Kenya into an industrializing upper middle income economy by 2030. However, Kenya is yet to attain energy security to power its economic ambitions, especially industrialization, economic growth and economic development. This has partly been contributed by the fact that *Vision 2030* technically under-states the significance of the energy sector to Kenya's economic aspirations. The country's energy sector is characterized by rigid monopolies, state control or interventionism and over-reliance on hydro-electric power (HEP). Given climatic adversities such as drought and structural constraints including monopoly and state control, Kenya's energy sector's competitiveness and growth is limited. The country's energy sector growth is stuck in under-explored energy generation potentialities, captured by institutional rigidities, and restricted by policy frameworks. The main contention herein is that Kenya is energy insecure and for it to holistically transform its developmental outlook, a deliberate and phenomenal energy undertaking ought to be made. Such reforms will unlock the country's energy generation potentialities, and liberalize the regulatory frameworks to spur competitiveness in the sector.

The central argument of the paper therefore is that Kenya's economic development significantly depends on attaining energy security from effective energy sector governance. Energy is a critical force or engine of industrialization and economic development because it fundamentally drives the production of industrial output (Barney & Franzi, 2002). Proper energy sector regulation and governance also needs to focus on energy markets to stabilize prices for better industrial performance (Martchamadol & Kumar, 2012). Price is a market factor that can affect access, affordability, consumption and ultimately production. In fact, according to Asghar and Zahid (2008) the higher the prices of energy in an economy, the slower the GDP growth and vice versa. The causal relationship

between energy supply capacity or the energy price (as a direct factor) and growth in gross domestic product (GDP) or energy consumption has been argued to be directly proportional (Asghar & Zahid, 2008). In other terms, increase in GDP has a direct impact on energy consumption in an economy as a result of expanded demand from productive activities which account for GDP growth (Asghar & Zahid, 2008). It is therefore important for Kenya to effect favorable policy regulations and governance regimes for the energy sector to boost energy production and installed capacity or ready supply, to stabilize energy prices, to support industrial production or industrial energy consumption for GDP growth.

The paper begins with the theoretical and analytical scope behind the central argument that 'energy security contributes to holistic development', before briefly discussing the empirical framework and the methodology of the research. Thereafter, the paper makes a retrospective analysis of Kenya's development experience, and carries out a SWOT analysis of Kenya's energy sector governance and capacity prospects. Lastly, the paper makes a number of pertinent recommendations on how to harness these strengths and opportunities.

Theoretical Framework

At the macro-economic level, economic development theory of Joseph Schumpeter (1911) predicates economic development of nations on the dynamism of the economy, and the contribution of innovation, technological and organisational forms which may include entrepreneurship (Foxon and Steinberger, 2011). While traditional economics focusses on labor and capital as the primary sources of economic growth or economic production, progressive economic thought acknowledges the role of technology and energy in economic growth (Moe, 2010; Allen, 2009). Accordingly, the availability (and access to) high quality and affordable sources of energy has significant contribution to economic output or GDP growth. At the micro-economic level, the energy poverty theory aptly prognoses that the lack of access to reliable, safe and affordable energy services at the household level, undermines households' economic output, cost of living and quality of life (Guevara et al, 2022). The theory further holds that the higher the energy poverty among households, the lower the prospects for national economic output growth (Guevara et al, 2022). Therefore, by applying both the economic

development theory and energy poverty theory, this paper presents Kenya's energy insecurity (at both macro-economic and micro-economic levels) as a risk to the country's holistic development.

Conceptual and Analytical Scope

There are as many understandings of what constitutes a state of 'being developed' as scholars and/or expert policy practitioners who attempt to define it. True enough, development is relative and contextual and hence the dicey question about the most acceptable set of criteria for qualifying the same. Scholars who analyzed the 20th Century development experience of the capitalist economies of western Europe and North America used the theoretical concept of modernization, in which they depicted a linear process of stages through which economies undergo to attain an industrialized and in effect, modernized state (Rostow, 1971). In reaction to modernization prescriptions, Neo-Marxist theorists faulted the historical process through which capitalism-driven industrialization in the West took place. They contended that the historical models behind slavery, enterprise capitalism and/or mercantilism, colonialism among other imperialist ventures essentially made the capitalist model as exploitative and hence responsible for global inequality and underdevelopment, which would ultimately not be sustainable in the long run. Instead they prescribed the socialist model in which advocated for centrally planned economies where the state had a direct hand in the process of production, distribution, marketing and pricing in the manner that it was applied in the Soviet Union, Cuba and the Peoples Republic of China albeit with modifications, customizations and immense challenges along the way (Frank, 1972, Wallerstein, 2004).

Yet other theorists of the Neo-liberal tradition contended that sound liberal economies are built on working institutions (North, 1990). All the same, there are a number of generally accepted working definitions that depict development as a progressive process through which nations go towards a better end-state in terms of general quality of human life, higher economic and social productivity and enriched and/or bettered mediums of supporting livelihoods and other domains of human productivity at a scale that on aggregate or/on average reflects such as state of affairs across various segments and/or facets of the

society; and hence higher human development index indicators (Todaro, 2021). The transformative economic modelling which seeks to enrich and/or advance the processes of production from simple hand-work to more efficient and effective modernized technology is at the centre of the energy-development discourse herein. Energy, (more so clean, sustainable and affordable energy), is therefore a crucial factor in industrialization and general economic transformation because it is a fundamental driver for optimal industrial output (Barney and Franzi, 2002; Sovacool & Murkerjee, 2011).

Empirical Framework

Besides other energy-specific nuances, transformative energy sector regulation and governance needs to focus on energy production and energy markets in order provide a favourable environment for industrial performance (Matchamadol & Kumar, 2012). Energy cost affects production, access, affordability, consumption, ultimately slows down GDP growth. In effect, scholars point to a direct and proportional causal relationship between energy supply, energy cost, energy consumption (as a direct factor) and GDP growth. Early studies on the energy-economic development nexus were done by Kraft and Kraft (1978), where they established that GDP growth increased energy consumption in the United State between 1947 and 1974. While other studies (such as Akarca & Long, 1980) later refuted this finding. yet others vindicated it. In the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) of Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, a unidirectional relationship exists between energy consumption and economic growth (Al-Iriani, 2005).

Another study by Stern and Kander (2010) which examined 200 years of energy and output growth established that in Sweden for instance, a scarcity of energy was accompanied by a commensurate contraction in output growth. Conversely, increased access to energy production as well as consumption did have direct outcomes on output expansion. To this extent, the study concluded that energy supply and consumption significantly contributed to industrial and hence, developmental transformation in Sweden. It is possible to argue that vibrant and fast-growing economies are powered by energy. Another study by Green and Zhang (2013) finds a direct correlation for instance between industry and energy

sustainability in the United Kingdom. From Figure 1, shows that a good chunk of the UK's industrial output between 1970 – 2013 review period for instance, is energy driven according to Green and Zhang, (2013).

Energy used by industry in the UK

Source: Green & Zhang, 2013

Going by the UK's experience, it is possible to capitalize on green and clean energy while maintaining a decent level of industrial productivity in a country, other things held constant. Therefore, when compared to the global average Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind in all these respects, that is: energy access, consumption and economic development. Well above 645 million people (more than half of the continent's population at the least) in Sub-Saharan Africa lack access to electricity on the continent (AfDB, 2018).

Data and Methods

Ideally, empirical research seeks to make meaningful patterns of the interaction(s) among specific variables in order to develop, test and explore certain theoretical

stances, conjunctures and/or explanations behind any given phenomenon in question (Kivunja, 2017). Nonetheless, this paper adopts a conceptual and discursive approach to a SWOT Analysis informed by secondary sources of data, the analysis makes a strong case for energy security as a prime ingredient in any recipe for holistic developmental transformation in Kenya. As such, it relies heavily on secondary data where books, book chapters, journal articles and other academic works, as well as authentic and credible professional and media reports are systematically examined in analytical prose fashion.

Kenya's Development Experience: A Retrospective Account

Kenya, like many other nations in the developing world attained her independence at the height of the Cold War divide which directly pitted the capitalist west against the socialist east. Though by all means and purposes Kenya tactically maintained a western orientation, in principal it adopted a non-aligned approach to these ideological differences while adopting an economic model that took a hybrid-like middle ground between the two economic models. Under the famous Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, which espoused a customized and unique African brand of socialism the government took upon itself to rollout a series of public enterprises and state-owned companies and/or parastatals with the aim of kick-starting productive ventures across specific sectors of the economy especially where there was little or no liquid capital in private hands, to undertake the same. This neo-classical economic approach in the western tradition was then coupled with a fair measure of open and liberal markets (Nzau, 2011).

During the decades of 1960s and 1970s Kenya adopted a number of Bretton Woods-prescribed models on development, especially under the platform of 'balanced growth' and 'rural development.' At that time, the developing countries (then classified as 'Third World') under the common platform of the Group of 77 (G77) were lobbying the United Nations and various International Financial Institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank (also known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development- IBRD) and the agitating for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) while decrying what they perceived to be global inequity, inequality and souring national debt which was essentially driving populations in the developing world deeper into

poverty and destitution despite 'favourable' rating in macroeconomic indices such as GDP per capita among others (Nzau, 2010).

In the early 1980s, the government rolled out the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), a programme that was meant to operationalize the then District Development Plans (DDPs) in a manner that brought development closer to the people. While these gross-roots oriented models were meant to tackle rural poverty and mitigate against the negative effects of runaway rural-urban migration; the role of parastatals and other state-owned ventures was to spur industrial activity through manufacturing, value addition and some forms of import-substitution in order to ensure economic self reliance and national productivity through savings and meaningful wealth creation in the country (Nzau, 2011).

Despite all these policy and institutional undertakings, by the decade of 1980s, developing countries (including Kenya) had sunk deeper into poverty and indebtedness, in what came to be known as the Third World Debt Crisis. To the World Bank and other IFIs as well as (mainly western) multilateral lending institutions, believed that poor governace led to Africa's woes and this could only be resolved through structural adjustments and economic divestiture, (hence the idea of Structural Adjustment Programmes SAPs, Privatization and Commercialization) while also liberalizing the political environment by make sweeping changes of the legal, policy and institutional kind that would provide for a favourable socio-political and administrative environment for national development anchored on the principles of good governance and rule of law. However, to African regional and/or sub-regional economic platforms under the Organization of African Unity (OAU; *now*, African Union) such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA, 1980), the solution lay in alternative home-grown policies that sought to seek unique solutions to African problems (Nzau, 2007).

Kenya also experienced economic decline. It is noteworthy that in the year 2000 her economic annual growth rate was at 0.6 percent, one of the lowest since independence (World Bank 2022). To improve the worsening human conditions in the developing world, in 2000, the United Nations launched the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) a global developmental platform that aimed at

addressing global poverty, inequality and hunger, improving access to maternal and paediatric health as well as fighting TB, HIV/AIDS and Malaria, mitigating against the adverse effects of climate change; while encouraging mutual multilateral development assistance engagements for the global south through favourable aid, trade and debt relief policies, by 2015.

In line with the MDGs outlook, governments in the developing world begun to roll-out a number of policies tailored to lift the majority lower cadres of society (the masses) from abject poverty through Poverty Reduction Strategies as well as Economic Stimulus Programs. It was against this background that Kenya government, through Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1999, launched the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP, 1999-2015) with the aim of lifting the rural and urban poor from abject poverty, while enabling them to access decent livelihoods and incomes. In 2003 the Kibaki Administration and with the assistance of both bilateral and multilateral development partners, adopted the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth Creation and Employment (ERSWEC, 2003-2007).

The Kibaki administration initiated the first progressive policy frameworks for energy production, distribution and consumption beginning with the Sessional Paper No.4 of 2004 and the Energy Act of 2006. The Energy Act (No.12 of 2006) sets out the powers, roles and functions of energy sector institutions, while the Physical Planning Act zones areas for storage, retailing and distribution of petroleum products and electric power sub-stations and related energy infrastructure construction. The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum is therefore tasked with formulating national energy policies and plans, and coordinates stakeholders to implement national energy policies and plans for national development goals. Energy regulation falls under the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) which carries out tariff setting, price stabilization, and licensing, regulatory approvals for power purchase and network service (Government of Kenya, 2018a). For energy generation, the Kenya Electricity Generating Company Limited (KenGen) is the main power producer and is state-owned with shareholding of 70 percent government and 30 percent private. Kenya Power (KP) on the other hand distributes power purchased from KenGen, while Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO) develops, designs and maintains the transmission grid

across the country. The Rural Electrification Authority (REA) on its part is responsible for electricity supply across rural areas in the country and part of rural development agenda (Republic of Kenya, 2018).

Kenya therefore increased investments in the energy sector and subsequently increased production volumes and capacities as well as supply across the country since the coming to power of President Mwai Kibaki. In the past two decades, the country has made significant strides to increase electricity access to its population from a low of 18.9 percent in 2002 to 39.97-75 percent in 2013-2022. Kenya adopted a strategy to increase grid-connected electricity capacity by 5,000 MW from 2013 – 2016. This was not achieved hence the government set to push it between 2020 and 2021 to 6670MW. Only 2.3 million households were connected to the electric grid in 2013 compared to 8.2 million households in 2021 for instance. Despite the country's electricity access being the highest in East Africa, it remains low by global standards (Gakunga, 2021; Xinhua, 2022; Macrotrends, n.d) as shown below:

Figure 2: Energy consumption across different sizes of economy

Country	GDP	Energy Use
Kenya	$98 billion	5,884.74 kWh
South Korea	$1.631 trillion	62,957.23kWh
South Africa	$300 billion	31,348.73kWh
Turkey	$720 billion	19,205.33kWh
Malaysia	$336 billion	34,930.13kWh
USA	$21 trillion	32,151.33kWh
UK	$2.7 trillion	79,130.48kWh
Luxembourg	$73 billion	76,157.96kWh
Singapore	$340 billion	59,566.58kWh
UAE	$421 billion	88,950.82kWh

Source: Our World in Data, 2015

Countries ranked at the same level with Kenya at independence in 1960s such as Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea have made major economic growth strides which is further reflected in their energy use or supply capacities as shown

above. For instance, South Korea's GDP stands at $1.63 trillion (17 times larger than Kenya's economy) with energy use of 62,957.23kWh (11 times Kenya's energy use). Luxembourg, which is a smaller economy to Kenya's consumes 13 times Kenya's energy use. Kenya's low energy to GDP ratio risks a gap between demand and/or consumption on hand, and actual energy generation capacity in the economy. Kenya's energy demand was projected to grow to 2600–3600 MW by 2020, which when compared with production capacity risks overwhelming the grid-connected energy, over and above load-shedding, outages and hence power rationing (Takase, Kipkoech & Essandoh, 2021).

As shown in *Figure 2*, currently Kenya consumes about 5,884.74 kWh for its GDP per capita of USD 2,000 and GDP size of USD 98.84 billion. The country's energy consumption is below sub-Saharan Africa's average of 7,992.45 kWh, world average of 22,329.5 kWh, upper middle-income average of 25,397.44 kWh, and lower middle-income average of 15,462.51 kWh. Kenya therefore operates with energy consumption nearly three times below its lower middle-income average and this might complicate or delay its transition to upper middle-income economy (Our World in Data, 2014). In effect, there is a significant energy consumption gap as well as energy supply gap between Kenya and the economies it aspires to catch up with. Such a reality does not only portend delays in Kenya's economic take-off, but also directly undermines its industrial competitiveness globally. Further, the demand and supply gaps in the energy sector in Kenya indicate the country is yet to attain energy security. The country therefore stands just a crisis away from acute national energy shortage, which in turn will impact negatively on the economy and the cost of living.

Indeed, the global economic developments during the period 2020-to-2021 have had all odds stacked against the quest of developing countries, Kenya included. Over this period, the COVID-19 Pandemic brought economic productivity and billions of livelihoods globally to a near halt. It disrupted trade, commerce, industry and exchange within states and across regions, thereby worsening unemployment and human suffering. By 2021, the pandemic pushed more than 30 million people in Africa into extreme poverty (Zuefack et al., 2021). Barely two years later in early 2022 the world was plunged into yet another crisis following the Russian

invasion of Ukraine. A host of international sanctions against Russia have since fuelled a global food and energy crisis thereby worsening inflation, national debt and a host of other macroeconomic problems world over. It is also estimated that the economic hardships emanating from the Russia-Ukraine conflict will push 2.1 million Africans (Kenyans included) into extreme poverty by the end of 2023 (AfDB, 2022). The IMF further predicted worse macroeconomic conditions world over in 2003 as a result of the aftershocks of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the Russo-Ukraine War while compounded by an economic slowdown in China (*New York Times*, 2022). The big question at this juncture is: How will Kenya achieve this holistic developmental transformation under these conditions? In responding to this puzzle this paper makes a strong case for energy security as a prime ingredient in any recipe for holistic developmental transformation in Kenya.

Towards a Holistic Developmental Transformation in Kenya: Making the Case for Energy Security

Kenya's energy sector is set up in a context of strengths and risks as well as opportunities, which the Government of Kenya should carefully review to ensure effective energy sector governance as follows:

Strengths

Even though Kenya is generally, energy insecure, Kenya's national energy planning is consistent with the GDP growth rate (through load forecasting) which therefore ensures that energy generation can sustain the country's industrialization and economic development targets (Government of Kenya, 2018; Republic of Kenya, 2018a). Load forecasting involves data-driven projections of energy requirements in relation to macro-economic changes and other variables. For instance, the Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 2017-2037 works with annualized GDP growth rate of 7 percent from the third medium term plan (MTP3) between 2017-2022, and 10 percent from 2025 (Government of Kenya, 2018; Republic of Kenya, 2018b).

Therefore, the country's energy sector plans are to ensure energy supply meets the energy demand to be occasioned by the GDP growth rate and related increase

in energy consumption for productive sectors. According to LCPDP, the country aims at certain energy capacities paced with commissioning dates and for the sake of transition into green energy, plans are also paced with decommissioning dates for 'dirty fuel or energy sources'. The total capacity targeted is 9400MW made of 3161MW (geothermal), 1381MW (wind), 356MW (oil), 824MW (hydro), 743MW (solar), 750MW gas turbine at Dongo Kundu from 2034, 1200MW (nuclear) from 2036, and 981MW (coal from Lamu) from 2024 (Kehbila, Masumbuko & Ogeya, 2021). The Kenya National Energy Policy of 2018 structures the regulatory environment for the energy sector in the country in a manner that liberalizes energy production and allows Independent Power Producers (IPP) to operate and further allows Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in energy generation. To date, there are about 14 IPP arrangements that account for 24 percent of the country's installed electricity capacity (Republic of Kenya, 2018b). With such a provision for the private sector to play a critical role in Kenya's energy sector, the country is likely to attract robust participation of the private sector and attract private sector investments to drive up energy production where the government is under-resourced. The country is also poised to benefit from public private partnerships which help unlock energy potential in mega projects that the government alone cannot possibly fund.

Weaknesses

Industrialization, economic growth (GDP) and economic development are goals which are tied together and hinged on energy. While advanced energy sources power industrial production, the alternative uses or sources of energy should further improve the quality of life and protect the environment for sustainable development. However, 80 percent of Kenya's population uses the three-stone method of cooking, and wood accounts for 74 percent of the country's primary energy supplies and 47 percent of households countrywide and 82 percent of urban households use charcoal with an annual wood fuel demand of 34.3 million tons. By and large, the cost of production and/or manufacturing (as well as ordinary running costs), across all economic sectors in Kenya is generally high and mostly unsustainable. One of the factors behind this state of affairs is (among others) the high cost of energy, which all other aspects of macroeconomic performance.

However, weaknesses in Kenya's energy sector mainly lie in the policy regulations, legal and institutional frameworks. The country's legal and institutional frameworks have tended to encourage monopolies in the energy market, which in effect stifle competitiveness in the sector. Competitiveness helps to spur supply and to lower costs of energy across the population and differentiated market sizes. Further, competitiveness in the energy sector helps to advance quality of energy products as well as innovation or adoption of better energy technologies. Fundamentally, suppression of monopolies in the energy sector can help to stimulate necessary investments that would in turn, sustainably expand the sector.

The institutional frameworks for instance created a behemoth of state-controlled or state-owned monopolies in the sector. Electricity production is carried out by Kenya Energy Generation Company (KEGEN), distribution by Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), while design and maintenance of transmission lines by Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited (KETRACO) which are all government-owned corporations. Kenya faces two serious challenges to developing a robust energy sector capable of propelling its strategic economic goals: not only overreliance on hydroelectric energy, but also under-investment in it; and under-investment other domains in the energy realm. As a result supply is not steady. Subsequently, does major and frequent power outages which last on average five hours and in some parts of the country, the entire day or several days on end (Takase, Kipkoech & Essandoh, 2021). Over-reliance on a hydroelectric energy pool that has not been expanded for many decades since independence has led to underinvestment in other energy sources with in fact larger productive potential hence leading to slow expansion of electricity generation and exposure of the country's energy to unfavourable weather and climate variability risks among other weaknesses.

On the whole therefore, though Kenya's legal, policy and institutional framework and/or environment is generally sound, it is also weak when it comes to actual implementation. The cost of energy production in Kenya is very high which makes every other sector in the economy a costly. It is a fact that Kenya has lost out on many foreign direct investment opportunities especially in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors due to the high cost of energy in the

country. It is also an established fact that the energy supply and/or distribution sub-sector, (especially the processes of electricity supply) are corruption-ridden, highly monopolized, inefficient and prohibitively costly for the most part.

Threats

Besides destabilizing energy market dynamics through monopolies, the management of the energy sector is effectively subject to political interests, public service lethargy and corruption since critical electric energy companies are state-owned. Climate variability and erratic weather patterns expose Kenya's largest source of energy, the hydro-electric energy, to low water levels, scarcity of water sources including rivers as well as competition from agricultural activities such as irrigation (Kiplagat, Wang & Li, 2011). Kenya's over-reliance on wood fuel, mostly attributable to poverty, smaller market size for LPG and lack of LPG infrastructure, threatens the country's environmental sustainability and subsequently, its energy sector. It is thus imperative to change domestic fuel system from wood or biomass to LPG and electricity or simply, to greener options which conserve the environment and protect the hydro power in long-term. Poverty is a factor threat to energy market in Kenya. Energy poverty is sustaining the use of wood fuel to the extent of providing 74 percent of the country's energy requirements for domestic use, while LPG market struggles to stabilize and expand including in urban areas where 82 percent of households still use charcoal (Njiru & Letema, 2018).

Poverty therefore not only restricts the LPG market but also electricity access across households in the country. While the electricity grid might have connected more Kenyan households to electricity since 2013, low-income households still suffer energy poverty which therefore threatens the country's energy access and transition ambitions. Imposition of 16 percent VAT tax on LPG used for cooking domestically in Kenya in July 2021, is yet another threat to Kenya's goal to transition to clean energy and expand access to LPG to 100 percent by 2028. LPG was zero-rated in 2016 to promote its access and use across Kenya in consistent with the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26). The introduction of VAT therefore increases LPG initial costs and refilling costs which therefore reduces the clean energy market size especially in rural Kenya as well as urban Kenya where nearly

82 percent of households now use charcoal as earlier highlighted. There is an urgent need to eliminate VAT on LPG gas and zero-rate it to promote its adoption and use across the country. Kenya should also make plans for exploration and establishment of local LPG sites to make the fuel cheaper for use (Shupler et al, 2022).

Further, critical infrastructure security threats also risk Kenya's energy sector. In mid-January 2022 for instance, the country suffered a serious of nationwide power outages following the collapse of four electricity pylons both in Nairobi and Nakuru. Such extreme acts of economic sabotage through systematic pilferage and vandalism supported by wider criminal networks are a major threat to Kenya's quest to industrialize. It is also a fact that due to corruption and unethical practices undue 'middleman profiteering' in the costing, billing, supply and distribution of energy (especially electric power, refined fuels and even LPG gas) at times ends up passing the burden to the consumer, which ultimately makes the cost of production prohibitively high, which subsequently discourages investment especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors. These are threats to the energy sector that with dedicated national leadership and functional institutions over and above a supporting national socio-political culture can be overcome to the betterment of Kenya's industrialization quest.

Opportunities

Kenya's energy production potential remains heavily untapped and un-actualized. There is much more room for energy production in Kenya through solar, wind and hydroelectric power sources. The energy potential in River Tana, Athi River and River Yala rivers among many others is yet to be fully and effectively harnessed. If this potential is fully tapped, Kenya will also realize its goal to achieve 30 percent forest cover by 2032 because the well regulated water flow and reservoir volumes realized will go a long way in ensuring forestation, which will further add value to the country's green economy and green energy potential.

In terms of wind power potential, Kenya's 2013 Wind [Task] Force established that over 73 percent of the Kenyan territory bears about 6m/s at least at 100 meters above the ground. Kenya can thus expand its wind power generated capacity from the three wind farms, two of which are in Ngong Hills, which generate 5.45 MW, to more wind farms.

The current generated capacity of 900MW is poor comparison to Kenya's economic growth aspirations. The total of 11 wind power sites in Kenya which account for 900MW indicate that there is potential to generate thousands of MW having learnt from the feasibility of the existing 11 wind power plants shown in Figure 4.

Figure 3: Wind power generation capacity in Kenya

No.	Name of firm	Status	Capacity (MW)
1	Aeolous Kinangop Wind	Existed before 2013	60
2	Aeolous Kinangop Wind	Existed before 2013	100
3	Aperture Green Wind	Existed before 2013	60
4	Daewoo Ngong Wind	Existed before 2013	30
5	KenGen Wind	Existed before 2013	15
6	Lake Turkana Wind Power Station	Commissioned 2019	310
7	Osiwo Ngong Wind	Existed before 2013	60
8	Meru	Planned	100
9	Isiolo	Commissioned in July 2013	150
10	Ngong Hill Wind Farm	Commissioned 2013–2016	25
11	Marsabit	Feasibility ongoing	50
	Total		**900**

Source: Kenya National Power Development Plan, 2019; Takase, Kipkoech and Essandoh, 2021

Kenya lies on the equator where its exposure to the sun is elevated, hence bears the potential to supply 4-6 Kilowatts per minute per day which can be easily found in the country's north eastern and northern arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs). There is need to invest further in expanding solar generated and grid-connected energy from the vast ASALs (Kiprop, Matsui, Maundu, and Mix, 2017). Kenya's geothermal energy potential remains significant especially due to the advantage created by the Great Rift Valley running from the northern to southern parts of the country. According to Malala and Adachi (2020), the Central Rift alone can generate about 7000 MW-10,000 MW which can be a huge addition to the country's grid, given that the southern and northern parts of the Rift Valley also hold significant potential for geothermal power generation.

Kenya can begin to invest in bio-fuels or bio-diesel by exploiting the 80 percent of its territory which is arid or semi-arid; such ecological conditions are favorable for growing feedstock such as Jatropha, which is good for production of bio-fuel. The investment in bio-fuels help to cut down on deforestation and improve environmental sustainability (it is carbon-neutral), cut down on dependency on foreign fossil fuel supplies, and create an alternative livelihood system for farmers in the country. Revisiting and perhaps holistically reviewing the energy sector's legal, policy and institutional frameworks will help get rid of these monopolistic tendencies in the sector and thereby enable it to sustainably produce affordable energy necessary to power the country to its next industrialization phase. Such policy reforms will inject healthy competition which will expand energy generation capacity, improve and stabilize energy prices and hence increase energy access across the country; which will ultimately spur sustainable wealth creation across all sectors (Kemoni and Ngulube, 2008; Nandi, 2016).

There is hydro-electric power potential in Kenya. Existing and upcoming dams such as Thiba Dam, Kerimenu Dam, Thwake Dam, Itare Dam, Aror and Kimwarer Dams among many others have the potential to produce even more hydro-electric energy for the country if only they can be upgraded and actualized to optimal levels. Dams will help not only with irrigation and steady water supply, but also clean energy generation that will power Kenya's economy to the next stage of its industrialization journey. Finally, the energy needed to transform Kenya into a stable middle income industrializing economy cannot be negated and/or accessed in Kenya alone. There is great potential in well thought out region-wide energy pooling. Kenya must take the lead in charting the way forward toward a situation where Africa countries can pool the financial, human and material resources that can fully operationalize energy production in major hydroelectric projects such as the Grand Inga Dam, which if fully harnessed can power the entire continent using clean, renewable and sustainable energy.

Conclusion

This paper set out to undertake a SWOT analysis of Kenya's energy sector in responding to the complex question of how best to actualize the country's vision

to transform itself into an industrializing middle income economy, against a background many odds stacked against Africa and the global south in the post-COVID world. A review of the conceptual and analytical dynamics around the energy security-holistic development nexus did support the idea that to transform a transitional economy- such as Kenya's- to optimality, energy sector policies, laws and institutional frameworks have to be set right at the strategic and/or governmental level, in order for the country to be energy secure. On the whole therefore energy generation, supply, access and affordability remains an important factor that will significantly determine Kenya's industrialization dream as espoused by Vision 2030 among other sector-specific development blueprints. In this direction, the analysis herein there of pointed to the fact that whereas there are serious threats and weaknesses in Kenya's energy sector, they also reveal numerous strengths and opportunities in as far as the energy security-holistic development nexus in Kenya is concerned.

Based on the findings, this paper recommends that the government re-examines and recasts the legal, policy and institutional environment of energy governance in the country in order to enable a major leap forward in energy generation, access, efficient distribution and affordability.

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Cybercrime, Cyber Security and the Economy: A Legal Perspective

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Abstract

In the recent past, Kenya has experienced exponential growth in its cyberspace. It is estimated that about 42% of the Kenyan population has access to the internet as at January 2022. Further, many institutions within the public and private sectors are now providing their services in the digital space through online platforms. This has created great opportunities for commerce as well as networking for individuals across the various social platforms. Thus, the Kenyan economy is now heavily reliant on technology. The rapid advancement within the cyberspace and use of technology has exacerbated vulnerabilities, threats and attacks in the cyberspace. This paper takes a two pronged approach to cyber security through legal and economic lenses by examining the extent of cybercrime and threats that have become a great challenge to the security of the cyberspace as well as its consequences. It also analyses the legal and policy framework for cyber security in the country. This research was conducted through a review of literature and data on the subject. The findings herein indicate that Kenya is experiencing high numbers of cybercrime, attacks and threats targeting institutions as well as individuals which has resulted in significant losses to the economy, institutions and individuals. The paper recommends adoption of cyber security measures to effectively mitigate the effects of these cyber threats and attacks.

Key words: *cyber-attacks, cybercrime, cyberspace, cyber security, digital economy, threats.*

Introduction

The Kenyan economy is projected to grow at the rate of 5.5% in 2022 and 5.2% in 2023 according to the World Bank projection (Mathenge, Ghauri, Mutie, Sienaert, & Umutesi, 2022). This growth will largely be contributed to by the steady growth of economic activities within the cyberspace. Kenya has experienced high levels of digitization and technological advancement resulting in improved service delivery within various sectors of the economy (Muthengi, 2015) leading to more Kenyans embracing digital technology for various aspects of life. A 2016 report by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics shows that 39% of private enterprises are engaged in e-commerce. Similarly, the Kenya National Economic Survey Report 2022 shows that the value of the ICT sector expanded by 6.9% from Kshs. 522.5 billion in 2020 to Kshs. 529.8 billion in 2021.

Following this growth, government policies are focusing and incorporating digital infrastructure into the Kenyan society. This is evidenced by the prominence given to digital strategies within the various development agendas and plans. The government has unveiled policy documents envisaged to propel Kenya towards a prosperous digital economy. Key among these documents are the Kenya Digital Blueprint and the Kenya National Digital Master Plan 2022-2023. The Digital economy blueprint envisions a digitally empowered citizenry, living a digitally enabled society. The digital master plan on the other hand, aims at leveraging and deepening the contribution of ICT to accelerate economic growth. These documents acknowledge that emerging technologies have great potential for impact on economic development.

The Kenyan economic ecosystem is composed majorly of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that form the backbone of the economy. These enterprises have embraced ICT in their operations aimed at improving their business efficiency and developing competitiveness. The digital space offers a number of advantages as well as a myriad of challenges inherent within the cyber space (Muhati, 2018; Okuku, Renaud, & Valeriano, 2015). While the cyberspace is full of opportunities and great potential for businesses and individuals, it also contains many risks, challenges and threats in equal measure. The degree of these

risks and threats is directly linked to the degree of growth in digitization. As such, the more the Kenyan society embraces ICT, the more the risks and threats grow (Kamary, 2018).

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are facing a lot of challenges some being cyber related. The cyber challenges include inadequate funds, limited technical knowledge and lack of proper awareness on cyber security among others (Muhati, 2018). According to Muhati (2018), these entities are worst hit by cyber threats and almost half of cyber-attacks in Kenya are targeted at SMEs (Hakmeh, 2017).

The review of literature on cyber security in Kenya shows that indeed there exists high levels of cyber threats and cybercrime targeting businesses and individuals. However, there is limited academic literature on the usefulness of cyber security in countering the effects of cybercrime on the economy within the Kenyan context. This paper therefore, looks at the role of cyber security strategies in countering cybercrime thus enhancing and fostering economic growth.

This paper seeks to contribute to the academic discourse on cyber security in Kenya by attempting to establish a link between cybersecurity and economic growth.

Theoretical Framework

There are a number of theories formulated around the subject of cyber security and ICT in general, this paper will be founded on the *Routine Theory* of cyber security. This paper focuses on cyber security through the lenses of cybercrime manifested in cyber-attacks and cyber threats targeted at businesses operating within the digital space. Thus, the study was inclined towards the criminal components and their effects within the subject of study herein.

The *Routine theory* assumes that criminals commit crime because they had the opportunity and victims may not have been victims if they took appropriate measures to protect themselves. It further posits that crime occurs when three elements converge; a potential offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. That all the three elements must be present for a crime to be

actualized (Purpura, 2013). This theory is particularly useful in understanding the rate and trends in cyber threats, attacks and cybercrime generally. Turvey, argues that the lack of any of the three elements sufficiently prevents the actualization of a crime (Turvey, 2013). For purposes of this study, the three elements are cybercriminals, digital economy and cyber security respectively. This study relied on this argument and posits that robust cyber security can prevent the actualization of cybercrime. It further helps to illustrate why cybercrime is on the rise and why cyber security strategies are critical in dealing with it.

Methodology

This study was a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources of literature on the subject. Insights were drawn from studies, articles, reports, policies and legal instruments relating to the subject of study. The insights were employed in the arguments advanced on the need for cyber security strategies.

Discussions and analysis of Findings

This paper reviewed literature relating to cyber security and cybercrime in Kenya with a view to establish the extent of cybercrime and the effects of cybercrime on the economy and businesses, and the legal and policy framework for cybersecurity. The findings of the review are discussed within the subsections below.

Cybercrime

Cybercrime, as already highlighted, is a global phenomenon that has recently gained collective attention from states within the United Nations (UN). In 2019, the UN general assembly voted to initiate negotiations for a convention to address the problem of cybercrime and to counter the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. An Ad hoc committee was established under resolution 74/247 which has since February 2022 been undertaking negotiations towards this end (UNODC).

There is no single accepted definition of cybercrime with the most preferred and commonly used definition referring to cybercrime as any unlawful action perpetrated by the use of a computer and or against a computer, system, network, program or data that pose a threat to the security of a nation, organization,

enterprise or individual (Muthengi, 2015). Cybercrime is composed of two categories; cyber dependent crimes that can only be committed by the use of ICT such as denial of services attacks (DOD) and; cyber enabled crimes which are the traditional crimes scaled up or sophisticated by the use of ICT such as online fraud. It is worth noting that most crimes now have an element of cyber (Swiatkowska, 2020).

Cybercrime has been reported to be on the steady rise and various factors have been noted to be contributing to this phenomenon. The growing number of cyber-attacks throughout the world coupled with the massive financial losses bring to the fore the vulnerabilities that exist in the cyber space and the serious consequences of cyber-attacks on the economy.

Some of the factors accounting for the increasing rates of cybercrime include the anonymity of carrying out criminal acts within the cyber space and the resultant minimal chance of getting caught (Swiatkowska, 2020). The structure of the cyber space makes it conducive for criminal activity, the lack of a single central control structure means that any person can carry out any action whether lawful or unlawful with the possibility of not being caught (Muthengi, 2015). Criminals exploit this unstructured nature of the cyber space compounded by the anonymity it affords them. Further, cybercrime is considered to be low-cost crime with very high profits thereby making it quite lucrative. This is highlighted by statistics showing that cybercrime is the third paying criminal venture globally after drug and arms trafficking (CSIS, 2018). Cybercrime has increasingly taken an economic angle with most attacks being economically motivated. The intention of the criminals being to disrupt normal operations of businesses with a view to gain financially by exploiting existing vulnerabilities as well as using illegally obtained data (Kajwang, 2022). As such it is possible to draw a connection between cybercrime and the economy because the greatest motivation for cybercrime is economic gain for cyber criminals.

The prevalence of cybercrime can also be attributed to the fact that cybercrime is relatively easy to commit and cyber-attack tools are now easily available for purchase at relatively affordable costs within the dark web (Swiatkowska, 2020).

Furthermore, the capabilities of cyber criminals are growing exponentially with the impact of their attacks equally growing in severity.

Cybercrime takes many forms, there are many categories of illegal activities that are prevalent within the Kenyan cyber space. The years 2019 and 2020 noted an increase in attacks in all key sectors including financial services, government, manufacturing and insurance (Serianu, 2021).

Cybercrime targeted at financial institutions as well as digital financial services increased and are of particular concern noting that banks in Kenya are highly reliant on technology for most services which makes them targets of cyber criminals (Wechuli, Wabobwa, & Wasike, 2017)

Malware is one of the forms of cybercrime that have become prevalent in Kenya. According to the Communication Authority cyber security report for April 2022, a total of 37,012,510 malware attack attempts were detected by the National KE/CIRT for the period between January to March 2022 with these attacks particularly targeting financial institutions (Serianu, 2021). This threat is quite serious with potential to adversely affect financial institutions due to the rise in online banking services. Online transactions, mobile banking and mobile money transfer platforms are widely used in Kenya due to their convenience and ease of access as alternative banking systems. The use of mobile devices for banking while offering convenience present serious security risks (Wechuli, Wabobwa, & Wasike, 2017). Malware specifically targeting mobile banking applications have increasingly been developed and deployed noting that most Kenyans are connected to the internet through their mobile devices via telecommunication networks (Okuku, Renaud, & Valeriano, 2015; Wakoli, Ogara, & Liyala, 2020). The report also noted an increase in malware targeted at automated teller machines (ATM). These malware are deployed against ATM machines triggering errors in the said machines that are then manipulated remotely by cyber criminals.

Ransomware was also noted to be on the increase specifically targeted at the financial sector as well as other sectors. This were targeted at the identity management systems of these institutions. Ransomware is one of the most

destructive tools of cyber-attack with potential for serious financial impact. It is deployed to encrypt data in a victims system and thereafter the criminals demand for payments to be made for them to decrypt the data and restore access (Swiatkowska, 2020).

Another growing threat noted is deployment of rogue devices. Rogue devices are malicious devices that are intentionally compromised for purposes of attacking computers, systems and data within a network of interconnected devices (Serianu, 2021). These devices gain access and carry out attacks within the infiltrated system. Phishing related social engineering is also on the increase. Phishing involves soliciting of personal information perpetrated through emails or malicious websites or mobile applications. These attacks usually seem to be originating from genuine sources. Customers are targeted largely by these attacks to obtain personal information that grants criminals access to the customer's account (Okuku, Renaud, & Valeriano, 2015; Jarud, 2020).

Business email compromise (BEC) was also noted to be on the rise (Serianu, 2021). This is a type of scam that targets companies and organizations for financial gain. They involve fraudulent emails purporting to be genuine usually requesting for funds transfer or privileged data (Interpol, 2021).

Another category of attacks steadily rising is mobile money fraud. The use of mobile money in Kenya is widespread making it a target of criminals who have developed elaborate scams targeting vulnerabilities within the mobile money platforms as well as customers' security lapses (Ndeda, Odoyo, 2019). The increased use of smartphones that hold personal information makes mobile devices used within the mobile money networks lucrative to criminals as they can easily obtain personal information that they can use to carry out fraudulent transactions (Wechuli, Wabobwa, & Wasike, 2017). Mpesa has been a target of such fraudulent activities which led to Safaricom engaging in public awareness warning customers about possible fraudulent attacks and how to protect against such attacks.

Cybercrime, as has already been alluded to herein, is one of the highest paying criminal ventures coming in at third place globally. Conversely, it is very costly

for economies, organizations, businesses and individuals. There are varying estimates on the cost of cybercrime to the world economy. Some of the statistics estimate that the cost of cybercrime to the global economy in 2022 is $7 trillion that is projected to rise to $ 10.5 by 2025 (Cybercrime magazine, 2022). Another estimate puts the cost at $600 billion which gives a percentage of 0.8% of the global GDP (CSIS, 2018). Regionally, cybercrime is estimated to have cost the African GDP $ 412 billion in 2021 which caused a reduction of more than 10%. Closer home, it is estimated that the Kenyan economy lost around $ 36 million to cybercrime (Interpol, 2021) which is a high cost for a developing economy.

These losses are costly for businesses and are even more detrimental to SMEs which are less resilient as they do not have huge budgets to invest in cyber security measures (Hakmeh, 2017). The effects on these business which make up the majority of the businesses in the country's digital economy have a direct negative impact on the economy.

The Human factor in cyber security

Most ICT devices, systems and programs are used, controlled and managed by human beings with the exception of some fully automated programs. This means that people are critical to the effective use of ICT and consequently have a role within the cyber security discourse. People can either be an enabler of cyber security or vulnerabilities (Okuku, Renaud, Valeriano, 2015).

According to the report by Serianu, there was an increase in attacks in 2020 from unsecured connections by people working remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic. This points to the human factor as one of the reasons for the increase in cyber-attacks. It has also been argued that cyber security measures and strategies should have the human factor as a central part and institutions should develop a cyber security culture which envisages how people interact with ICT systems (Njoroge, 2014). Cyber security should also focus on the role of humans who interact with ICTs. Users can be a serious threat to cyber security if they are not well informed of cyber security practices. These people need awareness on how to protect themselves in the cyberspace and general cyber hygiene (Okuku, Renaud, & Valeriano, 2015).

The study paper on human centered cyber security by KICTANet found that most cyber breaches in companies are as a result of human error as many citizens lack awareness on cyber-attacks. Thus, cyber security measures should not ignore the critical role of human beings. It should also address the needs of the people as well as the state's security concerns.

The importance of cyber security

Cyber security is concerned with the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems and data from malicious attacks (Ndeda, Odoyo, 2019). The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defines cyber security as the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk mitigation approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurances and technologies that can be used to secure the cyber environment and organizations and user's assets (ITU, 2018). In simple terms, it is interested in securing and protecting citizens and organizations which goes into the core of national and economic security that ultimately fosters and promotes human security.

Kenya has experienced a significant increase in coordinated attacks targeted at various sectors which have also been replicated across the region in East Africa (Serianu, 2020). This indicates that cyber-attacks in the region have taken a coordinated character that is linked to and similar to organized crime. The total cyber threats more than doubled from 139.9 million in 2020 to 339.1 million in 2021 (National Economic Survey, 2022; Serianu, 2020; Kshetri, 2016). These figures are quite staggering and clearly reflect the magnitude of the overall problem and the extent of the threats that are lurking in the cyberspace. Cybercrime and threats expose businesses negatively in various ways key among them being financial and data exposure that potentially have damaging effects on businesses (Ndeda, Odoyo, 2019).

These challenges are not unique to Kenya as they are prevalent around the world, thus making cyber security a very critical subject within any discussion or agenda on ICT and digital space. Cyber security is no longer frivolous, it requires attention from all sectors as well as individuals. Every sphere of human society is encountering the scourge of cybercrime and threats on a daily basis (Muhati, 2018)

This brings into sharp focus the centrality and indeed critical place of cyber security in society today. Society, but more importantly businesses cannot survive and grow without appropriate cyber security measures. There are emerging cyber security issues that have serious economic, social and political implications (Kshetri, 2016). Kshetri (2016) argues that there have not been scholarly studies on factors associated with cyber security in developing countries. He further posits that there have been efforts to close the economic gap in relation to factors contributing to digitization, there are lags in factors related to cyber security. These gaps create challenges that include ineffective approaches to cyber security and cybercrime. These factors increase the possibility of African businesses being excluded from the cyber space. This argument highlights the importance of developing appropriate cyber security that protects businesses and fosters the growth of the economy.

It is clear that the digital economy presents great potential for the country's economic prosperity as it can be harnessed for sustainable economic growth. This is achievable only if appropriate security measures are formulated to guard against the volatile nature of the cyberspace and the possible serious ramifications of potential attacks. Cyber security regulations and infrastructure are therefore critical to the development of the digital economy (Dahlman, Mealy, & Werlmelinger, 2016).

The achievement of full proof cyber security is impossible for various reasons including the highly dynamic nature of the cyber space as well as the constant growth in sophisticated technologies (Hakmeh, 2017). However, appropriate levels of cyber security and resilience can be achieved through the formulation of relevant legal instruments, policies, guidelines, safeguards, training and awareness.

Legal, Regulatory and Policy Framework

The growing rates of cybercrime have had serious ramifications for the economy estimated to have lost about $36 million to cybercrime (Interpol Africa, 2021). Like many countries around the world, Kenya has formulated domestic legal, regulatory and policy documents to address the challenge of cybercrime and cyber security. The country's approach to cyber security is also influenced by

international and regional frameworks that include the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest convention) and the African Union Convention on Cyber security and personal data protection (Malabo convention). Therefore, cyber security within the Kenyan cyber ecosystem is grounded on the legal, regulatory and policy instruments discussed in the forthcoming section.

Legal and Policy Framework

Kenya has developed a number of laws, policies and strategies relating to cyber security. They include Computer Misuse and Cybercrime Act, Kenya Information Communication Act, Data Protection Act, Digital Economy blueprint, National Digital Master Plan and the National Cyber Security Strategy among others.

a) Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act

The main objective of this legislation is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, programs and data as well as facilitating the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of cybercrime. It also establishes the National computer and cybercrime coordination committee with the mandate of coordinating all matters relating to the cyberspace and cyber security in Kenya. The Act gives the committee the responsibility of ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure and developing a cyber-security framework for the country. It is further mandated to undertake international cooperation on all matters relating to cybercrime and cyber security. The Act also establishes offences relating to computers, systems, networks and data. The committee has developed the National cyber security strategy to streamline all activities relating to cyber security.

b) Kenya Information Communication Act

This Act establishes the Communication Authority of Kenya as the regulator for entities dealing in telecommunication and ICT in the country. The CA established the Kenya computer incident response team KE/CITR which is multi agency association framework responsible for national harmonization of cyber security reporting and incidence response. The Act also provides for the Commission's functions and responsibility in relation to cyber security.

Policy Framework

The following policy documents underpin and guide the efforts within the country on cyber security. They are aimed at ensuring a wholesome approach to the security of citizens, institutions and businesses through the protection of systems, networks, devices while maintaining and ensuring their confidentiality, integrity and availability.

a) Digital Economy Blueprint 2022–2032

The digital economy blueprint provides a framework for the country in the journey towards a sustainable digital economy. The blueprint envisions a digitally empowered citizenry living in a digitally enabled society. It is based on the realization that society must adapt to the reality of the place of digital technologies in the modern world.

The blueprint defines the digital economy as the entirety of sectors that operate using digitally enabled communications and networks leveraging internet, mobile and other technologies irrespective of industry. It is aimed to offer an opportunity to the country to join nations in the first world and contribute to the global economy. The framework is anchored on five pillars that underpin technology as the bedrock of Kenya's economic growth. These are digital government, digital business, infrastructure, innovation driven entrepreneurship and digital skills and values.

This framework further identifies cyber security as one of the key enablers for the digital economy noting that the protection and security of the integrity of electronic and digital systems is a paramount concern in a digitally enabled economy. Without robust cyber security policies and strategies, the digital economy will not be sustainable or successful. Therefore, one of the aims of the blueprint is to foster confidence, trust and security of the digital space.

It acknowledges that the lack of an effective cyber security mechanism will have a negative impact on the digital economy with potential loss of competitive ability and future economic strength.

b) Kenya National Digital Master Plan 2022-2023

The National digital master plan builds on the pillars of the Digital economy blueprint. The main objective of the master plan is the provision of quality, accessible, affordable, reliable, quality and secure information communication technologies in government aimed at positioning Kenya as a globally competitive digital economy.

It is similarly anchored on four key pillars; digital infrastructure, digital skills, digital innovation, digital enterprise and digital business. These pillars will guide in the provision of digital services to the citizens of Kenya, businesses and other stakeholders. It gives prominence to information communication technology as a key enabler in economic development of the country under vision 2030 and the digital economy.

Under the master plan, data protection and cyber management have been highlighted as key themes that cut across all the four pillars highlighting the need to secure the digital space and assets so as to maintain the confidence of citizens and businesses.

c) Kenya National Cyber Security Strategy 2022-2027

The Kenya National cyber security strategy is the country's key policy for cyber security. It was developed pursuant to the provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act by the National computer and cybercrimes coordination committee (NC4). It is a frame work that seeks to provide for the implementation of cyber security measures in the country and address new challenges and emerging threats. It outlines the country's cyber security goals which include building a secure and resilient cyberspace and ensuring a safe and trusted cyberspace for the people of Kenya. The framework was formulated taking a whole of government approach on matters cyber security.

It is anchored on thematic pillars for effective cyber security for the public and private sector. The foundational pillars of the strategy are; cyber security governance; cyber security laws, regulations and standards; critical information infrastructure protection, cyber security capability and capacity building; cyber risks and cybercrimes management; cooperation and collaboration.

The legal and policy frameworks discussed herein have been formulated for the protection of systems, networks, devices while maintaining and ensuring their confidentiality, integrity and availability. The need for this protection is founded on notions of national security and the need to ensure security of citizens in all spheres of society. They are also developed taking cognizance of the fact that no single institution has the ability and capacity to deal with cyber security on its own. The frameworks establish coordinated mechanisms and approaches to cyber security. Further, the exponential growth in the digital front has necessitated inclusion of cyber security as a key component of national security. Throughout the world, countries that have advanced digital economies need to proactively engage in robust cyber security (Kovasc, 2018).

The frameworks further help to create clarity on the roles of different stakeholders within the cyber security ecosystem. They also shape the national security agenda as well as identifying and providing for appropriate allocation of resources (Kovasc, 2018).

Conclusion

This paper takes a two pronged approach to cyber security through legal and economic lenses by examining the extent of cybercrime and cyber threats that have become a great challenge to the security of the cyberspace as well as examining the consequences of cybercrime on businesses and the economy. It also analyses the legal and policy framework for cyber security in the country. In this quest, a review of literature, legal and policy instruments was undertaken.

The review of the legal and policy framework indicates that Kenya has made great strides in the formulation of laws, policies and strategies to protect the interests of Kenyans within the cyberspace. Indeed some of the laws, policy and strategy documents have adopted international best practices on cyber security. Further review of the policies indicates that Kenya has great aspirations of joining the developed economies of the world by embracing the digital economy that has merged the economic and social spheres of life noting that social platforms are now used for commercial purposes (Schwab, 2016).

A review of the available literature on the subject highlighted the critical place of the digital economy on the overall development of the country's economy as the digital economy presents great potential for organizations, businesses and individuals. It was noted that the Kenyan economy is on a large scale composed of SMEs that have been touted as the engine of economic growth.

The study also found that organizations, businesses and individuals continue to face an increasing level of cybercrime, risks, threats and attacks. It was noted that cybercrime is the foremost challenge facing businesses and individuals in the cyberspace in Kenya (Muhati, 2018). Indeed the statistics from the Communication Authority and Serianu indicate a spike in cyber-attacks within the last two years. This increase was attributed to various factors and vulnerabilities including the fact that cybercrime affords anonymity to criminals, availability of cyber tools for carrying out attacks and the vulnerabilities brought about by human beings as users of ICTs (Okuku, Renaud, & Valeriano, 2015; Swiatkowska, 2020).

For Kenya to realize the ambitious aspirations of joining the league of developed economies of the world as envisaged in the digital economy blueprint, harnessing the potential of the digital economy is crucial. As has already been highlighted, this can only be achieved by ensuring security of the digital economy through robust cyber security measures. While the country has formulated laws, policies and strategies on cyber security, the statistics on the trends and staggering levels of cybercrime indicate that the efforts so far have had minimal effect and that there is urgent need for increased efforts on cyber security.

The literature review also found that there is limited academic and empirical data on the relationship between cyber security and economic growth. The literature reviewed identified cybercrime as a serious challenge facing businesses in the cyberspace with serious financial implications on businesses and the economy. However, there is limited data that identifies the role if any that cyber security plays in connection to the mitigating the effects of cybercrime on the economy.

Recommendations

Following the review of literature, the paper makes the following recommendations;

- There is need for concerted efforts to be made by all relevant stakeholders to address the scourge of cybercrime that has been demonstrated as a serious challenge for the digital economy. Studies should also be conducted to identify the reasons for the prevalence of cybercrime within the Kenyan context with the aim of identifying possible tailored responses to the same. Counter measures need to be developed to protect the economy and SMEs from the debilitating effects of this problem.

- The paper also proposes training and awareness for businesses on the need to exercise due diligence and proper care in the cyber space to eliminate the vulnerabilities relating to the human factor. Businesses need to develop and inculcate proper cyber security culture within their operations to strengthen their business operations within the cyberspace. This will need adequate investment in training of staff and acquiring appropriate tools to protect against threats.

- It also proposes that SMEs need to invest in cyber security. As noted earlier on in this paper, almost half of cyber-attacks are targeted at SMEs which have been highlighted to be lagging in efforts to address cyber security challenges for various reasons.

- The paper also proposes that there is need for more research and studies to be carried out to establish the nexus between cyber security and economic development. As already highlighted herein, there is limited literature and data available on this subject. This limitation creates a gap in the body of knowledge on cyber security. This knowledge will be useful for policy makers and businesses in making decisions relating to cyber security and operations

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Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region: Adapting to the 21ˢᵗ Century Realities

2

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Introduction

The security challenges that nations and regions face today are far more complex and intertwined than ever before. As noted by Onditi et al. (2021), a wide range of non-state actors have emerged in the 21st century as contemporary dangers to both the national and international security. In addition to fundamentally altering international relations, globalization has also affected the channels through which the international security issues are experienced, channeled and addressed at all levels (Onditi et al., 2021).

The international system has a dynamic structure; specific modern security strategies have been developed to address some of the key systemic security issues of the twenty-first century. One of the most recent strategies is preventive diplomacy.

The region on the northeastern coast of Africa is known as the Horn of Africa. Historically, the region's leading countries are Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia.

Mengisteab (2017) observes that the Horn of Africa is one of the world's most unstable regions. This is due to the rise in in-security issues, armed conflicts, and the political turmoil which has been experienced since mid-1950s. The region is also perceived to be among the least developed in the entire world as a result of the rampant socioeconomic upheavals it faces. No state in the region has ever been insulated from the issues of her neighbors, regardless of how far apart or how strong or weak they are in comparison. As a result, every state in the region has always been intimately connected to the political and security fortunes of its neighbors (Mengisteab, 2017).

International resources have historically been heavily burdened by the human crises being experienced in the region. Since the 1960s, the region has repeatedly experienced significant population shifts, a trend that is still largely rampant. This is evidenced by the huge number of refugees in the region (Ouma, 2016). The eastern African coast is also threatened by maritime piracy, which

primarily originates from Somalia, a chaotic nation, in addition to the risks posed by terrorism.

The main issue is that, despite Somalia being a haven for pirates, none of the states in the area is currently prepared to handle problems with marine security. In part, as a result of this, the UN Security Council in June 2008 enacted a resolution permitting foreign states in agreements with the transitional government of Somaliland to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to fight pirates. The resolution gives these nations the freedom to combat regional piracy in whichever way they see fit (BBC, 2008), which has further damaged the Horn of Africa's already tenuous security balance.

The Horn of Africa contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world: Sudan has the highest, pastoralist percentage globally while Somalia and Ethiopia rank third and fifth respectively. In Djibouti, one third of the population are pastoralists. Kenya also has its share of pastoralist communities (Lomo, 2006). In search of water and grazing land, pastoral tribes cross borders and move with their herds within the region pitting the area at risk in a more complicated security situation (Catley et al., 2016). In all facets of pastoral social and economic life, consideration is given to the animals and their environment. Cattle serve as the foundation for identification with a range of social, political, and religious institutions in pastoralist communities where they play a significant part in the society's value system (Catley et al., 2016). This combined with weak governance; inadequate land and resource management policies; political and economical marginalisation; and increasing insecurity, resulting from small arms and cattle raiding, insecurity is taking its toll (Setrana & Adzande, 2022). In the region, tension between governments has also been exacerbated by historical, ideological, political, economic, geographical, and environmental issues, leading to animosity, rivalry, and mutual mistrust. Sometimes, as a result of the rivalry's influence on regional politics, certain insurgent forces engaged in regional battles with the rival state receiving cross-border support. This paper contends that for the dynamic security issues to be addressed, the focus should shift to preventive diplomacy. The paper presents an evaluative perspective of the concept on its application in the Horn of Africa region (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015).

Theoretical Framework

Preventive diplomacy is discussed using the lenses of Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) founded in 2003. The theory identifies a regional security complex as a group of states whose primary national security focus are so closely intertwined that they cannot be extracted or addressed independently of each other. International security is best studied from a regional perspective, because ties between nations (and other players) reflect regular, regionally concentrated patterns, according to the RSCT (Jarząbek, 2019). The theory is rightly applicable for this study in explaining the paradigm shift from the initial realities of the cold war era, when regional security arrangements of the horn of Africa region were largely explained by the offensive theoretical perspective. The study posits that the adjustment and adaptation has been occasioned by the emerging security concerns best explained by the Regional Security Complex theory (Jarząbek, 2019).

Methodology

This study adopted an analytical desk top review approach that focused fully on secondary sources: books, book chapters, journals, magazines, and government publications among others. Data was sourced, analyzed and triangulated thematically to help identify the key themes and trends from which the study identified the key findings, conclusion and recommendations. Desktop review was favorable for this study owing to its cross sectional advantage of a wide range of source materials.

Discussions/Analysis of Findings

Strategic Interest, Geopolitics and Insecurity in the Horn of Africa Region (HoA)

In many cases, the term "geostrategic interest" refers to the national interest including security that is "either endangered in close proximity to the national mainland or in areas of unique national interests overseas" (Dimov & Ivanov, 2015). Security threats are either made directly to the major power or to the nations that make up its sphere of influence. In the second case, the major power

feels obligated to stand up for its friend. The idea of geostrategic interest might demonstrate the interdependence of geography, power, and security in the world system (Krieg, 2013).

Dimov and Ivanov (2015) argue that, due to strategic interest and geo-political dynamics, East Africa and the Horn is one of the most politically dynamic regions in the world. Geopolitical factors and regional aspirations have rarely combined to yield such unpredictable outcomes, a factor that could be best analyzed by Regional Security Complex theory by Buzan and Ole weaver, the theory upon which this study is premised. The region may not have dominated the Cold War, but it did witness the establishment of two post-colonial states (South Sudan in 2011 and Eritrea in 1991); the turbulence of that war (Ethiopia transitioned from American to Soviet authority, almost immediately following the toppling of Emperor Haile Selassie); the atrocities of the Rwandan Genocide; the opening of the Great War in DRC, and the start of the War on Terror (Ouma, 2016).

On a global scale, the region is one of the world's most strategically important, since whoever controls it has a huge impact on world events. The conflicting interests have therefore had both positive and negative security implications both for the region and to the rest of the world. Its coastal expansion on the Red Sea establishes a major maritime commerce route between Europe and Asia due to access to new markets with seductively low labor costs. Because of the abundance of its natural resources, it also has a high economic value (CRU Policy Brief, 2018).

Geographically, the region links Muslim and Christian Africa. It has a combination of regional and global political-security interests due to its Red Sea frontage, proximity to the Middle East, and harboring an internal islamist insurgency. It serves as the continent's entry point to Asia and has long-standing relationships with the Middle East, China, and India that still manifest in trade and investment agreements today. Additionally, a number of states in the region are poised to begin producing oil, fusing the prospect of economic independence with the inequity and conflicts that frequent oil producers around the world (Humanitarian and Development Programme, 2022).

Alem (2007) argues that the Horn's strategic importance as a hub of trade and conflict has made it a major theater where governments, movements, and political groups have sought to intervene in the internal affairs of the states within the region, often contributing to instability in the entire region, thus setting some serious ripple effects not only in the region, but to the other parts of the world as well.

As a result of the geo-strategic interests, big powers frequently intervene in security matters in the Horn of Africa, in the belief that the matters threaten their interests by undermining the political and administrative infrastructure of friendly states. This part of Africa has experienced both economic and security challenges over the years, most of which are as a result of proxy wars between the opposing powers. History has shown that this type of contestation and scramble results into some form of challenges (Krieg, 2013).

All these factors have contributed to the region's vulnerability, resulting into significant conflict and securitization over the past few decades. Al-Shabaab attacks that still frequent the region and other parts, the ethnic turmoil in Ethiopia, the civil war in Somalia, Somalia's coast-based piracy; the civil wars in Darfur and South Sudan, and Djibouti's assurance of Red Sea security are just a few examples that therefore give credence and justification to the rationale for the application of preventive diplomacy in addressing the challenges bedeviling the region which is the hallmark of this paper.

Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework

From the global political standpoint, the communication process that is essential to the operation of the international system is referred to as diplomacy. Fundamentally, diplomacy aims at using power to establish some sort of order on the global political system, so as to leverage on the disagreements or dispute from turning into a full blown conflict or war (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Dag Hammarskjold's preventative diplomacy framework was forgotten with the end of the Cold War, but Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then-UN Secretary-General, brought it back to life and gave it new meaning by defining it as the

"effort to prevent disagreements from emerging between countries, to prevent current problems from escalating into hostilities, and to limit the spread of hostilities whenever they arise." Preventive diplomacy sits apart from other UN projects such as "peacemaking," "peacekeeping," and "peace building" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

The UN has been attempting to change from a "culture of response" to that of "prevention" in terms of crisis and conflict prevention. To do this, it is essential to view preventive diplomacy as a crucial tool for the UN to carry out its mandate. As a result, the various UN agencies now have better ability to respond quickly to emergencies including armed conflict. According to the UN Charter, the organization is required to participate in preventative diplomacy, which includes among other strategies adopting political action through the Department of Political Affairs and sending out the UN Preventive Deployment Force for peacekeeping missions (UNPREDEP) (Nambiar, 2019).

The fundamental logic of preventive diplomacy cannot be contested. According to Setrana & Adzane (2002), act swiftly to quell tensions that could spark a conflict and settle current problems before they turn into crises in the future. The international community should use preventive diplomacy as early as possible to resolve conflicts, since it is least expensive, most moral, and least difficult course of action. Due in part to the inability of the international community to avoid atrocities in areas like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War, the century-old concept of preventative diplomacy has therefore been favored. Preemptive involvement, crisis prevention, and pre-conflict peace building are Lund's three distinct sub-types of preventative diplomacy. They differ in terms of the tasks they accomplish, the situations in which they operate best, the deadlines they follow, and the equipment they employ (Lund, 2006).

Preventive diplomacy framework is now being practiced by more parties and through a raft of means than ever before, much like how the Horn of Africa serves as a prime example. This is due in part to the more solid normative frameworks that have been created to assist international efforts to stop violent conflict and

mass crimes and ensure that more people have a voice in governance, peace, and security-related matters. The new aggressive global powers and the new actors that have formed as a result of the devolution of power and responsibility to regional and sub-regional bodies are therefore altering the nature of preventative diplomacy (UN Security Council Resolution, 2000).

Due to the ever-present security threats, preventive diplomacy has emerged as one of the most crucial instruments for safeguarding peace, stability, and development not only in the horn of Africa, but on the entire continent. Finding flash points before they develop into open disputes and violent outbursts is the only approach to save lives, prevent individual tragedies, and avoid the society-fracturing that takes years to mend.

The Rationale for the Application of Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

Due to the growing involvement of both internal and external security players to advance regional and global security agendas, the Horn of Africa is experiencing a structural shift in the types of security plans and arrangements (Zartman, 2019). Therefore, the likelihood of proxy wars, rising geopolitical tensions, and a further expansion of externally driven security agendas in the region are all made more likely by the establishment of congested international security politics in the region. In line with the theoretical framework for this study (Regional Security Complex theory) the current continental and regional security systems, which are already having a difficult time adjusting to the new external security politics, are therefore faced with significant issues as a result of this (Zartman, 2019).

Considering all these dynamics, preventive diplomacy therefore suits the Horn of Africa's situation, since appropriate intervention to the security challenges would not only require proactive measures, but also deeper and more elaborate measures that do not only focus on the manifestation of the prevailing security issues, but also on the underlying issues of governance, conflict and insecurity. Additionally, this would be very helpful in addressing disputes and conflicts that result from interstate and intrastate ties (Kirimi, 2017).

Conditions exist in most parts of the Horn of Africa that favor the formation and expansion of transnational threats. Existing governments and societal systems are under pressure to address security concerns in the region as a result of a combination of regional circumstances and the pressures of globalization. Most of these problems have some connection to the geopolitics and strategic concerns in the region (Kirimi, 2017). The region would therefore be best served by preventive diplomacy as it provides a number of players with a set of tools that would be used as needed to specifically respond to the threats and instances of mass atrocities by facilitating governance solutions since the region has multiple actors, as it has been observed in this study.

Measures for Preventive Diplomacy in the Region

Peacetime and crisis-related actions are the two basic categories into which preventive diplomatic efforts can be separated. The main areas of analysis in this paper are early warning systems, institutional development, and fostering confidence during times of peace. Focus is largely on fact-finding, good offices and goodwill missions, crisis-management, and preventative deployment.

Confidence Building

"Confidence building" refers to efforts to "make clear to concerned states, via the use of a range of means, the true nature of potentially hazardous military activities." Building confidence frequently involves the sharing of information, early notification of military training activities and deployments, and supervision of regional arms accords (Debisa, 2021). Both state-sponsored and non-state organizations have used this strategy in the Horn of Africa.

In 2011, South Sudan separated from Sudan as a result of a historic vote for independence. However, less than three years after the historic independence referendum, the world's newest nation entered a civil war that resulted into deaths and bloodshed. Bringing the combatants to the negotiating table in order to negotiate the settlement for a lasting peace, many regional actors, notably the AU and IGAD, employed confidence building as a preventive diplomatic technique (Francis, 2017).

The conflicting parties in South Sudan signed and approved the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on September 12, 2018, as a result of confidence-building measures implemented by regional authorities in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This therefore won high recognition and admiration as a remarkable development that signaled the start of peace. The unwillingness of parties to peace agreements to uphold what they had in good faith agreed to, however, has been one of the most disturbing tendencies in South Sudan's history of conflict. For obvious political reasons, agreements have been frequently executed only partially, selectively, and reluctantly (Francis, 2017).

Institution Building

In order to pursue a similar set of interests or goals, attention, skills, and resources might be organized in formal or informal methods. Institutions create norms to conduct, produce routine consultations, and foster confidence. Institutions limit players' unilateral preferences and behaviors over time and encourage cooperation.

It has been noted by Marathi (2017) that whenever governmental and social structures in a society are destroyed by conflict and insecurity, central government institutions suffer irreparable harm from insecurity, which in turn hinders the delivery of public services, as well as economic restrictions, which distort or cease the payment of civil servants or the supply of critical goods. Through population displacement, it has widened the racial divide in the Horn of Africa, fueled intercommunal conflict, and destroyed local institutions and social capital. The rule of law has collapsed as a result, and a culture of impunity has developed, hence facilitating large-scale transfer of skilled workers abroad (Murithi, 2017). This has occurred in a number of the Horn of Africa's conflict-affected nations. This study observes that preventive diplomacy is the best remedy that could pull the countries in the horn from this abyss.

Without considerable structural and institutional change, it seems likely that the problem is likely to persist (Niyitunga, 2016). Reforming governance and transforming institutions are however challenging long-term processes that

cannot be aided by ad hoc, short-term measures, some of which are largely focused at the humanitarian projects. Instead, they should be viewed as the outcome of persistent, teamwork-based efforts supported by years worth of long-term strategies.

In the context of the horn of Africa region, there is no one fit that works for all local governance improvements rather, a case-by-case plan must be developed in light of a thorough assessment of the current institutional, social, political, and governance contexts. Establishing "norms" or encouraging rule-governed behavior among the players is a crucial component in institution-building for the state that have been adversely affected by internal conflicts in the horn of Africa Region. Multilateralism, non-intervention, and pacific dispute resolution are a few examples of such standards. In a broad sense, meetings and dialogue that are started primarily by non-governmental actors may be helpful for institution-building (Zartman, 2019).

Early Warning Systems

Onditi et al. (2021) argues that one of the measures for preventive diplomacy is for keeping an eye on the development of natural disasters, refugee flows, the threat of starvation, and the spread of disease, among other areas in the political, military, and ecological frameworks which, if not stopped, result into an upsurge in violence or significant humanitarian catastrophes. In relation to the Horn of Africa region, international interest in early-warning of human rights abuses and refugee migrations has grown significantly in recent years.

According to various schools of thought, the Early Warning System was created with humanitarian ideas in mind, whereas the other claims that it had military origins. The first argument contends that early warning systems were developed in the field of national military intelligence during the Cold War to enhance the capability to anticipate upcoming (ballistic) strikes (Simon & Niels, 2006). The latter, however, contends that early warning systems have developed as a means of anticipating environmental dangers, especially during natural calamities like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and floods (Nambiar, 2019). Nevertheless, the concept is rapidly being used in a variety of socioeconomic fields. This is quite

in sync with the focus for this study as captured in the title: adjusting to the new realities of the 21st century international system. The value of preventing disputes rather than resolving them through reactive means is becoming increasingly clear. Conflict avoidance has been found to be more advantageous in terms of protecting lives and cutting expenditures. Consequently, Article 12 of the African Union Peace and Security Protocol calls for the creation of a continental early warning system (CEWS). To acquire intelligence, this system works closely with regional organizations, all information is then sent to the situation room at the headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its stated objective is to aid in Africa's conflict prediction and prevention (Debisa, 2021).

The East African Community (EAC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-Sahel), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States are among the eight regional organizations that make up this framework (Rondos, 2016). Together with the eight regional organizations, the development of the situation room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the choice of indicators for data gathering have all been acknowledged as key contributions to the Conflict Early Warning (CEWS) in the horn of Africa region.

Since it was first founded, the CEWS has however undergone several revisions to help adjust to the 21st century realities. By working together, the eight IGAD Member States created the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The IGAD Member States established the CEWARN Mechanism to efficiently use the framework to respond to violent conflicts in the region and realize the aspirations for shared prosperity and a lasting, just peace in the Horn of Africa region (Francis, 2017).

Preventive Humanitarian Action

The major objectives of preventative humanitarian intervention are to prevent and control the humanitarian impacts of political conflicts as well as the political and humanitarian impacts of natural catastrophes. The World Health Organization (WHO) states that early humanitarian intervention in crises arising from long-term economic collapse, or slow-moving environmental calamities, such as drought,

can prevent the need for millions of dollars in additional corrective actions, and thousands of deaths. As ambassadors of preventative diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, and regional organizations all play a crucial role in this area (WHO, 2018).

According to Bellamy & Hunt (2015), security-related issues continue to pose the biggest danger to the safety and dignity of those who live in the Horn of Africa. The deaths and displaced persons in the area are attributable to the region's ongoing and recent wars, violence during elections, and those between communities. The primary cause of displacement in the region, has largely been as a result of conflict. The region is already susceptible as war occurrences are predicted to rise over the next few years as a result of a variety of triggers.

The humanitarian system is currently not well-tuned for readiness and quick action. This can be attributed in part to overstretching brought about by conflicting demands from crises that are currently occurring and receiving more attention, as well as in part, to a lack of prioritizing and money, both of which should improve (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015).

Regional and Sub-Regional Security Partnership and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

Accocring to the World Health Organization, preventative humanitarian intervention aims to reduce the humanitarian impact of political conflicts and natural calamities. Early crisis-related humanitarian intervention may avoid millions of dollars in additional corrective efforts and thousands of fatalities. Non governmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, and regional organizations have also played a crucial role as ambassadors of preventive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region as international politics and globalization effect regionalism in the contemporary world (Onditi et al., 2021).

Nearly all governments engage in regionalism, which also includes non-state actors and leads to official and informal regional governance structures and regional networks in most problematic areas. The current regionalism's complexity and heterogeneity make it difficult to comprehend the current security situation.

World politics' dynamism and globalization's acceleration affect contemporary regionalism. Since practically, all governments engage in some kind of regionalism, there are official and informal methods of regional governance and regional networks in most subject areas. Modern regionalism's variety and complexity provide new security problems and concerns. Dynamic global politics and accelerating globalization affect today's regionalism (Mengisteab, 2017).

Moreover, almost all governments throughout the globe engage in regionalism, which includes non-state players and leads to official and informal regional governance structures and regional networks in most problematic areas (Makiara, 2010). The intricacies and variety of contemporary regionalism make comprehending modern security difficult. In today's international system, regionalism is linked to international politics and globalization. Almost all nations practice regionalism, a worldwide phenomenon that affects non-state enterprises. Multiple official and informal regional government systems exist in most subject areas.

However, this requires broad security lenses. Along with protection from harm, one of the core characteristics of security is the ability of countries and civilizations to sustain their identities and structural integrity against hostile change agents. According to this viewpoint, survival is the most important aspect of security, although the notion includes a broad range of daily concerns. Regional groups are discussing diplomacy and conflict resolution more (Mancini, 2011). PSC, CEWS, and EASF have all been active. East African Community (EAC) and IGAD have been engaged in resolving disputes before and after they become violent.

Long-term success for security initiatives in any area requires a full grasp of regional institutions that promote economic integration, create shared norms and standards for security and governance, and build collective problem-solving capacities. The Horn of Africa has regional institutions that are unable to enhance cross-border security despite foreign attempts to develop such institutions and patterns (Mumma-Martinon, 2010).

African Union and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

According to the United Nations Charter of 1945, institutions supported by states hold the power of the international security system, which is structured along ideological as well as regional and zonal basis. In the continent of Africa, Africa Union has been very key in as far as security matters in the continent are concerned, as the security architect of the continent is patterned by the AU. According to the 1945 UN Charter, state-backed organizations control the international security system, which is ideological, regional, and zonal. Africa Union is the continent's security architect, hence its role in security concerns is crucial. The African Union (AU) is an intergovernmental organization comprising 53 African nations. South Africa assumed OAU's post in Durban on July 9, 2002. Morocco joined the OAU on November 12, making it the first country to do so since the OAU recognized the SADR as a sovereign state in February 1982 (Wellens, 1990).

The AU's aims include building greater solidarity and togetherness among African states and peoples, advancing the integration of politics and the economy, supporting democratic ideals, institutions, public participation, and good governance, and encouraging peace, security, and stability (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union). Preventive diplomacy is a new tactic the AU has created to manage internal security threats. Many of the AU's recent policies, notably as its position on the "global war on terror" (primarily Western) forces, have been influenced by foreign parties (Rotberg, 2005).

The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) actively engaged in peace discussions and worked as a mediator between the Sudanese government, armed groups, and opposition organizations. AUHIP was the most important regional player, although IGAD watched the peace talks. AUHIP's mediation efforts have focused on the crisis in Darfur and Abyei as part of the National Dialogue (Catley et al., 2016).

AMISOM is an African Union security operation in the Horn of Africa. AMISOM was part of a large network of collaborators when it landed in Mogadishu in March 2007. It is an example of "partnership peacekeeping," which the UN

secretary-general calls peacekeeping supported by international organizations, states, private firms, and local authorities (UN Security Council, Partnering for Peace, 2015).

IGAD and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) aimed to fight East African poverty, starvation, drought, and environmental degradation. In order to take into consideration, the political, social, and economic changes in East Africa, its goals were expanded in 1996, and since then, the creation of an effective security policy among the member states has been the fundamental goal of the IGAD. In addition to preserving peace, security, and stability, the main objectives of the IGAD are to develop regional integration and economic growth among its member states (Niyitunga, 2016).

The IGAD Charter's Article 18A outlines the group's security plan for East Africa. Building an effective system of consultation and collaboration is necessary for the peaceful settlement of disagreements and disputes. It is also important for regional cooperation to sustain the peace, security, and stability that are necessary for social and economic progress and to act forcefully as a unit to remove threats to peace, safety, and stability (IGAD, 2020). The states in the region deal with a number of interrelated security problems. Significant wars, which are frequently confined within national lines, are absent from these countries. Instead, if such disputes are not resolved quickly, they frequently affect neighboring nations in addition to drawing more nations in the region into the mix (Rondos, 2016).

Makiara (2010) observes that IGAD's top priorities are the security and peace concerns in the Horn of Africa. This is due to the fact that IGAD has managed some of the main peace and security initiatives in the region. As a result, the organization is vital to the Horn of Africa's political and security system and has been instrumental in efforts to bring about peace in Somalia and Sudan. Largely, due to the efforts of IGAD, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan was made feasible. The longest-running conflict in Africa came to an end when the CPA was signed on January 9th, 2005 in Nairobi. The Government

of Southern Sudan and the international community are concerned that the CPA is behind schedule in crucial areas, such as the demarcation of the North-South border, power sharing, governance issues, wealth (oil) sharing, resolution of the Abyei conflict, security arrangements, and the process of national healing, despite the fact that there has been significant progress in its implementation (Mumma, 2010).

The institutional foundation and track records required by IGAD to carry out activities that support peace, particularly those that include peace enforcement, are lacking. Institutionally, the East African Standby Force, which is the bigger East African component of the African Standby Force (EASF) is in charge of overseeing IGAD's operations in this region. However, efforts in this area have relied on the support of individual member countries on the political and diplomatic fronts as well as encouragement or coercion from external partners (Kidane, 2011).

Building regional capability for counterterrorism has been a step toward preventive diplomacy in the region. For instance, security officials regularly gather throughout eastern Africa to develop systems for intelligence sharing (relating to terrorism) and ideas for universal antiterrorism legislation that would prevent suspected terrorists from one nation from seeking asylum in another (Khadiagala, 2008). Similar gatherings of intelligence officials from thirteen African countries took place in Kenya in June 2004 to develop a coordinated terrorist approach. They agreed on a counterterrorism strategy that includes growing capacity, funding for cutting-edge technology, education, and law. In order to coordinate these efforts, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established a four-year Capacity Building Program against Terrorism in June (Rondos, 2016).

Key Challenges to the Application of Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

The Horn of Africa governments have a horrible track record when it comes to democratization, and their shared history of instability has only served to foster mistrust. Since then, efforts to carry out preventive diplomacy in the area have

been severely impeded. Both totalitarian autocracies and nations with democratic histories, a focus on human rights, and the rule of law are represented in the IGAD region. Many of these governments also back controversial regional and national laws that promote competition and mistrust both inside and between the member states. The state of regional security only highlights existing weak governance and authoritarian tendencies (Francis, 2017).

The concept of preventive diplomacy has proven to be controversial in the Horn of Africa region since the principle of state sovereignty limits most states from intervening from preventing internal problems, especially at the pre-conflict stages. Early involvement is often essential to the success of preventive diplomacy, but parties to conflicts often are not willing to admit they have a problem until the conflict has escalated beyond their control. They may contemplate avoiding legitimatizing an adversary or 'internationalizing' their problem by keeping off other actors, only to admit and accept their intervention when this has spiraled out of control (Musoma, 2021).

Conclusion

Preventive diplomacy is now carried out by numerous actors using a variety of tools. This is now achievable as a result of the development of a normative framework that supports global initiatives to avert violent conflict. International cooperation is essential because it doubles up diplomatic and international efforts by leveraging their combined resources and impact. Therefore, the Horn of Africa and the African continent as a whole should benefit from this normative framework. The political good will of national authorities, their capacity to accurately assess current risk factors, and their willingness to work with other important players in the international system to take appropriate action to address concerns before they spiral out of control remain the three key components of preventive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region.

Recommendations

- The international community should endeavor to increase states' capacity to handle the full range of security concerns in both their internal and

regional domains in addition to placing more focus on preventative diplomacy and providing more resources for its operations.

- A more stable governmental system in Somalia would be a significant political and security answer to the region's issues, given its importance to the security problems in the Horn of Africa, hence the international community's first goal should be to stabilize Somalia.

- The fundamental root of the region's violence and instability is widely acknowledged to be poor governance since politics and governance play a crucial role in both fostering conflict and resolving the political and security issues that the region's nations are currently confronting. Focus for the international community should therefore be to enforce good governance among the states in the Horn of Africa region.

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Gender Perspectives On Human Security For National Development In Kenya

By Dr. C.A. Mumma-Martinon

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between gender and human security for national development in Kenya. Using Feminist Economic Theory and Functionalism as a framework, the study analyzes how gender and human security impacts on Kenya's national development. The research questions are as follows: Is there a connection between gender and human security and development in Kenya? Does considering gender lead to improved human security and in turn to Kenya's national development? Will incorporating gender perspectives into institutional policies, security sector and legislation lead to improved human security and development in Kenya? The study employs secondary data using policy documents, journal articles, and books for data collection. The findings of this study highlight why gender perspectives and human security are important for Kenya's national development and the need for their incorporation in decision-making by the United Nations Security Council and in other conflict resolution situations and security procedures. The research findings inform the efforts towards integrating gender and human security for Kenya's national development.

Keywords: *gender, human security, national development, gender perspectives, sex, gender relations, gender roles, gender disparities, gender mainstreaming, gender impacts of security, gender-responsive policies and programs.*

Introduction

Human security as a concept is gaining popularity, due to security difficulties in the modern world. Old security and development challenges still exist alongside new ones that have also surfaced including: Drug and human trafficking, inequality among nations, terrorism, pollution, post-conflict stagnation, ethnic wars, and transnational crime, just to mention a few. To deal with these issues, a multidisciplinary, all- encompassing strategy is needed.

Applying the concept of human security to solve different insecurities, all the interlinked causes must be identified whether economic, social, political or cultural. Sickness, poverty, armed conflict also pose a danger to human security. Thus, in order to achieve human security, individuals must be provided with economic, physical, social, and environmental security in their residences, work places, and within the communities where they live. Unfortunately, decisions makers, politician and planners, more often than not never take the issue of human security seriously. Despite being important, issues of human security in Kenya are still not given the prominence they deserve. There are minimal efforts towards inclusion of a human security perspective in development plans and programs (Kumssa, 2010).

With the changing nature of war, there is an increased need to consider various effects war has on vulnerable individuals, especially on women and girls. The significance of involving women in peace and security is also becoming more widely recognized. Women constitute half of the world's population and hold a crucial place in the society. Without them, it would be impossible to create lasting peace and security.

There is a paradigm shift when discussing security issues and now the focus is on human security rather than state security. This broadens the debate on security to include: the risks to national security, such as gender based violence, poverty, discrimination, marginalization and lack of democracy, among others. Non-state actors, civil society and individual are more concerned with security issues than before. A security sector based on human security considers varied requirements of the different genders, ensuring that the needs of the entire community are

taken into consideration and that both men and women participate as equals. It helps to establish a society that is peaceful and secure.

Globally, more women than men live in poverty, women have minimal access to education and healthcare than men. They also often lack economic autonomy and are under-represented in leadership and decision making positions.

The Kenya Constitution 2010 promotes gender equality and women's empowerment. However, the promotion of gender *equality still remains a key concern in Kenya.* Girls and women in Kenya have the potential to contribute in different areas in the developmental agenda. But, still their contributions are minimal.

Key Definitions

Gender: can be defined as those characteristics that are contracted socially; meaning they are very dynamic and over time can be changed and even muted. It concerns the socially relegated roles of men and women (FAO,2009). Differences in gender are therefore, based on a particular society's perceptions of different capabilities of men and women, including basic traits like tastes of men and women. It should be noted that over time, these gender differences, can vary and even be transformed as societies and cultures evolve.

Gender perspectives: is how opportunities for the different genders are impacted upon in a society (FAO,2009). Any implementation of policies, programmes, or projects is directly impacted upon by gender. This also influences economic and social process of development, making gender an important component in every aspect of our lives. It influences the different roles given to women and men by society.

Sex: Refers to those characteristics that both men and women have that are permanent and immutable, are common to all individuals in different cultures and communities and they cannot be changed (FAO,2009).

Gender Relations: These are the different ways a society perceives and views the identities of men and women in relations to one another and in relations to their roles (FAO, 2009). Rights and responsibilities are thus described as those specific

ways in which the responsibilities of each sex are determined by different cultures.

Gender Roles, on the other hand are those responsibilities, tasks and behaviours, that a society considers as being appropriate for men, women, girls and boys (FAO, 2009). They also determine whether or not any gender has access to material resources which include: credit and training, land and even power etc. These kind of divisions have serious implications on the daily lives of different genders in the kind of responsibilities each family member can have both within the home and outside, on the way labour is divided between and among different genders, on education and different opportunities for professional advancement and even leadership when it comes to things like policy-making. In addition, to the differing power dynamics between men and women, gender refers to the social construction of the roles, personality characteristics, and behaviours that are associated with it.

Gender Disparities: has to do with differences in the way men or women access resources, well-being and status, which usually favour men more than women. This is made worse by the fact that systematically such favours are often institutionalized through the law, justice, and social norms (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015).

Gender mainstreaming: Entails the recognition of the different forms of insecurity that women, girls, men and boys experience (Megan, 2013). People and organizations are thus mandated to comply with national, regional and international laws to ensure that both men and women are represented in all programs within the society.

Gendered impacts of insecurity: Insecurity can have different impacts on men and women, girls and boys(Okyere, 2018). For example, women and girls may be more likely to experience sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, while men and boys may be more likely to be recruited into armed groups (Strachan and Halder, 2015).

Gendered drivers of insecurity: Causes of insecurity can be different for both women and men (Khoza, 2022). To give examples, poverty and inequality may disproportionately affect women, who may have less opportunities to access resources than their counterparts, the men (Smith, 2022).

Gender-responsive policies and programs: ensure that security and development efforts consider the different perspectives and needs of both women andmen (Henry, 2007). for example, incorporating gender considerations into security sector reforms, or ensuring that development programs are designed towards addressing the specific needs and priorities of girls and women (Hendricks, 2012). 6

Features of Human Security

People-centred

In the modern perspective of human security architecture, the welfare and affairs of the individual person are given prominence. As a result, human security is thus centred on key elements for human survival; security, rights, and development (incomplete 2016). According to Sabina and Alkire (2003) writing for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity agrees with this fundamental notion and further adds that "…respect for human security means that whatever their primary objective may be, all actors, whether institutional, corporate or individual, must ascertain that their actions do not foreseeably albeit unintentionally, threaten human security…". Muguruza (2017), states that since the end of the cold war in the early 1990s international humanitarian law and relations developed such that sovereignty preceded the protection of human rights.

In a bid to protect human lives and avert human suffering due to internal political instabilities witnessed across the globe, the United Nations re-asserted its responsibility to guarantee international peace and recognised human rights abuses as a threat to international peace as such it required states to show more responsibility in the exercise of their sovereignty as underlined in the principle of the responsibility to protect (UNGA, 2005).

Multi-sectoral

The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report (HDR) 1994 offered an inaugural moment for actors to reflect on the extent of complexity of the new dimension of human security and forge a multi-sectoral approach towards combating some of the world's most sinister challenges. In this regard, understanding of human security would attract the participation of actors from different sectors within society since the new dimension meant that a wider interpretation of what human security entailed. According to United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2016), human security is divided into at least seven categories, which are interrelated and as such require coordinated efforts that seek to resolve the root causes other than the symptoms.

Nature of Security	Major Threats
Economic Security	Poverty, unemployment
Food Security	Hunger, Famine, Drought
Health Security	Infectious diseases, malnutrition, unsafe food, inaccessibility to basic healthcare services
Environmental Security	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution, climate change
Personal Security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, gender-based violence, child abuse
Community Security	Inter-ethnic clashes/tensions, identity-based tensions e.g. religious, racial, caste, sexuality
Political Security	Political repression, human rights abuses

Fig. 1.1 Source: United Nations Trust for Human Security (2016)

Comprehensive

Weller (2014) notes that a comprehensive approach emerged to account to the fact that security, social, political and economic dimensions of conflict and crisis situations were increasingly becoming mutually reinforced and critical to sustainable transitions. As a result of this overlapping reality, there is a need for cooperation and coordination of efforts by actors involved in human security and development planning including the military, non-governmental entities,

diplomatic officers as well as local organisations. Weller (2014) further clarifies that steps that can ensure the achievement of these common goals include mechanisms for communication sharing, coordination and cooperation. When pursued appropriately these steps can yield coherence and efficacy of outcomes (Karstein & Pia, 2008).

Context-specific

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS, 2016) highlights that the human security approach recognises that there is no universal solution to addressing them. Threats to human security are divergent and require local and context-specific counter measures. The world's problems vary by geography, both within nations and across the boundaries of states, and across different dispersions of time and circumstances. It is also globally acknowledged that different individuals, communities, societies, nations and other entities also have varying capacities to deal with challenges differently. Therefore, there is a need to pay keen attention to the modalities of actions employed to address insecurity and align with the framework provided within the International system including the localisation of solutions within the context of the occurrences, in addition to these the mechanisms should endeavour to "…build on processes that are based on peoples' own perceptions of fear and vulnerability, Identifies the concrete insecurities and needs of populations under stress, enables the development of more appropriate solutions that are embedded in local realities, Unveils mismatches between domestic and/or international policies, and helps identify priority needs and vulnerabilities at the local level, and captures rapidly changing international, regional and domestic developments and their effects on different communities "(UNTFHS, 2016).

Prevention Oriented

Human security features a strong value proposition for unearthing and dealing with potential risks to human life and existence. United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS, 2016) defines human security as being prevention-oriented with conflict prevention and peace building strategies aiming for sustainable solutions. Therefore, efforts should be made to uncover the root causes

of insecurity and early warning systems established to identify the potential of the reoccurrence of threats and possibly undertake preventive measures to secure the future. Matsuoka (2014) posits the need to implement a comprehensive approach towards global security issues and the importance of developing the capabilities to address potential threats. While his concerns are within the realm of structural engineering for human security, the comprehensive analysis of the threats and risks for human security is impeccable.

Legal Frameworks on Gender and Human Security for National Development

According to the Commission on Human Security (CHS) in its report titled *Security Now,* human security entails "a response to new opportunities for propelling development and dealing with armed conflicts…" (UNTFHS, 2016). The shift from the traditional view of security from its traditional mainstay within the statecraft is thus highlighted. Human security is henceforth given a new understanding that is people-centred and development-oriented. The modern view of human security is especially concerned with the interlinkages that various actors portray in a continually globalizing world characterised by a growing involvement of non-state actors in the daily lives of individuals and communities on a scale never witnessed before.

As a result, multinational corporations, non-governmental bodies including International organisations such as the United Nations and its plethora of agencies, as well as grassroots entities are thus viewed as pertinent players in the human security discourse, particularly as regards to developmental agenda of different state. Therefore, to uncover more about the intervening nature of this new concept it is essential to establish some instrumental parameters within which human security and national development transcend.

Global Review

Over the years, development agencies and governments have put top priority to issues concerning gender issues specifically on different policies and development planning, major examples including the 1992 UN Conference on Environment

and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, which deals with gender issues (Alm, 1992). The World Conference on Human Rights 1993, recognized the rights of women and the girl-child as a pivotal part of human development (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993). The Gender principle was also tackled at the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 (Report on International Conference on Population and Development, 1994). The World Summit for Social Development, 1995 also restated the key role gender equity plays (World Summit for Social Development, 1995). During this Social Summit, governments reached a new consensus on the need to put people at the centre of development.

The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing (United Nations Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995) also reiterated the importance of gender and why the status of women must be strengthened. During this conference, a platform for action and a declaration was adopted with the aim of overcoming any barriers to gender equity, with the belief that this would guarantee an active participation of women in all spheres of life. The inherent dignity of men and women and their equal rights was emphasized in the report as it called for the elimination of discrimination against women in all its forms; described as the restriction or exclusion made on the basis of gender relations or roles that prevents any of the genders from enjoying full human rights (FAO, 2009).

Further, Governments, international organizations, non- governmental Organizations and civil societies were called upon to produce, promote and disseminate information regarding the different aspects of gender issues and to share gender-specific statistics for any planning including programmes, policies and evaluation. They were mandated to gather all statistics concerning individual's genders, compile, analyse and present as gender-disaggregated data. All the data collected should mirror the concerns and issues of different genders in society (UNTFHS, 2016).

Despite all these advancements, women continue to be underrepresented in government positions, at the negotiating table, and in peacekeeping operations,

in post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as in security sector reform, judicial system restoration, and the rule of law, women's demands and views are often disregarded. Numerous wars have been characterized by pervasive sexual and gender-based violence, which often persists after the battle and is frequently accompanied by the offenders' impunity. Women's integration into economic life and leadership are hampered in post-conflict cultures by persistent lack of physical protection and the presence of considerable legal restrictions.

Despite the Security Council resolution's 1325, women's level of involvement in peace and security has remained low. Only 4% of those who signed peace accords were women, according to research by UN Women on 31 significant peace initiatives between 1992 and 2011. Women made up just 9% of negotiators, 3.7% of witnesses, and 2.4% of key mediators. In the procedures up to the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreements, no women served as the principal mediators. An important fact is that the UN has never designated a woman as lead mediator in a peace process that it has supported (Peace Women 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa has the second-highest number of refugees and internally displaced people in the world, behind Asia, although making up just 10% of the global population (UNHCR, 2006).

The normative foundation for women's degree of engagement in peace and security is provided by international obligations. Women have a right to take an equal role in civic, political, and familial life, even in nations racked by war. But in order for women to really exercise this right, gender structures that deny them power and freedom must be changed. The foundation of women's involvement in development and peace projects should be their contribution to the economic growth of families and communities. Women have the right to participate in planning and running neighbourhood development projects, official efforts for peace and reconciliation, and neighbourhood government systems.

Aid organizations have a terrible track record of recognizing gender as a political problem, which makes this normative aim very political and contentious. Feminists contend that the mainstreaming of gender issues in development has

resulted in a sanitized kind of feminism known as "development feminism," which is dominated by bureaucrats, consultants, and donor-supported NGOs rather than grassroots and international feminist organizations (Harcourt, 2010; Eyben, 2008).

Continental Review

In addition to the global legal frameworks, there are several continental legal frameworks that guide gender perspectives on human security and national development. Some examples include:

African Union (AU) Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: This protocol was adopted by the AU in 2003, and it aims to ensure the protection and promotion of the rights of women in Africa. It includes provisions on the elimination of discrimination against women, the protection of women's rights in situations of armed conflict, and the participation of women in decision-making processes.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) Gender and Development Protocol: This protocol was adopted by the SADC in 2008, and it aims to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women in the Southern African region. It includes provisions on the elimination of discrimination against women, the protection of women's rights in situations of armed conflict, and the participation of women in decision-making processes.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Gender Policy: This policy was adopted by the ECOWAS in 2007, and it aims to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women in the West African region. It includes provisions on the elimination of discrimination against women, the protection of women's rights in situations of armed conflict, and the participation of women in decision-making processes.

Arab Charter on Human Rights: This charter was adopted by the League of Arab States in 2004, and it aims to protect and promote human rights in the Arab region. It includes provisions on the elimination of discrimination against women and the protection of women's rights in situations of armed conflict.

These continental frameworks provide guidance on how governments should ensure gender equality and women's empowerment in the areas of human security and national development in specific regions and they call on states to take necessary actions to make that happen.

National Review –Kenya

Kenya's stance on gender relations is guided by various international conventions and national legislative and policy documents. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 of 2000 remains to be one of the most acknowledged international instruments on the inclusion of women in all aspects of peace building, peace-making, peacekeeping and conflict resolution mechanisms across the world. The resolution underlines 4 pillars for enhancement of the role of women in peace and security processes; (i) Participation (ii) Protection (iii) Prevention (iv) Relief and Recovery. (UNSCR 1325, 2000).

The Kenyan law also provides that all international conventions to which Kenya is a party are by extension part of the laws of Kenya pursuant to Articles 3(5) and (6) of the Constitution. Kenya, being a member of the UN, has the international obligation to adhere to the UNSCR 1325, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), among others

Kenya's constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights clauses and it also categorises the nature of relations that is expected between both genders. In Article 27 (3), the law states that "…women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres." The State is also forbidden by law from perpetrating any form of discrimination on an individual either directly or indirectly on any basis including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, etc. (Article 27 (4)). In sub-articles 6 and 8 the state is called upon to take measures, including legislative, to ensure (i) the realisation of all rights and fundamental freedoms underscored under article 27 and (ii) to implement the affirmative action requirements as stipulated by law; which is that no more than two-thirds of a particular gender shall occupy an elective or appointive organ of the state. In addition, the state

shall also endeavour to redress any historical discriminatory conditions that were suffered by individuals or groups. Article 81 (b) of the Constitution further emphasizes that all "…electoral systems in Kenya shall ensure that no more than two-thirds of elective positions are occupied by persons of the same gender."

The National policy on gender and development (NPGD), seeks to have gendered perspectives in all aspects of national development including in policy development and planning for various sectors of the economy including labour, employment, education, health, land, housing, agriculture, environment, and natural resources, peace and security, governance, power and decision making, information and communications technologies, respect for the human rights, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence; the girl child and the boy child, intersectional discrimination, media and access to justice (NPGD, 2019).

Partnerships by various actors within the national development discourse including both levels of government; national and county, the Civil Society, International Development Agencies, the private sector, faith-based organisations, and other entities also feature prominently in the policy framework (NPGD, 2019). The policy framework characterizes key areas of focus and hence the areas for prioritisation for policy actions. In the considered opinion and in consistence with the categorizations of human security by both the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report of 1994 and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, in this paper, these areas are collapsed into the ten thematic areas of human security i.e. Family, environment, water management, health and nutrition, poverty, education, work land rights, politics, research and modern technology.

The Intersection Between Gender and Human Security for National Development

Globally, gender is recognized as a key factor in understanding and addressing issues related to human security and national development. The United Nations (UN) has emphasized the importance of incorporating a gender perspective in its work on human security, including in its human security concept, which recognizes that individuals and communities are vulnerable to a wide range of

threats and that women, men, girls, and boys experience these threats differently. The UN also recognized that gender equality is a prerequisite for human security, sustainable development, and peace.

Continentally, African Union (AU) has been working towards gender equality and women's empowerment as a means of achieving human security and national development. The AU has adopted a number of policies and frameworks, including the African Union Policy on Gender and Development, which aims to mainstream gender in all AU policies, programs, and activities. The African Union has also adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, which guarantees the rights of women and girls and calls for the elimination of discrimination against women in Africa.

Locally, in Kenya, the government has made efforts to promote gender equality and women's empowerment as a means of achieving human security and national development. The government has adopted policies and laws that aim to address gender-based violence and discrimination, and has established institutions such as the National Gender and Equality Commission to promote gender equality and women's empowerment. The government has also made efforts to include women in decision-making processes, and has adopted a National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Children.

In all levels, the intersection between gender, human security and national development can be understood as the recognition that gender equality and women's empowerment are essential for achieving human security and sustainable development, and that efforts to promote human security and national development must take into account the different ways in which women, men, girls and boys experience these issues.

Theoretical Framework

There are several theories and theoretical frameworks that can be used to explain the intersection between gender, human security, and national development in Kenya. Some of the most commonly used frameworks include:

Feminist Theory: This theory emphasizes the importance of understanding and addressing the ways in which gender shapes experiences of violence, insecurity, and inequality, and calls for the inclusion of women's perspectives and experiences in the development of policies and programs (Katherine, Sang, 2016).

Social Constructivism: This theory argues that gender is a social construct and that the roles and expectations associated with being male or female are created and reinforced by society (Buttler, 1991). This framework can be used to understand how societal norms and expectations contribute to the ways in which women and men experience human security and development.

Human Security Framework: This framework focuses on the security of individuals and communities and recognizes that people are vulnerable to a wide range of threats, including poverty, disease, and violence (Parvin Parmar Kaur, et al.2014). This framework can be used to understand how gender shapes experiences of human security and how policies and programs can address these experiences.

Human Development Framework: This framework focuses on the expansion of human capabilities and opportunities, and recognizes that social, economic, and political factors contribute to human development (IEG, World Bank, 2010). This framework can be used to understand how gender shapes experiences of development and how policies and programs can address these experiences.

Capability Approach: This framework focuses on empowering individuals by expanding the capabilities and opportunities available to them (Amartya Sen, 1998). This framework can be used to understand how gender shapes experiences of development and how policies and programs can address these experiences.

Overall, the intersection between gender, human security and national development in Kenya can be best understood by using a combination of these frameworks, which will help to understand the complex ways in which gender shapes experiences of human security and development, and to develop policies and programs that are effective in addressing these experiences.

Methodology

There are various research methodologies that can be applied to determine the relationship between gender considerations and human security and development in Kenya. These include:

Quantitative research (Trochim, 2006), qualitative research (Creswell, 2013) and case study research: (Yin, 2014). A mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods, can also be useful for triangulating data and gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between gender considerations and human security and development in Kenya (Creswell & Plano, 2011).

However, this study focussed on secondary data due to the research questions, the data availability and accessibility at the time of research, and other practical considerations like time constraints. This procedure was also adopted to ensure a comprehensive and rigorous review. In defining the research questions: and the objectives the desktop review guided in the selection of relevant data sources and in ensuring that the review was focused and relevant.

Additionally, it helped in identifying and selecting relevant data sources, such as reports and different studies and human security and development in Kenya and in the consideration of sources from international organizations, government agencies, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations.

In reviewing Literature, this procedure guided in developing a data extraction framework to ensure a systematic and consistent approach to the review of the data, in terms of the source of the data, the type of data, the date of the data, and any relevant findings related to the research questions.

We used this procedure to carefully analyze the data and extract relevant information on gender and human security and development in Kenya, look for patterns, trends, and relationships, and take note of any inconsistencies or gaps in the data and consequently, synthesizing the findings from the desk review and organizing the data into a clear and concise format.

In conclusion, we used the desk review to evaluate the quality of the data, including its relevance, accuracy, and validity, and to consider any limitations or biases that may have affected the findings.

Further to cross-reference the findings with other sources such as primary research data, policy documents, and expert opinions, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between gender considerations and human security and development in Kenya. By following these procedures, that we conducted a rigorous and comprehensive desk review of secondary data to determine the relationship between gender considerations and human security and development in Kenya.

Results and Findings

Gender and Human Security for National Development in Kenya: Exploring The Gaps

Over the years, development agencies and governments have put top priority to issues concerning gender issues specifically on different policies and development planning. Recent international conventions have prioritized gender equity, which denotes the fairness and impartiality in the treatment of men and women concerning their rights and duties, opportunities as well as benefits. They have also reflected on the relationship between sustainable development and gender equity.

Gender Disparities refer to differences in women's and men's access to resources, status, and well-being, which usually favour men and are often institutionalized through the law, justice, and social norms (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015). They occur in all areas, in, family life, poverty, employment, education, health environment, public life and in decision-making in the following ways:

Family life

Households in all societies differentiate various household responsibilities and activities and responsibilities by gender. For women, production and reproduction are interlinked, most women are not paid for much of the work they do.

In Kenya, the number of female headed households has increased, with "de facto" female headed households, where the woman is left to be the primary bread winner and decision-maker emerging due to factors such as widowhood, irresponsible male partners, among others (Caroline, 2017).

Environment:

In most developing countries, described as countries with less developed industrial economies relative to other countries (O'Sullivan, 2003), it is women who manage daily use of natural resources.

In Kenya, slums are a common feature in major cities, the largest being Kibera slum. Another is Mathare slum, with an estimated population of 600,000-800,000(COHRE, 2008). It has grown on top of a dumpsite with an ever-increasing population (COHRE, 2008). They are exposed to solid waste materials and other pollutants. The constitution of Kenya (2010), in Article 42 clearly underscores the right of every person to a clean and healthy environment including the protection of the environment for the benefit of the present and posterity. Women, however, remain largely excluded from control of their natural environment; mineral sites, land, forests, etc. in their communities. Kenya works with the United Nations Environmental programme to create solutions to pollution. It is therefore, important to have a coordinated plan of having the voices of both genders in coming up with sustainable solutions to environmental challenges in their communities.

Water Management

Climate change has worsened water security, forcing women to wonder tens of miles in search of water, fruits and, vegetables for their families especially in arid areas specifically in the northern part of Kenya. Taking care of weak animals often becomes their responsibility in pastoralist communities, which they have to move from one place to another in search of water, increasing their already heavy duties. They end up queuing in long files in water kiosks so they can fetch water for home use. In extreme cases, which are not uncommon, pregnant women lack water to use during or after childbirth, resorting to alternatives such as coarse

sand to clean themselves and their new-borns (Muna, 2021). Climate change also forces women to venture further away from home in search of food and water, making them vulnerable to sexual assault, murder and rape (Muna, 2021). Women, however, remain poorly represented in decision-making boards tackling climate-induced drought. This limits solutions tailored to their needs.

In Kenya, The National Climate Change Action Plan 2018-2022 cited gender inequality as a key source of vulnerability for climate action, demonstrating the seriousness of the issue. The Climate Change Act 2016 is guided by the principles set out in Article 10 of the Constitution, a key provision being gender equity. This has however, not yet been achieved, despite efforts, because of factors which include inequality, cultural norms and illiteracy.

Health and Nutrition

Women and men have different health needs because of their different biological makeup and physical capabilities. In some societies, the male is fed better than women and women are expected to eat last when everyone has eaten. This treatment severely affects their health. This continues even through pregnancy and breastfeeding (UN Women, 2012).

Article 43 (1a) of the Kenya Constitution (2010) provides that every person has the right to the highest attainable standard of health. However, Kenya's healthcare system remains one of the most unequal, inaccessible, and unaffordable. Reproductive health is particularly under serious strain. Recent research has shown a worrying prevalence of HIV/AIDS with women taking a serious toll of prevalence at 5.2% as compared to 4.8% for men in the adult population. The prevalence of HIV has been shown to be much higher in women than in men. This could be attributable to higher illiteracy among women, since the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics also reported that more men than women were using condoms with their partners. More men than women are also limiting sexual activity with one partner. Though this number in women has increased more than men as of 2014, it still remains lower.

Poverty

Poverty can be defined as a lack of access to the resources needed to ensure sustainable living conditions and the combination of uncertain or non-existent income. It can also be defined as a state of condition in which a community or a person lacks essentials for a minimum standard of living and the financial resources (Chen, 2022).

In Kenya, a majority of households living in poverty are headed by women, with the most vulnerable being slum dwelling families (IEA, 2008). These households are characterized by low incomes, many living on less than a dollar a day. In Mathare slum in Nairobi Kenya, Gitathuru, Kosovo and Mathare 4B slums were surveyed and 75.3% were found to be living on 0-10,000 Kenyan shillings a month (Billy, 2017). Social constructions in Kenya generally still relegate women to positions of limited power where wealth and authority is concerned, in distribution of national and local resources, relegating them to informal professions such as prostitution. Similarly, the contribution of women in wealth creation which is predominant in the informal sectors including small-scale farming and family-based chores is rarely recognised or even included in national development.

The National Policy Framework (2019) identifies poverty, access to labour and economy, access to education, access to health, land, housing and infrastructure, information and communications technologies and the media as areas that require deep reflection and auctioning. For instance, gender inequality is a key dimension in human development indexes in Kenya (UNICEF, 2016). Article 27(6) of the Constitution affirms its commitment to affirmative action for disadvantaged groups, which include women.

Education

Illiteracy is very high among women in rural areas and more men are educated than women. When the higher population of a country is illiterate, the gap between men and women widens (UNDP. 1995. *Human Development Report.)* The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that 41% of women in developing countries are illiterate, (as compared

men who are only 20%). In some countries, rural women between the ages of 15 and 24 are three times more illiterate than urban women (Nelly, 1990).

In Kenya, 26.8% of female headed population have no education, while the figure in male headed population is 23.5% (SID, 2013). School dropouts among girls are due to early pregnancies, lack of transport, lack of basic needs like sanitary towels and rigid cultural practices. Gender disparities in education go up the higher you climb the education ladder. In 2019, 50.6% of primary school pupils were boys while 49.4% were girls, while in secondary school the number was tied at 1.63 million.

In public and private universities, 60% were male while 40% were female (KNBS, 2022). The number of school dropouts in women and men also increases by age, and is higher in women as the age increases. In 2019 this figure was highest at age 17, with 0% female and 58% male dropouts (KNBS, 2022). This higher figure in women is attributable to lack of sanitary products, teenage pregnancies, early marriages, cultural norms as well as family responsibilities. In arid areas, for example in Wajir, girls opt to leave school during the dry season to lessen the burden on domestic chores at home (Muna, 2021).

Education legislation such as the Basic Education Act, 2013 have among their guiding principles protection against discrimination of any kind (Section (4) e), in line with Article 10 of the Constitution. Every child has the right to be educated free from discrimination on the basis of equal opportunity (UNCRC, 1989). Steps are being taken by the National Gender and Equality Commission and other organisations to reduce disparities such as by distribution of dignity packs to girls which contain sanitary towels, underwear and other personal effects to improve the situation.

Work

In the workplace, there is still a gap in the composition of the workforce between men and women. Gender disparities in accessing economic resources, prevents them from improving theirs and their families' lives. This greatly their potential productivity. As stated by Jacques Diouf (2009), economic and social inequalities

between women and men hold back economic growth and advances in Agriculture, thus undermining food security.

A study done by the National Gender and Equality Commission in 2021 found that of the 59 companies surveyed, 30.5% of the companies has complied with the two third gender rule (NGEC, 2021). 20% did not have women serving on the boards. The gender pay gap reported in 2019 is also still wide at sh68 to sh100 for men and women respectively (KNBS,2022. Organisations such as the National Gender and Equality commission lobbying for equal pay between men and women in its quest to "promote gender equality and equity generally and to coordinate and facilitate gender mainstreaming in national development…" (Constitution, Art 59(2) b) This is also set out in the establishing act, The National Gender and Equality Commission Act of 2011.

Land rights:

Before the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, women had limited access to land in Kenya. The legal Land Framework consisted of oppressive laws such as the Married Women's Property Act which tied women's rights to own land to their husbands. The 2010 Constitution however established a progressive legal framework that granted women and girls equal right to own land subjecting land laws to principles of equitable access to land and elimination on discrimination. This is line with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948, where Article 17 grants everyone the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. The Land Registration Act (s 28), for example lists spousal rights as an overriding interest to matrimonial property. This prevents one spouse from selling matrimonial property without the consent of the other. Section 93 also creates a presumption that a spouse that obtains land that becomes matrimonial property is presumed to hold it in trust for the other spouse unless this presumption is rebutted.

Despite this, many women lack education on their rights and therefore are uninformed as to the actions they could take against violations of their land rights under patriarchal cultures where land rights automatically vest in men. Reports show that less than 2% of title deeds went to women since 2013. Lack of data on

the subject also prevents policy action from being enforced to improve women's access to land.

Politics

Underrepresentation is still a challenge for women policy making positions. (UNDP Report, 1994). There is still a large gap in the number of women and men in political positions in Kenya, though the number of women leaders is increasing. This is still in contrast to the 260 male members of parliament elected, still violating the two thirds gender rule. There is a lack of gender-disaggregated data which makes the situation of women dire. Gender-disaggregated data (GDD) is sub-categorized into a (typically binary) distinction of male and female. Without GDD, women and girls are effectively invisible. GDD provides visibility into how programming targets and impacts women and girls.

Kenya's constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights clause and also categorises the nature of relations that is expected between both genders. In Article 27 (3), the law states that "…women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres." The State is also forbidden by law from perpetrating any form of discrimination on an individual either directly or indirectly on any basis including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, etc.

Research and Modern Technology

Despite women being very knowledgeable in use of domestic and wild varieties, they are still overlooked as resource managers and researchers. This is especially visible in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics fields (STEM) having many more men than women (ETGP, 2015). New approaches should bring more women to conduct research in different areas of development.

Conclusion

Through the data gathered from our sources, gender does matter in human security and development. Gender affects all aspects of life for individuals and determines whether individual rights are met. It is evident that women are at a

disadvantage in nearly all aspects of life, demonstrating a need for further action to be taken to improve their welfare. When gender is considered in policy making, better outcomes emerge for all individuals because their unique needs are met. Better Gender Aggregated Data should be collected in order to facilitate better policies to eliminate disparities between men and women.

Governments of developing countries, especially in Africa must increase women's access to local power structures in addition to focusing on their participation in politically visible initiatives and structures like negotiations, peace agreements, peacekeeping operations, the establishment of power structures during the post-conflict transition period, state institutions for constitutional and democratic governance, etc.

Kenya has taken valuable steps in reducing the discrimination and inequalities between men and women. This has included the setting up of the National Gender and Equality Commission in 2011 with a mandate to reduce gender inequality and discrimination for all. This is in furtherance of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of rights article 27 to promote equal treatment and eradicate discrimination and an implementation of Article 59(4) and (5) of the Constitution.

In conclusion, we can say that the efforts by Kenya's government to establish policy frameworks and other national reporting mechanisms for the women peace and security and other gender-related regimes is critical for the realisation of an equitable and responsive atmosphere in the achievement of gender equality, women's empowerment, equitable participation of both women, boys and girls, and vulnerable and marginalized groups in national development (National Policy on Gender and Development, 2019).

Owing to the insecurities that lead to lack of development in Kenya, The following actions should be taken urgently: increase the involvement of women in local development initiatives; enhance the development of the organizational, managerial, and literacy capacities of women's organizations in the communities; provide leadership development programs for women, particularly in rural areas; create a political environment that supports women's involvement

in local affairs, particularly through educating local actors and the wider public about the contribution that women make to peace, development, and national reconciliation.

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Kenya's Model for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: the Quintessential Embodiment of the Concept of Human security

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Abstract

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its Human Development report and defined human security as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". The UN General Assembly vide resolution 66/290 of 2012 described human security as "the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair". The implementation of Kenya's National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism undertaken under the coordination of the National Counter Terrorism Centre is the contextualization of human security at its best and one of the pioneer efforts in the world to customise the United Nation's Secretary General Plan of Action to prevent and counter violent extremism. This paper focuses on a brief discourse on human security. It illustrates Kenya's model of preventing and countering violent extremism and exemplifies its character as a home-grown solution to a perennial security problem. The implementation of the strategy is a departure from state-based security towards an all-of-society-based security system. The emergent enlightened and empowered society, choosing to confront their vulnerabilities rather than live in fear of violent extremists is a chronicle worth unfurling. The methodology is largely qualitative. The paper relies mostly on documentary analysis of national and county-level strategies for countering violent extremism, action plans, surveys and research policy reports on violent extremism trends and dynamics in the region. The paper also elucidates the good practices arising out of the gallant efforts that can be shared regionally and internationally especially in view of the perplexing spread of violent extremism in Africa.

Key Words: *County Action Plans, Good Practices, Human Security, Strategy, Violent Extremism*

Introduction

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report has been heralded as the "the publication which really promoted the new concept" of human security (Bosold & Werthes, 2005). This report clearly states that human security 'understands security first and foremost as the prerogative of the individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights and dignity to the relief of human suffering', (Commission on Human Security, 2003). It goes farther to outline the components of human security as follows: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

In the 2022 Special Report on Human Security, the United Nations Development Program noted that in almost all countries, the people's sense of safety and security had declined (Special Report on Human Security, 2022). This can be attributed to COVID 19 pandemic and the war against Ukraine, which rekindled the horror of strong states forcing their ideologies on others militarily. Indeed, there was some sort of general conviction that conventional battles between states were enfolded into the annals of history, until Russia invaded Ukraine. The world powers' immersion in this war and the deleterious effects it is having on economies means that there will be a shift of strategy and a realignment of priorities in the national domain.

All this is happening in the backdrop of a growing terrorist threat in Africa, with Daesh offshoots emerging across the region. From the east coast, horn, north, west, central and the south, Africa is erupting with a new ideological enemy, in addition to the existential poverty, disease, misgovernment and consequent military carnage (Field, 2004). Africa is in an idiosyncratic position, right in the midst of a globalization system that does not necessarily address the very problems that affront her. Since her own civilization was cut short by colonial powers and a western civilization imposed on her people, she has been subservient to policies

made in the west that she implements sometimes under diplomatic duress. It has long been proposed that Africa should start customizing these policies to suit her exigencies (Ukeje, 2010).

Kenya's response to violent extremism is one such adaptation to deal with the dilemma that she was presented with when her own children affixed themselves to a cause they never knew neither understood. Predominantly, since the arrival of Islam at the Coast around 700 AD, coastal residents practiced the Shafii strand of Islam, which was pious and civil. The geo-politics of the Middle East, especially the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 20th Century contributed to an ideological shift in the Kenyan Coast. Threatened by the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia started a scholarship program for the youth and clerics to universities in Saudi Arabia. Their return in the 1980s saw a transference of ideology to Salafism; they started condemning popular practices as non-religious and called for a return to pure Islam. They got a following especially amongst the youth and became very intolerant to anyone who showed a different inclination. They also started a rallying call to 'reclaim' religion from those who were desecrating it (Boga, Shauri, & Mwakimako, 2021). Thus, radicalisation began and spread to other counties in the country.

The 1998 twin attacks against the United States of America's embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam was the harbinger of the serious threat of international terrorism that Kenya still battles two and a half decades later. In 2002, the Kikambala Paradise hotel in Mombasa was the scene of another ugly attack. The 2010 decade saw a rapid succession of random grenade and improvised explosive devices attacks, followed by the infamous Westgate attack in 2013, Garissa University attack in 2015 and the Riverside attack in 2019 (Harper, 2019).

The 1998 and 2002 attacks were coordinated by foreigners within the Al Qaida organization however, in a tectonic shift that was unforeseen, Kenyan youth got embroiled in the 'jihadi' narrative espoused by AQ then, and many started a relocation to Somalia for training under some ideologues who had come back from Afghanistan. They were later instrumental in the formation of the terrorist group in Somalia, the Al Shabaab Al Harakat Al Mujahideen (AS) (Maaruf &

Joseph, 2018). Indeed, the subsequent attacks would be perpetrated by Kenyan youth or a combination of Kenyan and Somali youth.

Naturally, Kenya had responded to this material threat with counter terrorism measures, involving the identification and the prosecution of perpetrators. With time, it became apparent that there was need to stem the tide of youth movement to Somalia which was then buoyed by the enunciation of a radical and violent Islamic ideology by radical clerics especially in places of worship and spread of extremist content online (Van Metre, 2016). This necessitated a discourse of prevention and countering of this ideology which spontaneously led to violent extremism.

NCTC, which had been established by a cabinet decision in 2004 and enshrined in statute in 2012 was then mandated to coordinate efforts to counter and prevent radicalization. The first order of business was to establish a framework within which to carry out this mandate.

Theoritical framework

This paper proffers the Securitization Theory as the basis of the discussion, from amongst others, mainly because it seeks to explain "…how traditional and non-traditional security threats are perceived and managed, chiefly by states" (Seniwati, 2014). This theory is attributed to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and scholars such as Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde who posit, rightly so, that security in international relations is about survival. It widens the concept of security to include terrorism among other unique threats such as trafficking, and acknowledges a person and his immediate community as key players in the security domain negating the concept that security belongs exclusively to security players (Buzan, 2006). Terrorism causes an existential threat to the state and society as the referent objects, and this has generally been accepted by varied targeted audiences as a matter of fact. Balzacq (2016) considers other factors left out by the Copenhagen School to include the speech act to a significant audience whose experiences are such that they understand why the securitizing agent is making the speech act, especially if the audience has suffered

a detriment from the act sought to be securitized. For terrorism therefore, the state as the securitizing agent has an audience in the population; which has been the target of a terrorist act and has suffered a detriment. This audience provides moral support and gives the state the moral mandate without which no policy to address the threat would be possible. Policies to counter and prevent violent extremism are granted by this mandate. While a move to securitize contributes to the outcome, several sectors fill up the context. In the Kenyan case, all sectors are rallied, including political, military, and socio-economic, thus fulfilling the criteria set out by Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016) for this theory to apply.

Methodology

The main aim of this paper is to elaborate the unique measures undertaken by Kenya in response to the threat of radicalisation, which eventually leads to violent extremism and the commission of a terrorist act. This will be explained through qualitative methodology, which asserts a multiplicity of truths based on the writer's construction of reality (Sale, 2006). This reality will be interpreted and constructed in unpacking the social phenomena of countering and prevention of violent extremism, and the actors involved. The sources of data are the national and county-level strategies for countering violent extremism, plans of action, surveys and research policy reports on violent extremism trends and dynamics in the region.

Discussion and analysis of findings

The national Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)

Out of necessity, the NSCVE was formulated in 2016 to rally all sectors of the Kenyan social, religious and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and shrink the pool of individuals that terrorist groups seek to radicalize and recruit.

In his foreword, the former President Uhuru Kenyatta noted that the strategy responded:

"… to the need to drain our society of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism by engaging the public and all instruments of national power. It will be driven forward by a strengthened National Counter Terrorism Centre whose inter-agency nature is key to effectively coordinate different arms of government and multiple stakeholders in the civil space". (Government of Kenya, 2016)

The strategy aims at countering violent extremism through a whole-of-society approach whereby all citizens, including security actors, media practitioners, communities, religious leaders and business owners would be rallied to reject extreme narratives and help develop and disseminate effective messages responsive to the situation and threat. It would also guide the development of mechanisms to offer support to local communities specifically those targeted by violent extremists by providing an all-inclusive approach to address their vulnerabilities.

Imperatively, some of the youth that went to combat theatres became disgruntled and wanted to come back home (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019). The strategy aims at targeting such violent extremists who want to disengage from their chosen lifestyles by carrying out deradicalisation, rehabilitative and reintegration practices under a framework consisting of their families, communities and the civil society, and coordinated by the government. Recognising the stigma that terrorism attached to the perpetrators and their families, the strategy aims at relieving the tension between communities and security actors by growing the expertise amongst security actors and capacitate them to appreciate and adopt non-coercive measures insistent on the respect of human rights and freedoms.

The strategy document is a guide to interventions in the online spaces, given the swift growth in technology and the opportunities in there for terrorists to recruit and share their narratives. In addition, the dynamism of terrorism means that things will change rapidly, or undergo complex metamorphosis. Research to understand the changes is part of any strategy so that existing practices do not become dogmatic and get affixed to history. Finally, the strategy has galvanised international and regional players to support the countering violent extremism

framework, because terrorism is transnational and converging to fight terror is a promotion of human security.

In order to achieve the aforementioned aims, the NSCVE clearly sets out the pillars useful for its implementation, viz:

i. Psychosocial Pillar

This is based on recognition of the fact that radicalized persons and violent offenders desirous of disengaging from the extreme leanings require psychological examination to gauge the depth of their ideology. Disengaging a terrorist from the ideals for which he is ready to die is not an exact science thus the need for psychological assessment. Support for their families who are likely to be stigmatized and live in trauma, fear and shame also falls under this pillar. In execution of this pillar, a group of forensic and clinical psychologists, working hand in hand with faith leaders have been trained on CVE strategies and how to assess a violent extremist offender. This training is continuous; to take into account the evolving threat.

The disengagement program targets individuals that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist groups, members of terrorist groups who have not committed or facilitated violent attacks in Kenya or abroad, individuals who have voluntarily defected from terrorist organisations and those in prisons convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to be de-radicalised while serving their sentences. The goal is to take them through processes that enable them forswear violence, reject violent extremist ideologies, and become law-abiding citizens at the local and national levels. This is an ongoing program whose success is measured by the movement of an individual from a suspect or victim to a survivor to an ambassador continuum.

ii. Political pillar

Political leaders have the their mandate to legislate, provide oversight and engage the public will individually, collectively, and in collaboration with government agencies, a channel that CVE actors exploit to advocate for increased cohesion,

patriotism, and rejection of all extremist ideologies based on religious or ethnic dogma. To actualize this pillar, the political class has been engaged in review of the laws, such as the amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA 2012) and through the Statute Law Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA 2014) that gave more functions to the NCTC. Another novel development has been the push to have counties enact CVE laws to mainstream CVE within the county structures especially those dealing with youth and gender. The purpose is to include deradicalisation programs as part of the interventions to uplift the youth, taking cognisance of the push and pull factors that enhance vulnerability. This is especially critical for counties that have contributed substantially to the combat theatre statistics. Indeed, the Nairobi county was the first one to legislate as such (Nairobi City County, 2022).

iii. Security Pillar

This pillar espouses the legal provisions in Kenya's criminal justice system that are applicable to crimes associated with violent extremism. POTA and other relevant legislation have measures against radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. Under this pillar, security actors are also brought to the PCVE table to make them aware of the long term benefits of draining the pool, avoid responses that might exacerbate radicalization and understand strategies useful within their line of work that eliminate fear and apathy from the citizens towards the security actors (Van Metre, 2016). At the same time, other PCVE players are also obligated to understand their legal responsibilities as citizens, including reporting crime and collaborating with security actors for a common purpose, under the do-no-harm principle. It is also important for other players to understand that terrorists would be keen to infiltrate PCVE work and scatter this labour of love, thus the need to work hand in hand with security to identify and nip such attempts in the bud. NCTC has organized dialogue between county community leaders, faith leaders and security leaders and brought them to a convergence of grievances, blame games and ultimately an appreciation of the dynamics and complexities that they face severally and collectively (Ervin, 2016). Trust has been built in these fora, networks have been made and fear and suspicion levels have come down substantively. This started with the counties heavily affronted by violent extremism and the conversation is extending to other counties.

iv. Faith Based and Ideological Pillar

Ideology is usually the overt justification of terrorist acts, thus when dealing with religious terrorism, it can never be overlooked (Tarlow, 2017). The NSCVE defines ideology responsible for the violent extremism exhibited by Al Qaida, Al Shabaab and other Islamic radical groups as a political project that manipulatively utilises a selective literalism of some Islamic religious texts and histories to justify terrorist violence and falsely claiming to protect and advance Islam (Mwangi, 2020). The ideology justifies the murder of those who do not adhere to its political and religious views, and is fundamentally anti-democratic.

This pillar is meant to immunize Kenyans against such beliefs by emboldening the moderate voices of faith to come out and without fear counter the malignancy of this ideology. Under this pillar, different faiths are gathered to speak in one voice, especially given that most faith leaders hold sway within the populace and have plausible believability, eventually influencing and shaping opinion and action (Ishaku, Aksit, Maza, 2021). Imperatively, in some of the past attacks, Al Shabaab deceivingly projected a religious war by targeting persons who did not ascribe to the Islamic faith. Fortunately, their efforts came to naught due to concerted efforts, as part of implementing the NSCVE, to bring people of different faiths into an interfaith community. This pillar complements the psychosocial pillar in disengagement because faith leaders who are well versed in the true tenets of religion are able to gauge how extreme the subject of disengagement is; make an assessment during the process on the gains made in changing 'ideals' and advise in cases where the subject rejects the disengagement attempts.

The NCTC has gathered together various faith leaders in the counties, and have merged them regionally into strong inter-faith communities. While some are still in the formative stages, others are so strong that they have become trusted reference points for youth wanting to disengage. They have also diffused tensions amongst their communities where there is misunderstanding within different faiths, such as in the style of worship or mode of dressing in schools. These inter-faith groups consist of respected religious scholars who are connected to young people and can reach out to them and delegitimise the radicalisation messaging (Mandaville & Nozell, 2017). In the past, places of worship were used as radicalizing centre;

however, the cooperation in the inter-faith family and the self-policing has shrunk these spaces and the vice has moved to the online spaces.

v. Education, Training and Capacity Building Pillar

This is a cross-cutting pillar; and has been very well implemented diversely across every sector of society. All actors mandated with countering radicalization and recruitment are equipped with the right skills, tools and awareness relevant for their mission. This is one pillar that has been thoroughly discharged, within government ministries, departments and agencies, within the private sectors, educational institutions of higher learning, private security sector, teachers and facilitators. Indeed, many great partnerships have been forged in this space (Ramadhan, Ouma, Mutahi, & Ruteere, 2021).

This pillar recognizes three aspects based on the Kenyan experience; first, that education institutions have been targeted by terrorist recruiters who promote intolerance and thus there is need to expose learners to values that promote free thought, tolerance, diversity and moderation. Secondly, that educating the citizenry is an enhancement of human security because they become aware and live without fear. Thirdly, that entrenching prevention and resilience measures in the education system is a strong tool against vulnerability to radicalization. Ingraining the values especially in basic education institutions ensures that they are forever imprinted in the psyche of the learners, who grow up as patriotic well-informed citizens. To this end, NCTC have developed a policy document, the Child Safety and Security against Violent Extremism to be incorporated in the curriculum of basic and secondary education. Hundreds of teachers have been capacitated to spot any signs of radicalization amongst students. Moreover, drama and music teachers have been trained to influence the themes of the drama festivals to exhibit an awareness of terrorism and CVE; indeed, such themes have featured prominently in the drama and music festivals in 2015, 2018 and 2019 (Wambugu, 2015), (Mutunga, Musyoka, & Nyakundi, 2019), (Epukaugaidi, 2018).

In addition to training, advisory security surveys have been conducted in schools, hotels, universities, health facilitators, water and energy infrastructure amongst others, as part of protection of critical infrastructure (Niemi, Benjamin, Kuusisto, Gearon, 2018).

vi. Legal and Policy Pillar

There is a constant need to update laws and generate policies that address the metamorphosis of terrorism. The innate nature of law is that it requires proactivity to ride along with societal changes, otherwise it dawdles while society flies past, and eventually becomes archaic (Schanzer, Kurzman, Toliver & Miller, 2016). This stance is unaffordable in countering terrorism; the price would be too dear to pay. While law makers are perpetually being lobbied as aforementioned, NCTC has also actively generated policies to fill up any lacuna that would cause a break in the chain. Policies such as CSSAVE and the Counter Terrorist Security Coordinator (CT SecCo) have been generated and customized to address protection of public places in Kenya (Botha & Abdile, 2020).

vii. Media and Online Pillar

This pillar recognizes the role played by the media in propagation of terrorism and also in countering of violent extremism. Media is indeed a force multiplier; thus all terrorists desire to publicise their conquests. The Al Shabaab modus operandi includes a media team in every attack, to capture the moment for future propaganda. Other terrorist groups globally have been competing as to who produces and disseminates the most gruesome content online (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). With the advancement of technology and the meteoric rise of social media, every one with a technical gadget has literally become a journalist, albeit minus the ethics. Training, radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups is rampant in the online spaces.

In the past, the media has unwittingly played into the hands of terrorists by broadcasting attack scenes that propel the invincibility myth and impunity of the attackers. A recent report published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) showed how terrorists are using the internet and adopting to new technologies much to their benefit (ISD, 2021).

It is particularly important for CVE practitioners to keep up with the pace of innovation by terrorist groups. This pillar seeks to grow a partnership between the media (and big technology companies) with CVE practitioners to deny terrorist the enabling environment for the spread of their narratives and to use the fora

positively to negate these narratives (Amit, Barua & Al Kafy, 2021). Sensitizing the media on developing and deploying compelling alternative and counter-narratives, engaging technology companies on extremist content, formulating a regulatory framework, rallying the citizens to identify and reject extremist content and ensuring that government agencies have a coordinated and effective strategic messaging process are part of the efforts under this pillar. NCTC has invested in a solid relationship with the media and has offered training on CVE and ethical reporting of terrorist attacks; as such the reporting of the riverside attack of 2019 was a stark positive contrast with that of previous attacks. (Musoma, 2020)

In 2022, NCTC with support of the European Union carried out a media CVE campaign on television, radio, and in the online spaces on alternative narratives to extremist content. (National Counterterrorism Centre, 2022)

viii. *Arts and Culture pillar*

> Radicalisation is indeed an affront to culture as it delegitimizes existing traditions and purports to cleanse them and introduce new loftier ones. It is thus no wonder that at the height of its success in Syria, part of the Daesh's strategy was to destroy cultural sites that had existed for eons. (Curry, 2015)

Al Qaida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) destroyed ancient Islamic and historical manuscripts in that ancient town of Timbuktu in 2013. (Maroonian, 2013). Closer home, Al Shabaab in 2012 bombed the National Theatre in Mogadishu just as it reopened after being closed for years, and have been active in destroying graves of Sufi sheikhs and other cultural representation that they felt irked their ideology. (Al Jazeera, 2008).Terrorist desire that their audience live in captivity, physically and mentally. This pillar envisages promotion of cultural and arts festivals, diversity, support music, theatre, and book festivals that are accessible to the broadest possible audiences.

County Action Plans (CAPs)

The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010 introduces a dual system of people's representation and governance, at the national level and at the local

level via administrative boroughs with territorial boundaries called the counties. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that Kenya is divided into counties, and that 'the governments at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation'. The First Schedule to the Constitution outlines the 47 counties that make up Kenya's devolved units.

The NSCVE envisages coordinated action at both the national and county level (Strong Cities Network Programmes, 2019). At the national level, the coordination includes linkages between the various government agencies, law makers, multilateral organisations, private sector, non-governmental organization, civil society and countries sharing interests with Kenya. Resources are scarce, thus need to rally all of government to ensure PCVE is mainstreamed in the normal business of county and national governments. At the same time, rallying regional, multilateral and bilateral partnerships to share experience, skills and tools are paramount; they save on resources and ensure that just as terrorists transcend boundaries, the responses are also borderless.

As part of cascading the efforts, NCTC in conjunction with various stakeholders formulated plans for implementation of the NSCVE in every county. The Centre developed the Guiding Principles for County Action Plans as the start of a unique innovation bringing together government and citizens to counter violent extremism and develop resilience within communities (Strong Cities Network Programmes, 2019). These guidelines were a precursor to the CAPs, which were inspired and aligned to the NSCVE. If there ever was a novel invention distinctive to Kenya, the CAPs scoop the prize. Nexus with efforts such as Nyumba Kumi, Peace Committees, and Community Policing, County leadership, Senators, local MPs, MCAs and other elected officials have been prioritized.

Imperatively, different counties in the country are impacted differently by terrorism. Profiles and geographies for extremism are dynamic. As such and while it is important to focus on 'hotspots' of recruitment, it is equally important to protect areas that have not been drawn into mass radicalisation by ensuring that radicalisers and their message do not find ready pathways. That informed the decision to have a CAP for every county. The framing of the county action

plans took into consideration the security, cultural, economics, geopolitics, socio-political and the population dynamics in each county. The CAPs process started in 2016 with multiple stakeholders modelling the CAP in what is popularly referred in the PCVE nomenclature as the first generation CAPs, to be reviewed every 5 years. In 2018, the second generation CAPs modified the previous ones by incorporating an objectivity of performance and measurement, under the Objective Key Results (OKR) model (Doerr, 2018). In 2019, the third generation CAPs famously known as the rapid CAPs (R-CAPS) were adopted. These have also been undergoing annual examination to ensure they are still relevant to terrorism morphology, that their impact is measurable and positive, and that they remain platforms for action through solution-seeking, collaboration, coordination and accountability.

CAPs are implemented through the County Engagement Forum (CEF) under the joint leadership of the County Commissioner (appointed by the National Government as the coordinating office with the County government) and the Governor who is the elected leader of the County. The CEF membership is very inclusive, composed of representatives of the youth, women, persons living with disabilities, minority communities, County Security and Intelligence Committees (CSICs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the media, the faith community, educators, and political leaders. The membership is not a fixture; it is reviewed regularly to include emerging P/CVE actors who may not have been active or involved during its formation (Mesok, 2022).

Counties have prioritized the pillars that apply to their communities depending on socio-economic factors traversing the counties. P/CVE cannot be generic, each region has to introspect, dissect their circumstances and espouse what works for them. At the same time, it cannot be "everything for everyone". By being too broad, it waters down the efforts, and does poorly at aligning them and evaluating their impact. It needs to be tightened to have impact on protecting Kenya and Kenyans from terrorism by building networks and collaboration in the pre-criminal space, and bringing together state and non-state actors to this end (Mbugua & Misiani, 2017).

For instance, while the Taita Taveta county prioritises the economic, media & online, political, ideological and education, Baringo prioritizes education, political, media, gender and law enforcement. This is because from the original study, issues of gender especially women representation were found wanting in the later. Each pillar has a pillar lead who is a mandatory member of the CEF who coordinates the implementation of the pillar, identifies and brings on board other relevant stakeholders.

Case Study: Mombasa County Action Plan

The 28th of November 2002 terrorist attack at the Kikambala Paradise hotel in Mombasa that left fifteen people dead, including three suicide bombers, three tourists and nine Kenyans was a game changer for the county of Mombasa with regard to security and the fight against terrosim, radicalization and insurgecncy. It became apparent as investigations started that there had been an attempt to down the Arkia Airliner, a chartered Israeli flight that was departing from Mombasa to Tel Aviv, in a coordinated attack targeting Israeli interests. The undetonated missile was found within the precincts of Moi International Airport. The economic effects came in quick succession; the British, Australia, Canada and the United States of America immediately shut their embassies temporarily and issued travel advisories to their citizens against visiting Kenya. Israel stopped charted flights to Kenya altogether. The fact that the attack was largely planned in Mombasa brought all the limelight on the town. (Theuri, 2020)

Despite being the smallest county, Mombasa has a very unique history and culture. Indeed, in the preamble to the June 2022 revised CAP, the former and first governor of Mombasa, in an illustration of Mombasa's diversity wrote "….the Muslim call to prayer (The Adhan) is normally heard with the backdrop of church bells, and Hindu temples and Sikh Gurdwalas are part of the city's landmark" (Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and countering violent extremism).The Kenyan coast has traditionally had a very moderate strand of Islam, which was exported by the Arabs. The intermarriage with locals brought a perfect blend of culture and religion where communities interacted with a high sense of decorum.

In formulating the Mombasa CAP, the history, the intermingling of culture, the economic importance especially as the main port of Kenya, its access from various combat theatres among other factors had to be considered. The first generation Mombasa CAP was very elaborate, giving a brief history of Mombasa and fronting its uniqueness. It elucidated in details the objectives, the methodology for prioritization of the pillars, the implementation plan and the mechanism for measuring results and effects. Subsequent revisions have concentrated on ensuring the CAP is still responsive to the threat of radicalization and that its implementation improves societal understanding and resilience against violent extremism.

The June 2022 revision upgraded the implementation framework by defining the deliverables within the next one year. The pillars currently prioritized are ideological, legal and law enforcement, political, education, economic and gender. The table below is an excerpt of the CAP showing the implementation of the ideological pillar:

Ideological Pillar Objective

To strengthen the inter-Religious, inter-cultural, and inter-ethnic dialogue response in neutralizing false ideologies propagating violent extremism in Mombasa County.

Key Results Area (KR)	Activity	Key Performance Indicator (KPI)	Actor/ Person Responsible	Time frame	Budget (Kenya Shillings)	Budget Sources of funds
KR 1.1: Strengthened interreligiou, inter-ethnic, and inter-cultural dialogue between	Activity 1.1.1: Conduct one rotational Inter-ethnic and Inter-religious dialogues	Number of participants reached	CICC-LEAD CEF-SEC-RETARIAT SUPKEM CIPK NCCK HINDU	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	600,000 per dialogue	Development partners, CSO's, Private sector, National Government and

Key Results Area (KR)	Activity	Key Performance Indicator (KPI)	Actor/ Person Responsible	Time frame	Budget (Kenya Shillings)	Budget Sources of funds
religious institutions and commu-nities	within each of the six sub-counties in Mombasa		CATHOLIC YWCA KMYA HAKI AFRICA			County Government
	Activity 1.1.2: To train and support 1,200 at-risk youths, to improve their response to VE	Number of at-risk young people trained No. Of at risk youth trained and supported	CICC-LEAD CEF-SEC RETARIAT ARIGATOU INTER-NATIONAL KENYA KECO-SCE KMYA HAKI AFRICA	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	2.4 m	Development partners, CSO's, National government
	Activity 1.1.3: To train and support 600 religious' leaders/ Cultural elders to improve their response to VE.	Number of religious leaders trained	SUPKEM IRCK CIPK NCCK EAK HINDU ATR CATHOLIC YWCA	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	1.2m	Development partners, CSO's, National government

The above table is just an illustration of how the Mombasa CAP has brought together state and non-state actors to implement and jointly fund PCVE activities.

It also shows objectivity in the expected results, and measurability in the key performance indicators.

Reviewing the NSCVE

The NSCVE is an organic document, which ought to respond to the transference nature of the monstrosity it was conceived to address. It is the subject of an ongoing review, which is at its tail end. Though the review is not a sweeping departure from its original version, it has some new adaptations, including modification of pillars to provide specifically for the citizenship and the youth and gender pillars. Effective participation of women, youth and minorities (ethnic, racial or religious) in P/CVE is key in strengthening community resilience against extremism and terrorism. The inclusion of the victims of terrorism in a significant way is also contemplated in the review.

A do-no-harm approach is also to be considered, given that CVE is a sensitive activity that is being conducted in the context of determined terrorist operations to radicalise, recruit and attack Kenyans. As such, all CVE initiatives should ensure that they do not exacerbate radicalisation or aid terrorism in any way. The idea of monitoring, evaluation and reporting will be explicitly in-built into all programme concepts, to ensure that CVE efforts are not a risk to the actors in this field, civilians and the nation at all times.

The review also considers three broad levels for prevention. The first level deals with general preventive efforts with the entire Kenyan society to address preconditions that breed the violent extremist ideology. Interventions at this level concentrate on building community resistance and resilience to radicalisation through outreach, dialogue, access, and trust-building. An important aspect of the general preventive work is the 'leverage principle' whereby efforts focus on large groups of people. At this level, the messaging focuses on strengthening social cohesion, citizenship, patriotism, and uplifting African values of unity and social harmony.

Level two deals with specific preventive efforts aimed at individuals and institutions who may be targeted by violent extremists but are still safe. It is

crucial to inform, educate and empower religious leaders, educators, politicians and local communities to know and resist any attempts. Prisons and probation systems must be part of preventive efforts to reduce the risk of radicalization within the facilities,more so to reduce the risk of imprisoned terrorists radicalising their fellow prisoners.

Level three focuses on individual-oriented preventive and curative efforts. These include individuals who are part of a violent extremist group, but are motivated to disengage. If they have already committed terrorist offences, curative interventions will run hand-in-hand with punitive measures according to the prescription under the criminal justice system.

Conclusion

Kenya has learnt many lessons over the years. When terrorism appeared on her space, it was an alien concept in which Kenyans were just collateral damage. Over time, Kenya adopted many strategies and welcomed partners with terrorism knowledge aforethought to help shape responses.

However, with time and in the face of incessant attacks, she had to introspect and craft counter-measures unique to her. Some of the measures have indeed beaten the inbred nature of the threat itself. For instance, Kenya learnt that terrorism is fluid and fast-changing, not confined to nomenclature but to an enduring character. Additionally. global security interests shift all the time, thus Kenya has pegged responses on her own national interests.

Terrorists totally negate human security, especially because the most potent weapon they have on their hands is instilling fear and curtailing freedoms. The response to violent extremism as coordinated by NCTC is the personification of human security in implementing a whole-of-society, whole-of-government outlook. It promotes personal and community security, edifying individuals and communities to be free from fear, take charge of their lives and rise above the abomination of violent extremism. The incorporation of respect of human rights and liberties as an intrinsic philosophy in PCVE by NCTC is the glittering jewel on the crown.

Recommendations

Arising from the foregoing experience and the lessons learnt, the following measures are recommended in the face of an abiding threat:

- Investment and proficiency in strategic communication and new technology is critical since terrorists shift with the drift. PCVE practitioners will not win this alone, thus enduring collaboration with big technological companies is important.

- As much as possible, there is need for a measurement, evaluation, reporting and learning framework for PCVE even though it is not an exact science.

- The CAP model has been very fructuous in reaching the grass root community and creating a sense of responsibility and resilience. While it was originally conceived to address violent extremism arising from international terrorism, it may be efficacious to spiral it to other forms of violent extremism as they manifest. Protracted social and political conflicts, particularly those that are violent, are a powerful driver of violent extremism. Measures must be undertaken to resolve these conflicts through a peace building and reconciliation approach.

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Kenya's Ineffective Response to Climate Change–related Food Insecurity: A Growing and Overlooked Threat to National Security

By Roselyne Omondi

Abstract

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is unfolding amid Kenya's year-long national disaster - chiefly because of the series of five consecutive failed rainy seasons - but also as a factor of other long-standing, interrelated issues such as protracted conflicts, migration, environmental degradation, and deficits in governance. As these issues hamper mass food production; lead to loss of livestock, and crops; and disrupt livelihoods unfavorably, Kenya's food system has become increasingly unstable, and food is unavailable, inaccessible, and/or misutilized. About 19.5 million individuals in Kenya's agriculture-oriented economy are reportedly starving, hungry, and/or malnourished. Using mixed methods, this paper interrogates Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity to determine how and the extent to which it undermines national security. The paper observes that Kenya's attempts at reducing climate change-related food insecurity are yet to reduce the rising number of acutely food insecure individuals in the country. Their exploitation by state and non-state actors cannot be ruled out. The paper thus advances that the bourgeoning mass of acutely food-insecure individuals is a growing but overlooked threat to national security. Its main preliminary finding is that Kenya has several robust strategies and plans to, inter alia, manage drought, and achieve climate smart agriculture. These efforts are yet to break the recurring drought-flooding cycle; adjust the country's security expenditure; and change her reactive response to climate-related food insecurity, and are, to this extent, ineffective. It also finds indications that the main concerns

of the government and citizens are misaligned. Ditto the security expenditure vis-à-vis the country's rising human security needs. The paper recommends the proactive centering of climate change mitigation in the country's national security framework. This will help Kenya secure her people and territory better, and maintain her geo-strategic appeal.

Key words: *Climate change, food (in)security, Kenya, drought, flood, response, threat, disaster, development, mitigation, adaptation, national security.*

Introduction

Kenya is in the throes of acute food insecurity. The rainy season has failed at least five times consecutively. At least 23 of Kenya's 47 counties are in different stages of climate-related food insecurity. Of these, 12 are in the 'stressed' phase; eight are in 'crisis,' and three are in the 'emergency' phase (National Drought Management Agency [NDMA], 2022). Food is scarce, food prices are high, and livelihoods are slumping. About 19.5 million individuals are starving, hungry, and/or malnourished, and need relief food. Additionally, more than 4 million individuals urgently need food aid. A now-year-long national disaster is also in place (Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], 2022; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2022; Kenya Red Cross, 2022). On 26 September 2022, for example, President William Ruto reportedly said, "The brief that we have is that many people are suffering because they do not have food, water, and many livelihoods are being lost including livestock." He dispatched 40,000 bags of beans, rice, animal feed, and cooking oil for use in drought-afflicted regions of the country, cautioning against aid diversion via theft and/or sale (*The Star,* 2022). In these circumstances, climate change has become a proxy for the acute staple food production shortfalls; shrinking economy; and rising youth unemployment in modern-day Kenya. These seemingly 'non-security' factors are known to weaken national security.

For the most part, links between climate-related food insecurity and national security in Kenya tend to be indirect. For instance, Kenya's Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kenya MEF) describe droughts and floods - Kenya's "main climate hazards" - as "extreme events" which "cause large-scale disasters that destroy

livelihoods, trigger local conflicts over scarce resources, and erode the ability of communities to cope, threatening Kenya's security" (Kenya MEF, 2020). There is also a tendency to express these largely indirect links between climate-related food insecurity and the country's national security in terms of deterioration in one or more aspects of human security such as the economy, environment, health, and food. The acute lack of basic needs such as food or vulnerability to adverse climate-related events such as flash flooding and prolonged droughts predispose 'at risk' individuals or communities to exploitation by state and non-state actors. Recurrent resource conflicts in some of Kenya's drought-prone counties such as Turkana, Garissa, and parts of Laikipia (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2022; Omondi, 2018) is an expression of this predisposition. Further, in times of crisis (including those related to climate change), violent extremist groups such as al Shabab, for example, have been known to entice vulnerable persons with food, cash, or emergency medical supplies, and assume roles of states, filling governance deficits (IEP, 2022; UNHCR, 2022). Notably, in the face of increasing climate change-related food insecurity, Kenya spends about 1.2 per cent of her gross domestic product (GDP; USD 110.35 billion in 2021) on military equipment, security personnel, peace stabilization missions, and countering terrorism (Kenya MEF, 2020, p.3; Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2022; World Bank, 2022; CIA, 2022).

These realities are occurring on the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022. The war has interrupted the production and exportation of wheat, maize, and sunflower seeds from the two leading global grain basket countries. The demand for these limited products has resulted in predatory and scarcity-driven price increases, including in Kenya, which imports wheat and sunflower oil. The war has also shifted the focus of humanitarian and development actors from drought-afflicted countries in the Horn of Africa region such as Kenya to Ukraine, reducing funding available for Kenya's humanitarian food aid. Kenya also has a sizeable, unsettled debt, and her recovery from the negative economic impact of COVID-19 is incomplete. The country's capacity to cope with these geo-economic challenges is limited (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2022; World Bank, 2022; Ministry of Finance, 2021; Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2022).

This paper observes that the mass of acutely food-insecure individuals (as a result of climate change) in Kenya is a growing. This is happening amid the rising climate change-related food insecurity in the country. The paper also observes that the national disaster and the government's emergency food aid delivery and distribution to alleviate this food insecurity situation have not yet reversed the situation. Further, resource conflicts persist. This suggests that the number of 'at risk' individuals in the country has increased in the recent past. In other words, climate change-related food insecurity has predisposed some of the 19.5 million individuals who are starving, hungry, and/or malnourished as well as some of the estimated 4 million individuals who need food aid urgently to exploitation by state and non-state actors. The link between underdevelopment, uneven development, or arrested development and armed conflict is well documented [IEP, 2022]. It also indicates that the government's response to climate change-related food insecurity is ineffective. This paper thus advances that the bourgeoning mass of acutely food insecure individuals is a growing but overlooked threat to national security. It also seeks to address the question *How and to what extent does Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity undermine her national security?*

It is worth noting here that this paper conceives 'climate change-related food insecurity' as the acute unavailability, inaccessibility, misutilization and /or food system instability in a locality as a result of famine, drought, flooding, and/or locust infestation attributed to changing weather patterns (FAO, 2008). It also views 'national security' from a lens that extends beyond security officers' efforts to limit threats to territorial sovereignty such as those posed by armed states and non-state actors - to freedom from other threats such as unmitigated climate change, and the ability of citizens to participate actively in the country's overall stability as well (Buzan, 1991). 'Ineffective' as used in this paper, refers to efforts that have not yet yielded the desired result.

In the following sections, this paper: summarizes its theoretical perspectives; details its methodology; highlights and discusses its preliminary findings; concludes; and offers its recommendations.

Theoretical Perspectives

This paper employs a logical framework that is underpinned by the theory of change (Weiss, 1995) and game theory (von Neumann, 1928). These provide the theoretical basis for examining how and the extent to which Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity undermines the country's national security. This paper's use of the theory of change and game theory is in keeping with precedence of research in this field.

Within the ambit of the theory of change (Weiss, 1995), a given action is intended to produce a certain result. This could be a change in the situation that existed before a given action was taken or intervention made. The declaration of a national disaster in Kenya in 2021, for example, was expected to accelerate resource mobilization to address the critical issue of rising food insecurity related to prolonged, recurrent drought at a faster-than-usual-pace. If resources are mobilized quickly, then food in the form of food aid or imported food would be obtained. Improved access of affected individuals to this relief or imported food would for instance relieve, albeit temporarily, the acute hunger that citizens in several (23) counties were facing before they received the food.

At the same time, the said declaration signals to citizens that the government is working with and for them to address the critical issue in a mutually beneficial way or a win-win situation as the game theory (von Neumann, 1928) explains. In the case that is the focus of this paper, the declaration signals that the government is making an allowance for accelerated resource mobilization to minimize the adverse effects of acute food insecurity (starvation, hunger, malnourishment) on the affected individuals. However, if these efforts do not produce the desired outcome, the targeted citizens (beneficiaries) may reject government's efforts such as relief food distribution, or overlook requests to sell their livestock to minimize herd depletion during prolonged drought. Both are zero-sum situations as the gains of one actor accompany the losses of the other actor. The interaction between the two theories is such that a win-win situation facilitates change, and a zero-sum one maintains the *status quo*. The paper employs this theory triangulation to help minimize research bias. The following section ('Methodology') details this paper's mixed methods approach further.

Methodology

In addition to the theory triangulation indicated in the 'Theoretical Perspectives,' this paper's mixed methods approach to answer its central question - *How and to what extent does Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity undermine her national security?* - also entails the use of a literature scan and a quick-extended survey. The paper relied primarily on data obtained from literature scan. However, in a slight departure from existing studies, the paper employed a quick-extended survey on issues related to its focus. This complemented the literature scan and hence this data triangulation provides insights to enrich analysis. It also helped to overcome the challenges of obtaining a more desirable sample size (as described in the 'Limitations' section of this paper). The following sections highlight the literature scan, quick-extended survey, and approach to data analysis.

Literature Scan

This paper's literature review involved a scan of relevant official documents, work by scholars and experts, and grey literature relating to: first, Kenya's response to climate-related food insecurity; then climate change and food security; and climate change and security; and, finally, climate-related food insecurity and Kenya's national security - as indicated in the following section.

Kenya's Response to Climate-related Food Insecurity

A myriad of international commitments, policy documents, and development initiatives characterize this response. Kenya is a signatory to the Paris Agreement (a legally enforceable, international, climate change treaty) and the Kyoto Protocol (agreement that operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Both frameworks encourage the active reduction of carbon emissions by states, including economies in transition. Kenya is also committed to the achievement of the 17 United Nations' Global Goals for sustainable development (SGDs) by 2030. Zero hunger, and climate action are two of these goals (UN, 2015). Further, Kenya has several policy guidelines to manage drought and achieve climate smart agriculture, among other objectives. These include a National Climate Change Response Strategy (2010), a National Climate Change

Action Plan (2013), a National Adaptation Plan (2015), and the 2016 Climate Change Act.

The implementation of these policies is guided by available scientific and indigenous knowledge; international law; technological innovations; and social, economic, and fiscal circumstances that relate to climate change and impact the Strategy and Plans (Kenya MEF, 2020). Guided by such frameworks, Kenya has introduced several drought-resistant crops, upheld a 2012 ban on seeds that contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs) until October 2022, and engaged in forestation campaigns. On 3 October 2022, the government lifted the ban and removed related regulatory protocols to allow for importation of GMO crops such as maize, ostensibly to alleviate food insecurity (Kenya MEF, 2020; 2016; Qaim, & Kouser, 2013; *The Star*, 2022).

Additionally, former President Uhuru Kenyatta's administration (2013-2022) pursued the *Big 4 Agenda*, a development initiative prioritizing: food security, affordable housing, manufacturing, and affordable health care. The *Agenda* is to be realized through six enablers: infrastructure, security, governance, technology and innovation, energy, and technical training. The *Agenda's* food security is to be achieved by reducing: household food cost by 47 per cent, malnutrition in children under five years by 27 per cent, number of food insecure Kenyans by 50 per cent, and increasing farmers' average daily income by 34 per cent. President Ruto's administration is prioritizing climate change (Government of Kenya, 2022). This will likely improve the country's food security and grow related industries in the future.

Different public and private sector actors in the food and climate science fields have attempted - through improved agricultural practices, farmer trainings, and innovation - to resolve animal and crop losses related to changing climate. These include Kenya Agricultural and Livestock Research Organization (KALRO), Agroforestry, and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). This has resulted in some new crop varieties and livestock that are better adapted to extreme weather conditions such as quick-maturing crops, and farm produce with extended shelf lives, for example. These efforts notwithstanding, Kenya

continues to import market-vulnerable staple foods such as maize. There have also been efforts to encourage Kenyans to expand their staple food choices, reducing dependence on crops such as maize that are more vulnerable to changes in temperature and precipitation, for example, and increasing consumption. Some civil society actors and Kenya's development partners have also been encouraging pastoralists communities in parts of north eastern and north western Kenya to diversify their livelihood sources through agro-pastoralism, bee keeping, and/or irrigation (KALRO, 2022; ILRI, 2022; Vi Agroforestry, 2014; Kabubo-Mariara & Kabara, 2018).

It is instructive to note here that about 48.1 per cent of Kenya's 582,646 km²-large land is used for agriculture. Permanent pasture utilizes 37.4 per cent of the agricultural land. About 9.8 per cent of this agricultural land is arable (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2022). This arable land and pasture "support over 80 per cent of Kenya's population," according to Kenya's Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kenya MEF, 2020, p.2). Given the climatic stress - and that Kenya's agriculture is rain-fed; her economy agriculture-oriented, and that the said 23 counties occupy more than two-thirds of the country by landmass - Kenya's food system is unstable. Food is increasingly becoming unavailable, inaccessible, and/or utilized inappropriately. Calls for a national emergency are growing (CIA, 2022; NDMA, 2022; IGAD, 2022; FAO, 2022; Kenya Red Cross, 2022).

Further, drought has repeatedly affected millions of Kenyans in recent times. In the past five years, for example, 23 counties have consistently experienced prolonged drought. This has resulted in repeated humanitarian food flagging-off ceremonies. Food relief appeals and delivery of food aid have become common but increasingly disconcerting. On 27 September 2022, for instance, President Ruto dispatched a relief food convoy to 23-drought afflicted counties. He said, "It is my hope that this is the last time we are having this ceremony" (Kenya MEF, 2020; UNHCR, 2022; *The Star*, 2022; CIA, 2022). The suggested relief food fatigue highlights a cycle or pattern that should be broken.

Climate Change and Food Security

There is a growing body of work on climate change and food security. As is evidenced in scholarship and practice, some academics, practitioners, and policy

implementors view the two issues as being separate. Climate change, has been described as, *inter alia*, a "crisis," "a new threat," the "greatest challenge of our time," "a disaster," and "a global phenomenon with diverse local consequences" (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre's [IDMC], 2022; Kelman, 2020; UNHCR, 2022; World Bank, 2018; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2022; Sending et al., 2019, p. 183; Mayer 2012, p. 32, FAO, 2008). Climate change researchers tend to focus on the causes, evidence of, or effects on the phenomenon IDMC, 2022; World Bank, 2018; Busby, 2018; Campbell, 2014). Similarly, food security researchers and practitioners focus their work on different aspects food production or consumption, including nutrition (Kabubo-Mariara & Kabara, 2018). Abouleish, a national adaptation plans champion, for example, terms the two issues as "huge problems of the 21st Century" (2021).

Others regard the two issues as being related linearly in a cause-effect manner, with the pursuit of food security contributing to climate change, or climate change contributing directly to food insecurity. On the one hand, Kenya's agricultural sector is the country's top carbon emitter; carbon dioxide is a key greenhouse gas. This carbon is emitted as livestock digest their food (enteric fermentation) and through soil enhancing practices such as on-the-ground manure preparation and fertilizer application. It accounts for 40 per cent Kenya's total emissions. Carbon emission is a climate change accelerator (Kenya Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2021; IPCC, 2022). On the other hand, climate change is worsening food insecurity. FAO has identified four components of food security: food availability, food accessibility, food utilization, and food system stability. FAO notes that changing weather patterns alter agricultural production patterns, diminishing food supply. This reduces access to food, and disrupts livelihoods (FAO, 2008). IPCC has observed that:

> "Climate change has led to, and will continue to lead to, increases in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes … with expected reduction in agricultural productivity, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Predictions suggest that yields from rain-fed agriculture in parts of sub-Saharan Africa could fall by 50 per cent by the year 2020" (IPCC, 2007a).

As Figure 1 indicates, the National Drought Management Authority's (NDMA's) assignment of 'stressed,' 'crisis,' or 'emergency' food insecurity tags to different counties in Kenya is based on how extreme the heat is in the counties (NDMA, 2022).

Figure 1: Climate-based Food Insecurity Phase Classification in Kenya

Source*: National Drought Management Authority (2022, p.1).

Kabubo-Mariara and Kabara (2018) contend that climate variability and change increase food insecurity in Kenya. Gitau (2022), and IPCC (2020) note that

climate change deteriorates food security by lowering crop production. While addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 21 September 2022, President William Ruto linked food insecurity caused by crop failure to changing temperatures (increasing heat waves) and precipitation (inadequate rainfall, regular drought) patterns in the country. He also suggested the mobilization of the agricultural sector to mitigate climate change.

Others suggest a multi-directional interaction between the two variables with climate change as a 'threat multiplier' exacerbating existing structural, geopolitical, or environmental conditions. In this line of thought, food insecurity may or may not be attributed to changing weather patterns, but climate change worsens food security outcomes. This could happen, for instance, when drought-driven migrants such as 'climate refugees,' pastoralists, or internally displaced persons deplete food sources for humans and livestock in their destinations (FAO, 2008; Climate links, 2022; El-Hinnawi, 1985; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2021). On 13 September 2022, during his inauguration as Kenya's fifth President, Ruto said, "In our country, women and men, young people, farmers, workers, and local communities suffer the consequences of climate emergency" (Kabukuru, 2022).

Climate Change and Security

Climate change is linked to security in scholarship and practice in five main ways: exploitation of 'at risk' communities by state and non-state actors; armed conflicts; forced migration; delayed troop deployment; and expanded focus on 'security proper' to include increasing humanitarian duties. As witnessed in September 2022, security officers accompany humanitarian food convoys to flood- or drought-affected locations to minimize attacks on the convoys and diversion of relief supplies through theft, for example (Climatelinks, 2022; Maathai, 2006; IDMC, 2022; IEP, 2022; FAO, 2008). FAO (2008), for example, observe that "climate change and its impacts trigger internal and international migration, resource-based conflicts, and civil unrest" (FAO, 2008).

Hanlon and Christie (2016) view climate change as a contemporary human security issue, and human security as "an extension of traditional security." They

also define human security as "the protection of vulnerable individuals from threats and dangers posed by their environment" (Hanlon & Christie, 2016, pp. xi and 4). Buzan (1991) conceives security as freedom from several human insecurities: environmental, food, political, economic, and personal that threaten the survival of a state. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) lists hunger, poverty, disease, and natural environmental disasters as threats to life (UNDP, 1994). Hanlon and Christie (2016) note that these kinds of threats "kill far more people than war, genocide, and terrorism combined" (2016, p.5). Speaking at UNGA on 21 September 2022, Kenya's President termed climate change as a "conventional threat," placing it on the same pedestal as the global food crisis, terrorism, cybercrime, and armed conflict. Ruto also stated, during his inauguration, that Kenya (where 75 per cent of the population is aged below 34 years according to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS, 2019]) has "the huge challenge of youth unemployment." Kenya's 2022 population estimate is 55,864,655 (CIA, 2022).

Climate-related Food Insecurity and Kenya's National Security

As has been indicated in the 'Introduction' of this paper, the links between climate-related food insecurity and national security in Kenya tend to be - for the most part, indirect. Secondly, these indirect links are generally expressed in terms of the deterioration in one or more aspects of human security such as the economy, or environment. Lastly, individuals or communities who acutely lack basic needs such as food and/or are vulnerable to adverse climate-related events such as flash flooding and prolonged drought are 'at risk' of exploitation by state and non-state actors.

Overall, empirical studies on climate-related food insecurity and Kenya's national security are limited. Even then, the association between climate change-related food insecurity and national security is inferential, and discussed in terms of the impact of Kenya's implementation of climate change adaptation and/or mitigation efforts on pillars of human security such as the economy (employment opportunities), fiscal circumstances (vulnerable communities), and the environment (ecosystem, biodiversity). Given Kenya's vulnerability to the negative effects of increasing and frequent climate extremes; the ineffectiveness

of the country's climate change mitigation actions; and the rising number of climate-related food insecure citizens, this paper examines how and the extent to which climate change-related food insecurity undermines Kenya's national security. It thus attempts to increase scholarship at the nexus of climate change-related food insecurity and national security.

Quick-Extended Survey

In addition to the literature on this paper's focus, spanning: Kenya's response to climate-related food insecurity; climate change and food security; climate change and security; and climate change-related food insecurity and Kenya's national security, this paper deployed a 20-question, structured survey containing questions on climate change and forced displacement. The literature scan in which some scholars indicate climate change as a key challenge in modern-day Kenya, and climate change as a migration trigger in the country informed these questions.

The survey targeted 500+ individuals. These potential respondents, who were Kenyan residents aged above 18 years, were identified using convenient sampling. This sampling method was used because the quick-extended survey required that survey respondents be available in a specified period. Additionally, the method allows potential respondents to respond to the questionnaire willingly. This eagerness to participate in the survey enhanced the paper's respect for research ethics such as voluntary participation, anonymity, and freedom to withdraw participation.

Survey Limitations

Three key factors frustrated this paper's primary data collection. First, the lack of funding to mobilize a large-enough pool of respondents through research assistance (for example); make follow ups; and collect data. The biggest hurdle was overcoming the prevalent culture of incentivizing data collection through provision of cash or non-monetary 'compensation' such as airtime. Secondly, limited research time. Thirdly, the timing of the survey (which inadvertently coincided with the immediate-post 2022 election period, and with a short timeline). This timing likely diminished the participation of potential respondents for whom politics was a more immediate concern. To overcome some of these

challenges, the survey was digitized and administered online via email and social media platforms (WhatsApp). The survey findings are preliminary and have the utility of illuminating and complementing the paper's secondary data, but cannot be generalized.

Eighty-one (81) individuals took, completed, and submitted the questionnaire within the suggested time (36 hours). 3.7 per cent of them were aged between 18 and 19 years; 46.91 per cent were in their 20s; 24.69 per cent were aged between 30 and 39 years; 17.28 per cent were in their 40s; and 7.41 per cent were aged between 50 and 59 years as Figure 2 indicates.

Figure 2: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age Group

As Figure 3 shows, 48.15 per cent of the respondents were male; 48.15 per cent were female; and 3.7 per cent preferred not to disclose their gender.

Figure 3: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Gender

Data Analysis

This paper collated its quantitative and qualitative data. It categorized the quantitative data (Kenya's: population estimate, security budget, and GDP, as well as number of countries experiencing acute food shortage, number of individuals in dire need of emergency food supplies, and so on) it generated from the literature scan and quick-extended survey into descriptive statistics. It also categorized the qualitative data from the scan into three broad themes: climate change-related food insecurity in Kenya; Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity; and implications of Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity on national security. The paper's preliminary findings are highlighted and discussed in the following section.

Discussion, Analysis of Preliminary Findings

Drought and Floods are Kenya's Leading Climate Hazards

When it comes to climate change-related food insecurity in the country, drought and floods are the leading climate hazards. The two hazards are cyclic, and are becoming more severe. The hazards also damage the ecosystems that support crop production, livestock farming, vegetation, and wildlife (Kenya MEF, 2020; NDMA, 2022).

Kenya's Two Leading Climate Hazards are Disempowering a Rising Number of Citizens

Drought and floods are disempowering a rising number of citizens through hunger and malnourishment. As has been previously indicated in this paper, about 19.5 million individuals either lack or have insufficient food. More than 4 million of the individuals who have no food need food aid urgently (FAO, 2022; IGAD, 2022; Kenya Red Cross, 2022). The two climate hazards are also contributing to loss of income, and hazard-driven displacement. FAO (2008) categorizes drought-driven migrants into three groups: pastoralists, internally displaced persons, and 'climate refugees.'

Survey respondents were asked for their view on 'climate refugees.' Asked whether '*People who flee their homes because of changing climatic conditions are also refugees*,' 45.68 per cent of the respondents 'agreed' with this statement, 27.16 per cent of survey respondents 'agreed strongly,' 7.41 per cent had 'no opinion,' 18.52 per cent 'disagreed,' and '1.23 per cent 'disagreed strongly' (n=81), as Figure 4 shows. 19.

Figure 4: Level of Agreement on Respondent's View on Whether Climate-displaced Persons are Refugees

Survey respondents were also asked for their view on the leading cause of forced displacement in the country. As Figure 5 illustrates, 42 per cent of this paper's survey respondents said 'armed conflict' is the leading cause of forced displacement. 37 per cent said 'political violence,' 11 per cent said 'natural disaster,' and 10 per cent said 'other reasons.'

Figure 5: Respondents' Perceptions on Leading Cause of Forced Displacement in the Country

Kenya's Response to Climate Change-related Food Insecurity is Evidence-based but Ineffective

Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity exhibits three main features. It is: informed by scientific and indigenous knowledge; characterized by international commitments, policy documents to manage drought and promote climate-smart agriculture; and development initiatives; and largely reactive.

Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge

Kenya's knowledge on climate change and food insecurity backs and is backed by international laws, and technological innovations. Interestingly, scholars generally agree that climate change and food insecurity are key challenges in modern-day Kenya. However, they disagree on whether - on the one hand - the two issues are inter-related linearly, multi-dimensionally, or one variable amplifies the other, or - on the other hand - are disparate (separate, unrelated). In the same vein, it appears that there is some reluctance to favor scientific knowledge over indigenous knowledge. For instance, although pastoralists are among the most vulnerable communities to climate change-related food insecurity, they have been generally reluctant to adopt agro-pastoralism. This is likely because

a sedentary lifestyle threatens their traditionally mobile way of life, which is tied to and defined by the size of their herds. It is fair to say that in the face of recurrent and prolonged drought, even alternative livelihood sources such as bee keeping (which is dependent on vegetation, including flowering plants) or surface irrigation are untenable. Variations in scientific and indigenous knowledge on the climate change-food insecurity link and what to do about it arguably contribute to varied approaches to improving climate-sensitive agriculture in the country. In this regard, Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity appear to yield mixed, uncoordinated results.

Several Policy Frameworks and Development Initiatives

Kenya has an impressive array of strategies and plans to mitigate climate change and minimize the acute lack of food by the masses, including climate-related food insecurity. These evidence-based international commitments, policy documents, and development initiatives that characterize Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity also prioritize the country's food security. Further, the *Big 4 Agenda* cites security as an enabler for food security.

However, this effort has not yet produced the desired results as evidenced by the country's current realities in this regard. This makes for an interesting read with interrelated aspects. The drought-flooding cycle is undoubtedly reducing the quality of life of millions of Kenyans in several counties, and undermining their livelihoods through forcible displacement, and environmental degradation, for instance. However, Kenya seems to be more focused on meeting her global obligations on carbon emissions than on disrupting this cycle.

The focus on reducing carbon emissions is envisaged to prevent further rise of global temperature and minimize the incidence and frequency of extreme weather events (Weiss, 1995). It is thus not necessarily misplaced. However, Kenya is struggling to glocalize and align these obligations with her other critical obligations such as securing her people, food systems, economy, political influence, and territory concurrently, consistently, and sustainably (Buzan, 1991). The ongoing drought and lifting of the GMO ban have recast the spotlight on the merits and demerits of leveraging technological innovation in food production

without exposing Kenya's people, food systems, economy, and territory to known and unknown bio-environmental threats. Additionally, the agriculture-climate change nexus is complex as the agricultural sector doubly mitigates and contributes to climate change. A more effective approach would be an integrated and simultaneous focus on increasing the country's carbon sinks and disrupting the drought-flood cycle. The process thus requires sustained political and financial investments in the short and medium terms.

Largely Reactive

At least 23 counties have consistently experienced climate-related food insecurity in the past five years. This suggests that, unmitigated, this challenge is expected. Interestingly, while Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity is ostensibly evidence-based and prioritizes food security, it is also generally reactive. Typically, these interventions are the effecting of national disasters; humanitarian appeals for emergency food to alleviate starvation, hunger, and malnutrition; and the selling of pastoralists' livestock during drought, among other reactions. Occasionally, other interventions are made. The lifting on the GMO ban in October 2022, for example. In mid-October 2022, Kenya's former Vice-President reportedly said:

> "We must safeguard future generations and protect our sovereignty at all cost from manipulation and penetration by foreign entities. Kenya's multi-billion-shilling food market is susceptible to manipulation by profit-hungry multinationals … Our biodiversity and natural pride in organic seeds will forever be lost to mutated crops … GM [genetically modified] crops cannot co-exist with organic and non-GMO crops due to contamination" (*Daily Nation*, 2022).

This ban reversal reportedly elicited mixed reactions about what Kenyans' food choices and right to food. For example, organic farmer Sylvia Kuria's response to whether citizens will have a choice between GMO- and non-GMO-animal-fed products was part rhetorical, "If the animals have been fed with GM maize, how then will I know that these pigs, cows or chickens have actually been fed by such

feeds? … as a Kenyan, I have the right to choose the food that I want to eat" (*Daily Nation*, 2022).

The Star Editorial has suggested that the use of GMOs is a choice.

> "Let GMOs be allowed in Kenya because that will reduce food import prices and help battle drought. But Kenyans should not be forced to use GMO seeds provided by Monsanto or KALRO [Kenya Agriculture and Livestock Research Organization] unless they wish to – it should be their choice" (*The Star*, 2022).

Paul Mwangi, a lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of the directive, and sought legal redress. "It goes against the right to food of acceptable quality, consumer rights guaranteed by Article 43 [of the Kenyan Constitution] …" he said (*Citizen Digital*, 2022).

Kenya's reactive approach to foreseeable 'crises' such as persisting climate-related hunger signals the myriad of challenges confronting the country. These challenges range from an underperforming economy to high youth unemployment. Further, the limited application of Kenya's numerous climate-related strategies and plans suggests deficits in governance. To some extent, the reactive response also arguably reflects some of the disagreements in the scholarly community on the climate change-food insecurity conundrum. It is difficult to act on differing advice on the same issue. Such challenges curtail efforts to comprehensively secure the nation (Kenya MEF, 2020; 2016; World Bank, 2022; Buzan, 1991; Weiss, 1995). It may be time to revisit the 2016 Climate Change Act alongside the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2010), a National Climate Change Action Plan (2013), and the National Adaptation Plan (2015), and find better ways to overcome Kenya's climate change-related food insecurity sustainably.

There are Differences in Political Rhetoric and Citizen's Perception of What 'the Biggest Crisis at the Moment' Is

There are indications of discordance between the central concern of the government and the governed. On the one hand, the incoming government

has stated 'climate change' as its main concern. On the other hand, high youth unemployment has featured in key public statements of the government as a known and undisputed fact. Asked what they 'think the biggest crisis at the moment is,' most respondents (29.63 per cent of them) said 'high youth unemployment.' 20.99 per cent said 'unstable government,' 18.52 per cent said 'armed conflict (wars),' 16.05 per cent said 'climate change,' 3.7 said 'forced migration,' and 11.11 per cent said 'destruction of natural environment,' as Figure 6 illustrates.

Figure 6: Respondents' Perception of What the Biggest Crisis of the Moment is

There are Policy Gaps Relating to "Conventional Threats" to Kenya's National Security

President Ruto's administration views climate change and food insecurity as "conventional threats." However, his pronouncements are silent on how the two issues actually threaten Kenya's national security. Further, although Kenya's climate change strategies and plans are up-to-date and speak directly to the two issues, these guidelines are heavily focused on shrinking carbon emissions and make no direct or explicit connection to national security. This is despite the knowledge that non-confrontational threats such as acute hunger causes similar or higher number of deaths as or than conventional ones such as war and terrorism.

Traditional Threats Constitute the Bulk of Kenya's Security Expenditure

Kenya expends the bulk of her security budget on traditional threats. This is despite increasing human security threats and the country's increasing struggles to secure her territory and population from the two critical "conventional threats" to national security.

There is also the matter of Kenya's regional disposition. As an anchor state in a conflict-prone region, Kenya supports the region's peace efforts. As her overt security expenditure attests, the support has typically entailed: peace stabilization missions to Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; joint counter-terrorism against al Shabab and other violent extremist groups; and mediation (Buzan, 1991). This has had two mixed results. On the one hand, it has helped to preserve Kenya's territorial integrity. On the other hand, it has undermined the country's human security, predisposing her to internal (resource conflicts in drought and flood prone regions, loss of agricultural land, growing mass of vulnerable and marginalized individuals, and external security threats (global economic shocks, and rising food and energy prices). Kenya's security outlook is out-of-step with the contemporary global practice of securing a country's territory and people (Buzan, 1991). Recalibrating her 'security' expenses will be a first step in the right direction. Not in the least because equating climatic stress and acute food insecurity to terrorism conflates conventional and non-conventional threats, but also because both threats have caused hundreds of needless deaths in Kenya (Hanlon & Christie, 2016; Kenya Red Cross, 2022; Omondi, 208; ICG, 2022).

Implications of Kenya's Response to Climate Change-related Food Insecurity on National Security

Kenya's ineffective response to the increasing climate change-related food insecurity, and - by extension - rising number of individuals that this situation is disenfranchising is undermining national security in three main ways. First, it is increasing the exposure of 'at risk' individuals and communities to exploitation by state and non-state actors, in exchange for food and livelihood sources. The higher the number of 'at risk' individuals becomes, the more difficult it will

become for Kenya to secure her territory in both human security and traditional security terms. The risk of increasing armed violence in forms such as resource conflicts, crime, protests, and violent extremism cannot be ruled out.

The second implication of Kenya's ineffective response to climate change-related food insecurity is arrested development. Arguably, acute food insecurity reduces the capacity of the climate-afflicted individuals to make and sustain meaningful contributions to development. As Hanlon and Christie (2016) note that these kinds of threats [acute food insecurity, for example] also "kill far more people than war, genocide, and terrorism combined" (2016, p.5). Internally, this portends uneven national development, with areas most affected by climate change-related food insecurity lagging behind those that are less affected by the situation. This could exacerbate grievances that violent extremist groups can exploit. Externally, the high and rising number of disenfranchised people signals that the country is struggling to manage her domestic affairs. Unresolved, this will diminish the country's standing among regional communities such as the East African Community, and IGAD that generally hold Kenya in high regard. It will also take the edge off Kenya's positioning in important global *fora* including those on climate action.

The third implication of implication of the Kenya's ineffective response to climate change-related food insecurity is (forced) hazard-driven population displacement. The more drought, flood, and the effects of the same displace people internally and into neighboring countries, the higher the risk of intercommunal and cross border conflicts becomes. As has been well documented, such conflicts can destabilize a state, or region. In sum, the presence of human insecurities relating to the environment, food, politics, economy, and individuals and their communities compromise security and threaten the survival of a state (IEP, 2022; Buzan, 1991).

Conclusion

Kenya's efforts to mitigate climate change and reduce the related food insecurity in law and practice are commendable and welcome. However, on account of

the reasons that this paper has highlighted, the efforts have not yet disrupted the recurring drought-flooding cycle. The said cycle is damaging the ecosystems that support crop production, livestock farming, vegetation, and wildlife. This, for a country whose key economic drivers (agriculture, wildlife tourism, for example) are rain-dependent, is critical as it portends the increase of acutely food insecure individuals in the country. The presence of a growing mass of food insecure people increases the risk of unrest, which can destabilize the country.

Further, Kenya's security budget is yet to meaningfully accommodate non-confrontational existential threats such as the acute climate-related food insecurity that is disempowering millions of Kenyans in at least 23 counties regularly. Humanitarian appeals for emergency food and medicine have featured repeatedly on the country's socio-economic fabric in the past five years. It is also evident that climate change threatens to increase the number of people at risk of food insecurity. A growing mass of acutely food insecure individuals is incapable of participating meaningfully in developing the nation or securing its borders. It is likely that President Ruto's administration will consider allocating some funds to address growing or emerging threats to Kenya's security related to climate change. Until then, Kenya's response to climate change-related food insecurity has been undermining the country's national security to the extent that efforts at drought management and climate-smart agriculture have not yet turned the tide of Kenya's climate change-related food insecurity; reduced the "conventional threats;" or strengthened Kenya's capacity to secure her people and territory better.

Finally, Kenya's response to the growing climate-related food insecurity is reactive. This is in part because empirical studies on climate-related food insecurity and Kenya's national security are limited. At the same time, this response is based on varied scientific and scholarly approaches to climate change and food security. This has contributed to mixed, ineffective results. Amid these, the number of acutely food insecure individuals as a result of climate change-related food insecurity is rising. This is a growing but generally overlooked threat to national security; no effort should be spared in addressing it.

Recommendations

Center Climate Change Mitigation in Kenya's National Security Framework Proactively

This will bridge the traditional security-human security divide; free up some traditional security funds to address human security threats to the country better; and forestall non-confrontational threats such as acute food insecurity. It will also provide room for more public-private partnerships that could inject funds and technical expertise to shore up Kenya's efforts at reducing drought- and flood-associated food insecurity. The reduction of 'at risk' individuals in drought- and flood-prone regions will in turn reduce the need for security officers to secure humanitarian food caravans, counter resource-based conflicts, and prevent recruitment of disempowered individuals (unemployed youth, marginalized persons, and vulnerable communities) by merchants of violence in the country and region.

Fund Research at the Climate Change–Food Insecurity–National Security Nexus

This should be undertaken by an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary team with the support institutions such as the National Defense University-Kenya. The study could build on the preliminary findings of this paper and other that have attempted to explore this nexus. Such a study could be conducted at county-level (targeting the 23 hazard-prone counties) or national level. It may also include neighboring countries that have had climate change-related national emergencies in recent times such as Ethiopia and Somalia. The findings of such a study will help to revise Kenya's outlook and approach in relation to issues at this nexus, and geopolitical positioning, which will serve her well in the long run.

Encourage More Kitchen Gardening at Household and Community Levels

Repeated failed crop seasons has compelled farmers to abandon agriculture and pursue other livelihood sources such as real estate and/or migrate to other regions including urban areas where opportunities for large-scale farming or subsistence farming as is practiced in Kenya's rural areas are limited. These, among other reasons, have reduced food production. Kitchen gardens including

vertical gardening techniques will help to meet basic food needs at household and community levels while complementing Kenya's efforts to attain an acceptable level of food security for her population amid changing climate. Supplying kitchen gardeners with organic seeds will also help to assail health fears of producing and/or consuming potentially 'harmful' or technologically altered food, and provide entry points to further deliberations on the implications of genetically modified produce on Kenya's development and stability. Engaging young unemployed youth in such an endeavor may have the added benefit of reducing the country's high youth unemployment. Kitchen gardening also helps to reduce household food costs, which is one of goals of the food security pillar of the *Big 4 Agenda*.

Plug Deficits in Climate and Environmental Governance

Improving climate and environmental governance will help to disrupt Kenya's 'normal' perennial ills: the recurring drought-flooding cycle; an unreflective security expenditure; and reactive response to climate-related food insecurity. This could be coupled with active citizen participation to energize the implementation of existing and emerging strategies and plans. This will reduce the country's leading climate hazards (droughts, floods) and bolster climate smart agriculture.

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The Role of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in Sustainable Human Security

By Prof. Fred Jonyo

Abstract

This article examines the role of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in sustainable human security. The overarching question that the paper proffers is to what extent and in what design could SSR securitize human security? SSR addresses security problems and attempts to improve the situation through institutional reforms given the centrality of security and peace as the purview of public good. SSR is aimed at creating a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy. The OECD thesis rests on two pillars, which inform the paper's objectives. First, is the ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed, and secondly, the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society's wellbeing. The article shall deploy the C-H model of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in situating SSR in sustainable human security. This shall further be buttressed by Jürgen Habermas's concept of positive peace vis–a–vis negative peace. The study purposively sampled 60 respondents representing households in Nairobi City County. It concludes tentatively that the lower the risks or threats to human life, the better the security. In lieu of conclusion, the paper recommends periodic evaluation and capacity enhancement of the holistic security architecture in sync with the ever-changing satisfaction of human needs.

Key Words: *Security Sector Reforms; Human Security; Securitization; CH Model; Positive Peace*

Introduction

The state system remains an enduring entity that shoulders citizen security. Consequently, order becomes a fundamental requisite of the state system. As postulated by social contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacquez Rousseau in their treaties, anarchy is ever present in the state system. As such any challenge to state security becomes at once a risk (McCartney and Parent, 2015). A lot of literature has endeavored to shortlist risks to security yet scanty prescriptions have been offered in an attempt to mitigate such risks.

Globally, governments have the primary mandate to protect their citizens from any forms of existential threats arising internally or externally. This is grounded on the fact that security is a critical pillar of statehood. Despite this constitutional commitment, the global security index remains worrying, with governments forced to integrate both soft security and hard security interventions. According to the Institute for Economic Peace Report (2022), the average level of peacefulness and global security deteriorated by 0.3% compared to 2021. The report also referred to Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Russia, South Sudan that, have remained hard hit by insecurity, vulnerabilities, and political instability, and other forms of human insecurity despite international interventions. The report noted that global insecurities have constrained development efforts across the globe.

The increasing rates of global insecurity are largely attributed to several factors including the rise in social cleavages, unprofessional conduct and activities in the public service, and increasing vulnerabilities that individuals are exposed to. Increasing trends of insecurity, the changing nature of security needs as well as the emerging realities of globalization culminated in the advocacy for reforms in the security sector as a strategy to mitigate society cleavages and vulnerabilities that individuals are exposed to. Further, these dynamisms in security needs called for the urgency and necessity to shift the security approach from national security to human security (Homel and Masson, 2016).

This paper deploys insights into security sector reforms that guarantee the reduction of security risks and enhancing state survival. The main argument is that states, continue to be bedeviled by security risks that from time to time

require adjustment, modification, and re-strategizing its security apparatus. It is evident that states in the global south specifically Africa, hosts weaker, fragile, and failed states. Yet these states continue to survive despite their status but with spontaneous consequences to their region and economic blocks.

A lot of arguments and counterarguments characterize the idea of security sector reforms. In his view (Max Weber, 1978) argued that the state is a political organization, wielding exclusive coercive power over a large area and group of people, which power it uses to tax, maintain internal order, make war, peacefully engage other states, deliver social services and protect property rights. The state's ability to lay claim legitimately over means of violence and be able to assert its defense within a given territory sets the nation-state as distinct from other forms of political organizations that it subjugated and subdued after the 1948 treaty of Westphalia.

Homel and Masson (2016) argue that, the state enjoys a mandate derived from the sovereign to maintain security over all citizens, monitor migration, and preserve its territorial spheres of influence against external aggression. The colonial political economy constructed boundaries that defined most countries in the third world and bequeathed on them institutions of government that were intended to superintend the state. Whereas the institutions were critical in the organization of the state, both internal and external realities necessitated a dynamic security set up, which could be compatible with internal needs and external concerns. A hybrid security system would thus emerge incorporating both indigenous and exogenous modern security policies (Homel and Masson, 2016).

Security as viewed by Buzzan (1991), would entail the pursuit of freedom from threat internally, while externally it implies the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. Consequently, the international system was viewed by realists as brutal and each state would be keen to achieve its own security at the expense of their neighbors.

Mearsheimer (2001), correctly predicted that the end of the cold war would significantly alter the power polarity within and among states. The return of

balance of power, ethnic rivalries, and extreme nationalism would usher great instability. State security has therefore shifted to human security as espoused by societal security. Liberal institutionalists observe that in a world constrained by state power and competing national interests, international institutions are unlikely to eliminate war among states but could construct an environment of cooperation.

Theoretical Framework and Literature

This research article integrates Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's C-H model with Jurgen Habermas' positive peace vis-a- negative peace to conceptualize the connection between security sector reforms and human security. These conceptual frameworks and models were chosen because they complement each other and show how security sector reforms link to social and domestic political transition, notably democracy, hence reducing individual and societal conflict vulnerability. The models assume that security sector changes promote human development.

In their C-H model, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), argue that modern conflicts and wars are driven by greed and grievances. Economic possibilities and agendas are more likely to produce societal conflicts or wars than group and social complaints. Failure of the state to accomplish its economic objectives and provide more job possibilities creates a conducive climate for coups and countercoups as well as violent organizations that threaten well-being and peaceful coexistence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).

The C-H model agues that global conflicts have political and economic underpinnings. The model shows that governmental failure to address local complaints, such as poverty reduction, job creation, and active engagement in economic activity, may foster social unrest. Collier and Hoeffler (2002), say Africa's low GDP per capita and high poverty index cause most civil conflicts. Low GDP per capita implies low revolt opportunity costs, fomenting civil conflicts. Poverty reduction and public empowerment diminish government complaints, according to Collier and Hoeffler's approach. Based on this assumption, Collier

and Hoeffler view a state's capacity to eliminate poverty and generate jobs as a medium-sized conflict prevention method. Collier and Hoeffler (2002), advise emphasis on development as part of the model's policy implications.

The C-H model applies to this research because it links sustainable human security with democratic security goals. Efficient bureaucracy, excellent institutions, government stability, democratic accountability and openness, and low corruption prevent civil wars and conflicts, according to Collier and Hoeffler's model. Strong institutions may reduce the detrimental consequences of ethnic diversity on economic development, according to Easterly (2000). Easterly (2000), says excellent institutions may facilitate peaceful dispute resolution, minimizing societal fractionalization. Corruption-prone countries are more susceptible to human insecurity, the model shows. The model shows that democracy is superior at preventing conflict because it allows people to voice their concerns to the government and find agreeable solutions. Adopting democratic values that include feedback mechanisms enhances military-civil ties and reduces conflicts. The model says complaints cause conflicts, which cause more grievances.

The C-H model cites natural resource reliance, corruption, poor institutions, high poverty index, and sluggish development as factors fueling African conflicts and increasing human insecurity. According to Collier and Hoeffler's (2002) model, dependency on natural resources may enhance government corruption, fund rebels, increase vulnerability to shocks, and fund violent organizations. Stable economies with strong institutions and large GDP are more likely to meet human security objectives, such as peaceful cohabitation. This is because these economies can solve mounting frustrations that leave residents prone to crime. Stable economies effectively resolve societal cleavages such as ethnicity and racism, hence fostering the country's growth. Barry Buzan's view of security is multifaceted and needs holistic frameworks. Individual, state, and international security are interconnected, according to Buzan. In his perspective, tackling current security concerns require identifying insecurity's core causes. Buzan identifies economic, social, political, and environmental security. He argues that social weaknesses, particularly the state's inability to develop, create conflict and underdevelopment (Buzan et al., 2003).

Barry Buzan posits that the state may be an agent of underdevelopment if it participates in activities that contradict individual and group interests, formulates elite-based laws, and battles over power. Barry Buzan's analysis identified dangers to human security as insufficient or excessive law enforcement, ethnic division, state marginalization, extreme poverty, unemployment, and failure to respect human rights. Buzan concludes that security is complicated and needs diverse methods. He advises the state improve its ability to respond appropriately to changing security demands to decrease residents' criminal vulnerability (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 2003).

Positive vs. negative peace bolsters the state's role in implementing security sector changes that fulfill human security demands. Positive peace means addressing, mitigating, and transforming cultural and structural violence. Positive peace theorists argue that nations must build defenses against structural and cultural violence. In doing so, the state will establish an accommodating and supportive climate for growth, reducing economic vulnerability to crime. Ethnicity, unlawful cultural ideas, and economic marginalization and inequality drive crime (Buzan, 1991).

Conceptualising Security Sector Reforms and Human security

The increase in global insecurities, the globalization of threats to human security such as HIV/AIDS, global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental problems, global poverty, and pollution, and the evolving and dynamic nature of contemporary security needs have prompted discussions on the need for security sector reforms that are in sync with ever-changing human needs. This required shifting from state to human security. Human security acquired policy relevance, domination, and significance after the cold war and prevailing security and development narratives (Cloutier et al., 2016).

Security sector changes redefine and widen the conventional idea of security, which emphasized safeguarding state interests from foreign and domestic threats and governing regimes. National security centered on state stability and regime security, not the general well-being of the governed (William, 2005). Security

sector reforms involve setting security frameworks that respond effectively and efficiently to new global challenges and opportunities posed by demands for an effective development donor role in post-conflict reconstruction, conflict prevention, and anti-terrorism as part of efforts to create a security sector that fosters human development, diversifies the economy, and reduces the global poverty index (DFID, 2008). Reforms suggest redefining and transforming security actors, their responsibilities and mandates, and actions to make security systems more democratic, transparent, and accountable and match the evolving requirements of the global population. The changes aim to create a favorable working environment in the security sector by embracing professionalism, enhancing oversight duties, and boosting citizens' contacts and control of security services (Cloutier et al., 2016).

The reforms involve understanding that localities and people have varied security demands and strengthening the state's ability to provide them. Existential threats to national security, such as ethnicity in the security sector, corruption and misuse of money, unprofessional behaviour, and bad public relations must be overcome. The approach involves improving the security system's professional standards and establishing an effective work environment and people-centric security system (Skeppström et al., 2015).

The move from state security to human security was heavily influenced by the complexity and interdependence of security and development, as well as new security challenges like as health dynamics, people trafficking, and climate change. Human security is preventative and person-centered and reduces security risks. This security paradigm includes economic, health, food, environment, personal, political, and communal security (Blatz, 2016).

Human security includes freedom from crime and violence, protection against human rights abuses, income sustainability, freedom from deliberate sickness and illnesses, and enhanced human habitation. This security protects human rights and the economy. The human security paradigm moves security from a state-centric emphasis to the person and shared values. The security approach believes security to be the well-being, safety, and dignity of humanity and implies a secure state cannot exist with an unsafe populace (Oberleitner, 2004).

Human security is people-centered and advocates for people's empowerment, in contrast to the old definition of security, which valued state sovereignty (Blatz, 2016). By empowering the public via education and immersing them in national issues, they can deal with security risks like abject poverty and hunger (Martin and Owen, 2014). This reduces the risk of individuals joining terror organizations or committing organized crime.

This paper establishes linkages between security sector reforms and human security. The Security Sector Reforms advocacy for beneficial institutional reforms, including depoliticization of security, security nationalization, and greater professionalism, offers the platform for achieving human security goals (Blatz, 2016). A safe society depends on the state's ability to adopt programs and policies that alleviate individual vulnerabilities and societal cleavages. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005), a society free from fear and hunger depends on the state's capacity to reduce, avert, or resolve existential risks to people' well-being. Human security equates security with people rather than regions, with development rather than weaponry, and tries to cope with security concerns via a new paradigm of sustainable human development.

Study Methodology

This study relied on household interviews as primary sources of data collection. It depended upon desktop research techniques including a review of published academic journals and books as secondary sources that served to augment findings obtained through primary sources. The target population for this study included residents of Nairobi city and security actors including local administrators and police service. The cumulative sample size for this study was 60 households purposively sampled. The sampled population constituted individuals with in-depth knowledge of the interplay between security sector reforms and sustainable human security. The household surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews and respondents were interrogated using structured questionnaire. The collected data was processed and analyzed in order to generate key findings of the study.

Discussions and analysis of findings

The Role of Security Sector Reforms in Human Security

The nexus between security sector reforms and human security and development has been conceptualized to lie within the policy agenda that is covered by the security sector reforms. According to William (2005), the reforms address the fundamental challenges that instigate insecurity in different ways. Firstly, the reforms focus on establishing accountable and professional civil authorities with the potential to address social cleavages. Secondly, the reforms strengthen the security institutions hence insulating them against both internal and external variables that may make them less responsive. Thirdly, the security sector reforms aim to embrace people's participation in the security process and formulation of policy and institutional frameworks that integrate development and security by providing the necessary environment that harbors human development. This is generally premised on the fact that the nature of security that a county wields or possesses can undermine or contribute to development, democracy and peace because of the intricate linkages among them.

Weigand (2013), carried out a study on the role of security sector reforms in nation-building with a specific case analysis of Afghanistan. The study findings reveal that security sector reforms contribute to nation-building by establishing the necessary frameworks for development to take place. According to the study findings, democratizing the security sector legitimizes the security civil service hence harboring state stability. The study findings highlight that the traditional approach to security that was state-centric and laid emphasis on regime stability may have a delegitimizing effect hence destabilizing the state especially when the security apparatus opt to protect institutions that are not embedded in the society. The study findings conclude by postulating that security sector reforms portend to support endogenous and exogenous processes of building legitimate institutions and also creating the necessary incentives for national development. The study findings, therefore, corroborate the position of the United Nations Development Program that views security as a condition for development.

It is evident that effective security sector reforms contribute to human security through the creation of a favorable, safe, and democratic society that is critical

for the state-building process. This is informed by the fact that the reforms are geared toward the political, economic, and social transformation of the security sector to reflect the dynamic security needs of society. This finding conforms with the findings by Jonyo and Buchere (2011), who view the institutional or security sector reforms within the police service in Kenya as a significant step toward enhancing human security in Kenya. The study identified critical issues within the police service that required drastic reforms to constitute politicization of the police service, ethnicization of the service, police brutality, lack of trust in the police service, corruption, and mismanagement of public funds among others (Blatz, 2016).

Further, the study findings noted that to address the growing human insecurities and other forms of police problems, the security system approach must focus on pertinent areas including the issues dealing with the demographic composition of the police service in terms of gender and ethnic representation, increased police oversight that enhances police accountability and transparency and oversight, creation of a civilian oversight agency, the introduction of community policing program and introduction of a professional system of labor relations. Given the multi-ethnic nature of Kenya, ethnic and regional diversity embraces security cohesion and integration within the police service hence providing the necessary framework for development to take place.

Study findings by Jonyo and Buchere (2011), note that security sector reforms are very critical pillars of human security based on the fact that it provides the necessary framework for creating responsible and accountable civil service hence providing security for the citizenry effectively, reducing the risk of conflict and create a favorable environment for sustainable. Security sector reforms, therefore, provide the requisite institutional and policy adjustments that are central to the achievement of sustainable development goal number 16 which is geared towards creating a sustainable and secure society. Tartarini (2015), argue that post-election violence that took place following the disputed 2007 elections was largely fueled by the politicization and ethnicization of the country's security sector. Politicization and ethnicization breed social cleavages which hinder the development potential of the country hence leading to human insecurities.

Security sector reforms securitize human security. This is informed by the fact that the sector reforms emphasize development policy and institutional frameworks that generate viable conditions necessary for mitigating the vulnerabilities that make individuals susceptible to engaging in crime. The major vulnerabilities or factors facilitating insecurity are constituted of human security indicators including high poverty index, high rates of unemployment, lack of economic development, ethnicity, unprofessional conduct of the civil service, and the poor distribution of resources. Security sector reforms address these human security problems through their attempts to nationalize and professionalize the police service to make the service more responsive to the changing security needs of the population.

Case Illustrations of Security Sector Architecture

Ghana

The role of security sector reforms on human security is exemplified in a case analysis of Ghana. According to study findings, Ghana currently stands out as among the examples of demilitarized, professional, and democratized security service despite having a historical experience of a security service that was less responsive to the changing security needs of the Ghanaians, suffered legitimacy crisis, and a strong sense of unprofessionalism (Black, 2016). This is exemplified in the propensity of coups and counter coups and other forms of violent conflicts that Ghana experienced in the late 19th century. Despite these security challenges that threatened to impoverish and break Ghana apart, Ghana's civil service continues to undergo lots of transformations that reflect the expansive goals and objectives of security sector reforms (Ansorg, 2017).

The security sector reforms' aspects that exemplify positive transformation of Ghana's security system include the restoration and inculcation of discipline and command among security actors, delinking of security actors from popular movements including politics, increased public participation of security stakeholders, improved civil-military relations and improved civil control of the security institutions (Ansorg, 2017). The spillover effects of these drastic transformations have been significant reductions in military expenditure. Upon the imposition of the security sector reforms, military expenditure regressed from

$57million to $56 million in the period between 1998 and 1999, and political stability was restored hence providing the necessary platform for development initiatives including foreign investments to spur. Blatz (2016), notes that, the government was therefore able to divert the security resources to other sectors of the economy with the potential to enhance human security such as the healthcare sector and even the education sector.

Nigeria

Uzuegbu-Wilson (2019), assessed the implication of security sector reforms on development using a case analysis of Nigeria. The study findings highlighted that upon receiving political independence, insecurity remains a major bottleneck to Nigerian economic take-off. The insecurity is intricately linked to the vulnerabilities that constitute Nigeria and the governance deficits that define the Nigerian security system or apparatus. The security sector reforms, largely implemented by President Obasanjo constituted the creation of an independent body called the "Oputa Panel" and a Human Rights Commission to oversight the security apparatus, review the civil-military relations, nationalizing the police service, formulation of the national defense policy of 2006, enforcement of legislative oversight on security budgets and organizing training programs for the security actors.

The study highlights the reforms have to some extent addressed security challenges in Nigeria including the propensity of coups and counter coups and other forms of crime. While recognizing that contemporarily Nigeria suffers from the York of Boko Haram, it recommends that the security apparatus should refocus on reducing the vulnerabilities that expose individuals to radicalization (Ogbozor, 2016). Therefore, the research paper avers that security sector reforms have to some extent stabilized Nigeria hence providing the necessary platforms for development to take place

Kenya's SSR Architecture

The need to undertake SSR in Kenya has been hanging for some time. It got intensified after the post-election crisis in which the security actors came into sharp focus. The question of human rights violations, extra-judicial killings, and lack of

respect for the rule of law was also raised by civil society, religious organizations, and the media. The foundation of SSR in Kenya was connected to the issue of transitional justice and constitutional change. These were to be carried out as guided by Agenda IV of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government (referred to as the National Accord) (Gok, Commission Report, 2008).

Agenda IV highlights the long-term focus of the coalition government in enacting a new, democratic constitution, and reforming state institutions, including the security sector and criminal justice institutions. The spirit of SSR in Kenya thus was predicated on bringing security agencies under civilian oversight and aligning the functionality within the internationally accepted norms. The observation was quite clear in the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) report which noted that most security actors in Kenya abandoned professionalism in discharging their duties and were openly biased. Some were actively involved in perpetrating criminal acts (GoK, Commission Report, 2008).

CIPEV also decried the lack of national security policy in Kenya, where there was no joint planning, cooperation, and coordination (GoK, Commission Report, 2008). Kenya has also put in place a relatively extensive SSR targeting the police. This was established under the government's Economic Recovery and Wealth Creation Strategy (2003), guided by the National Task Force on Police Reforms. The outcome expectations of these reforms were to transform the Kenya police into an effective, efficient, human rights compliant, people-oriented and accountable institution.

In Kenya, as part of the government's attempt to democratize the security service implemented its community policing program famously known as the "*Nyumba Kumi*" (Ten Households) initiative. The initiative that adopts a bottom-up approach in security management has helped better the relationship between security agencies and the citizenry. The Nyumba Kumi initiative harbors public participation in security matters hence fulfilling the goals of the human security dimension of political security (Black, 2016).

Security sector reforms are critical enablers to economic development and human security because they advocate for optimal budgetary allocations that are properly utilized hence creating opportunities for the remaining or free resources to be utilized to spur social investments and financing of poverty reduction initiatives.

The United Nations Development Program considers security sector reforms as integral to sustaining peace and preventing conflicts that serve as bottlenecks to development. The UNDP considers the reforms as both preventive and a long-term strategy for the realization of its agenda on international peace and stability. The report highlights that when security sectors including the police service and the military are unprofessional in their conduct or perform poorly, they lose social trust which is an important ingredient for sustained well-being and prosperity of the population. It argues that states that still integrate the traditional approach to security that emphasized regime stability rather than individual stability encourage predatory environments that impoverish the vulnerable, enhance repression and favoritism, and other forms of human rights violation. While putting cognizant of conflict-prone areas, the report highlights that security sector reforms create a viable environment for socioeconomic and political growth (GoK, Commission Report, 2008). The SSR debate in Kenya has tended to be characterized by the balance between human rights and the judicial process. Questions of how the rights of criminals should be managed and giving the citizens a feeling of action continue to be a challenge.

In Kenya, the transformative security sector reforms that the country has undertaken have remained significant in securitizing human security. Based on the foundational basis that security sector reforms are incentives to human development, the government has initiated a range of programs aimed at making the police service more professional, accountable, and accountable, enhancing civil security control, and improving civilian-security relations (Hope, 2018). To achieve these objectives, the government created a police oversight body called the Independent Police Oversight Authority that monitors and oversights the conduct of the security actors and undertakes necessary actions in cases where human rights violations including police brutality are evident. Essentially, the government implemented the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, decentralization of police

actors, increased capacity-building programs, and increased concerted attempts to nationalize the police service among other reforms (Egesa, 2017).

The reforms were largely initiated as a response to the 2011 East African Bribery Index Report that highlighted security actors including the police service as among the most corrupt institutions globally and noted that the police index of corruption increased from 77.7% in 2011 to 80% in 2012. The report findings were corroborated by findings from the World Bank (2011), that ranked Kenya as a top corrupt institution and accused the police service of police brutality, impunity, and absolute disregard for human rights. Whereas the reforms have not been effective, they continue to serve as legal frameworks for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Kenya's security sector. Good security sector reforms have the potential to reduce government spending in the security sector hence similar funds could be invested in other social programs. This is informed by the fact that effective sector reforms reduce social unrest arising from mass deprivations and the persistence of social cleavages. It is imperative to note that in economies in which a lot of funds are allocated to the security sector, the welfare benefits of the civilians will be distorted hence hindering the realization of human security goals within the civilian economy (Egesa, 2017).

As highlighted by Jonyo and Buchere (2011), security threats that impede a state's development are a direct function of state failure and the internal vulnerabilities of the states including marginalization, ethnic polarization, militarized ethnic formations, and weak economic bases among others. Ideally, these vulnerabilities make the masses susceptible to engaging in crime hence making it futile to spur development. The vulnerabilities provide necessary justifications for local grievances and complaints which serve as potential sources for crime and other forms of insecurity such as global terrorism (Hope, 2018). To address these pertinent existential security threats, it is necessary to strengthen the security institutions to make them responsive to the security demands and ensure the institution reflects a national outlook, democratizes the security sector and embraces public participation in security activities, and fosters social integration within the police service. These will help reduce the vulnerabilities hence reducing the vulnerabilities for organized crimes and the formation of groupings that threaten national and regional security.

Security Sector reforms in Kenya

From the study conducted the respondents were aware of Kenya's security sector changes. They cited the Independent Oversight Authority, the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, concerted efforts to nationalize the security agencies, setting the necessary frameworks for promotions and demotions in the security sector, intensifying training programs and exchange programs to embrace professionalism in the police service, and increased public participation. Although these measures improve the country's security architecture, Nairobi still confronts existential challenges to local security. Sedra (2010) smuggling, murder, terrorism, and other criminality as major security challenges. Respondents ascribed rising insecurity to the government's inability to undertake security sector reforms.

The study found that lack of employment opportunities, a high poverty index, low standards of living, poor police-civil relations, irresponsive governance, security actors' brutality and unprofessional conduct, exclusion, isolation and insularity, government repression, institutional marginalization, weak security agencies, imbalances in security provision, and a lack of transparency and accountability in police resource management. Economic determinants, such as unemployment and poverty, render local communities prone to behaviors that restrict human security requirements, such as crime (Sedra, 2010). These factors make young people more likely to join militias to earn a living (Newton, 2018). Respondents noted that a stable economy with higher living standards deters crime and fosters progress. Respondents from slums like Kibera linked insecurity to living standards. Slum dwellers feel disenfranchised and alienated in governance and economic possibilities distribution, and they consider crime an alternative to better livelihood and an act of retribution against the government.

Unprofessional behavior of security services as a barrier to achieving human development goals such as peace, stability, and poverty reduction. Respondents identified corruption, bad police-community ties, and police violence as risk factors for peaceful coexistence. These misconducts persist due to limitations in security sector reform implementation. These findings reinforce what Chêne (2009) describes as first level of police corruption which involves acts bribery in the I the streets whereby police officers use their power to obtain money or sexual

favours from members of the public in exchange for not reporting illegal activities or expediting bureaucratic procedures (Blatz, 2016; Hope, 2018).

Respondents agreed that security sector changes and human security requirements are linked. They noted that "the smaller the danger to human life, the greater the security," but said the government's capacity to solve institutional, economic, and social gaps is key to building a peaceful society. These findings resonate with Oberleitner's arguments that security is the well-being, safety, and dignity of humanity. A secure state cannot exist with an unsafe populace (Oberleitner, 2004). Respondents recognized that a people-centered security system that respects human dignity, freedom from hunger, and equal opportunity for all populations to enjoy their political, social, and economic rights is vital to accomplishing human security objectives. The Nyumba Kumi Initiative is a preventative security sector reform to boost local security involvement. Though under-equipped, underfunded, and under-monitored, the initiative exemplifies the government's commitment to a people-centered security system, according to one responder. Through the effort, local engagement in security problems has increased, reducing top-down leadership weaknesses.

Security reforms require embracing technology, a people-centric security system, depoliticizing security players, accepting democratic norms such as openness and accountability, and inculcating a culture of professional behaviour within the police force. The three technologies used in security are biometrics, encryption, and tokens. Biometrics is the use of a person's physical characteristics to identify them. It uses fingerprints, facial recognition, or even voice recognition. Encryption is the process of transforming readable data into an unreadable format (Smythe, 2022). Multidimensional techniques decrease social cleavages that foster fears, according to the findings of the study.

The research found a link between Kenya's security sector reforms and state stability. The qualitative results showed that the execution of security reforms after the 2007 post-election violence demonstrates that deficient security infrastructure nurtures political instabilities that make it difficult to meet the developmental requirements of the populace. The study remarked that security

services were prejudiced during the 2007 post-election violence, fueling the disputes an issue that Ogada (2020), discusses citing police using excessive force during elections. The study found that security actors were prejudiced, harsh, and harassed citizens, and positioned themselves as organizations concerned with protecting governments and elites, not the public. Respondents noted that the Grand Coalition Government and succeeding regimes helped enhance police professionalism and police-civilian relations, averting similar incidents in future elections.

De-ethnicizing the security sector, offering regular training to security agencies, and providing a security framework that guides leadership transition in terms of promotion and roles and responsibilities have remained central to cementing internal relations among security players and promoting state stability (Jonyo and Buchere, 2011). State stability is a major push element to growth because it offers the essential work environment for investments and company expansion, addressing security weaknesses such as poverty and unemployment. The study highlighted the institutionalization of the Police Oversight Authority and security sector commissions. While IPOA and other investigating commissions were required to fulfill Kenyans' human security demands, respondents said IPOA has not completely met its goals and responsibilities (Egesa, 2017). The IPOA legislation requires the institution to investigate unprofessional security forces, including the police, offer independent supervision and accountability, and prosecute or report to competent institutions, including the judiciary, the National Assembly, and the Executive. Respondents attributed these agencies' inefficiency to a lack of political goodwill, underfunding, and investigative actors. Inculcating a culture of professionalism in the security industry requires better supervision structures, respondents said. The research indicates that professionalism in the security sector helps prevent strikes and protests against security forces, which hinder Nairobi's progress.

While acknowledging that security sector reforms are a critical pillar of developing state systems with the ability to pursue developmental initiatives and programs, respondents posited that the government of Kenya, with a primary focus in Nairobi city, appears less capable and efficient to roll out expansive initiatives

and programs that de-incentivize local engagement in activities that inhibit localism. Respondents said the Kenyan government's *Kazi Mtaani* (Community Work) program and government-supported attachment and internship programs minimize young vulnerability to social crime.

Internal stability and realization of human security needs, are intricately linked to the state's ability to put in place necessary frameworks and develop necessary infrastructure. Strong institutions can protect security sector organizations against corruption, brutality, and politicization, the research concludes. Stronger institutions successfully manage citizen complaints and requests, minimizing existential dangers from societal cleavages, according to the research. Strong institutions may communicate security information with the public, boosting stakeholder trust.

This saw the reforms extend to the judiciary, which remained weak yet critical actor in the human security ecosystem. It went major reform in which a number of judicial officers across cadres were dismissed due to charges of corruption or misconduct. There were charges of corruption or misconduct against 5 out of 9 Appeal Court judges, 18 out of 36 High Court judges and 82 out of 254 Magistrates (US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004).

Further, efforts were made for improved remuneration of judicial staff, rehabilitation, building of courtrooms and introduction of mobile courts for efficient and faster administration of justice.

Challenges of SSR

Whereas SSR remains a critical practice, there are many challenges that countries still face. Many nations keep their security apparatus secret. This separates civilians from security actors. Insufficient information makes civilian oversight of security services ineffective. This would mean fewer people-centered security groups. To add to this, SSR has competing stakeholders. Police, prosecution, and judiciary perform separate, complimentary functions. These actors utilize their

standards to handle criminal or security issues. So changes may be a struggle for who wins. (Sedra, 2010).

Integrating SSR into human rights, justice, peace, and development is difficult. One of these expectations might easily be forgotten. The media's involvement is complicated. Many security organizations dislike the free reporting preferred by the media. Many security agencies there try to avoid the media.

Poverty is high in many emerging nations. Complicates SSR. Growing urban populations without steady incomes cause much urban violence. Such organizations may compromise security.

Insufficient risk research weakens SSR. Intelligence research must be improved to select actionable data.

Egesa (2017), emphasise that low security officer pay, inadequate welfare management, and lack of equipment invite corruption. The result would be lawbreaking, collaboration in crime, inadequate investigations, and criminal protection. To add to that the Low public confidence in security services hinders citizen-agency engagement. Many nations that implemented community policing failed because residents distrust, suspect, and hate police.

A poorly thought-out national security policy may hinder coordination, planning, and operations. Interagency friction, position overlaps, rival interests, and indifference might result.

Private security is a factor. Many private security services lack defined policies, screening, or training. Despite their importance in security. Ill-trained, low compensated, and without career growth, these companies are difficult.

The international community burdens SSR. SSR in many poor nations is funded outside. Donors would want to enforce certain security management systems, operations, equipment purchases, and policy frameworks. In many situations, SSR benefits donors, not the governments adopting the changes.

Conclusion

The paper acknowledges that security sector reforms are necessary ingredients for development. It avers that governments must fully enforce security sector reforms to reduce the vulnerabilities that expose individuals to crime. The study highlights that the reforms facilitate the establishment of a conducive environment for development to take place. This is informed by the fact that owing to the ubiquity of the police sector and the military, the security sectors can contribute to or undermine the stability of the economy and this may undermine prospects for human security. Against this backdrop, establishing a secure society characterized by reduced vulnerabilities calls for the existence of an efficient, more democratic, effective, and professional security sector. The study affirms the notion that the lower the risks or threats to human life, the better the security.

Recommendations

- Stakeholder involvement is mandatory in the conceptualization and implementation of SSR. Security agencies have to deliberately create opportunities for feedback and adopt such in their activities.

- Governments have to make available resources that could facilitate public participation and dialogue in SSR

- A whole-of-government approach is required in which ministries, institutions, and agencies work as a team in realizing national security interests.

- Countries have to come together in harmonizing and collaborating on cross borders risks and threats to enable a common approach.

- The judiciary, executive, and legislature have to work as a unit in security management. Whereas they are independent but security reforms would demand a deliberate effort towards a unity of purpose.

- Priority would have to be given to economic security since it tends to carry the other facets of the security system. Whereas other facets are equally important, all efforts would elevate the securitization of economics to enhance capital formation and income mobilization.

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United States Withdrawal from Afghanistan: A Systems Theory Analysis of Implications on Africa Human Security

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Abstract

In August 2021, the United States withdrew the last of its troops from Afghanistan, ending its military presence there after nearly 20 years. This paper uses the Systems theory to examine the effects of this withdrawal on Human Security in Africa. The military action in Afghanistan represented a massive global coalition effort. In addition to the United States, the 20 years period saw military forces and assets from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Russia and Turkey. The termination of this conflict is likely to have long term effects on Human Security in Africa. These effects traverse personal and community security, economic security, environmental security, food security, Health security and Political security all of which fall within the larger domain of Human Security. This qualitative method based paper uses SALSA model to source and analyze information from a diverse set of literature. The key findings of this research are; likely increase in terrorism activities; the dangers posed by the increasing population of refugees; the problem of proliferation of sophisticated weapons and small arms; and increased economic challenges such as unemployment and poverty. The theoretical lenses provided by the Systems theory showed that Africa is a player within the global system. The identified effects require Africa to rethink its strategy and policy to decisively address them. Additionally, the silenced guns must translate to improved human security across the Continent by re-focusing the massive resources that were being used to sustain this campaign towards the creation of sustainable developmental

programmes across the African continent. On her part, the continent must come up with strategies to address human security challenges, create employment, enhance efforts to fight terrorism, minimise the impact of refugees, eliminate drugs use and abuse and stop the proliferation of illegal arms.

Key Words: *Afghanistan, Africa, USA, Human Security.*

Introduction

This paper uses the Systems theory to investigate the interplay between the US mission in Afganisatn and how it interplays with global security and more specifically its impact on human security in Africa. The Afghanistan war started in 2001 after 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. The USA and its allies launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7, October 2001 to pursue the masterminds of the terror attack. The war sought to dismantle terror networks and ensure that Afghanistan was no longer a breeding ground for terrorists. After 20 years of war, over USD 2 trillion spent and more than 3500 lives lost, the USA exited Afghanistan on 30 August 2021 (Beaumont, 2021).

The shift from traditional security to human security provides the world with a comprehensive and preventive approach that challenges the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper reference for security should be at the human level rather than at the national level (UNDP, 1994). This thinking seeks to refocus efforts at all levels to whole-of-human security needs to reduce vulnerabilities and achieve a world free from fear, want and indignity. The Human Security approach spans the personal and community security, economic security, food security, environmental security, health security and political security (Babu, 2016; Ogata & Cels, 2003).

Africa is endowed with natural resources and warm-hearted people with greater aspirations. However, despite its potential and positive outlook, it has continued to face human security related challenges such as poor health, failing political systems and economies, poverty, hunger and environmental degradation (Abutudu, 2006; Ake, 1996; Chossudovsky, 1997). It continues to be a melting pot of diverse conflicts that differ in shape, volume, magnitude, actors, motivation and causes.

This reduces the quality of life despite concerted efforts by governments, policy makers, regional and global bodies to alleviate suffering in the continent.

While Africa has had its share of internal conflicts and wars, it is part of a larger global ecosystem and events happening elsewhere in the world, especially in the Middle East usually come with great shock and consequences. In addition, the connected nature of the world has caused dependencies that cannot be ignored. There are shared religions, cultures, economic dependencies, mass movement of people and the ever-increasing technological capabilities that make the present world a global village. According to United Nations, digital technologies has greatly contributed to global connectivity (United Nations, 2021). This connected nature of the world has both positive and negative impacts and the end of the US campaign in Afghanistan has human security related impact on Africa.

From a Systems theory perspective, the rise of Taliban, the mass evacuations of foreigners and Afghans and the transatlantic movement of refugees was a human security catastrophe not only to Afghanistan but also to Africa. While the full extent of the global impact of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan continues to unfold, there is need for deliberate and proactive actions to safeguard Africa from the ripple effects of USA's withdrawal from Afghanistan (Beaumont, 2021). From a Security perspective, there were Taliban or their Sympathisers who disguised themselves as security, intelligence and economic personnel to work for the USA and their allies in various capacities. These people by nature of their association with USA and its allies, found their way out of Afghanistan and are in various European and African cities as they wait for an opportune time to reactivate their networks, recruit, train and even radicalise Western and African citizens.

Therefore, this paper, uses the Systems theory to dissect the intricate system's inter-dependencies to investigate the likely effects of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan on human security in the African continent.

Conceptualising Human security

Human Security is a concept premised on the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. It contends that individuals are entitled to freedom from fear, freedom

from want, and the freedom to live in dignity, and that the global community and each country ought to prioritize building a world that secures these essential freedoms (UNDP, 1994). It revolves around protection of people from severe and pervasive threats and situations through creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Ogata & Cels, 2003).

Buzan refers to security as ultimately a political process, that when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object, existential in that the continued being of something is at stake or in danger (Buzan et al., 1998; Ogata & Cels, 2003). Other arguments include the mainstream international relations theories, where the notion of 'security' is primarily codified as the prerogative of states (realism), and institutions (liberalism) to be free from danger that presents 'an existential threat'.

Over time, the subject of security has advanced from traditional security to more inclusive human security and therefore expanding the concept of security with a wholesome lens to include other aspects of security. Further, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) support the extension of the concept of security to include human security aspects, to achieve freedom from fear, want and indignity.

Global security

The struggle for statehood has seen countries pursue national interests for their survival and posterity. More often, this pursuit results in conflicts between states and allies who come in support of either side. Consequently, after two world wars, the UN and other regional bodies were formed to promote world peace hence while a third world war has been successfully averted, there have been major wars and conflicts that have had a serious global impact. Key among these include the Korean War that separated the North from the South, the Israel-Arab wars, Iran-Iraq wars and the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan among others (Marks, 1976; Mentan, 2020; Pellegrini, 2019).

While the world craves for peace and stability, the struggle for resources, the need for survival of states, self-preservation and even the pursuit of self-interests

continue to fuel conflicts across the globe (Jouannet, 2012; Kanishka, 2022; Kanishka, 2021; Mentan, 2020). From World War I, World War II, the cold war, the war on terror and the global war against pandemics, the world is sieged with conflicts. In the endeavour for self-preservation, more nations are amassing sophisticated weapon systems including nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can transcend continents. The number of aircraft carriers continues to increase and these floating airbases project airpower for defence and also deterrence and extend reach far beyond the ordinary stationary bases. In addition to the over 45 aircraft carriers operating around the world, approximately 485 submarines move stealthily across the world oceans ready to pounce on short notice (Lehman, 2021).

These aspects of military might and balance of power between nations continue to shape global security and policy. Additionally, the USA war on terror in Afghanistan has been a defining moment in the global scene with conflict transcending generations, redefining geopolitics and realignments. In the end, its closure and the withdrawal of USA of its troops opens a new post-Afghanistan era and provides impendence to the discourse on the individual rights of states to protect themselves and pursue perceived enemies beyond their borders.

Afghanistan war will remain a classical case study in military schools and colleges for decades to come. It provides an opportunity for national security scholars and strategists to examine and interrogate it, in order to extract lessons into posterity. While the full repercussions are yet to manifest, military scholars and strategists should examine this war and its effects on Human Security in order to inform global, regional and national security policy and posture.

An overview of African continental security

Africa has been a centre of interest due to its vast resources, unique political systems, size, population and diversity in culture and religion (Austin, 2010; Austin, 2008). Despite being over 1000 miles from Afghanistan, the interconnected and systematic nature of the world portends that the withdrawal of the USA from Afghanistan is likely to have effects on an already burdened continent.

A general overview of the security situation in Africa reveals that the 2010 Arab Spring revolution in North Africa affected countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (Ghanem, 2016; Haas & Lesch, 2017). However, its gains have been slowly eroded and, in most countries, terrorist groups continue to be a growing threat. In addition, various armed groups are operating in the region especially in Libya and in the Sahel region, carrying out sporadic attacks. Therefore, the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan and the rise of Taliban is likely to add to the growing list of security challenges for these nations. While the bulk of Afghanistan refugees may be headed to Europe, North African countries share common religion and language with Afghans and are likely to be an attractive option to terrorists who are looking for safe places where they can easily disguise and therefore receive little attention from the authorities and security organisations.

To the south of the continent, there are frequent Xenophobic attacks in South Africa and the increased movement of Al-Shabaab, ISIS and other terrorist groups in the SADC region is likely to further compound these problems. A country like Mozambique has already solicited support from Rwanda to help its troops fight jihadists in the northern Cabo Delgado region (Cannon & Donelli, 2022). Therefore, with the developments in Afghanistan, terrorist networks may expand as they look for safer havens. The mass movement of people and refugees across the globe is likely to escalate the scramble for limited resources and may be trigger to attacks within this region.

To the eastern parts of the continent, we have the volatile Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (HoA). Within the Great Lakes, Rwanda and Uganda have agreed to host Afghanistan refugees (Athumani, 2021). While this is a good international gesture, the presence of these refugees may provide cover for communication and movement of terrorist elements who may take advantage of these countries' generosity to camouflage their activities. Within the horn of Africa, there is the Ethiopian and Tigray conflict and the threat of Al-Shabaab and terrorism in Somalia that has fuelled over three decades of conflict. There is also Sudan and Darfur conflict which started in 2003 and the perennial internal issues in South Sudan after successful cession and independence from Sudan on 09 July 2011.

The HoA situation is further complicated by the Somaliland region willingness to also take in Afghanistan refugees (Yayboke, 2021). While Afghan refugees are not a problem, their presence provides cover for terrorism elements to move in and out of Somaliland in the pretext of visiting family and friends as they recruit, train and arm themselves to carry out attacks across Africa and the globe. The danger is not for Rwanda, Uganda and Somaliland but Africa at large and countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania being in close proximity should watch out for terrorist elements that are likely to move around masked as refugees or their relatives.

The western parts of Africa are already a volatile region with active terrorist cells. There have been several abductions of school-going children by groups such as Boko Haram and attacks by ISIS-affiliated groups in Mali and Cameron (Muraga, 2021). Finally, in the central part of Africa, we have the CAR which has an ongoing active conflict. Mr Idriss Deby was killed on 19 April 2021 as he led his troops in battle. In addition, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCAR) has been on the ground since 10 April 2014 with a mandate to monitor and enforce peace agreements between the government and the various rebel groups.

On the other hand, countries such as Rwanda that have entered into bilateral arrangements with the Central African Republic government to assist in enforcing security (Brendon & Donelli, 2022; RNP, 2022). Despite its distance from Afghanistan, African location and perennial conflicts may provide terrorist groups with a safe haven to thrive. The presence of UN peacekeepers in various parts of Africa should also be a warning to Africa as the multi-national nature of these missions may provide lucrative terrorist targets.

Theoretical Framework

Systems Theory

The first call for a general systems theory originated from Ludwig von Bertalanffy's research in the 1940s-50s.increasing complexity of world interconnectedness and the positive and negative outcomes arising from this connectivity (Montuori, 2011).

The theory provides researchers with a scientific approach to the interdisciplinary investigation of systems and subsystems, their interrelations, dependency and interaction with the environment (Bertalanffy, 1969).

From a Systems Theory perspective, changes in one part of the globe will directly or indirectly affect other parts or the whole system. This theory has found multidisciplinary applications and in this paper it provides an opportunity to investigate the effects of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan on human security in Africa, being cognisant of the fact that the continent and its member states does not exist in isolation but are a critical cog in the world ecosystem.

In this discussion, the Systems theory thinking was applied within the defence and security discourse to provide answers to human security dilemma that Africa faces (Mesjasz, 2006; Tierney, 1972). The theory provides lenses through which developments in Afghanistan can be scientifically investigated to identify pertinent issues that require strategic leadership and direction from Africa. Indeed, the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban's seizure of power has been examined from a systems perspective to bring out likely human security effects in the post-Afghanistan war chapter. Therefore, Policymakers and Scholars should partake in this discourse to provide scholarly and scientific output into the likely effects on human security in Africa.

Methodology

The SALSA (Search, Appraisal, Synthesis, and Analysis) model was used to source and analyze information from a diverse set of literature from both general and specific search engines. Secondary sources of data from books, journal articles, conference proceedings to examine the likely effects of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan on human security in Africa. The method selected was informed by time and cost considering that the events that happened in Afghanistan have been affected by space and time. A prose and narrative technique was used to present the findings. The paper gives a critical presentation of the findings.

Findings and Discussions

The ripple effects of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan as experienced in Africa are discussed and analysed with a view to inform governments, security services, policy makers and scholars who need to develop relevant response mechanism to mitigate these effects.

Increase in terrorist activities

One of the likely effects that the USA withdrawal from Afghanistan may have on Africa is the likely increase in terrorist attacks and activities. The fall of Afghanistan's Western backed government and the Taliban takeover rolls back costly and many years of global efforts on the war against terror (CRS, 2021). Africa has already had its fair share of terrorist attacks and activities that threatens personal and community security in Africa. Moreover, the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Africa, including the measures to contain their occurrence has always had devastating effects due to reduced movement, reduced investment, security and travel advisories among others. The vacuum created may allow Terrorists groups to regroup, recruit, train, equip and package themselves to make attacks to soft and lucrative targets.

There is an increased danger of home-grown terrorists who may get the opportunity to train in Afghanistan and be released back into their own African countries as they wait for the perfect opportunity to strike. Already countries such as Kenya have seen increased attacks from their own nationals with foreign training and logistics support. According to the US National Security Council (2021), domestic terrorism poses a direct challenge to America's national security. Homegrown terrorist presents the biggest danger to most nations due to their ability to innocently silhouette among the local population where they raise the least suspicion as they wait for an opportune time to strike.

It is therefore incumbent upon the global community, African included, to ensure that Afghanistan under the Taliban is safe for Africa and not a haven and source of terrorists. The Afghan's post-American era should not be allowed to pose a danger to world peace and the gains already made. Africa ought to join

other countries in ensuring a terrorist free Afghanistan. The continent needs to safeguard the hard-earned gains and blood sacrifices that have been made in the fight against terrorism.

Motivation for armed groups

In addition to the terrorism menace, Africa is already home to many armed groups with diverse objectives. Therefore, the Taliban takeover may have far-reaching implications for the unforeseen future as their success is likely to provide motivation and crucial lessons to other armed groups. Despite the USA and Western supported financial superiority, sophisticated weapon system, increased troop build-up, the Taliban were able to preserve their resources and energy for the opportune time. To the USA in Afghanistan, by the time the last flight and soldier flew out of Kabul International Airport, the international recognised government in Afghanistan and its military had already collapsed (Murtazashvili, 2022; CRS, 2021).

While the African continent scenario may be different, Taliban's victory created an aura and invincibility among like-minded armed groups across the globe. This euphoria and motivation provided armed groups with positive energy as well as awoke sleeper cells, a situation that may lead to increased attacks in Africa. In addition, this motivation and inspiration coupled with limited in-theatre achievements provide enough fodder to feed armed groups propaganda machinery which may lead to increased recruits and funding.

Taliban takeover changes the global security architecture and African countries need to review their security posture to commit more human and financial resources to their internal and external security. This is likely to jeopardise investment and expenditure in other sectors such as education, health, agriculture, housing and infrastructure development which are key to support national human security efforts. Arising from this, the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan makes the emergency of armed groups and the hardening of their resolve a real threat to Africa (Kilcumen & Mills, 2021).

Challenges with new refugees

Other human security issues that Africa is likely to contend with in the post Afghanistan war era are the dangers arising from increased number of refugees. The collapse of the USA and Western backed, Afghanistan government led to a massive movement and evacuation of Afghans who feared retribution and the expected harsh rule of the Taliban (Kilcumen & Mills, 2021; Murtazashvili, 2022; CRS, 2021). This saw the USA and its allies evacuate over 130,000 people who either worked for them or were classified as vulnerable and were likely to face prosecution from the new Taliban government.

Closer home in Africa and Kenya, counties such as Rwanda, Uganda and Somaliland agreed to host Afghanistan refugees (Athumani, 2021; Yayboke, 2021). While this is a great gesture and fulfilment of international obligations to provide a haven to vulnerable groups and people fleeing their country, the security implication of these acts of kindness cannot be ignored. Whether hosting these refugees or not, governments, security leaders and strategists should consider developing a refugee security framework that assures the security of the host countries and continent. Refugees can be screened to weed out terrorist elements whose objective may be to obtain a safe haven to mask their activities and initiate sleeper cells that would be activated at an opportune time (Yayboke, 2021).

Internationally and regionally, the UN, AU and USA, ought to ensure that refugees are re-settled to allow them to enjoy a normal life in their adopted countries and focus on developing their lives without being a security threat to the host. The lessons learnt from refugee's camps in countries such as Kenya are vital and should inform a security framework that ensures the safety of these refugees at the same time preventing refugee camps from becoming terrorism breeding and radicalisation centres. Refugees are human beings and need to be treated with honour, respect and dignity as per international conventions, but the security of the host nations, territorial integrity, honour and respect of its citizens should not be compromised.

The presence of Afghanistan refugees in addition to the other refugees in Africa provides a perfect opportunity for UN, AU and individual nations to revisit security

and refugee management framework and policies. Additionally, host countries should not be left to suffer the consequences of their generosity. This is a world problem, and requires the attention it deserves. Having refugees in Africa and worse still, from 1,000 miles away in Afghanistan provides Africa with questions to ponder. Time may be ripe for the UN, AU, leaders, Strategists and Scholars to re-think the subject of refugees in the 21st Century, as the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan has made this problem a threat to Africa (Murtazashvili, 2022).

The proliferation of illegal and small arms

The massive cache of sophisticated arms that was left behind by the USA and the ousted Afghanistan government compounds an already fragile security situation in Africa. These arms fell into the hands of Taliban, related terror groups and even normal citizens and are therefore likely to find their way into the continent (Ali et al., 2021; Taylor, 2021). The arms will be used to propagate various interests in Afghanistan, Africa and in countries where these groups have a presence and interest. Already the effects of Soviet presence and the arms that were left in the hands of the various groups continue to resonate the world over and illegal small arms such as the AK47 has been used internationally to destabilise nations and economies (Lionel, 2020; Zipporah, 2020). Indeed, according to Lionel (2020), the Kalashnikov AK-47 has been in all conflict in Africa since the 1950s and a rifle of choice for rebels, terrorists, drug lords and gangsters alike.

In Kenya, terrorist attacks on the Westgate, DUSIT2 Hotel and Garissa University were carried out using small arms such as AK47. The same has also been a weapon of choice by Al-Shabaab and has been used extensively to carry out various attacks (Lionel, 2020; Zipporah, 2020). With other America lethal weapons such as M16 being in the hands of the Taliban and their affiliated groups, it may just be a matter of time before they find their way into Africa and other parts of the world.

Conflict is one of the biggest impediments to prosperity of African states and the AU has made silencing the guns in Africa as one of the flagship projects of the wider developmental blueprint Agenda 2063 with the sole objective of eliminating small illegal guns and achieve peace across the continent (Musau,

2019; Zipporah, 2020). According to the 2019 SAS and African Union study, Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa, it is estimated that 80% of small arms and light weapons in Africa are in the hands of civilians and rebel groups. That leaves security agencies with only 20% which means that the security apparatus are outnumbered and outgunned.

According to Fleshman (2011), the northern parts of Kenya have been experienced an arms race between communities. For example, the pastoral Pokot people and their neighbours have gone from protecting their herds with spears to outfitting their young men and warriors with cheap, reliable and deadly automatic rifles from the war zones of Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan. The list is likely to expand to include Afghanistan, escalating an already delicate, fragile and fluid security situation.

Indeed, the presence of illegal and small arms poses a considerable threat to security in Africa and the world at large (Murtazashvili, 2022). Time may be ripe for strict measures against the presence of small arms. Already, conflict in the northern parts of Africa has led to an increase in small and light weapons in some parts of West Africa and the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan makes the proliferation of illegal and small arms a real threat to Africa.

Increased supply of illicit drugs

Drugs pose a health and economic human security ceoncern. According to UNODC (2022), Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium and its harvest accounts for more than 80% of the world's supply. Its production is estimated to contribute to approximately 11% of the country's economy (Windle, 2021). Additionally, Landay (2021), observes that despite the massive investment made by the USA and its allies to eradicate the trade of opium, Afghanistan remains the world's biggest illicit opiate supplier and looks certain to remain so under the Taliban.

One of the major reasons why the Taliban continued to survive and grow strong despite being out of power, was the financing they received from the billion-dollar drug trade. Peters (2009), argues that, it is not possible to treat the Taliban

insurgency and the drug trade as separate matters, meaning the two were linked up and supported each other with the Taliban providing a secure operational environment for the producers and the producers providing much needed economic lifeline. The production of drugs is likely to increase as Taliban isolation and lack of international recognition will make them fall back to drugs as a source of funds.

These drugs especially opium and cocaine are likely to affect the health of people in the African continent. Their increased production will make them easily accessible and affordable leading to increased consumption by vulnerable groups such as the youth. This is likely to negate African government efforts to fight drug abuse and related security challenges arising from increased drug use and abuse.

According to Jumbe et al. (2021), drugs and substance use and abuse continue to be a growing major public health concern in Africa. It can therefore be argued that drug abuse is a Health Security issue and a key factor in the ever-deteriorating security in the continent as most of the criminal gangs and organised crimes groups thrive in the use of drugs to mask their inhuman and heinous activities. Accordingly, this increases the cost of security services as more and more equipment and personnel are required to secure the populace and also fight drug-induced criminal gangs.

The use of drugs and the deteriorating security situation will likely lead to reduced economic activities as most investors consider security as one of the key determinants before they can make their investment. The events in Afghanistan will therefore slow the recovery of African economies, increase the cost of providing security as well as reducing the jobs available as a result of reduced investments. Therefore, the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan makes illicit drugs a threat to Africa (Murtazashvili, 2022).

Increased unemployment

Africa faces the challenge of unemployment and poorly performing economies. To mitigate its effects, most of the youths seek opportunities in Europe and the Middle East. According to Fox et al. (2020), the youth employment crisis in

Africa is actually a missing jobs crisis. This made the war effort in Afghanistan one of the sources of employment of many nationals from around the world, Africa included and therefore, the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan will have an economic impact on Africa. The end of USA campaign in Afghanistan has costed Africans jobs as the massive logistics required for the Afghanistan operation required technical personnel and support staff to undertake non-combat operations. This was being undertaken through civilian contractors most of which provided employment opportunities to Africans, more specifically to retired military personnel who used their security experience to support the war effort.

The money earned would be ploughed back home in Africa to support families, enterprises and as investments in real estate. In addition to jobs, the war effort provided ready market for African produce and products and the job losses are likely to directly impact on the state of security as unemployed youths are likely to resort to other illegal means to earn a living.

The UN International Labour Organization (ILO) has already estimated that more than half a million people have lost or have been pushed out of their jobs in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, with further expectation that these job losses will increase to nearly nine hundred thousand (ILO,2022; ILO 2020).

Conclusion

This paper has used the Systems theory to examine the effects of USA withdrawal from Afghanistan on human security in Africa. The Systems theory provided vital lens in this scholarly discourse noting that nothing happens in isolation. The findings show that, some of the likely effects are increased terrorism activities, security challenges associated with increased refugees and their movement, the likely proliferation of small arms and weapons, increased challenges and problems associated with use of drugs and the challenges of unemployment, increased poverty and other related economic challenges. Therefore, the withdrawal of

the USA, the eventual collapse of the internationally recognised Afghanistan government and the rise of the Taliban is a set back to the global war on terror. This makes Afghanistan a haven and breeding ground for terrorists and related elements. The mass movement of refugees provides cover for terrorist elements to mask their movement across the globe and more so across Africa. In addition, small arms have continued to find their way to organised gangs that can carry out criminal activities against law-abiding citizens and reduce their ability to engage in productive activities. The effect of drug supply is likely to cost African countries due to increased abuse, increased criminal activities and increased burden on the health system. Unemployment and poverty remain a major problem that has seen Africans seek global opportunities in other parts of the world. Indeed, the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan is likely to have long term human security effects on Africa. The Paper has further identified the dangers posed by the increasing population of refugees; the problem of proliferation of sophisticated weapons and small arms; and increased economic challenges such as unemployment and poverty as some of the key issues that Africa will face

Recommendations

- There is therefore need for USA, global partners and Africa to ensure that the silenced guns ought to translate to improved human security across the Continent by re-focusing the massive resources that were being used to sustain this campaign towards the creation of sustainable developmental programmes across the African continent.

- At the same time, Africa as a continent need to come up with strategies to address human security challenges in Africa.

- There is need to create employment and enhance efforts to fight terrorism, minimise the impact of refugees, eliminate drugs use and abuse, stop the proliferation of illegal arms among others.

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Book Review

Author:	**Elizabeth Nyamayaro, Scribner of Simon and Schuster UK**
Title:	**I AM A GIRL FROM AFRICA:** A Memoir of Empowerment, Community, and Hope
Place of Publication:	**1ˢᵗ Floor, 222 Grays Inn Road, London, 2021**
Publisher:	**Kenya Defence Forces**
No. of pages:	**261pp. ISBN 978-1-4711-8032-3**

Review by: Dr. David R. Snow

I AM A GIRL FROM AFRICA, a book by Elizabeth Nyamayaro, traces her unlikely, yet highly inspirational, rise from near starvation as a Zimbabwen youth to working on, leading global United Nations initiatives. A singular event, a life-saving encounter with a United Nations aid worker, when the author was eight years old became her inspiration and placed her on a dedicated path of a life of service. The words of the aid worker, "as Africans we must uplift each other" shaped and informed young Nyamayaro's goals and subsequently this critical encounter is a point of reference in the entire book. These seven words, constantly remind and encourage the author as she faces challenges not only throughout Africa but in London, Geneva, and eventually the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. She inspires the reader as, over the course of many years, she rises to serve as Senior Advisor to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General, UN Women. By 2014, she is selected to lead the United Nations "HeForShe" global initiative fighting against and raising awareness of gender inequality.

The book coincidently provides real world examples of Human Security issues raised in this inaugural edition of *National Security: Journal of National Defence University-Kenya*. The authors' experiences touch on many of the seven dimensions of Human Security: economic, food, health, environmental, political, community,

and personal. Her truly inspirational memoir also serves as a warning that despite progress in recent decades, much work remains.

Summary

The book begins with a previous encounter with the United Nations aid worker and this life defining event sets the author on a path in pursuit of serving others – particularly Africans. While the book bounces between key childhood events to those later in life, this back-and-forth transition is seamless and proves both complementary and supportive of the two storylines: childhood influences and adulthood in pursuit of and working for the United Nations. The heartwarming stories of family support demonstrate the sacrifices made to achieve the dreams and ambitions of the author. The books early chapters establish the foundation of family influence and recognize the challenges encountered in society, school, and Africa. These early life influencing events include frequent relocation, food insecurity, an emerging health crisis in Africa, and even the independence of Zimbabwe.

The book's latter half, while still linking to personal experiences and occasional loss, focuses more on the authors' work with the United Nations and the globally impactful results. While perhaps the earlier parts of the book detailing the youthful challenges establish the readers connection to the author, I found the latter half of her story no less compelling and one of pure resiliency and determination. These later chapters demonstrate how a single person, motivated and inspired, can make a lasting impact on the world stage. Each professional undertaking, whether associated with the World Bank or UN Women, inspires the reader to "do more". This "do more mindset" also pays homage to her early influences such as the authors Aunt Jane who helped raise her, often while working multiple jobs as a medical doctor in Zimbabwe at the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis.

Conclusion

After decades of government service working with militaries, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and various aid agencies, I found the book compelling. The writing is clear, engaging, inspiring, interwoven with personal observations

and experiences, and supported with relevant facts and figures as appropriate. Though the world is ever changing and uncertainty a constant, the writing of Elizabeth Nyamayaro, reminded this reader of two things. First, we are all global citizens and part of an ever-evolving environment. Global connectivity, whether positive or negative, is a reality and visible for all to experience during the recent COVID pandemic. Second, as the title of the books last chapter states, "It takes a village to raise a child". This collective effort to care for one another, inspire, and uplift each other is our pathway to improved health, prosperity, and peace. The work of just a single person can make the world a better place and adopting a "I must do more" mindset prepares us for future challenges. **I AM A GIRL FROM AFRICA** is a superbly inspirational story of love, support, heartbreak, perseverance, dedication, and, most importantly, humanity.

Book Review

Author:	**Kenya Defence Forces**
Title:	**War for Peace:** Kenya's military in the mission in Somalia, 2012-2020
Place of Publication:	**Nairobi**
Publisher:	**Kenya Defence Forces**
No. of pages:	**xxiv, 201 p. Includes bibliography, maps and illustrations**

Review by Dickens Rodrigues Wendo, Deputy University Librarian. NDU-K

War for Peace: Kenya's Military in the Mission in Somalia, 2012-2020, is a book that takes the reader through the different phases of Kenya-Somali relations, the Somalia conflict and the involvement of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in the war against terrorism in Somalia. Thematically, the book is divided into three phases; the age of war, the age of war and peace and the age of extremism. It begins with a historical view of the past, present and future of Kenyan troops' engagement in Africa's response to violent extremism in the context of the ever-changing geopolitical environment in the Horn of Africa.

The author puts into perspective the progress made over time, from when the KDF was established to its evolution from a small army into a modern, credible and professional force. The troops defend the country, and their contributions regionally in peace restoration cannot be gainsaid. Chronologically, the author highlights Kenya's historical relations with Somalia through the 'shifta' campaign, the Somali Civil war after 1989, and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Finally, the author identifies the key players in internal conflict across the different phases.

As documented in the book, the KDF operations in Somalia started with' *Operation Linda Nchi'*, which was the reason for its deployment to degrade Al-Shabaab and its asymmetric warfare. The Kenyan military in Somalia was later placed under AMISOM, the continent's boldest and riskiest collective security to respond to Jihadi Islamism. The author notes that the forces aim to route the Al-Shabaab, secure and support the internationally recognized government and create an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation. However, it is pointed out that Kenya's interest was not just to achieve peace through routing the Al-Shabaab. Still, it was meant to curtail cross-border incursion, piracy and robbery at sea, smuggling of contraband and trafficking of humans and weapons, disappearance, torture, murder and other crimes.

The author observes that working under AMISOM, the troops applied smart power, combining hard and soft power. The successful humanitarian development and peace nexus changed the image and perception of the force among the Somali community. The soft strategy deployed was through de-weaponizing water, securing humanitarian support inflow, infrastructural reconstruction, sport and peace-building.

Besides the troops' successes, the mission in Somalia faces numerous challenges. Through the 'war on truth', the author sheds light on the limited or negative reporting that the mission received. The swarming tactic of the al-Shabaab and the negative reporting by Al-Shabaab as a 'Post-truth era' strategy of perfecting propaganda war and its tactics of instilling fear to get support. The author also takes a spike at reports by the 2014 UN monitoring Group Report that was not just biased but maliciously painted the KDF forces negatively regarding their involvement in sugar smuggling and charcoal export networks. It also claimed that the report dismissed the KDF's contribution to the Somali peace as not amounting to anything.

The author concludes by recommending that, with AMISOM's exit from Somalia, there is need to come up with a post-AMISOM security order and security visions in the Horn of Africa. Comprehensive consultation with clear timelines and

milestones should inform the decision to exit to avoid situations witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan following the withdrawal of foreign troops. Hurriedly exiting will erode all the achievements and lead to a resurgence of violent extremism and conflict in Somalia.

War for Peace is a well-researched book that is easy to read and informative. It is an invaluable read for students, experts and practitioners of military history, regional security strategy, and peace and conflict studies. Though a few editing errors are noted in some sections, the author provides a different perspective on the inside dynamics of battling terror groups, a subject where very little has been reported or known. It has clear and organized content, and the layout makes the book an interesting read. It is an insightful reflection on the Kenyan's struggle to safeguard its territory and pacify its borders for a meaningful achievement of human security. It demonstrated how as a country, Kenya's success in utilizing a well-designed, coordinated and broad alliance, together with strict training and discipline, responsiveness to technological solutions, and constant modernization of the military. Moving forward, Kenya finds itself in charge of future efforts to stabilize the Horn of Africa for the sake of her own and the interest of the larger region.

Authors Biographies

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Raudhat Sayeeda Saddam is a Researcher at the HORN Institute. She hold a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Strathmore University (Kenya). Her areas of interest include Youth and Female empowerment, International Development, Conflict Resolution, and Community Development.

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Dr. Martin Odhiambo Ouma

Dr. Martin is a senior lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Department of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS). Dr. Ouma is also an instructor at National Defense University, Kenya. He is a holder of PhD in peace and conflict studies and a distinguished scholar with wide experience in academia (university teaching and research) at both postgraduate and undergraduate levels.

His key thematic areas of teaching and competency include: International studies with specialty in international security, strategic studies, diplomacy and academic research, areas under which he has taught, mentored and supervised several PhDs, Masters, Post Graduate Diploma and undergraduate students in different universities and institutions of higher learning.

As a researcher, conference speaker, International security expert, Dr. Ouma has also been involved in several consultancy work and research projects both in Kenya and in other parts of the world.

Dr. Peterlinus Ouma Odote

Dr. Odote is a multi-skilled professional with a strong academic record and experience, who has been successful in research, teaching and community service. He is a senior lecturer in the subject areas of International Relations, Diplomacy, Conflict and Peace and Security Studies at National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K). He is currently the head of programme at joint command and staff collage (JCSC).

Prior to this, he taught at Hekima University College, University of Nairobi and Tangaza University College. Dr. Odote also served as the Director Horn of Africa Region at the Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR). He has published in a number of referred journals on wider areas of international relations, Diplomacy, conflict and Peace

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Roselyne Omondi

Roselyne Omondi is a conflict and peace professional and knowledge content creator. She is an excellent writer-researcher-editor with broad humanities and social sciences backgrounds. Roselyne works at the intersection of research, and policy; communication, journalism, and media; international development; and humanitarian action - typically with interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and multicultural teams. She has a good grasp of current affairs, and a global outlook. Her research interests and expertise span but are not limited to: armed conflict, forced migration, food insecurity, pastoralism, terrorism, geopolitics, conflict mapping, media

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Roselyne holds Erasmus Mundus Master of Art degree in Journalism, Media and Globalization – War and Conflict Specialization (Denmark and United Kingdom); Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts degree in International Humanitarian Action – Comprehensive Security Specialization (the Netherlands); a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and English Language (Kenya); and several other post-graduate qualifications in Peace and Conflict Research (University of Oslo and PRIO, Norway) and Advanced Grammar (United Kingdom), among others. Roselyne is the Associate Director, Center for Climate Change, Migration, and Development, the HORN Institute.

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